Tag Archives: Ajit Doval

Modi’s Balochistan Gambit

20 Tue Sep 2016

Posted by in India, Pakistan, South Asia

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s mere mention of Balochistan in his Independence Day speech probably caused more flutter than any actual Indian policy ever has. An earlier reference to the western Pakistani province by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval at the 10th Nani Palkhivala Memorial Lecture in February 2014 had already set the tone – in rhetoric, at least – of the Modi administration towards misadventures from its western neighbour. In the wake of the terror attack in Uri, these comments have acquired greater salience among the public.

To be sure, these utterances represent some bold and out-of-the-box thinking by anyone in the Indian government. However, supporting an insurgency – in whichever country – is a complicated and messy affair that cannot be dismissively relegated to a mere talking point. There is interest in many quarters about the feasibility of Indian support to Balochistan, especially since it appears at first glance to be analogous to the situation in Kashmir. Yet appearances can be deceptive and if Modi & Co. are serious about the option, there are some questions they must first consider.

Henry Kissinger is famously said to have asked, “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” The same is true for Balochistan. Whom does the prime minister – or his national security advisor – call if he wants to call the Balochi rebels? The Balochi struggle, such as it is, remains deeply fractured and it is difficult to identify one clear leader or even someone who could potentially unify the different factions against their common oppressor. Needless to say, Islamabad would have picked off such a person at the earliest had one emerged.

Uniting factions in service of a common cause is not easy as even the United States with its several carrots found out in Syria. Even supporting the two or three major factions is a recipe for disaster as intra-faction fighting can quickly sap international sympathy and India’s patience.

Even if the Baloch were able to come together, what would India’s aid look like? The rebels would be committing suicide with small arms alone and heavy arms would only encourage the Pakistani Army to bring in even heavier arms such as armour and air support; Delhi can hardly supply the rebels commensurately. Yet India’s struggle to even overtly train and arm the Afghan Army puts the country’s role as an arms supplier to the Baloch in question.

There is also this to be considered: who stands guarantee to the suitability of Baloch targets? So far, India has had the advantage of international confidence that it does not distinguish between good and bad terrorists. Were Balochi fighters to target Pakistani civilians, especially schools or hospitals, it could tarnish India’s reputation for no apparent gains. This is not an unlikely situation – Baloch anger at their harsh treatment by Islamabad so far would only naturally boil over and lash out at the first instance it can strike where it hurts. Wars seldom remain kosher for long.

An armed and active Baloch insurgency would cause alarm in the neighbourhood – Tehran, Kabul, and Beijing at the very least. Historically, the Baloch people have lived in what is today western Pakistan, eastern Iran, and southwestern Afghanistan. If the insurgency were to excite dormant aspirations among Balochis outside Pakistan, it would very well sour India’s relations with Iran and Afghanistan. Baloch leaders would have to promise to abandon any dreams of an akhand Balochistan and even if they were to, could they be trusted? For how long?

Beijing would have its own concerns with a Baloch uprising. After having invested heavily is propping up a teetering state like Pakistan, China would be loathe to see its interests washed away. First, they would lose the strategically important port of Gwadar; second, they would have to abandon their economic corridor into Pakistan; third, and most vitally, their dagger pointed at India’s back would be blunted. It is highly unlikely that China’s leaders would sit idly by for long if Baloch fighters gained momentum against Islamabad’s forces, with or without India’s help.

The international community would have its own nightmares – it is not often that a state possessing nuclear weapons succumbs to such a virulent separatist movement. There would be immense pressure on India – if links were established – to cut all support to the Baloch rebels and to do so quickly.

Allowing for the moment that a Baloch insurgency is successful and Kalat regains its independence, how would it benefit India? Pakistan would lose approximately five percent of its population and 45 percent of its territory; electoral results suggest that it is unlikely that this would excite other separatist movements such as in Sindh. Will the new Balochistan tilt towards India? Delhi’s experience with Bangladesh in 1972 suggests that even this is not a given.

The nuclear arsenal, India’s primary concern, will in all likelihood remain in Punjabi hands. Punjab, the brightest ember in Pakistan’s fire of anti-India hatred, will emerge even more concentrated and certainly in no mood for negotiations henceforth. While the new situation may affect the tactical military situation, there would be little impact strategically except perhaps to lower the nuclear threshold even more and make the subcontinent an even more dangerous place.

Finally, if answers to all these convolutions do already exist somewhere in South Block, is it really wise to announce Indian support for an independent Balochistan so publicly? Declaratory wars have not been in fashion for over a century now. Plausible deniability is a very effective strategy; if Indian fingerprints were indeed found on a resurgent Baloch insurgency, there is no guarantee that it will not cross Pakistan’s nuclear threshold…especially if the insurgency makes initial gains.

None of this is to say that Modi should not extend support to the Baloch. The first step, however, might be to regularly highlight their plight on the international stage. If indirect funding could be made available for the diaspora and others to produce documentaries, organise conferences, and lobby important politicians in major capitals, it would create momentum around their cause. Exaggeration and too shrill a tone, however, would only set back the cause. A model one might learn from is how Armenians got the massacres of 1915-1917 internationally recognised as genocide. Such recognition opens several legal avenues for concerned states as well as affected people to take against Islamabad’s policies.

If aid were to ever include weapons, the Indian government would do well to closely consider the impediments to their action, potential fallout, and certain blowback.

This post appeared on FirstPost on September 21, 2016.

Dealing With A Pariah

23 Sun Aug 2015

Posted by in India, Pakistan, South Asia

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The cancellation of the scheduled talks between the national security advisors of India and Pakistan, Ajit Doval and Sartaj Aziz, felt like euthanasia – unpleasant but a welcome respite given the lack of alternatives. Rawalpindi’s persistence in sabotaging talks – terrorist attacks, cross-border shelling, infiltration attempts, and insisting on talking to Kashmiri separatists, the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) – ultimately paid off.

There will be an outpouring of concern in editorials over the next few days over how recklessly Narendra Modi is steering the country’s foreign policy with regard to Pakistan, but it is difficult to imagine the editorials remaining silent had talks continued – in all likelihood, the Modi government would have been criticised for continuing with talks despite repeated and deadly provocations, not to mention an inexplicable and sudden softness in its Pakistan policy. As such, these opinions are worthless for the goal appears to be more Modi-bashing and less critical thought.

The drama of the past few days is uncannily similar to events almost exactly a year ago, when the new Modi government cancelled talks with Pakistan over the meeting of Abdul Basit, the latter’s High Commissioner, with Kashmiri separatists in Delhi just before the talks. Such consultations have been a longstanding tradition but the actions of the Modi government indicate that India has reconsidered its policy on the acceptability of foreign leaders meeting with separatists. So much for continuity of foreign policy…

There is a large constituency in Delhi that support diplomatic engagement with Pakistan no matter the circumstances. However, it remains to be asked what benefits India has ever accrued from its umpteen talks with its troublesome neighbour over the past decades. Not one achievement can be recalled that validates, even partially, the efforts of Indian diplomats. The question naturally arises, why should India continue to engage with Pakistan seriously, or why Delhi should even maintain a full diplomatic mission in Islamabad. It might even be argued that India should not be emollient with Pakistan any longer but take a tougher stance. As the oft-quoted wisdom goes, repeating the same thing and expecting different results is a sign of insanity.

A tough policy, to lay rest to the caricature at the outset, does not mean a military invasion or even a large cross-border raid. Due to certain acts of Chinese commission and US omission, use of force against Pakistan above an ambiguous threshold is fraught with risks. Besides, there are several options India can consider before the ultimate argument of kings.

If Pakistan cannot conduct itself in the manner befitting the basis of diplomatic exchange, there is no reason to accord them that privilege. In fact, there is little reason for Delhi to maintain a full mission in Islamabad. India can request the United States, Pakistan’s great benefactor, to host an Indian diplomatic interests section within its embassy; all critical communications can be relayed out of the section without having to maintain the charade of normal relations.

Diplomatic links may be progressively reestablished as signs emerge that effective measures are being taken against non-state actors along the border and that Pakistani troops have been ordered to stand down from indiscriminate cross-border shelling. Pakistan must be made to earn the right to participate in talks. If Islamabad cannot promise to curtail its army or its terrorists, what is the purpose of keeping on talking?

India can also use its diplomatic influence at every international forum to push for counter-terrorism commitments in every aid package to Pakistan. In all likelihood, this is unlikely to reap rich rewards but it will put pressure on Islamabad and constantly remind the international community about questions regarding the safe haven for terror networks in Pakistan. Islamabad would be forced to expend diplomatic capital and lobbying effort to counter India’s narrative of its conduct.

Taking the fight to the enemy, India also retains the option of encouraging Baloch and Pashtun sentiments on independence. This is a delicate matter which has diplomatic, cultural, and military dimensions to it and the risk of blowback is high. For example, Baloch separatism may ring alarm bells in Iran, a country important to India’s Central Asia and energy strategies. Similarly, Pashtun sentiments must be balanced against Afghan repercussions. Nonetheless, it is an option worth exploring and pursuing, albeit with caution.

As far as terrorists of interest are concerned, India would stand to profit from the development of covert operations capabilities to carry out surveillance, infiltration, and targeted assassinations. From all reports, India is years away from fielding such skills and even then, such tactics usually cause only disruption rather than bring resolution. No matter, it is best to keep available the widest range of options and such considerations should not stop Delhi from developing a force capable of such missions. Furthermore, the occasional public spectacle of a successful clandestine operation serves a psychological purpose among civilians and combatants alike.

The usual word of caution in taking any hawkish stance on Pakistan is a reminder of the nuclear shield behind which Pakistan conducts its nefarious asymmetric operations. As the United States tries to impress upon India, Pakistan’s political and economic stability is in Indian interests too for turmoil in the country would put the custody of approximately 120 nuclear warheads in question. Yet it must also be borne in mind that none of what has been suggested as part of India’s offensive panoply represents anything more than a minuscule show of arms; most of Delhi’s tactics remain diplomatic and economic with only the slightest armed assistance.

As regards the survival of a unitary (West) Pakistani state, the secession of Balochistan and a Pashtun region – to consider the extreme outcomes – may not be a flowering of democracy and peace but it will certainly restrict Pakistan militarily, geographically, and strategically as several strategic assets move out of its jurisdiction. Punjabi control over the state apparatus, its army and its nuclear arsenal, will certainly be weakened and circumscribed but not threatened. Given the ethnic paranoia that drives Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that any critical nuclear facilities are far beyond the borders of Punjab. A truncated Pakistan will leave an irate nuclear stump of Punjab and Sindh who would be less willing to negotiate with India but Delhi can find some solace in that the new state would have lesser economic, geographic, and demographic resources to conduct its vendetta against India. A weakened Pakistan would also limit the scale of China’s ambitions in India’s rear.

There are those who argue that the strongest weapon in India’s arsenal is economic growth. India should keep negotiations with Pakistan ongoing while expanding its own options by simultaneously growing the economy. Whatever else might be said about this, it is an unsound theory in the sense that Karl Popper would define the term – it is unfalsifiable. While it seems intuitive that an economy of $5 trillion comes with more options than an economy of $2.5 trillion, the disparity in wealth did not achieve for the United States its aims in Cuba despite decades of sanctions. Similarly, it was not the United States’ stronger economy that secured a nuclear agreement with Iran.

Indeed, an economy growing at nine per cent per annum would be enormously beneficial to India. Yet that will not change the nature of Pakistan’s relations with China, the United States, or terrorist organisations. As Christine Fair argued recently, even Kashmir is merely a symptom – the real problem lies in the conception of the Pakistani state itself.

The latest flashpoint in diplomacy between India and Pakistan has arisen over the role of the Hurriyat. It is argued that they are the Kashmiri voice in the negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad and that consulting with them is an old Pakistani diplomatic tradition. Yet this status has been accepted only by Islamabad. The Modi government has done well in its insistence that separatists have no standing in India’s international affairs, and far from being a minor matter of protocol and decorum, diplomatic recognition is in fact a significant thing.

As columnists impotently bemoan the latest tragedy in India-Pakistan relations and condemn India’s hawkish NSA and government, there will be at least one small voice in the country wondering why Modi Sarkar is still so soft on Pakistan. Even if this entire premise is flawed, can India possibly lose more than it does already?

This post first appeared on Swarajya on August 23, 2015.

Raid on Myanmar

10 Wed Jun 2015

Posted by in India, Opinion and Response, Security, South Asia

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Five days after a deadly attack on a convoy of Indian troops of the 6 Dogra Regiment in the Chandel district of Manipur left 18 soldiers dead and at least 11 more injured, Indian Special Forces of 21 Para conducted a raid into neighbouring Myanmar to attack and destroy two rebel bases belonging to the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) and the Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup. One base was on the Nagaland-Myanmar border near Noklak and the other on the Manipur-Myanmar border near Chassad. Reports put casualties among the insurgents at anywhere between 20 and 100 while there were no losses among the Indian forces.

The raid has been hailed by the citizens of India, including the media, as sensational, daring, and proportional. While information on the operation is plenty, quality is less so; conflicting stories have emerged in the Indian press about the equipment used (Mi-35, Dhruv), whether the Indian military actually crossed the border, and if so, whether the Burmese government was informed. Some unconfirmed reports suggest that India acted upon impeccable intelligence while others suggest that unmanned aerial vehicles played a more important role in the preparations for the operation.

Thirty-six hours after the fact, it appears more certain that the international border was indeed crossed though Myanmar initially stated that it had been informed of the raid but later denied that Indian troops had ever crossed the border; permission was not a concern as the armies of the two states have had a tacit understanding between them since at least the mid-1990s which has since been solemnised via treaty. Regarding this particular operation, Naypyitaw was informed of the specifics well after Indian forces had engaged with their targets.

Newspapers also reported that National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Gen. Dalbir Singh changed plans to meet, discuss, coordinate, and oversee the operation with the defence minister Manohar Parrikar. The political decision to strike back, apparently, had been taken within 24 hours of the ambush on 6 Dogra but the military was not ready to launch an immediate counteroffensive. Air strikes with Sukhoi fighter jets were considered but abandoned after the risk of collateral damage was found to be too high. Major General Ranbir Singh announced after the mission that the action had been preemptive as well as retaliatory as intelligence revealed that the groups had planned further attacks into India in the near future.

The political impact of this military action is unmistakable. Domestically, it reinforces Narendra Modi’s image as a tough, no-nonsense prime minister willing to take difficult and potentially uncomfortable decisions. Regionally, the raid into Myanmar sent a strong message to insurgents taking refuge in India’s neighbouring states that Modi’s India is willing to come after them if necessary. It also put China on notice that its support of rebel groups in India’s northeastern region has not gone unnoticed and localised cooperation will thwart Beijing’s perfidious intentions, by force if necessary. As the greatest patron of cross-border terrorism in the region, Pakistan could not have failed to get the message implicit in the Indian Army’s raid into Myanmar.

For some, the eager reporting on the incident has come off as unwarranted, jingoistic chest-thumping. This, of course, is an activity reserved solely for one’s own convenience and no other. In any case, the context of such euphoria explains its reasons quite well:  Indians feel that, over the decades, they have consistently come out worse in asymmetric conflict with their neighbours. The unsatisfactory response to repeated attacks on Bombay (March 1993, July 2006, November 2008, July 2011), the hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC 814 to Kandahar in December 1999, and the attack on the Lok Sabha in December 2001, not to mention the countless ambushes of police and military convoys have left most feeling anaemic in a deteriorating security situation. While this was not the first Indian counter-terrorism operation, it was one of the very few known ones that acted with such speed, focus, purpose, and was so successful.

In response to India’s operations in the East, Pakistan’s interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, warned Delhi that such adventures will not succeed against his country which was capable of giving a befitting reply. “Pakistan is not Myanmar,” Nisar reminded India. There are several points here: first, such rhetoric is expected in international relations – in fact, it would be astonishing if Rawalpindi announced that it was worried about India’s resolve and would consequently roll up some of the terrorist camps along the Line of Control. Second, no two military operations are exactly alike and to compare Indian operations in Myanmar, conducted in concert with a cooperative neighbour, with potential raids into the terrorist safe haven of Pakistan stretches credulity. India’s options against Pakistan are different from those it has in the east. Nevertheless, Tuesday’s operation is a far cry from winding up covert operations against enemies in the east and west as former prime ministers PV Narasimha Rao and IK Gujral did. In that sense, what may be mistaken for chest-thumping is actually relief.

All said and done, the government could have managed the post-operation publicity with more aplomb. A single informative statement from the military that covered all aspects of the mission they were willing to discuss would have been preferable to the buffet of contradictions and multiplicity of government voices on the subject. Contrary to some concerns, the publicity will not hurt future operations – it is highly unlikely that terrorists do not know that the Indian Army possesses drones, commandos, and helicopters. Silence only keeps the common citizen in the dark. Besides, a public celebration of such successes is important for citizens’ morale as well as geopolitical signalling.

Many Indians take particular pride in their country’s use of soft power in sensitive regions like Afghanistan and are allergic to the “cowboy solutions” for which some other countries have an affinity. This, however, should not be construed for being a soft state. Unfortunately, that is exactly what India had become in the name of prudence. Tuesday’s actions smacked of an Israeli flavour, something that has many admirers in India. The raid into Myanmar, though not conducive to a cut-paste job to the Western front, was nonetheless a first step in the rebuilding of Indian special operations capabilities. Raising it to be a panacea to all of India’s asymmetric security ills and then to criticise it is to just tilt at straw men.

This post appeared on FirstPost on June 11, 2015.