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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: al Kibar

Diminishing the Heathens

18 Fri May 2018

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Book Review

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Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Ahmed Yassin, al Kibar, Ali Hassan Salameh, Aman, Amichay Ayalon, Atef Bseiso, Avigdor Ben-Gal, Avraham Shalom, Barak Ben-Zur, Black September, Eliyahu Cohen, fedayeen, FLLF, Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners, IDF, Israel, Israeli Defence Forces, Isser Harel, Joint War Room, Kav 300, Meir Dagan, milchemet mitzvah, milchemet reshut, Mivtza Za'am Ha'el, Moshe Yaalon, Mossad, Muhammad Suleimani, Nazi, Operation Atlas, Osirak, Otto Skorzeny, Palestine Liberation Organisation, PLO, R Shila, Rafael Eitan, Rise and Kill First, Ronen Bergman, Sayeret Matkal, Shin Bet, shudder under the wing, Simon Wiesenthal, Torat Cohanim, Vayikra, Wolfgang Lotz, Yedioth Ahronoth, Yuval Diskin, Zikit, Zvi Zamir

Ronen Bergman

Bergman, Ronen. Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. New York: Random House, 2018. 784 pp.

“If a man comes to kill you, rise early and kill him first,” said the Talmudist Shila of Kefar Tamarta. This spirit has suffused Israeli security policy even since its pre-independence days, argues Ronen Bergman in his latest book that has conveniently – and appropriately – borrowed the amora’s words for its title – Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. In an impressive survey of assassinations from the days of the Bar Giora brigades through the Hashomer, Haganah, Irgun, Lehi, and eventually the modern apparatus of state – Mossad, Shin Bet, AMAN, and the Israeli Defence Forces along with the various special operations units associated with it, Bergman argues that the tactical brilliance and spectacular successes of Israel’s security forces has obscured its strategic failure to bring peace to the country. If decades of targeted assassinations have not worked, is it perhaps time for Israel to look to other methods?

Rise and Kill First has admirably steered clear of two pitfalls that ensnare books like this – the first is to get side-tracked into a brief history of the Israeli conflict with the Arabs, and the second is to slip into either a jingoistic, chest-thumping defence of whatever Israel has done or an ingratiating, Muharram-esque mea culpa for the country’s “misdeeds.” Bergman, the senior political and military analyst for Israel’s largest daily newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, has remained a critical yet understanding observer of Israeli security politics over a vagarious century and presented a fair and balanced analysis by any standards.

It is tempting to delve into some of the dozens of missions discussed in Rise and Kill First, the stunning successes, the indomitable courage, the mind-boggling oversights, and the fatigued callousness. Indeed, the book reads like a thriller and is hard to put down despite its heft. What is important, however, is the framework of Israeli security thinking – its assumptions, its resources, and its goals – that Bergman creates for the reader. Naturally, this framework evolves from the pre-state days to through that of the fledgling Jewish republic to the contemporary system challenged as much by religious terror as Arab nationalism.

Although Bergman’s story starts in the first decade of the 20th century, he spends a scant few pages on Zionist activities during the Mandate period. That period is better covered in Bruce Hoffman’s Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel but Bergman distills a picture of monstrous Arab hatred for the Jews. Operation Atlas, for example, was a joint Nazi-Arab mission to parachute near Tel Aviv and poison the city’s water supply to kill all the Jews. Later, during the War of Independence, the Secretary General of the Arab League, Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, declared before invading Israel, “This will be a war of great destruction and slaughter that will be remembered like the massacres carried out by the Mongols and the Crusaders.” Bergman only briefly alludes to this extreme malevolence with which Arabs held Jews but this dimension is elaborated upon in Klaus Gensicke’s Der Mufti von Jerusalem und die Nationalsozialisten and David Motadel’s Islam and Nazi Germany’s War.

From the outset, it was clear that Jews could expect no quarter from the Arabs. This informed Israeli policy towards its neighbours in the early decades after independence: it did not see itself as committed to the borders laid out in United Nations Resolution 181 in November 1947 because it was evident that the Arabs did not accept the partition plan either. Israel’s security agencies were pushed to the limit in performing traditional roles of intelligence gathering on its Arab neighbours and preventing marauding attacks by wandering fedayeen. David Ben Gurion was also pressed by recalcitrant Jews belonging to the Irgun and Lehi unsure of living in a socialistic Israel. One of the ironclad principles Israeli agencies have followed until this day, without exception, was forged in this climate – we don’t kill Jews, Isser Harel, the first director of Shin Bet (Sherut ha-Bitahon haKlali – General Security Service) and later of Mossad (HaMossad leModi’in uleTafkidim Meyuhadim – Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations), declared with finality.

The Mossad, established in 1949, set for itself the role of protecting Jews not just in Israel but all over the world. This may seem like a trivial detail or hubristic overreach to most but as the only Jewish state in the world, so soon after the Shoah, the First Generation decided to take upon themselves the defence of Jewish civilisation. With dozens of Christian and Muslim states whose narratives and interactions form the mainstream, the notion of a civilisational state may seem quaint to many but it held vital importance to the early Israelis.

The early targets of Israel’s “negative treatment,” as the professional lingo goes, were former Nazi scientists continuing their wartime research on advanced weapons for new, Arab masters. Nazis in hiding were also a matter of importance but it was clearly understood that these were symbolic and emotional targets rather than threats to Israel’s security. As a result, the hunt for Nazis petered out and the Mossad, ever pragmatic, was willing to recruit one former Nazi – Otto Skorzeny – to acquire a vital and recurring source of inside information about Egypt’s missile programme; in exchange, Israel promised not to come after him for his crimes during World War II and even attempted – unsuccessfully – to get him off Simon Wiesenthal’s list of most wanted Nazi war criminals.

Like any good thing, Israel was established on the highest moral principles and its security agencies were no different. Revenge is not a Jewish trait and is explicitly forbidden in Vayikra 19:18. Indeed, as Bergman notes about Natan Rotberg, an innovative bomb-maker in the Shayetet 13 (naval commando force), he did not act with hatred in his heart. “You need to know how to forgive,” Rotberg had told the author in an interview in 2015. This principle finds its way also into the legal opinion of the military advocate general written many years later that sets the parameters of an assassination operation as one in which harm is imminent and is not for revenge or punishment for a past act. The IDF’s Human Resources Directorate has even consulted with philosophers in academia to define the scope of some of their policies. Admittedly, like all things human and corruptible, these noble principles and well-intentioned guidelines have not strictly been followed over the years, especially in the heat of battle.

One of Israel’s early methods of assassination, parcel bombs, such as the ones used to eliminate the head of Egyptian intelligence, Col Mustafa Hafez, and Salah Mustafa, the Egyptian military attaché in Jordan stirred up some debate. Although this method presented the least danger for operatives, particularly in hostile territories, it also left to chance the success of the mission – parcels could be intercepted; someone else could open it; the target might only be injured or maimed and killed. Agents refrained from sending parcel bombs to their targets except in the most necessary of conditions; despite the risks and uncertainty involved, the method had quite a high success rate particularly in Gaza. Nevertheless, Mossad and its sister organisations moved away from using parcel bombs as soon as technology allowed them something more accurate and certain.

Bergman’s work also reveals how little counter-terrorism cooperation Israel has received from Europe and the United States. Although Washington entered into an information sharing agreement with Jerusalem after the Suez Crisis in 1956 and began selling military equipment and extending aid after the Six-Day War in 1967, Israeli intelligence always found their Western counterparts unresponsive to security alerts and generally dismissive of Jewish concerns. For its part, Israel, too, hesitated to operate in friendly countries without the permission of the local authorities: Jerusalem had decided that it might need European help in other arenas and it was not worth antagonising them.

That all changed after the massacre of the Israeli Olympians in Munich in 1972. German security was criminally negligent and incompetent from the beginning to end and the result was the death of 11 Israelis. Then prime minister Golda Meir rescinded her orders to Mossad not to operate in Europe, though they have always been cautious about doing so. Interestingly, former Mossad chief Zvi Zamir reaffirmed Rotberg’s view in a February 2006 interview to the Israeli daily Haaretz that Mivtza Za’am Ha’el was not motivated by revenge but by the desire to ensure that such a tragedy never repeats itself.

The United States outdid the sluggish Europeans by maintaining close relations to the Palestinian movement through Ali Hassan Salameh, the chief of operations for Black September – the group that had carried out the Munich massacre. Langley frequently helped move Salameh around, tipped him off about Israeli surveillance, and even paid for his honeymoon (to Hawaii and Disneyland). Similar courtesies were extended to Atef Bseiso, the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) head of intelligence; both were eventually dispatched by Israel.

When Israeli intelligence did manage to carry out a successful execution, Western nations severely criticised the Jewish state if the operation was carried out on their soil, for even the slightest collateral damage, and a general appeal to abjure from violence. It was blatant hypocrisy but became more apparent when all condemnation fell silent after the attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001. Israel, long used to being counter-terrorism’s Cassandra, suddenly found itself in large crowds and asked to train foreign services in their methods.

Israeli security agencies have obviously evolved over the years to counter new threats and take into account the latest technologies. One periodisation that Rise and Kill First offers divides the history of independent Israel into four eras. The first was an era of material weakness of the Jewish state and largely inter-state conflict with its neighbours. Even the fedayeen terrorism was strongly controlled by the security services of neighbouring Arab states and dropped off as Israel hit back directly at them.

The Six-Day War marks the beginning of the second period, when Palestinians realised that their dream of creating an Arab state in the remaining 23 percent of Mandatory Palestine – the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan had been created with 77 percent in April 1921 – could not be achieved by relying on Arab strength of arms. Despite its inferiority in numbers, the Jewish state had repeatedly prevailed over Arab armies and irregulars time and again. The second period marks the mushrooming of terrorist groups and an exponential expansion in the scope and range of their activities. Although state support had lessened, it had not vanished entirely. Furthermore, as with any organisation, there had been some institutionalisation of knowledge and a new generation of terrorists had learned from the mistakes of their predecessors. The new profile characteristically led to a greater diversity of targets that were not all strictly restricted to the boundaries of Israel. International airlines were hijacked on routes that carried a greater number of Jews and Israelis were targeted for assassination.

After the initial surprise had worn off, Israeli intelligence quickly adapted and struck harder with the help of in-house special teams such as Caesarea and the military’s commando forces like the Sayeret Matkal, the Shayetet 13, and Shaldag to reach far beyond the Greater Levant and strike terrorist leaders. However, Palestinian groups had developed elaborate funding networks and become better armed over the years that Israel was forced to use increasingly greater force against terrorist targets. Collateral damage and brutality correspondingly increased on both sides and the war in Lebanon saw a particularly dark chapter in the history of Israeli targetted assassinations.

Until Lebanon, Israel’s covert operations had taken exceptional care to avoid collateral damage. Missions were scrubbed repeatedly over the sudden appearance of family and were never planned in crowded public areas. This is not to say that there were no unintended casualties but great efforts were taken to keep them to a minimum. Even Meir Dagan’s innovative methods with the Zikit squads of rooting out terrorists in Gaza in the early 1970s did not ratchet up a civilian body count.

Ariel Sharon had sold Israel’s political leaders a bill of goods on Lebanon and Israel’s increasing frustration at the lack of (mis)anticipated success in the conflict caused the IDF to hit harder. Additionally, Israel’s allies in Lebanon, the Maronite Catholic Phalange led by Pierre Gemayel, were savage barbarians who had their own scores to settle with the Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims. On several occasions, Mossad had refused to work with them and some officers had even resigned in protest but the exigencies of war had a momentum of their own. The brutality between the Christians and Muslims dragged the IDF in and after particularly brutal attack in Nahariya in 1979, IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan ordered the setting up of the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners.

The FLLF operated without the constraints restricting Israeli intelligence. In other words, no heed was given to collateral damage and hundreds of civilians were killed in operations that targetted PLO assets. To conceal Israel’s role, the group set itself up as another of a dozen terrorist groups and even claimed credit for (but never carried out) attacks on Israeli targets and allies. By all standards of international law, Israel’s FLLF indulged in terrorism. IDF General Avigdor Ben-Gal insists that a key difference between the FLLF and Arab terrorist groups, however little consolation it may be to its victims, was that the former ultimately targetted the PLO rather than sow terror with indiscriminate acts of violence. Regardless, many Israelis have come to see Lebanon as Israel’s Vietnam in that the alliance with an unsavoury local outfit propagated a moral contagion among Israeli security agencies as well.

The third era came with the First Intifada in 1987. Decades of failed promises and corruption had eroded the authority of Palestinian leaders on the street. The uprising was sparked off as a spontaneous groundswell after a minor incident – an IDF truck accidentally crashed into a car killing four Palestinians – became a symbol of Israeli callousness towards Palestinian lives. The entirety of Israel’s security services were unprepared and at a loss as to how to deal with the riots and every use of force was projected to the world as state brutality against unarmed civilians in a reversal of the David and Goliath story. The fact of the matter, however, is that much of the deaths during the Intifada were due to intra-Palestinian settling of scores.

Hamas’ introduction of suicide bombing in 1994 again shocked Israel. The very willingness of the suicide bomber to die changed the equation and made the fear of Israeli counter-terrorism less effective in that the terrorists were already prepared to die.

Bergman’s research reveals that Israeli intelligence was not outdone merely by the terrorists’ tactics and technological acquisitions (mainly from Iran and Syria) in the turbulent period between the outbreak of the First Intifada and the end of the Second Intifada in 2005 but were intellectually in the wrong place to understand the evolving threat from their neighbourhood. The head of Shin Bet, Amichay Ayalon, for example, was initially quite pleased with the enervation of the PLO and the rise of Hamas in the early 1990s. In a surprising misreading from a sabra, Bergman relays that Ayalon believed that the Islamism of Hamas was preferable to the nationalism of the PLO. Similarly, the Israelis could not process Hamas co-founder Ahmed Yassin’s quiet admission to Barak Ben-Zur, head of AMAN’s terrorism branch, that “[t]here will never be peace. We will take what you give but we will never give up our armed struggle.” It took much blood to be spilled before Israeli intelligence gained its bearings again.

Early failures against the Intifada had begun a revolution inside the Israeli security establishment. The agencies were relying more and more on modern technology to identify relevant data and collate it in a manner meaningful to operatives on the ground. Israel was among the first countries to track terrorists using their mobile phones and also the first to introduce drones in targetted killings. Computers had also been brought in during the leadership of Ayalon to look for patterns and put everything together. Moshe Yaalon, when made chief of the IDF’s Central Command, together with the head of Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin, created a Joint War Room where information from all sources would be pooled to be analysed. The JWR quickly bore fruit and the intelligence agencies were able to interdict terror operations into Israel. Combined with a high-tech border security fence, access to Israel became much harder for would-be terrorists.

Bergman’s periodisation fits snugly with political and technological developments readers would already be aware of. The unique contribution of Rise and Kill First is the psychological and emotional cost of a grinding war of attrition and its effects on jus in bello. Israeli intelligence had strict guidelines regarding the rules of engagement but the more numerous and bloody terrorist attacks became, the more lax Israeli commandos seemed to be about the rules in return. “Shudder under the wing” was the phrase one commander used to describe how his pilots were supposed to feel about bombing a terrorist target.

Interestingly, the Israeli public at large would not have any of this callous attitude. Errors in Israeli counter-terrorism brought sharp cries from common Israelis, demanding that their government maintain a civility in its response to terrorism. The outrage over extra-judicial killings by the Shin Bet in the Parashat Kav 300 in 1984 nearly toppled a government and ended the career of Avraham Shalom, then head of Shin Bet. Yet while insisting on high moral standards from its armed forces, Israelis were equally unforgiving on their leaders for allowing terrorism to continue unabated. The terms were clear – kill those terrorists without mercy but do so in keeping with civil and moral standards; do not become them.

Perhaps the most surprising revelation in Rise and Kill First is the enormous number of mistakes Israel’s intelligence services made in their operations that either failed to kill their prey, allowed him to escape, caused unmanageable collateral damage, or simply was a mess from beginning to end. This is certainly not the Mossad of legend, and Bergman’s telling of the story pulls the most feared and admired intelligence service in the world back down into the realm of ordinary mortals.

There is a scene in the 2005 movie, The Constant Gardener, in which an Amnesty International activist, Tessa Quayle, says to the resident MI-6 agent in Kenya, “I thought you spies knew everything.” Tim Donohue, the agent, replies, “Only God knows everything and He works for the Mossad.”

Bergman’s work suggests that the Mossad, after a few spectacular successes in the early years, settled back and became an organisation of pencil-pushing bureaucrats whose non-performance was protected by secrecy laws. For many years, most of the counter-terrorism workload had been borne by Shin Bet and AMAN (Agaf HaModi’in – Directorate of Military Intelligence) with firepower assistance from the IDF. It was during the prime ministership of Ariel Sharon that Meir Dagan was appointed the head of Mossad to reconvert the “effete” outfit back into one of spies with “daggers between their teeth.”

By the very nature of the conflicts Israel has found itself in, the legends of its intelligence community are mostly from counter-terrorism operations. Bergman reminds us of the few stunning successes they have had in more conventional activities against their neighbours as well. The exploits of Wolfgang Lotz and Eliyahu Cohen are well-known as are the bombing of the nuclear reactors in Iraq (Osirak, 1981) and Syria (Al-Kibar, 2007) but less known are exploits such as the elimination of Egypt’s entire military supreme command hours before the Suez Crisis began or the assassination of Muhammad Suleimani, the National Security Advisor to President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, in his house in Tartus. Such missions not only set enemy ambitions back but also paralysed them with fear that Israel was listening in at every moment and they might be the next targets.

Of course, some of Israeli intelligence operations contributed to the Jewish state’s resounding successes in its wars with its Arab neighbours. Just days before the Suez Crisis in 1956, for example, the precursor of AMAN’s (Agaf HaModi’in – Directorate of Military Intelligence) Unit 8200, responsible for signals intelligence, picked up information that placed the entire Egyptian military supreme command on a plane from Damascus to Cairo. On the afternoon of October 28, hours before land operations were to commence, the Israeli Air Force shot down one of the two Ilyushin Il-14s ferrying Egypt’s military leaders and wiped out its senior command. In the capture of Gaza in the subsequent war, Israel uncovered secret files that contained a long list of Palestinian terrorists conducting hit-and-run missions into Israel; over the next year, each of them received a parcel in the mail.

Bergman’s argument that Israel has for long succeeded and brilliantly at the tactical level against her enemies but has not achieved her strategic goals despite a body count that keeps steadily creeping upwards is not a new one. Daniel Byman’s A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism makes a similar point. The author suggests that the only solution is peace negotiations with the Palestinians, and he offers the change in thinking of two fiercely hawkish leaders – Sharon and Dagan – as food for thought in his study. These are not the only warriors turned peacemakers – Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak, and several other Israeli prime ministers and leaders who have had a distinguished military record have come to feel the nihilism of conflict without end.

Well-intentioned though this position may be, the operational benefits of wearing down experience through assassinations cannot be denied, and the statements of Yassin and dozens like him cannot be dismissed. How do you fight an enemy that will not stop attacking you until you or he is dead?

Rise and Kill First does not try to judge or solve Israel’s imbroglio with the Arabs. Rather, it seeks to focus on the consequences of Israel’s preferred policy of targetted assassinations. Several times, the figure eliminated was replaced by someone far more capable and worse. Even if this were not the case and terror groups have dissolved owing to Israeli strikes, others have sprung up in its place. Bergman sensitively discusses the psychological toll of such never-ending operations in a book packed with detail for the trivia aficionado and historian as well as ethicist and policy wonk.

Despite being trained as a lawyer – with an M.Phil in international relations and a doctorate in history from Cambridge as well – there is little legal analysis in Rise and Kill First. Rather, Bergman leaves as much of the story as possible to participants because it is also a story of a clash of personalities and philosophies – Menachem Begin’s Biblical nostalgia, Efraim Halevy’s concern for diplomatic fallout, Sharon’s Joshua complex (the Israelite commissioned by G-d to conquer the land of Canaan in a milchemet mitzvah – obligatory war), Dagan the scalpel.

Bergman’s seven years of research and over one thousand interviews conducted shines through in the magisterial Rise and Kill First. This book is an invaluable contribution to several fields of study – security studies, ethics, foreign policy, and the history of Israel. Pace the seriousness and complexity of its topic, Rise and Kill First is a captivating read with even a slight emotional roller coaster of a novel.

Violence is a serious affair in Judaism and not something to be taken up lightly. Over their history, Jews have seldom been in a position to engage in wars and hence their thoughts on jus ad bellum and jus in bello – just war and just conduct in war – have not been highly developed. However, the Talmud lays down several conditions that makes it very difficult to go to war. As Bergman quotes in his opening, the scriptures say of defensive wars to rise and kill first. And of preemptive defensive war, the Sages say (Sotah 44b) to diminish the heathen before he comes and wages war against you.

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Blind Man’s Bluff

04 Sun Mar 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

≈ Comments Off on Blind Man’s Bluff

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al Kibar, Arak, enrichment, Fordow, GBU, heavy water, ICBM, Iran, Minuteman, Mivtza Opera, MOAB, MOP, Natanz, non-proliferation, nuclear, Osirak, Tomahawk, Trident, TTPV, United States, uranium

In a recent interview with Atlantic magazine, President Barack Obama declared that as president of the United States, he doesn’t bluff when it comes to the use of military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. He went on,

I also don’t, as a matter of sound policy, go around advertising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and the Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say.

Dismissing the idea that the United States does not have the capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the President also stated that Iran represents a profound national security threat to the United States even if Israel were not part of the equation; Obama reiterated that Iran has been and is a state sponsor of terrorism and an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger a domino effect in the Middle East, resulting in a Saudi, Turkish, and perhaps even Egyptian nuclear weapons programme.

Was Obama’s interview merely an election year gimmick or is there mettle in his words? Is a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in fact possible? The President seemed quite confident of a successful US strike against Iranian facilities were he to give it the green light, but given the insurmountable difficulties such a mission entails, it is difficult to accept Obama’s words at face value. Beheading the Iranian nuclear monster is not a fraternity challenge that one enters into inebriated – it is an exceedingly complicated task that will take enormous resources, may cost many lives, will have unintended consequences, and for all that, has a low probability of genuine resolution of the Iranian problem. It would be wise to consider fully the many obstacles to victory.

1. Evidence: Neither the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) nor American intelligence has yet come across any conclusive evidence that Iran is proceeding towards nuclear weapons. There have indeed been many false calls in the past regarding the function of specific Iranian laboratories such as at Chalus and Lavizan. An assault on Iran only to find that there were indeed no nuclear weapons would rekindle the acrimony caused by President George W. Bush’s search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq a decade earlier. Is President Obama willing to take the risk of starting another war on mere suspicion?

2. Cost of War: Unless US forces land in Iran, there can be no confirmation of either the presence or destruction of nuclear weapons research. This would entail tens of thousands of troops with all the implied support – logistical, armour, air cover, etc. – in hostile terrain. Given the size of the country and dispersion of its nuclear sites, it is highly unlikely that any operation could take less than six months – even this time frame is assuming virtually uncontested terrain and large teams of scientists and engineers to maximise speed. Although the White House would not intend the war with Iran to involve occupation, that is effectively what it will be, for Iran’s nuclear facilities stretch from their easternmost at Narigan in central Iran to Bonab in the west, almost at the Iran-Iraq-Turkey border – a distance of 1,600 kms. Controlling such a huge swath of land is not impossible or even necessarily difficult for US forces, but it could become expensive in lives and dollars. Juan Cole estimates, somewhat absurdly, that a war with Iran would cost $3 trillion, but even sensible calculations would put the costs near $80 billion (assuming similar troop concentrations and costs as in Iraq) for a six-month operation. These costs will be above the regular defence budget – the figures the Cost of War project has produced calculate only incremental funds that are expended due to the war. For example, soldiers’ regular pay is not included but combat pay is included. Potential future costs, such as future medical care for soldiers and veterans wounded in the war, are not included. These figures also do not include additional interest payments on the national debt that will result from higher deficits due to war spending. Factoring in these costs would raise the bill for a six-month 170,000 troops-strong deployment to near $250 billion (using the same methodology as the Joint Economic Committee of Congress). Meanwhile, temperatures between May and October in Iran range from the mid-40s to 50°C. Is President Obama willing to subject the US economy, already struggling with sluggish growth and unemployment, to further strains of such magnitude?

3. Geography: The full Iranian nuclear establishment is spread over 23 known sites, out of which five have attracted the attention of the media and nuclear wonks as critical installations: the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the heavy water factory at Arak, the uranium enrichment laboratories at Natanz and Fordow, and the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan.

Iranian nuclear facilities Critical Iranian nuclear facilities
Figure 1: Complete (known)
Iranian nuclear facilities
Figure 2: Critical Iranian
nuclear facilities

Of these, the two most important sites, Fordow (near Qom) and Natanz, are hardened facilities, meaning they are buried underground and the roof is constructed of reinforced concrete. Bushehr, the site of Iran’s first reactor (purchased from the US in 1967), is more of a symbolic target as most experts now agree that an LWR (Light Water Reactor) poses little threat of proliferation on its own since its production of fissile plutonium is minuscule. Of course, any of the other sites are liable to military strikes as well and if the US does embark upon the military option, it would be foolish not to damage the other sites responsible for mining, milling, isotope separation (uranium enrichment with the use of lasers), ballistics tests, and research.

What is obvious from the maps is that these sites are, unlike Osirak in Iraq and al Kibar in Syria, multiple and far apart. To allow unimpeded precision bombing of these sites, total air superiority and the elimination of air defences will have to be achieved for the duration of the operation. Although not impossible, even a layperson will see that an Iranian adventure will have nothing covert and surgical about it but will be a longer, more thorough, and more expensive operation. Has President Obama considered the size and tasks of an Iranian excursion even achieving minimum results? More importantly, does he have the complete list of Iranian nuclear sites or will he be striking blindly?

4. Capability: Some doubts have surfaced whether the US military arsenal contains ordinance that is physically capable of destroying Iran’s underground nuclear complex. But most of these analyses assumes a one-bomb kill scenario, which would indeed be impossible. However, as former IAF commander Major General Eitan Ben-Eliyahu explains, “even if one bomb would not suffice to penetrate, we could guide other bombs directly to the hole created by the previous ones and eventually destroy any target.” Analysing the mission requirements and available arsenal, after a few simple calculations, it appears that Obama was correct in dismissing the rumours that Iran’s fortified sites are invulnerable to presently available munitions. Back-of-the-envelope calculations against the core Iranian installations (with 75% reliability, assuming reinforced concrete ranging from 35-75 MPa) suggest the following:

  • Isfahan (100,000 sqft, overground) – 5 GBU-27s, requiring a similar number of F-16s
  • Natanz (646,000 sqft, underground) – 50 GBU-28s, requiring 25 F-15s if each can carry two bombs
  • Arak (55,000 sqft, overground) – 8 GBU-10s, requiring a similar number of F-16s
  • If missile sites close to nuclear targets (Bakhtarun, Khorramabad, Manzariyah, Hasa, Qom) were included, 4 GBU 27s and GBU 10s per site can be used, adding another 10 F-16s to the mission

The armada for just a small portion of Iran’s nuclear structure adds up to 50 F-15s and 23 F-16s. Add at least another 50 F-16s to provide escort and suppress enemy air defences, and the total shoots up to 123 aircraft (as a comparison, the Israeli air force has 72 F-15s and 248 F-16s – though not impossible, contrary to the rhetoric, the IAF would be hard-pressed to conduct a strike against Iran on its own). Additionally, depending upon the attack plan, KC-135 tankers will be required for mid-air refuelling. For an armada of 123 aircraft, that would amount to approximately 15 KC-135s. Again, this is just to strike three nuclear sites and five missile sites right next to them – any expansive operation targeting all nuclear sites would demand more air power. Finally, factoring in air defences, missile sites, radar operators, etc. would place an exceptional burden upon the US air force.

The US has in its arsenal the GBU-43B and the GBU-57B, both of which can be delivered only by the B-2, B-52, or a C-130. Using fighters with the smaller but more numerous bombs allows greater manoeuvrability in the air (though there is the added element of stealth with the B-2). Of course, any attack can be augmented by a barrage of missiles raining down upon the targets, but these are not likely to be as effective as the bombs. The most powerful payload, 315 kgs of high explosives, is carried by the Tomahawk (RGM/UGM-109C TLAM-C) and slightly more than the GBU-28’s 290 kgs. However, the TLAM-C is not as effective a penetrator as the GBU-28, and the Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant (TTPV), RGM-109H, has not yet been battle-tested.

It is possible, however, that Iran has used ultra-high performance concrete (UHPC) in the construction of facilities for its national jewel, the nuclear programme. This type of concrete is relatively new but old enough to be off the drawing board. Like its regular cousin, UHPC is a mix of sand and cement, but doped with polymer fibres and pure powdered quartz. Australian studies in 2006 involving six tonnes of TNT and UHPC panels showed that the panels were fractured but not shattered – Israeli declarations that repeated bombing would soften the facilities seem dubious in light of this study. Furthermore, it is not sure how the GBU-57B, penetrating 9m of 69 MPa reinforced concrete would perform against UHPC (or is classified). This leaves only the most powerful (and hopefully sure) option – ballistic missiles.

It is most likely that Israel has also considered the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) against Iranian structures given the difficulty of an aerial assault. This is certainly an option that is open to the US, but one that requires a leap of imagination – ICBMs have never been used in a war until now (Scuds are theatre missiles), and may be seen as overkill by many opposed to a military option. Nevertheless, a logistically simpler option does remain open to the US, that of conventionally-tipped ICBMs. The Trident, with its 2,800-kg throw-weight and the Minuteman III with 1,150-kg throw-weight deliver a far more significant punch than any other weapon in the US arsenal. Of course, the Trident costs $70 million per unit and the Minuteman III $7 million per piece, with circular error probables (CEP) of 90 m and 150 m.

Undoubtedly, the surest way of turning Iran’s nuclear facilities into craters (and a guaranteed way) is deploying special forces. But this method connects directly to duration of conflict, safety of troops, cost, and the fog of war.

Thus, in terms of capability, President Obama is probably not bluffing. Even accounting for the strongest defence, Iranian facilities are not impregnable if the political will to expend significant assets and resources is there. But after such tremendous effort, it is likely that the Iranian nuclear programme is set back, at most, a decade. Is President Obama willing to authorise the use of such force against Iran only to delay their programme a handful of years?

5. Law of Unintended Consequences: Through Thucydides, the Greeks tell us,

Think too of the great part that is played by the unpredictable…; think of it now, before you are actually committed…the longer a [crisis] lasts, the more things tend to depend on accidents. Neither you nor we can see into them: we have to abide their outcome in the dark.1

The Romans warn us by way of Tacitus, “Once killing starts, it is difficult to draw the line.2” Any leader would do well to heed these warnings from the Ancients, for no strike on Iran will be confined within the borders of Iran, nor will the repercussions be merely within the realm of conventional warfare. Some of the fallout of a US strike on Iran could be

  • Withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): This is almost a certainty; citing the need to deter further aggression by the US (or Israel or one of its other neighbours), Iran will withdraw from the NPT as Article X.1 allows: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” This shall make any future negotiations about nuclear issues with Iran all the more difficult.
  • Iran will become even more determined to acquire nuclear weapons. If, indeed, its programme was purely civilian up until now, it will become a military programme and clandestine one at that too. A very likely scenario is one in which Iran emerges as a major buyer on the nuclear black market – financially susceptible states like North Korea and Pakistan would be tempted by Iranian oil credits and pose a greater proliferation risk.
  • With Iran embroiled in a war, oil prices will shoot up – sanctions have already driven up oil prices to $120 per barrel, and experts say that oil could easily hit $150 per barrel before the end of 2012 if fighting breaks out.
  • It is possible that Iran might strike out at Israel with its Shahab missiles, targeting civilian centres and military bases as well as Israel’s own nuclear infrastructure. Iran might also strike out at oil facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in an effort to send oil prices skyrocketing. After all, the Kingdom did allow Israel to fly over its territory if the latter were striking Iran.
  • Tehran’s connection to Hamas, the Hezbollah, and the Mahdi Army are well-known. Any US strike on Iran will see the latter on the short end of the stick; as in any situation when faced with overwhelming conventional might, a state might make use of asymmetric strategies. Targets could be any US or Israeli asset worldwide, as attacks on Israeli embassies in Argentina (1992), India (2012), and Georgia (2012) have shown. Furthermore, Hamaz and Hezbollah could increase their rocket attacks on Israel in conjunction with Iranian missile attacks.
  • Tehran could also increase support of Shi’a insurgencies in Iraq, Bahrain, and Qatar, throwing the entire Middle East into turmoil.
  • Even if Iran’s nuclear fangs are successfully removed, it will leave behind an emaciated state, hurting from decades of sanctions and the ravages of two wars. US intervention has already eliminated Iraq as a source of regional power. This power vacuum could raise tensions as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel rush to fill the gap. This state of disequilibrium is also ideal for the increase of Russian and Chinese influence in the region, as well as the spread of non-state actors.

Unless executed to the standards of perfection of a French chef, the game in the Middle East could very well turn out to be Russian roulette with a faulty pistol. Is President Obama willing to assume these risks in exchange for negotiating with Iran?

6. International Law: There is, of course, a small matter of international law involved (and it is indeed small). As Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota reminded the United Nations Secretary General, “One sometimes hears the expression, ‘all options are on the table.’ But some actions are contrary to international law.” Although Patriota is absolutely correct in his observation, the fact remains that no one is willing to nor has the power to punish the United States for attacking Iran unilaterally. To put this fact of realpolitik (or is it machtpolitik?) in legalese, the argument would be that national security is ultimately a sovereign right and the United States has already designated Iran’s nuclear programme as a serious national security threat. Critics who argue that such unilateral actions weaken the international system should realise that the system is only what its most powerful members wish it to be. While Pakistan and North Korea have escaped decapitating blows against their nuclear establishments and India has been awarded an nuclear deal that makes it a de facto if not de jure member of the Nuclear Club, Iran has been singled out as as example in defence of the non-proliferation cause. There is nothing President Obama has to worry about on this front – US restraint in the Iranian case will certainly not be a factor in a future Chinese decision to crush a Tibetan uprising or a Russian invasion of Belarus.

7. Result: Ultimately, after all the money has been spent and all the blood has been spilled, this is not a permanent resolution. Critics have argued that preemptive strikes against nascent nuclear states have never been successful, not even in the famed Operation Opera. In defence of such strikes, Amos Yidlan, one of the eight Israeli pilots that took part in Mivtza Opera, argues with some merit, “Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years — hence any successful strike would achieve a delay of only a few years.” The Iraqi nuclear programme ended not in 1981 after the Israeli strike on Osirak, but in 2003 when the US invaded the country. Similarly, no matter how much the White House tries its “shock and awe” routine, a guarantee of success cannot be achieved without boots on the ground – tens of thousands of them and for a while. Anything less will mean another US president facing the same dilemma ten years down the line. Is President Obama willing to countenance a risky military option with not only the uncertainty of success but the fair probability that the outcome will be half-baked?

Thankfully, Obama has shown wisdom beyond that required to wag a six-shooter. Whether he knows the twisted history of US-Iran relations or not, someone in his staff certainly does, and one can only hope his military planners have taken into account all the hurdles they will have to face if war does break out. In his interview, the president explained his preferred policy with Iran,

Our argument is going to be that it is important for us to see if we can solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily, and the only way historically that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa.

If Obama intends to demonstrate such sound foresight, then what is it that he is not bluffing about? Will the White House allow the demands of an election year tie their hands on Iran? Or will the president have the freedom and courage to make the right decisions? That President Obama is not bluffing (on the military option) may well be his bluff (to the Iranians) – but which game of bluff is the president playing? Is it Blind Man’s Bluff, the poker variant, or the childrens’ game? The former may be chancy, but the latter could be deadly.

——–

1: The History of the Peloponnesian Wars, 1.78
2: The Histories, 1.39

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