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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

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Tag Archives: Agni

A War in Space

01 Mon Jun 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Security, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on A War in Space

Tags

A2/AD, Agni, ANGELS, anti-access/area denial, anti-satellite, ASAT, Automated Navigation and Guidance Experiment for Local Space, C5ISR, Cartosat, CCI-Sat, China, Communication-Centric Intelligence Satellite, Corona, Dong Fen 21, Dong Neng 2, Earth Observation Technology Experiment Satellite, electromagnetic pulse, EMP, EOTES, Fengyun, geosynchronous orbit, Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle, Global Positioning System, GPS, GSAT, GSLV, GSO, India, Indian Regional Navigational Satellite, Indian Space Research Organisation, IRNSS, ISRO, Istrebitel Sputnikov, Joint Vision 2020, laser, LEO, Low Earth Orbit, microwave, Pakistan, Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, Prowler, PSLV, radar imaging, RISAT, satellite, SC-19, Soviet Union, space, United States, United States Space Command

A few hundred kilometres above the earth, an orbiting object receives a signal from a ground transmitting station; gently, the satellite powers up its systems and conducts a series of short thrusts that put it on course to its target. Drifting into the proximity, at almost five km per second, it emits a short yet powerful electromagnetic pulse. Far below, the Indian Navy cannot seem to get through to its nuclear submarines, the bearers of its vital nuclear second-strike capability. This may sound like a scenario from a John McTiernan blockbuster but it is very much within the realm of the possible. For years now, China has been developing its capabilities to wage war in space and of late, its string of successes merit series concern from India and its neighbours.

The militarisation of space started decades ago. Beginning in June 1959, the United States began to launch the Corona series of reconnaissance satellites that were tasked with gathering information on the Soviet military, their economy, electronic intelligence, and even early detection of missile launches. A total of 144 satellites were put into low earth orbit (LEO) until May 1972. The United States had halting success with anti-satellite (ASAT) weaponry but efforts were discontinued by the US Congress as the Cold War was winding down. However, in February 2008, the United States used a Standard Missile 3, designed primarily as an anti-ballistic missile, to destroy one of its military reconnaissance satellites.

On the other side of the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and deployed an anti-satellite weapons system as early as November 1963, the Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS). The weapon was a single-launch kamikaze satellite carrying a 300 kg fragmenting warhead that would be put into LEO by a launch vehicle and then manoeuvre itself towards its target. The radius of the shrapnel from the warhead was no more than two kilometres and the satellite itself carried only enough fuel for 300 seconds of operation. The Soviet Union had little success with anti-satellite missiles but experimented with military space stations, lasers, and other means of intercepting, jamming, and destroying enemy satellites in case of war. The Soviet Union’s successor state, Russia, has recently restarted this project after a lull since the end of the Cold War and secretly launched a satellite in December 2013 that is capable of approaching other satellites, studying them, and intercepting, jamming, or destroying them if necessary. This is similar to the US Prowler satellite launched in 1990 or the ANGELS (Automated Navigation and Guidance Experiment for Local Space) programme announced in 2014.

SatellitesChina’s first forays into space had begun in 1956 with a programme whose primary task was to detect and counter American and later Soviet ballistic missile threats. Its formative years were spent developing a credible nuclear deterrent and received much assistance from Moscow until the Sino-Soviet split ended all cooperation in mid-1960. A presence in space was envisioned only in July 1967 and China’s first successful satellite was launched in April 1970. However, space evinced little interest from a China that was still recovering from the Cultural Revolution and new projects were taken up sparingly. Improving on previously tried and tested systems, China was able to offer a commercial launch facility in 1985 that would put several European and Asian satellites into orbit. Interest in space was on the rise again in Beijing in the late 1980s and a full-fledged ministry for aerospace was established in 1988. The first Gulf War two years later served as a Sputnik moment for Beijing and the state-owned aviation industry concern was made responsible for extraterrestrial endeavours as well. The number of annual Chinese space launches currently exceeds that of the United States and it is believed that China presently operates some 132 satellites in space, second to only the United States.

China shocked observers by bringing down one of their Fengyun class meteorological satellites with an ASAT variant of their Dong Feng 21 missile in January 2007. A further test was carried out in January 2010 with the same missile, the SC-19. Beijing conducted two more tests, one in May 2013 and another in July 2014, under the guise of a scientific mission. In these, a new type of missile was tested, the Dong Neng 2. China has already tested placing a parasitic microsatellite in orbit in 2008 when a BX-1 passed within 25 kms of the International Space Station – a collision could have been catastrophic.

These developments might not have been particularly worrying during the Cold War as few countries had come to depend heavily on satellites. However, the extent of integration of space-based assets in prosecuting Operation Desert Storm in January 1990 marked a new era in war-fighting. The use of global positioning to locate troops, reconnaissance satellites for image data of terrain and enemy troops, communications satellites to connect various services and theatres of battle, and Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites to detect early the launch of Scud missiles made the conflict the first space war; by Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001, satellites had become even more integral to the military – now, they guided smart bombs onto their targets, provided video links to headquarters, and were the interface between unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and their operators. In 2015, the ability to cripple or even deny an opponent the use of space assets is a severe threat that can very well decide the fate of an engagement.

Beijing has observed these developments closely and has come to the conclusion that “whoever controls space [the universe] can control the earth,” a quotation the Chinese military attributes to US president John F Kennedy. In fact, much of Chinese thinking on space warfare is directly influenced by the United States. Chinese security journals regularly cite US literature on strategy, tactics, and technology development in space and some of their more influential thinkers even borrow Western terminology. Presently, there is an unstated acceptance in the Chinese Politburo and the PLA of the United States’ unassailable technological and material superiority in space. As a result, China has opted for an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy that would eliminate or hinder US C5ISR capabilities (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) against China in case of conflict. China would conduct nodal warfare, breaking the United States’ information chain at critical moments to undermine support given to conventional forces and weaken their dominance.

Chinese military ambitions are focused on achieving tactical parity with the United States. To this end, the country’s primary focus in counter-satellite warfare has been on space object surveillance and identification, direct ascent and co-orbital ASAT programmes, laser and microwave weapons systems, electronic warfare, and cyber weapons. The PLA’s understanding of US military doctrine, based on US actions as well as policy documents such as the United States Space Command’s Vision for 2020 and Joint Vision 2020, is that a space war is inevitable; through the command of space, the United States has the ability to perform surgical strikes and obviate the necessity for the greater use of force. This ability may be enough of a deterrent to an opponent to submit without fighting. Yet the cost of deploying space assets and their limited scale means that these forces cannot be employed at will. Even rich nations like the United States will be strained to maintain even a thin layer of space-based assets. Instead of challenging the United States in toto, Beijing will seek to gain footholds in a few, well-chosen areas that have decisive implications for security and operations. Thus, full engagement is avoided because, as one Chinese analyst wrote, “to break one finger is more effective than hurting all fingers.”

Satellite centric warfareAccording to Chinese military strategists, in contrast to the past, modern wars have become increasingly short and are often decided by just one intense campaign. Thus, winning the campaign may well mean winning the war. There might not be time, or China may lack the capability, to destroy all the enemy’s strategic assets as it might have had to in previous wars. In fact, there is no need to do so anymore if offensive focus can be spearheaded, even temporarily, against vital targets that integrate and support the enemy’s overall operations system. In other words, the PLA will strive to paralyse its opponent first and then conduct an operation of annihilation later to encourage a rapid political conclusion to hostilities. The appeal of this strategy against a technologically and operationally superior foe is obvious; as a Xinhua article recently stated, “For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice.” Once most of the technological force multipliers are eliminated, China will have the upper hand in terms of sheer numbers.

This is unfortunate for India, who has to contend with a hostile power on its border that is constantly expanding its military capabilities. China’s undeclared Cold War with the United States pulls it into an unacknowledged arms race whose ripple effects its neighbours have to bear. India will also have to contend with the possibility that China will share at least some of its space assets with Pakistan. Beijing may easily provide Rawalpindi with intelligence on Indian troop movements, deployment, and signals intercepts in addition to what Pakistan might have managed on its own. The use of Chinese A2/AD against India on its western border will degrade Delhi’s conventional superiority against Islamabad and bleed the Indian treasury more to mitigate the situation. Such a scenario is highly plausible given the reckless sharing of nuclear and missile technology by Beijing with Islamabad in the past.

The good news is that destroying space assets is not a particularly difficult task – satellites are relatively easy to detect and since their orbits are clearly defined, much easier to shoot down than ballistic missiles. Indian defence planners will also be glad that their efforts in the new domain of space need not start from the ground up – India has already developed several technologies on its own for other weapons systems that may be modified and applied to defence purposes. Much like in the nuclear field, the difference between a space asset for civilian use and for military purposes is marginal and apparent only towards the end of the production cycle.

India’s Agni III and Agni V missiles, for example, amply indicate the potential to engage targets at high altitudes. The recent space missions to the Moon and to Mars also demonstrate a fair ability to track objects through space and to communicate with them. India’s family of satellites is not unimpressive and it has already launched several dual-use civilian and military satellites. India’s first remote-sensing satellite was launched in 1988, the IRS-1A, with a resolution of 36 metres; the IRS-1C, seven years later, achieved a resolution of under six metres. In 2001, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) launched the first satellite that had clear military applications as well: the Earth Observation Technology Experiment Satellite, with a resolution of one metre and weighing slightly over 1,100 kgs, was put in orbit from Sriharikota by the workhorse of the Indian space programme, a Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle. In 2008, Cartosat-2A was launched with even better resolution than the EOTES, and Cartosat-2B was put in orbit in 2010. The same year, ISRO also sent up the Oceansat-2, purposed for weather tracking and identification of fishing zones. However, it is also available to the Indian Navy for bathymetry and anti-submarine warfare. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Bombay, India acquired a radar-imaging satellite, the RISAT-2 from Israel. It was India’s first such platform and was equipped with the X-Band Synthetic Aperture Radar, allowing it to monitor its assigned area regardless of time of day or weather. ISRO had planned to launch Cartosat-3 by the end of 2014 but it has now been pushed back to September 2017; the satellite will have a resolution of 25 centimetres and provide the highest resolution earth photographs of any commercial satellite.

None of these are exclusively military satellites, of which India has very few. Even the constellation of seven Indian Regional Navigational Satellite (IRNSS) GPS satellites is meant to be available to civilians as well as the military. Part of the reason is the expense of becoming a space-faring nation. ISRO subsidises the development of its space infrastructure by selling services – launches, imagery, applications – commercially. Data from Indian satellites is routinely used around the world and benefit many causes. According to one estimate from 2004, India’s IRS satellites have earned more than four times the amount which has been invested on them through commerce as well as their contributions to urban planning, disaster management, and water resources management. However, this sort of jugaad economics cannot continue for much longer. “In space we have to be at par,” explains former ISRO chairman UR Rao. “We cannot say that we would make products which cost less but can get part of the job done. You just cannot bargain with space and have to have the best technology.” The GSAT-7 was India’s first exclusively military satellite, meant for communication with and between Indian naval vessels, was launched only in August 2013; another dedicated military satellite for electronic intelligence, the Communication-Centric Intelligence Satellite (CCI-Sat), is scheduled for 2020.

Not all satellites are the same. Other than shielding and the limited ability to manoeuvre in space, satellites are also defined by the orbits they trace. Satellites in LEO are easier to target than those further away in Medium Earth, High Earth, or Geosynchronous Orbits. GSO satellites are, as the name suggests, stationed above a particular point on earth at an altitude of 36,000 kms. Their coverage of the earth’s surface is greater but they are less flexible in their orbits or manoeuvrability. This trajectory is usually reserved for communications satellites as their fixed location obviates the need for expensive and bulky tracking equipment on the ground. At the other end are LEO satellites. These cover far less of the earth’s surface at a time but are faster, more manoeuvrable, and have greater proximity to the earth, all of which makes them ideal for imaging missions. The lower orbit also means that a greater number of such satellites are required to cover the same area constantly as a satellite in higher orbit. LEO satellites are more vulnerable to ASAT missiles than are GSO satellites but they are also usually cheaper and less valuable strategically than the latter. A country spreads its space assets in a multitude of orbits depending on mission profile, budget, and strategy.

One important step India can take is to give its disparate space efforts some focus. A dedicated Aerospace Command, to serve more as a nodal agency between the services than an independent wing of the Indian military, will be better able to judge and accommodate the needs of the services without unnecessary and expensive replication of capabilities. Furthermore, it would be a politically wise decision to separate ISRO from military missions; the organisation only recently was removed from under US sanctions and its involvement in Indian space warfare missions would only make it a target again. The dual use of space technologies a well established fact, it serves India’s needs to have one of its space centres beyond international reproach.

India also needs to significantly upgrade its space infrastructure. The country has just one space launch facility at Sriharikota that struggles to handle much more than six to eight launches per year when several more are required if the deficiencies in space are to be overcome in a timely manner. Additionally, ISRO has been struggling with the development of an indigenous cryogenic engine and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) for years. The PSLV has managed to handle the workload, especially with additional boosters strapped on, but India needs a reliable rocket that can put payloads in excess of even 15 or 18 tonnes into LEO.

Beyond infrastructure, India needs to consider what countermeasures it can provide its satellites. Even though satellites are easy targets, the more advanced varieties can withstand some amount of interference with its sensors and communications. Shielding is perhaps the simplest countermeasure, but this makes satellites heavier. Another method is to build in some amount of manoeuvrability so that it can escape from a predatory co-orbital anti-satellite device. This will require fuel to be carried and stored onboard which will also make the satellite heavier and will eventually run out. Yet another option is to build in redundancy – if a certain mission requires a constellation of nine satellites, a dozen might be tasked; the additional three satellites, together with the ability to launch replacements quickly if needed, might perhaps be a cheaper option than a handful of very expensive and very valuable satellites.

The military must also consider what kind of anti-satellite measures it wishes to develop to disrupt the enemy’s C5ISR. Given the work done in developing India’s ballistic missile defence and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, a kinetic kill vehicle – industry parlance for an ASAT missile – might seem the easiest option. However, the Chinese test in 2007 created over 2,500 fragments in space that now interfere with the satellites of all nations. In fact, one of these fragments crashed into a Russian satellite in May 2013 and destroyed it. Cleaner kills would be through the development of microwave, EMP, or laser weapons systems. Depending upon their nature, intensity, and exposure, the effects could be temporary or permanent, giving India far more flexibility in its response to incidents.

There is little reason to panic just yet but space warfare is something that deserves more scholarly attention in India. A fair portion of India’s space budget goes unused each year despite the need for aggressive expansion of infrastructure, facilities, and manpower. Though it is difficult to compare space budgets internationally due to the dual use nature of the technology, India needs to invest significantly more into the industry. Luckily for India, this is not a guns vs. butter argument because the potential for overlap between civilian and military needs is enormous. While the initial elements of robust space defence exists in India, strategic vision is needed to shape it into a potent programme. As the Good Book tells us, where there is no vision, the people perish (Míshlê 29:18).


This article first appeared in the June 2015 print edition of Swarajya.

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An Arms Race in South Asia?

15 Sun Sep 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Security, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Agni, China, DRDO, India, nuclear, Pakistan

India tested its nuclear-capable Agni V today. The missile, with a range of over 5,000 kilometres, may eventually have its range enhanced or be equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology though there are no signs that either of these was achieved in this morning’s test. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been focusing instead on improving India’s second-strike capability by making its missiles faster, more agile, and road mobile (survivable). India’s latest missile, with its significant range increase over its predecessors, is seen as a China-centric missile and likely to be deployed after a few more trials only by 2017.

There are several interesting facets to the development of the Agni V. The first and most obvious is its range. Delhi can deny its rivalry with Beijing until it is blue in the face but there is no reason for India to develop a missile with such reach to target Pakistan. The Agni V underscores the argument that India sees itself in a dyad with China rather than, as US analysts have tried to argue, as an equal hyphenated with Pakistan.

As several observers have noted, despite today’s successful missile test, India remains a fair way away from an assured second strike capability that is essential to its no first use (NFU) posture. Others have commented that India’s focus on China creates instability in its relations with Pakistan, who, unable to keep up with the defence expenditure required to attain party with India, has chosen to resort to asymmetric warfare which could inadvertently bubble over into a full-fledged war. In an effort to become an established nuclear power with a credible triad, India’s nuclear arsenal has abandoned the minimum credible deterrent philosophy.

These fears are either exaggerated or inaccurate. First, the deployment of the INS Arihant will enhance the survivability of India’s nuclear arsenal and ensure a second strike capability, but India’s road- or rail-mobile nuclear arsenal is not an easy target for a hypothetical first strike. India may be significantly behind its rival across the Himalayas in terms of operational readiness, indigenous development of military hardware, and sophistication of its missiles and nuclear warheads, but none of these lacunae take away from India’s crossing a minimum threshold of nuclear readiness.

Second, while it has been fashionable to consider India and Pakistan as one sub-system and China as part of another isolated network, these assumptions bear no resemblance to the reality on the ground. China’s behaviour, vis-a-vis the United States, Russia, or anyone else, will impact Indian nuclear thinking and Delhi’s response will in turn affect Islamabad. It is irrational to expect Delhi to stand idly by while China improves its nuclear arsenal, no doubt in response to US modernisation initiatives, develops an anti-ballistic missile defence shield, and anti-satellite missiles.

Third, minimum credible deterrence is a philosophy that depends greatly on one’s rival; Pakistan has never been more than a distraction in India’s nuclear planning, much to its chagrin. For Delhi, its deterrence has always been against Beijing’s ambitions, and in that capacity, India has always maintained a technologically and numerically modest force. In fact, the DRDO’s moratorium on developing longer ranged missiles shows caution, responsibility, and the power of a limited purse. As Chander has stated, the DRDO’s primary goal now is to refine rather than expand India’s defence capabilities.

The fear that MIRV capability will somehow spiral into armageddon is based on US and Soviet experiences during the Cold War. This is not applicable to the Indian sub-continent – neither China nor Delhi have suffered from the insane Cold War dash to accumulate gargantuan nuclear arsenals, and there is little evidence to indicate that a MIRVed Agni V will substantially increase the size of India’s arsenal. In fact, barring one or two analysts, the considered opinion of the strategic enclave is that the country would be well served by a nuclear kitty ranging from 150 to a maximum of 250 warheads. Of course, this is liable to change with fluctuating threat perceptions but is still a far cry from the 16,000+ warheads the US and Russia have between them.

There is, however, merit to the claim that India’s military developments will keep Pakistan on edge; it is the same dynamic India experiences with China’s rise and challenge to the United States. However, acknowledgement of this fundamental dynamic is not to equate the two rivalries – India does not support terrorist activity against China as Pakistan does against India. The low intensity conflict Islamabad sponsors does far more to destabilise sub-continental relations than a straight up military and nuclear rivalry.

Another factor contributing to the region’s instability is China’s refusal to acknowledge the threat posed by India’s nuclear arsenal. The Pokhran II blasts and the success of the Agni V has made Beijing’s tone terse, but until it acknowledges India’s nuclear prowess, there can be little hope for confidence building measures or nuclear discussions between Asia’s two largest states. There are many questions hanging over China’s NFU policy, which Delhi is certain to notice and compensate for in its force structure.

It would be supremely irresponsible for any nation to ignore the increasing military capability of a neighbour it considers its rival. India cannot rationally expect Pakistan to not be worried as India continually increases its military capabilities and reach, just as it is impractical to expect India to ignore China’s advances and activities in the region. Europe has witnessed several of these multi-variable rivalries as powers rise and fall in its history and something similar is being played out in Asia today, albeit with nuclear weapons. As China flexes its muscles in the region, India will be forced to respond, which will in turn put pressure on Pakistan.

Refraining from developing the Agni V, MIRV capability, and various defence technologies will only make India weak without increasing regional stability. Stability and peace have come either by the total destruction of an enemy, the peace of a graveyard, or by negotiations among equals; moderation is a virtue only in those who are thought to have an alternative.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on September 16, 2013.

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Tango with the Dragon

24 Tue Apr 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Security, South Asia

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Agni, China, Cold Start, India, lawfare, nuclear, unrestricted warfare

The Agni V is not the ace India was looking for in its security calculus with China. But what is?

The successful test of the India’s Agni V missile recently has rekindled a nationalistic fervour in India. Blogs, newspapers, and the Inderatti (Indian twitterati) have been busy congratulating the scientists of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and their fellow citizens, while policy wonks and strategists have reiterated the obvious claims that this new addition to the Indian arsenal brings all of China into range and strengthens India’s deterrent. Not to be outdone, the usual suspects have also floated the tired “guns vs. butter” argument. But looking past the jingoism, beyond what blogger Harini Calamur called the “bleeding hearts with leaking brains,” how does the Agni test increase India’s diplomatic and security toolkit?

Contextualising the Agni V

My heretical thought is that it doesn’t. Strictly from the specifications of the latest missile in the Agni family, it is evident that India means the missile as an insurance policy against China – the 5,000+ km range is serious overkill for Pakistan, and it is highly unlikely that New Delhi will entertain the idea of ordering a missile strike against Djakarta or Warsaw. There is no doubt that the development of the Agni V has been an umbrella under which the DRDO could develop ancillary defence technologies, and its presence in the Indian arsenal, particularly because of its canister-launch capability, certainly increases India’s choices. The mobility provided by the TEL system would virtually guarantee India a second strike capability against a Chinese attack.
Agni V specifications
Name: Agni V
Height: 17.5 metres
Weight: 50 tonnes
Payload: 1.5 tonnes MIRV-capable
Range: 5,500 kms
Propulsion: Three-stage, solid fuel propellant
Transport: Road or rail mobile
Launch platform: Canister-launch from TEL (transporter erector launcher)
It is not clear, however, how all this adds to New Delhi’s already existing capabilities. The Agni V is touted as a long range missile, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) no less (albeit by a whisker), bringing all of China into range; its TEL platform, as mentioned, makes it difficult for enemy satellites to locate it for a preemptive strike and thus virtually guarantees a second strike capability; the missile is MIRV-capable (Multiple Independently Targetted Reentry Vehicle),  multiplying India’s target selection options. Yet all this is already available between the Agni III and the Sagarika (K-15) SLBM (submarine launched ballistic missile), not to mention India’s fleet of nuclear-capable aircraft (Jaguar, MiG-27, Mirage 2000, MiG-29, Tejas, Sukhoi-30 MKI, Rafale). While the Agni III (also using a TEL launch platform) can hit most parts of China, the Sagarika can hit any part that was missed, and both missiles are capable of surviving a preemptive first strike.

This is not to say that the Agni V was an unnecessary project – it adds to the government’s operational flexibility (nuclear release is a civilian decision in India) and allows further development of technology to keep India abreast of the major powers. Most importantly, keeping an eye on the future, it lays the groundwork for the development of longer range missiles if necessary. Yet it is important to underscore the fact that while the Agni V marked a breakthrough in Indian missile development, it has not changed New Delhi’s equation with Beijing as drastically. Among the chest thumpers, the Agni V – or any display of military achievement – is an article of faith, and they will no doubt point out that neither the Arihant nor the Sagarika are yet operational and therefore the new missile is sorely needed, but the same applies to the Agni V. In India, there is a long lag between the DRDO’s dog-and-pony show for the benefit of the country’s masses and actual military readiness.

It needs to be reiterated to the South Asian public that the moment a nuclear missile lifts off, be it from Secundrabad, Sargodha, or Delingha, they have already lost regardless of the outcome of a missile exchange. The paradoxical nature of nuclear weapons (and their delivery systems) is such that they serve only as a deterrent of last resort and cannot be used to actually fight wars (there is some debate on the defensive use of tactical weapons but one would hope that a government would delay detonating nuclear warheads on its own soil). Thus, while the Agni V reinforces a military option that no sane person dare use, its real utility is not as much as the less glamorous tactical doctrines.

Intellectual flexibility and depth

While India has achieved a certain degree of strategic depth with its missiles, submarines, and nuclear weapons, it is sorely lagging in methods of asymmetric warfare (while the term is usually understood as a synonym for terrorism a la Pakistan, it refers to conflict between two entities who capabilities and strategies differ widely). The implicit assumption regarding asymmetry so far has been that it deals with the unknowable, relying on surprise as ends and means. Thus, it is argued, there is no effective bulwark against such warfare except vigilance. But this is no different from symmetric warfare, in that uncertainty is inseparable from the nature of warfare (admittedly, asymmetry increases the realm of the unforeseen). The structure of symmetric warfare allows for a clear articulation of doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, but such formulaic solutions and checklists are not possible to operationalise in asymmetric warfare. If and when the enemy succeeds in surprise, the response is necessarily ad hoc and less effective. Depending on preconceptions held by the military and politicians and ability to adapt, the advantage an opponent enjoys might persist. Indian military training must emphasise a mindset to deal with uncertainty quickly and effectively.

A vital ingredient to intellectual flexibility is intelligence and knowledge. India’s academic-military-government structure and practices are so foreboding that Indian think tanks and academics find it difficult if not impossible to contribute to a lively security debate within the country. The country’s universities are not prepared to produce area studies experts as are available in the West and China. Inadequate resources, poor faculty, paltry library collections, and a national ethos that favours technical education over the humanities have all made for a tiny pool of foreign policy scholars in India. While the state of Indian intelligence is not known, it cannot be near adequate given the glaring security failures India has experienced – while it is asinine to expect a 100% success rate, the sheer frequency of major attacks on Bombay, Parliament, and other targets throughout the country should stand as testimony to the need for a complete intelligence overhaul.

Different modes of warfare

As technologies change, so do battlefields. This is even more so in the case of asymmetric warfare when the weaker side tries to capitalise on terrain, weather, force composition, centre of gravity (in the Clausewitzian sense), and anything else they could use to advantage. At the tactical level, good intelligence is crucial, but at higher levels, military leaders must be able to see beyond the battlefield to the whole theatre and with non-linear thinking. While the Indian military does not have a stellar record for original and innovative thinking, there has been an acknowledgement of the evolving battlefield. For example, the Army announced a new war doctrine, Cold Start, in 2004. What the strategy lacks in originality, it makes up in vision – the plan calls for eight integrated battalions of armour, mechanised infantry, artillery, and combat air support. Such a composition would allow army units to mobilise quickly and strike fast and hard, reducing the time available for diplomatic intervention from third parties and domestic indecision. A quick mobilisation also increases chances of surprising the enemy. Further, the DRDO has worked towards creating weapons systems suited for Cold Start – in instances requiring rapid response, the Prahaar missile with its range of warheads outdoes India’s more famous line of missiles such as the Prithvi or Agni.

Cold Start is a Pakistan-centric strategy, and for all the fancy terminology and equipment involved, it is, in essence, an upgraded version of the German World War II doctrine of blitzkrieg. This means that it needs vast, open, and flat terrain, such as the plains of Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat  to work effectively (though in the Punjab sector, Pakistan has built defensively aligned canals, distributaries and ditches which in terms of time and space thwart the use of armour). Obviously, the Himalayan geography will pose problems for Cold Start. With the same initiative as demonstrated in creating Cold Start, Indian strategists need to formulate plans appropriate to mountain warfare and commit resources to building the required infrastructure and specialised units for such combat.

Ironically, India may be able to draw lessons from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 1999, two colonels of the PLA, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, wrote a very interesting book on asymmetric warfare titled, Unrestricted Warfare. Rather than postulate on conventional strategies of asymmetric warfare, the authors assumed the undesirability of direct military confrontation and emphasised other unconventional means such as attacking networks, economic, and legal warfare. Unrestricted warfare battlefields reach beyond the physical domain to include culture, information networks, economics and finance, natural resources and energy. Control of sea lanes, cyber warfare, passport and visa controls, import-export controls, legal action for human rights violations, child labour, environmental concerns, etc. are all forms of unrestricted warfare (also known as 4th generation warfare) open to a state as well as private actors. For example, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) regularly publish data on domestic violence, drug use, pollution, the environment, law enforcement, and a host of other issues. Some sue state governments (Israel is a prominent example) while others incite public unrest against a policy or project (the Kudankulam agitation in India is a recent example). In either case, the state is harassed and distracted from important issues. Gerald Steinberg of Bar Ilan University in Israel says, “NGOs manipulate international legal terminology and exploit the rhetoric of human rights to accomplish their political goals.” Such warfare can even be waged by proxy – clandestine support of some NGOs in raising certain issues can be given by a state if necessary. As US President John F. Kennedy said to the graduating class of 1962 at the United States Military Academy (USMA),

This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him…. It requires in those situations where we must counter it… a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.

Training and Equipment

Interwoven with mental battlefield agility is the availability of abundant training, cross-training, and joint training. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has been in the news recently for its lack of adequate training for the pilots (25% of US Air Force and 33% of European air forces), and there is no reason to doubt that the situation is the same in the other branches of the military. Equipment is also essential in creating force multipliers in battle, through which critical zones, if not the whole battlefield, can be controlled. Yet Indian research and development as well as procurement from abroad is a horror story best left unrecounted. As Shashi Tharoor recently wrote, “any meaningful modernisation that will substantially enhance India’s combat capabilities remains a chimera, and the money at the disposal of the military remains inadequate even to replace the ageing and obsolete weapons systems with which the Indian defence services, armed police and para-military forces are replete.” Other aspects of maintaining top military readiness and effectiveness such as rotation of troops from conflict areas, salaries and benefits, reduced domestic use, clear strategic and political guidelines, and non-interference in operational matters leave much to be desired too. Thus, while India may have recently stationed three Sukhoi-30 MKI squadrons on her border with China and is raising two more mountain units, the deciding factor will not be numbers (which China has in plenty) but their equipment, training, and, just as critical, rest.

What Arms Race?

The launch of the China-specific Agni V has generated much talk about an arms race between China and India, and consequently, India and Pakistan. The Chinese media (and hence the government) has taken exception to this, reacting sharply to the test and labelling it as India’s missile delusion. Understandably, part of this bitterness comes from the gap between China’s and India’s capabilities closing; Beijing understands that while India may not, in the next decade, be able to challenge China’s rise to superpower status, it can certainly inhibit China’s rise by forcing Beijing to take cognisance  of a potential threat from the southwest. Meanwhile, analysts have rushed to point out that India is lagging far behind China, with a quarter its economy and a third its defence spending. Beijing also added that “for the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China.” But unless India has abandoned its old policy of MUD (Mutually Unacceptable Damage), analysts and Beijing have jumped the gun. Under India’s policy of “minimum credible deterrent,” the idea was – is – the ability to have an accurate second strike capability through advanced technology and a nuclear triad. The question of the actual number of bombs has been left vague, at least in public, but the aim of the policy has been reiterated – India does not seek to ‘make the rubble bounce’ but only to inflict enough damage that it would cause an enemy to pause, think, and desist. In other words, India’s deterrent is not an existential threat to its enemies but one that promises a very high cost if India were invaded. Under such a policy, it would be unnecessary to acquire the mind-numbing number of weapons the Soviet Union and the United States thought fit to deploy during the Cold War; rather, a modest arsenal of even 200 nuclear bombs would be enough of a deterrent could it be guaranteed that they would reach their targets. It is in that spirit that the Agni V – and the rest of India’s nuclear paraphernalia – should be viewed.

Lessons from Deng Xiaoping

For the first time in the history of Indian military development, China had a sharp reaction to India’s achievement – not even the 1998 nuclear tests extracted more than a bland statement out of Beijing. But India must tread cautiously – the Agni V has not truly changed the equation between herself and China, and the various measures that could augment India’s war-fighting capabilities in the Himalayas are not yet in place. The Indian government’s reaction to the test has remained fairly muted but the Indian media and Inderatti have taken to jingoism. Instead of provoking the dragon out of sheer bravado, India ought to remember that China is far ahead of India economically as well as militarily. In an arms race, the only possible result of a showdown between these two Asian giants presently is a second victory for China. Instead, it would behoove Indians to take a page out of Deng Xiaoping’s book, at least for the time being. The best strategy for India to emulate in a critical period of her ascent would be to 1. lengjing guancha — observe and analyze [developments] calmly; 2. chenzhuo yingfu — deal [with changes] patiently and confidently; 3. wenzhu zhenjiao — secure [our own] position; 4. taoguang yanghui — conceal [our] capabilities and avoid the limelight; 5. shanyu shouzhuo — be good at keeping a low profile; 6. juebu dangtou — never become a leader; 7.  yousuo zuowei — strive to make achievements. China itself has followed this policy very closely in regard to its diminishing gap with the United States. As a result, it is only recently that American strategic planners have woken up to the potential danger China poses (even now, not everyone is convinced) to US interests.

Returning to the testing of the Agni V ICBM, there is much that needs to be done still. It needs to undergo six more tests and will be inducted into the military only in 2014. Even then, there are some issues to consider – how good is its accuracy? Why is it so heavy compared to US and Russian missiles of similar range? Can it host guided warheads? Can the missile be made to carry more warheads? How miniaturised are the warheads, and can they be made even smaller and lighter? After the questions of capability come the questions of capacity – right now, the DRDO can manufacture only two Agni Vs per year; at this rate, having a moderately sized arsenal can take quite while. Can the capacity be upgraded? How quickly can India manufacture and deploy, say, 50 missiles? The head of the DRDO, VK Saraswat, declared that over 80% of the missile is indigenous – the key question then is how much of the remaining less-than-20%, comprising mainly of electronic components, is critical to the project?

None of these questions have answers that would please Indian strategists. Therefore, India must still wait on the Agni V for its promise of security to be fulfilled. The motto on the Belizean flag reads, “Sub Umbra Florero,” which refers to the mighty mahogany tree and translates from the Latin to, “Under the shade, I flourish.” Perhaps Indians can take the cue.


This post was originally written for the CRI and has been reproduced with permission.

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