Category Archives: United States

A Rebirth of American Power

20 Wed Dec 2017

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The United States released its latest National Security Strategy (NSS) document on December 18. By and large, these releases are more important for the intent they personify than any actual policy decisions and the Trump administration’s first NSS is ripe with symbolism. The NSS comes as no surprise, staying close to the rhetoric and tone Donald Trump used during his election campaign last year and as president these past twelve months. That in itself is a drastic change in the way America sees the world and its role within the international community.

Trump’s NSS boldly announces the return of the United States to the world stage after a long spell of quasi-isolationism following the Cold War. As Washington tried to put together a consensus or a strong majority in its international actions, the perception was that the White House squandered away American dominance. The contours of the conflict in Syria and Libya especially showed an indecisive superpower whose best days, many said, are past. The new NSS intends to remedy this by strengthening the four pillars of American security: the protection of US soil, the promotion of American prosperity, the strengthening of the US military, and the advancement of American global influence. While all administrations promise the first two, it is the road map the Trump administration has for the latter two that make this security document interesting.

Trump wishes to substantially build up the US military again in support of a more aggressive posture against America’s enemies. The NSS differentiates between three kinds of threats requiring different tactics. At one level is the threat of Islamic extremism and international crime syndicates; these will be opposed by military force as well as sanctions that target operations networks. At a second level are the threats posed by rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, directly as well as from clandestine proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to state and non-state actors; the United States wishes to weaken such powers through strict sanctions and erect enhanced missile defence systems to blunt any aggressive designs from Tehran or Pyongyang. The NSS specifically mentions that such measures are “not intended to undermine strategic stability or disrupt longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China.”

The third level of threats, however, includes these same countries. The Trump administration believes that these threats will need to be faced through strengthening American space and cyberspace capabilities, re-establishing America’s lead in nuclear (energy) technology, advanced computing, and green technologies, combatting unfair trade practices and market distortions, and reviewing the visa process to curb industrial espionage.

What is interesting is that despite the chumminess Trump has been accused of having with Moscow, his administration’s NSS clearly calls Russia out for attempting to weaken US influence in the world and drive a wedge between Washington and its allies. “Russia want[s] to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests…seek[ing] to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders.”

In a stark departure from previous NSS documents, the Trump administration reserves its harshest tone for China. Rumoured to want to get tough with China, the George W Bush administration was distracted by terrorism in the Middle East and ultimately “welcome[d] the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China” in its 2002 NSS and maintained focus on trade relations and development with a gentle nudge towards internal democratic reforms in its 2006 document as well. The succeeding Obama administration was more interested in achieving some progress on human rights and climate change with China while maintaining strong trading ties as its NSS documents from 2010 and 2015 reveal. Taiwan and denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula are mentioned too but in a conciliatory tone rather than as a challenge. The Trump administration’s NSS, however, launches into a jeremiad against Beijing:

China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.

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For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s world-class universities.

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Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific.

The important question for Delhi is what this means for India and its relations with the United States, at least for the next two years. Superficially, the NSS is a godsend for India – not only does the document identify India’s main rival as a threat to the United States but it also targets Delhi’s perennial nuisance Islamabad through its counter-terrorism aims. In addition, Washington recognises India as a “Major Defence Partner” and declares its intent to expand defence and security cooperation as well as “support India’s growing relationships” including “its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.”

Indo-US relations have clearly come along way since Bill Clinton’s desire to come down on Delhi “like a tonne of bricks” and “cap, rollback, and eliminate” its nuclear programme after Pokhran II. The credit for transforming Indo-US relations goes to Bush ’43 and his administration’s willingness “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century,” but even such a pro-India White House spoke of the South Asian giant largely in terms of its relations to Pakistan, democracy, development, and economic growth; the Obama administration was even more tepid. This latest NSS makes, in that sense, another great departure from its predecessors.

The Trump administration’s prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific region, the Australia-India-Japan-United States Quad as a key regional institution, and recognising Delhi’s potential as a provider of regional security and stability is certainly a promotion for India. This good news does not come unalloyed: regardless of what this White House – or any administration before it – says, the true measure of relations can only be supporting policies. The United States has for long promised to compel Pakistan to abandon its support of terrorism but next to nothing has been done in that regard. Hafiz Saeed, one of the most wanted men in America, walks free and even participates in Pakistan’s politics. US aid is yet to come with stringent preconditions and sanctions against Islamabad have not been mentioned even as a joke.

Similarly, Trump was hawkish on China during his election campaign and even began his presidency with a call to the Taiwanese president. However, he has since mellowed and not followed through on some of the economic punishments that had been under consideration to persuade Beijing to stop market distortions and intellectual property theft. It would be foolhardy for India to fully bank on the United States and assert itself on the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean against a stronger foe just yet.

Delhi bears some of blame for the United States’ ambivalence in the Indo-Pacific – its ideological compulsions have historically prevented it from becoming a useful ally to Washington and thereby increase its influence with the superpower. As a result, the United States has looked elsewhere to meet its needs and contributed to the spiral of mistrust between the two estranged democracies. This was particularly evident between 2004 and 2008 when India dragged its feet in response to the Bush White House’s enthusiasm for strategic relations. This is slowly changing now but the pace may not be enough to satisfy India’s strategic regional interests.

If Delhi can stop tripping over its hollow phrases like non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and partnership of equals, the Trump administration’s NSS presents a real opportunity for India to forge greater economic and military ties with the United States. The ripple effect will open doors to better ties with other US allies as well. A demonstration by India that it is willing to play like the big boys could set a higher trajectory for India-US relations.

The Emperor’s New Words

23 Wed Aug 2017

Posted by in Opinion and Response, United States

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President Donald Trump’s speech on Monday in which he declared a new American policy towards Afghanistan and South Asia is a postmodern masterpiece – you can choose beforehand how you want to respond and find something in the address to validate your decision. The announcement was awaited with some trepidation by US and South Asia observers, accustomed by now to the 45th US president’s unceasing social and policy gaffes, but there was ultimately little need for concern at the end of the night.

The new US policy jettisons the previous administration’s phased withdrawal that was beholden to the calendar and instead replaces it with a withdrawal policy that considers local political and security conditions. This is exactly what regional observers had stressed to Washington over the years but had been disregarded by a weary Foggy Bottom that was eager to extricate itself from a war that did not seem to have any end in sight. “The consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable,” Trump declared, reminding everyone of the American experience in Iraq where too rapid a US withdrawal precipitated in part the resurgence of terrorism and the birth of ISIS; scheduled US withdrawal from Afghanistan had caused a similar upswing in the Taliban’s fortunes.

While the Obama administration was willing to saddle the region with America’s mess, Trump has gone back to the thinking of George W Bush: a secure, stable Afghanistan and US withdrawal were desirable but in that order. In that sense, Trump’s new direction is actually a return to an old plan that had been abandoned by his predecessor, Barack Obama. The reasoning, Trump said, was that the security threats in the region were immense and the United States sought an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the sacrifices made.

Trump’s words will be met with approval in Afghanistan and India but with frustration back home. Despite near-total support among US parliamentarians (Senate: 98 ayes, 0 nays, 2 abstentions; House: 420 ayes, 1 nay, 10 abstentions), involvement in Afghanistan has steadily lost support among ordinary Americans over the years. Now, many would rather wash their hands off and forget about the whole misadventure than see it to an unforeseeable conclusion. The fundamental premise of Trump’s strategy – the use of military force to create a favorable political situation – was felt wanting by many the last time around.

Reminiscent of the George W Bush years, Trump emphasised that the United States was not there to “dictate to the Afghan people how to live or how to govern their own complex society” but as “a partner and a friend.” Afghans would be ultimately responsible for their own future, the United States did not want to build nations but kill terrorists.

More frustrating for many analysts was the lack of detail in the president’s Monday night address. Trump did not suggest what success in Afghanistan might look like nor did he mention any other details of how his administration was going to tame Afghanistan. To Delhi’s certain chagrin, who has consistently railed against the American concept of good and bad terrorists, the US president did not close the door on a negotiated settlement with the Taliban: “Someday,” Trump said, “after an effective military effort, perhaps it will be possible to have a political settlement that includes elements of the Taliban.” India can only hope that US estimation of what “effective military effort” entails would be maximal.

Trump’s address comes in the wake of news that the United States is redeploying 4,000 additional soldiers to join the 8,400 already present in the country. This number will be seen as insufficient in some quarters and as unnecessary in others.

What has probably attracted most comments about Trump’s Afghan policy is his statements on Pakistan. Calling out Pakistan’s practice of providing safe havens for terrorist activity on its soil while taking billions in US aid, the president warned that the United States can no longer remain passive on such perfidy. The threat is worse, Trump warned, because Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and its actions cause tense relations in the neighbourhood that may well spiral into conflict. With uncharacteristic grace, Trump softened his rebuke by recollecting the Islamic republic’s contributions and sacrifices to the mission in Afghanistan.

Trump’s public rebuke to Pakistan has no doubt gladdened hearts in Afghanistan and India, where the afterbirth of Indian independence is seen as the greatest instigator of terrorism in its neighbouring realms. Peace in Afghanistan, many academics, bureaucrats, and politicians – from the United States as well as India and Afghanistan – have repeatedly stressed, can be achieved only after Pakistan has been effectively dealt with.

There is no cause for optimism, however. Trump is not the first US president to criticise Pakistan – and there have been countless other officials and analysts – for its links to terrorism and extremism and will unlikely be the last. Obama did the same – multiple times – and Bush ’43, Bill Clinton, and George HW Bush were all troubled about Islamabad’s ties to the Taliban and its support for terrorists in Kashmir. None of this concern manifested itself in any concrete manner and the United States continued to call Pakistan an ally in the global war on terror. Trump’s own flip-flop on China from campaign to presidency gives little reassurance that this time will be different.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Trump’s speech was his call upon India to do more in Afghanistan economically. In the past, the United States has usually sought a greater Indian military role in Central Asia but Trump’s call is a rare exception. Delhi’s military aloofness from Afghanistan has been criticised by many, myself included, in the past but it has been active in Afghanistan’s social and political recovery. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, India has extended over $3 billion in aid to Afghanistan, making it the fifth-largest donor to the country. Delhi has built roads, schools, hospitals, dams, and other vital infrastructure in its war-ravaged neighbour. The US president’s criticism of India in this regard is therefore puzzling.

What has jarred some observers, at least on Twitter, is Trump’s blatant and crass linking of Indian economic contributions to Afghanistan to the trade surplus it runs with the United States. The US president’s penchant of seeing the world through a prism of economic transactionality notwithstanding, it is unclear what the Trump administration’s larger economic role for India in Afghanistan specifically entails beyond the South Asian country’s already generous efforts.

What was left out of the Trump blueprint for Afghanistan is as interesting as what was said. One word the president did not mention at all is Islam, either as provocation or as platitude. The omission is striking because one of the first moves of this new US presidency was to restrict the entry of Muslims from certain countries into the United States. Although Pakistan was not in that original list, US visas have become harder to obtain even for legitimate visitors such as the Afghan robotics team in July.

A more consequential absence is China, widely accepted as Pakistan’s new godfather. Although the Trump White House is yet to publicly formulate how it intends to win Islamabad’s cooperation, it is unlikely that any coercion will succeed without some assistance from Beijing. And succour will not be coming from China, who has already proven unhelpful over North Korea, and feels threatened by Washington’s build-up of India and challenged by American proxies in the South China Sea. Although Beltway wisdom has been keen on impressing upon the president the seriousness of the Russian threat, China appears to be the one stuck in America’s craw.

Trump’s speech on Monday marks no new direction for American policy towards Afghanistan though it might still be celebrated as slightly more sensible than the earlier one to hie. As with all US presidents, it will be interesting to watch how Trump squares the Pakistani circle, especially now with China on stage. While success is doubtful, India and Afghanistan can at least hope that US policies will increase the pressure on Pakistan – a better alternative to sitting back and doing nothing.

Obama’s Foreign Policy Legacy

20 Fri Jan 2017

Posted by in Opinion and Response, United States

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When Barack Obama was sworn in as the 44th president of the United States in January 2009, I remember one of the people who had worked on his campaign telling me, “We have built [Obama] up to walk on water. If he delivers anything less, he’ll be looking for a job in four years.” That observation may not be too far from the truth, albeit eight years down the road rather than four. As the president readies to remit his office to his successor, evaluations of his legacy have been harsher than necessary. It is not that the Obama presidency failed to deliver, but that it failed to live up to (unreal) expectations. Although it is not clear how much of his work will survive the next president, Obama has had a few important successes nonetheless.

One of Obama’s successes is starting on the path to normalisation with Cuba. The tiff between the world’s largest military-economic complex and a country whose GDP is less than the worth of America’s richest citizen had long lost any strategic significance and turned comical but Washington stayed course to save face against Fidel Castro.  In December 2014, Obama put an end to the absurdity and four months later, removed Cuba from the Department of State’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list. This was followed by a resumption of diplomatic missions, an exchange of prisoners, air and mail links, economic initiatives, and ease of travel restrictions. In March 2016, Obama visited the Caribbean island on a three-day trip, the first by a US president since 1928. Of course, some issues remain outstanding, such as the US presence in Guantanamo Bay, but the days of icy hostility already seem to be a distant memory.

On Iran, the Obama administration has, in conjunction with its European partners and China, delivered a commendable outcome. Not only has Tehran accepted safeguards and stringent conditions regulating its research on centrifuges, machining and casting fissile material, and metallurgy over the next 15 years, it has also agreed not to conduct any research in reprocessing spent fuel; verification of each stage has been negotiated. Short of a complete abnegation of its nuclear programme, the United States and its partners have extracted the most that can be reasonably expected from Iran. The Obama administration’s perseverance and willingness to take a risk in reaching out to Iran must be applauded: such willingness was not present in any of the previous administrations since Jimmy Carter despite several overtures from Tehran.

Obama has been faulted for his policy on Syria, particularly his refusal to bomb Bashar al-Assad after the Syrian Army used chemical weapons on Ghouta, a Damascene suburb, in August 2013. There is some merit to this criticism – credibility is important in international relations, especially in a state that offers a nuclear umbrella to over a dozen other states – but would a clinical missile strike have truly contributed in any meaningful way to the conflict in Syria itself? The administration did not think so, and there is little evidence that it was wrong.

Obama has also been blamed for not supporting the Syrian rebels earlier on. To assume that this would have changed the course of the civil war is to also believe that Iran and Russia would remain passive while their ally was forcefully replaced by a potentially pro-Western regime. Tehran and Moscow did involve themselves in the conflict eventually, but after it was clear that military assistance, however paltry, was flowing to the rebels and putting Assad on the back foot. More importantly, what was the quality of America’s potential allies? As far as the Yezidi, Kurds, or other minorities are concerned, let alone those who are not puritanically Muslim, the rebels were scarcely better than ISIS. The United States has a history of trying to pick a side that is good enough rather than wait for an illusory perfect ally in Afghanistan and it has not boded well for the region. Finally, should Obama have put US boots on the ground in Syria? There was phenomenal opposition to that from the public as well as most quarters of the government.

What may be considered a failure, perhaps, of the Obama administration is its pivot to Asia. For all the fanfare, the United States did little to augment its position or those of its allies in Asia. This, in the face of an exertive China in the South China Sea, has raised doubts in the minds of several of the Southeast Asian states. However, America’s allies must also realise that their patron has been facing an economic slowdown and finds it difficult to tolerate its allies spending less on defence. Furthermore, Asians do not want to hurt their lucrative economic relations by openly coming out against China and would all prefer that someone else take the tough stand. Even India, the largest and most able of the states in the region, has taken a hesitant posture towards its rival. In this game of ‘Who’ll bell the dragon?’ Beijing has been able to cajole some of its neighbours over to its side. Unless Asian states are willing to step up and do more in a loose partnership with the United States, there is little that Obama or any president can do to actualise a pivot.

A more disappointing foreign policy record is Obama’s inaction over Pakistan. Pace its occasional usefulness such as in the ongoing war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan has rarely been of use and usually more of a headache to the United States. Washington is keen on repeating that Kashmir is the most dangerous flashpoint in the world, but all roads back from that precipice seem to begin with even more Indian restraint in the face of Islamabad’s terrorism. The Obama administration has even proceeded with the sale of F-16s to Pakistan in an effort to elicit some cooperation from the country. As Delhi would probably advise, Washington has already tried saama and daana; it is time for some bheda and danda. Obama has instead followed in the footsteps of his predecessors, wringing his hands, condemning, and complaining – in fact, everything short of action – and left the region on a simmer for his successor to handle.

The greatest shortcoming of the Obama regime, one that will likely be reversed as soon as he leaves office, though, is the United States’ deteriorating relationship with Russia. Rumpled over Crimea, the Obama White House, urged by his European partners, stumbled into a strong show of force: NATO troops were buttressed and readiness levels improved, sanctions declared against Russia, and diplomatic pressure was brought upon Moscow. Rather than deter Vladimir Putin from pursuing his aims in Europe, these measures have resulted in increased Russian military exercises and missile tests. Worse, it has pushed Moscow into Beijing’s arms. Obama’s misreading of Russia as a greater threat than China at present is at best wishful thinking, and at worst, uncritical muscle memory from the Cold War. Russia is not the Soviet Union and China, with its powerful economic network across the globe, is a far more dangerous opponent despite its minuscule nuclear arsenal.

Obama’s one active error is Russia; the others – Pakistan and Syria – are passive errors of inaction and poor options. However, the president does have Cuba and Iran to boast of, and it is a bonus that Osama bin Laden was killed on his watch. Could he have done things better? Perhaps. Given Donald Trump’s bonhomie with Putin, it does not appear there will be any lasting damage from Obama’s biggest failure. Islamabad may become a problem in the future but Obama is hardly the president who “lost Pakistan.” Syria may haunt him, but on the whole, this is not a bad report card to go away with.

This post appeared on FirstPost on January 20, 2017.