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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Category Archives: India

Does Narendra Modi Have A Foreign Policy?

09 Sat Mar 2019

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Does Narendra Modi Have A Foreign Policy?

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China, foreign policy, India, Israel, Narendra Modi, Pakistan, United States

Over the past five years, analysts have bickered over how much of a divergence the Narendra Modi administration has exhibited in foreign policy. As with all things Modi, opinions seem to lie at both ends of the spectrum with plenty of room in the middle.

On the one hand are those who believe that the prime minister has merely tinkered with the policies of his predecessors and there is nothing remarkable about Indian foreign policy in this ‘era of Hindu nationalism’ – the pragmatic elements of running a state has tamed the exuberant rhetoric out of the Modi and his foreign policy team.

On the other hand are those who see a distinctly new foreign policy path being charted out by this yugpurush of a prime minister. A sea change in attitude is posited in relations with India’s neighbours and partners, and incidental events are fielded as evidence of a Modi doctrine that fundamentally alters the basic structure of Nehruvian foreign policy.

A closer study of Modi’s foreign policy indicates a third position – of a desire to not repeat the errors of the past yet constrained by a hidebound bureaucracy and the intellectual shortcomings of India’s foreign policy apparatus. More out of necessity than design, the Modi administration has chosen a gradual divergence from India’s non-aligned past but promises a much greater variance to come.

The sharpest example of this small yet radical foreign policy shift is seen in India’s ties with Israel. For decades, even after the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1992, Delhi treated Jerusalem like a mistress, accepting favours without recognition. Modi pulled the curtains on the relationship with a stand-alone trip to Israel in 2017 but his embrace fell short of wholehearted as India continued to vote against Israel in the United Nations and maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv; moreover, India has kept up its paeans to solidarity with the Palestinian people, which serves little purpose other than as an annoying vestige of Gandhian moralpolitik.

In some ways, the relationship with the United States is even more intriguing. Most of the foreign policy commentariat accepts that America is India’s most important partner in the foreseeable future, yet there remains in Delhi a symbolic sliver of stubborn anti-Americanism. As India makes bigger, more sensitive defence purchases from American vendors, enters into logistical agreements with the US military, and resuscitates the ‘Quad’ grouping that also includes Japan and Australia, it still sits with Russia and China in a trilateral that is at odds with the rest of its strategy. Delhi’s ambivalence sends mixed signals to international capitals about Indian intentions and its reliability as an ally in case the balance of power gets worse in East Asia.

A third major departure from Nehruvian guidelines has been in Modi Sarkar’s handling of the threat from Pakistan and its terrorist proxies. Like its predecessors, the Modi government has used diplomatic pressure against Islamabad, arguably with greater success, yet has not hesitated to use military force against terrorist camps across the border and called Islamabad’s nuclear bluff at least twice now while remaining open to peace initiatives.

On the other security front, with China, India stands far behind in most benchmarks of development and power. In preparation for the worst eventuality, Modi has focused on substantially improving infrastructure near the border without concern for Beijing’s sensibilities. This has been a glaring weakness in all previous administrations’ resolves since 1947 that this administration has ameliorated. A glimpse of the new infrastructural ease was seen during the standoff at Doklam. At the same time, India has been less hostile than the West to Chinese business to avoid provocation and to encourage a fruitful conversation.

It is true that India under Modi has kept all doors open in its dealings with foreign powers in a manner that some might misconstrue as more non-alignment. The prime minister has not substituted inaction for recklessness, understanding the arguments for India’s behaviour so far. However, it is in the boldness of his actions that a new picture emerges that not only outlines a different mode of thinking from the moribund Nehruvian school of Indian foreign policy but clearly indicates the early makings of a Modi doctrine.

While excessive moralising and equivocation were the hallmarks of the earlier era, the prime minister has introduced a dash of vim into Indian foreign policy. Modi’s interjection, however, is no novel creation – it is merely the country’s awakening to machtpolitik in international affairs and a desire to wield some of it. To this end, the administration needs a vibrant community of aides, bureaucrats, and researchers free of old ideological commitments to consider the full implications of its bold new policies. It is this lack that has so far inadvertently camouflaged the Modi administration’s foreign policy intentions and led many to underestimate the potential of what has passed over the last five years.


This post appeared in the Hindustan Times on March 30, 2019.

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The Writing on the Minority Wall

16 Wed May 2018

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ 4 Comments

Tags

Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, elections, INC, India, Indian National Congress, minorities, secularism

The Bharatiya Janata Party has proven it again. First in Maharashtra in October 2014, then in Uttar Pradesh in March 2017, then again in Gujarat in December of the same year, and now in Karnataka, the BJP has emerged the single largest party in the state elections and formed the government without fielding a single “minority” candidate or pandering to their vote banks directly. In the four major states of India where the party has even a slight presence, representing almost 29 percent of the land mass, over 36 percent of the population, and nearly 42 percent of the economy, the BJP has shown that it is not hostage to minoritarian sentiments and can rule without their support if necessary.

Psephologists and pundits will attribute this to several reasons. Two, however, are prominent enough to be visible to even the casual observer. The first, a more optimistic take on history and humanity, is that this is a new India – the youth is interested in upward mobility and want infrastructure and opportunities more than in arbitrary government handouts based on identities modernity and urbanisation may have frayed. This postulation arises from a Marxian privileging of material over the intangible and belief in the infamous rational actor.

While there are, no doubt, many who belong to ‘New India,’ an equally persuasive argument posits that the opportunistic excesses – political, economic, as well as social – of the Left has turned people away from them towards the Right. The litany of complaints against the Left are well known – the usurpation of temples, a war against Hindu customs exclusively in the name of social progress, unequal status in education, double standards in the freedom of expression, whimsical amendments to the constitution, the whitewashing of history in academia. Resentment against these and many more grievances built up over the years and economic liberalisation coupled with the democratisation of the public sphere via social media gave vent to long-repressed sentiment.

A corollary to this view is that the Left’s “Nehruvian secularism” has eventually led to a small degree of Hindu consolidation. Narendra Modi’s ability to deliver development targets while at least stemming the tide against Hindu institutions has proven a potent electoral formula. The wages of the Left playing minoritarian identity politics for decades has come back in the form of majoritarian identity politics. The four victories and the manner in which they were achieved will only encourage the BJP to stick to their formula. In the short term, this is a welcome corrective to the national narrative.

In the longer term, however, the ramifications of Hindu consolidation might be more problematic than we imagine. Other parties may begin to try and emulate the BJP’s successful formula – already, we saw Rahul Gandhi undertake a temple-hopping trip and claim to wear the sacred thread to project a Hindu identity. Such overt, even if diluted, displays of Hinduism do not come naturally to the Indian Left which has historically been more comfortable sporting a taqiyah before elections.

The shifting of the Overton window on Hindu identity could potentially isolate large numbers of, without beating about the bush, Christians and Muslims. Admittedly, there is a substantial number that does perfectly well in integrating with the diverse national community but as Shiraz Maher, an analyst with the rare qualification of being a former member of the Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir, warns in his Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea, the vast majority of Muslims may not be violent but many share the same idea of utopia as their violent co-religionists. The isolation of “international” minority communities makes them ripe for radicalisation attempts. Remarkably, the BJP’s governance has shown a far more inclusive posture than its electoral strategy. This maintains an extended hand towards India’s minorities and sees the country as a single entity – as any political party should. The inclusive approach, without favouritism, should retard a drift towards radicalisation.

For the well-being of the country as well as for their own narrower interests, minority communities must retain some influence in the national public sphere; without it, they have little to lose. One option is to hitch their wagons to the more acceptable aspects of the BJP’s platform such as development. With sincere effort in building the party and nation, it is a matter of time before they have more voice in the BJP. Thorny issues could be discussed calmly and seriously instead of making a public circus out of them. Minority communities may retain their unique identities but must learn to subordinate them to the national whole rather than stick out as rocky little islands.

A genuine and thorough inclusion of minorities into the public sphere, not just pro forma or for a token broken secularism, will change the nature of politics in India. Moreover, the effect is beneficial for all involved – the nation as a whole will be stronger and more stable while minorities’ participation in the national conversation  ensures that there will be no gradual encroachment on their distinctiveness. In 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru inherited a state from the British; it is time Indians made a nation to go along with it.

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Earning the Dragon’s Respect

16 Fri Mar 2018

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Earning the Dragon’s Respect

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Chabahar, China, India, Line of Actual Control, LoAC, nuclear, Pakistan, Tibet

Pace protestations from Delhi to the contrary, India’s relations with its larger northeastern neighbour China have at best been fraught with tension that have boiled over to outright hostility at the worst of times. Given Beijing’s consistent efforts to undermine Indian security and standing on the world stage, it is beguiling to see a not inconsiderate number of Indians expressing the hope that the 21st century will belong to a partnership between the two countries that will reshape the international order to the benefit of rising powers; with greater contacts through education, tourism, and trade, the border issue would diminish in salience.

Such aspirations are unrequited from the other side: it is a striking difference that Chinese businessmen returning from India are rarely as optimistic as their Western counterparts. Whereas CEOs from the United States, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere are enthused about India’s growing middle class, the improving regulatory environment, and the massive opportunities it offers in infrastructure, services, defence, and other sectors, the Chinese corporate class is more likely to complain about regulatory red tape, poor quality of human resources as well as material, woefully lacking infrastructure, and the culture of middlemen and rampant corruption. This difference indicates more than just the other side of the coin – it reaffirms that the Chinese do not see India as belonging, with themselves, to the first circle among nations.

The fundamental, unrecognised road block to India’s improved relations with China is that Beijing does not see Delhi as an equal. Incomprehensible to South Block’s mandarins confident in their own greatness, India remains for China a lesser power that could yet derail their aspirations for a Pax Sinica. Beijing, therefore, has never considered India in its own respect but as an appendix to its policies with other states.
A defining element of India’s self-projection on the world stage is the belief that somehow, it is an important nation. This could be seen in its first prime minister’s gratuitous commentary on international events at a time when India did not have the means to play a practical role in global affairs. In an audacious attempt, Jawaharlal Nehru tried to lead most of the world’s nations away from the superpower rivalry in a non-aligned third bloc. Delhi’s confidence did not come from its abilities but from a deep-rooted hubris that India simply was great; by virtue of its ancient civilisation, rich in philosophy, literature, science, architecture, and engineering, India deserved respect today.

Perhaps motivated by curiosity more than anything else, the world did accord India some attention in the early years of the newly-independent republic. With the passing of Nehru, however, so too did those giddy days. A planned economy that stumbled at every step, the constant moralising, and little contribution to alleviating the problems of the word soon put India back in the ranks of the “fly over” nations. Going by historic trends, India’s geographic size, population, and strategic location would have normally destined the country for an important global role but India’s leadership believe(d) that this was already so.

It is easy to bask in the praise of allies as India has done in recent years with the United States, and to a lesser extent, France, Israel, and Japan. However, much to Delhi’s discomfiture, it has not received the same deference from its unacknowledged rival, China. In fact, Beijing has studiously avoided reference to India in its policies except as a curt, off-handed afterthought. This disregard is apparent in the way Chinese policies are always presented as having their focus elsewhere but whose objectives may coincidentally impinge on Indian interests. For example, Beijing’s increasingly heavy footprint in Tibet has been portrayed as the integration of the forcibly annexed state into the mainstream of Chinese national life; however, the infrastructure, demographic transfers, and military deployments coincidentally put pressure on the Line of Actual Control with India. Similarly, China’s sudden activity on nuclear non-proliferation is couched in the language of creating a non-discriminatory regime though its real aim to stymie India’s admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group is transparent.

After the Pokhran nuclear tests of 1998, China was initially silent but later released a restrained statement expressing shock and urging India to disarm and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China’s official position on India’s nuclear ambitions is that it is unfortunate, wasteful, and that Delhi and Islamabad should sort out their differences peacefully; the China threat is a rumour of ulterior motives. Similarly, India’s missile tests have not merited a comment until the recent Agni V finally rattled China into seeking a hearing in the United Nations. Even then, Beijing’s greatest concern is Delhi’s cosying relationship with Washington – and perhaps Tokyo – more than anything it has been able to achieve itself. There is no acknowledgement of any consideration of India in China’s defence planning, perhaps studiously so. This has successfully de-linked the two Asian giants in most minds, though the yawning gap between the two states in terms of the size of the national economy, their militaries, and infrastructural development has also contributed in some measure.

It is natural  that a rising power like China has expansive interests. Yet Beijing’s quest for influence has always tried to block Delhi’s gains – such as the recent interest in Chabahar –  or undermine India – Pakistan is the most glaring example. Competition between powers is natural, and no one can deny China’s legitimate interests around Asia. Yet it is the tone in which they are pursued that ought to have clued Delhi in on its neighbour’s thinking.

Delhi may believe China’s indifference to be merely a psychological game but all indications suggest it is much more than that: Beijing does not see Delhi as its equal. This is why the response to overtures towards resolving the border dispute have been met with flippancy. In October 2013, as well as during Xi Jinping’s visit to India (September 2014) and Narendra Modi’s stop in Beijing (May 2015), the Chinese army intruded deep into Indian territory and remained for days.

Although the Line of Actual Control separating India and Tibet is quiet in comparison to the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, there has nonetheless been constant friction. There have been three serious incursions in as many years during which the Chinese army camped inside India for weeks before finally retreating back to their side of the line.

There is also the matter of continued support for Pakistan – not just in terms of conventional military supplies, nuclear weapons, and missile technology but also in the form of substantial economic investments that could fundamentally alter Pakistan’s economic geography as well as support for Islamabad’s terrorist forces in the United Nations. This is not out of any shared worldview or camaraderie but is purely utilitarian – Beijing’s belief is that a lesser power like India can easily be distracted from global geopolitics by significant irritation from an even smaller state such as Pakistan.

The growing disparity in economic and military werewithal between India and China lends some credence to the latter’s attitude towards the former. More importantly, Indian leaders and society remain too focused on their domestic bickering to present a strong and unwavering image to the rest of the world. If Delhi truly wishes to improve relations with the dragon, it must do so from a position of equality. This means a far narrower difference in power and a demonstrated ability to achieve strategic goals – be they defence manufacturing or aid projects in the neighbourhood – in a timely manner. India must earn the respect of its opponent before anything fruitful may be expected of border talks and other summits.

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