Tag Archives: Arab Spring

The Quest for Democracy in Syria

01 Tue Dec 2015

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In the March of 2011, the turbulence of the Arab Spring reached Syria. What began as agitated demonstrations quickly escalated into a civil war that has now claimed some 340,000 lives, displaced over seven and a half million people, and involves nearly a dozen countries. After almost five years of fighting, the situation still appears bleak and has become even more complex. Yet could this conflict have been resolved earlier before the various factions had become set in their demands? This is a dangerous yet tantalising counterfactual: if the Western powers had not been so insistent upon using the revolution to remove Bashar al-Assad from power, would Syria have turned into such a quagmire?

When the Arab Spring hit Syria, many wondered at what would replace the Ba’athist tyranny. Quick on the revolutionary bandwagon, Western leaders salivated at the chance of finally removing a pro-Russian government from power. The fall of Saddam Hussein had inadvertently promoted Iran up the ranks of regional powerdom and with Iraq still tottering on the brink of viability, the opportunity for a friendly if not necessarily pro-Western government in Syria was welcome. It is in the pursuit of this goal that the United States and its European allies constructed a narrative of bringing democracy to Syria. Assad must go for any peace to come to Syria, they argued, because it was the democratic will of the people. Years of bitter fighting has now changed this rosy view.

Had it merely been press statements and patronising editorials, Western policy could have been dismissed as the usual blend of naïveté and realpolitik. Unfortunately for the Syrian people, it has come at a far greater cost. What has been almost forgotten in recent commentaries on Syria is that Russia had approached the West with a peace deal in February 2012, when casualties stood around 7,500. According to Former Finnish president and Nobel peace prize laureate Martti Ahtisaari, the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, had approached him with a three-point plan. The Russian plan was simple and what the United States and Europe have come around to accepting only a couple of months ago as the best alternative. As Ahtisaari recalls, Churkin said, “Martti, sit down and I’ll tell you what we should do. One – we should not give arms to the opposition. Two – we should get a dialogue going between the opposition and Assad straight away. Three – we should find an elegant way for Assad to step aside.” Ahtisaari took this message to the American, British, and French delegations at the UN but they ignored the proposal, convinced that Assad was going to be booted out in a matter of weeks.

To be clear, Assad is no boy scout. He is a typical Arab authoritarian leader like Saddam Hussein was and the House of Saud is. Despite the trouble brewing in his neighbourhood all through 2010, he refused, just weeks before the unrest started, to relax his hold on the government. There would be no political pluralism, diversity of ideas, or greater tolerance on expression. During the civil war, Assad has been indiscriminate in his use of force in population centres, used heavy weapons such as cluster bombs, barrel bombs, thermobaric weapons, chemical weapons, and even Scud missiles against the rebels. Such behaviour has encouraged recruits into the ranks of ISIS, analysts point out. On a purely humanitarian basis, it is not difficult to see why anyone would wish Assad away.

However, it remains unclear as to what other options exist that are in any way better than Assad. Defeating ISIS, it is said in Western capitals, can only happen in conjunction with the removal of Assad from power. Yet the Syrian opposition gives little reason for confidence. Most of them are almost as conservative as Da’esh, albeit more restrained in their implementation of Islamic law. The West has always harped on moderate elements among the Syrian opposition but what that means in the Syrian context may not be entirely savoury. There is also this to be considered: can the moderate factions bring stability to Syria after Assad is gone and ISIS has been eliminated? Or will we see a bloodier version of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, with sectarian strife ripping the country apart?

Other than Assad’s forces and ISIS, one of the strongest orgainsations in Syria is the Jabhat al-Nusra. The group is essentially the al-Qa’ida front in Syria with the explicit near-term aim of overthrowing the Assad government and bringing Syria under Islamic law. However, the Nusra Front has pursued a smart long-term strategy focused on embedding itself into Syrian society. They have shown restraint in their application of the harsher tenets of sharia and have portrayed themselves more as nationalists than as Islamists to garner support of the Syrian people. For example, the Nusra Front is immediately more concerned with the ouster of Assad than global jihad. As a result, the group has become popular despite having an ideology almost as vicious as that of ISIS. The Nusra Front is also loyal to its parent organisation; over the years, Turkey and Qatar have repeatedly tried to bring the group out of the al-Qa’ida fold to make them more acceptable to the West as potential successors to the Assad regime but to no avail.

Another powerful group in the anti-Assad coalition is the Ahrar al-Sham, arguably the strongest faction in Syria both politically and militarily. The secret of its success lies in sustained backing from Turkey and Qatar, with even Saudi Arabia showing some interest of late. Again, the group is avowedly Islamist with loose ties to al-Qa’ida in the past but it is, like the Nusra Front, committed to ejecting Assad from power. Ahrar al-Sham also benefits from excellent organisation, which, according to Charles Lister, a senior consultant to the Shaikh Group and involved in Syria Track II dialogues, has allowed it to survive major losses such as the gutting of its leadership in September 2014. This administrative acumen indicates an able pool of people to run a post-Assad Syria but their ideology is just as unpalatable as the Nusra Front and the US Central Intelligence Agency has declined providing the Ahra al-Sham with training and weapons.

A third group worth mentioning as contending for a role in a new Syria is the Jaish al-Islam. The result of a merger of fifty or so smaller Damascene groups in September 2013, the Jaish al-Islam is a powerful militia in the conservative Islamist fold that is backed by Saudi Arabia. There have been consistent rumours that Riyadh has not only extended financial assistance to the group but also recruited instructors from Pakistan to provide them training, primarily because the Saudis were afraid that the Nusra Front had become too dominant a force in Syrian politics. Curiously, however, the ideology of the Jaish al-Islam is also Islamist in the al-Qa’ida mould, with the group’s leader, Zahran Alloush, calling Nusra Front fighters as his brothers and addressing Osama bin Laden with honorifics such as rahimahu Allah. However, the Jaish al-Islam is as devotedly anti-ISIS as it is anti-Assad and has released several videos that show the mass execution of captured ISIS fighters. Its battle strategy is as gruesome as that of ISIS, oftentimes using civilians as human shields to evade Allied air strikes. While their ideologies do not align perfectly, Jaish al-Islam has in fact cooperated with the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham on the battlefield in the past.

Groups like the Jaish al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham hold a reluctant interest for the West because they have been extremely effective against ISIS, more so than the more publicised Kurdish peshmerga. Furthermore, despite their unequivocally anti-ISIS and anti-Islamist stance, the Kurdish factions pose a problem in the long run because their Arab neighbours are wary that the price of Kurdish assistance against ISIS would be independence or at least autonomy. Interestingly, the one thing that unites everyone in Syria, from Assad to the Syria-focused Islamists, is the unity of the country. At a recent seminar in London organised by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lister stated that in his two and half years of close talks with the Syrian opposition, the overwhelming consensus – 90 to 95 per cent – was that Syria must stay as a single and unified state. Unfortunately for the West, the only groups who seem to be capable of holding a post-Assad Syria together are staunchly Islamist.

These prominent Islamist factions pose a more immediate problem too: they are Sunni extremists and as such, virulently against Syria’s several minority groups such as the Shia, Alawi, Druze, and Christians. Any anti-Assad coalition that includes groups like the Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jaish al-Islam will never gain the acceptance of minorities that have steadfastly remained loyal to Assad. In their opinion, a secular dictator is supremely preferable to a religious tyrant; they see little difference between the massacre of Yazidis around Sinjar by ISIS in August 2014 and the massacre of minorities in Adra by the Nusra Front and the Islamic Front, in December 2013. Any suggestion of incorporating Islamist groups into a Syrian political settlement is a non-starter while keeping the Islamists out would mean a long, bloody and protracted civil war.

There are, to be sure, scores of moderate, nationalist factions in the Syrian civil war too. Judging from the assessment made by the British Joint Intelligence Committee, this segment numbers about 75,000 fighters divided between 105 to 100 groups. The largest two, the Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army and the Northern Free Syrian Army, comprise 58 factions fielding 25,000 fighters and 14 factions fielding 20,000 fighters respectively. Both these groups have been amenable to a political settlement to the civil war but again, to the West’s misfortune, these groups have proven ineffective against Assad’s forces. In September 2015, the secretive US Military Operations Command in Amman withdrew support to the Southern Front after a string of battlefield failures against the Syrian Army. This has led to signs of splintering in the group, with some elements allegedly reaching out to more successful yet Islamist groups such as the Ahrar al-Sham.

With a lack of feasible anti-Assad options on the field of battle, there is also this to be considered: are Syrians capable of democracy, that too one with multicultural hues? Such questions are usually summarily dismissed as racist but it is worth bearing in mind that a democratic system is the embodiment of values already present in the people. Thus can be explained, for example, the institutional failure and weak democracy of India. The successful implantation of a democratic framework in West Germany and Japan after World War II can easily be countered by the failed democracies of over a dozen postcolonial African states, Pakistan, and Iraq. Hussein and Assad, little Stalins that they have been, may not nourish the lofty ideals of free expression and political freedom but at least they saved their countries from descending into sectarian bloodbaths. The hypocrisy of the West in demanding a perfect solution to the Syrian question can be seen among its regional allies in Saudi Arabia, a state that many have compared to ISIS unfavourably. The Western pursuit of democracy, or realpolitik, in the Middle East has unlocked an enormous wave of human tragedy.

Had the proposal that came to Ahtisaari in February 2012 been pursued, the Syrian tragedy might have been averted. Assad’s own infractions may have been responded to, at least partially, via sanctions and diplomatic pressure. Given that the country is surrounded by US allies, this would not have been too difficult. However, some diplomats from the P3 (Britain, France, United States) have alleged that no such proposal existed, or if it did, it was not serious. If this is true, it would still have been worth considering a future of Syria in which Assad had a role, at least temporarily. After all, a nationalist dictator might make for an uneasy region but a global jihadist ideology is inherently expansionist and an international ulcer. This latter event has been the cost of the Western pursuit of “democracy” in Syria.

This article first appeared in the December 2015 print edition of Swarajya.

The Nixon Doctrine and the Second Cold War

26 Thu Dec 2013

Posted by in United States

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In November 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton wrote an article, America’s Pacific Century, in Foreign Policy in which she drew an outline of US policy towards Asia over the foreseeable future. The six spokes of the pivot that Clinton outlined included strengthening bilateral security alliances, deepening America’s relationships with rising powers, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. In essence, the pivot heralded Washington’s realisation of Asia’s growing importance and the gradual shift of the centre of economic and political gravity back to the world’s largest continent.

Despite Washington’s repeated denials, analysts were quick to see the pivot as a US manoeuvre to balance China’s increasing political and economic muscle. Yet whatever Foggy Bottom’s intent was, a realignment of American military and economic attention from the Atlantic to the Pacific would inevitably reduce Beijing’s room to manoeuvre – this is a fact of machtpolitik one cannot get around. China’s increasing assertiveness in its neighbourhood – the nine-dashed line and the air defence identification zone – have caused heightened tension between itself and US allies in the region add to the suspicion that the US pivot to Asia is a counter to China’s attempt to create for itself a de facto Monroe Doctrine.

Other reactions to the pivot argued that American rebalancing to Asia would fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict with China, or that the pivot was premature. Yet others thought that a safer alternative would be to further enmesh China in a web of international institutions and trade so that it feels no need to challenge the status quo and a few pointed out that the United States had no reliable partners in Asia for a pivot. In any case, the Obama administration’s pivot could not have come at a worse time – in the Middle East, the Arab Spring had started and the United States found itself playing a military role in Libya in addition to its duties in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan. Furthermore, as Egypt slid into chaos and Syria erupted, Iranian nuclear ambitions monopolised the State Department’s mindshare; this, despite ignoring several other uprisings such as in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. With US resources drawn by the Middle East and burden-sharing – such as with India in Afghanistan – not bearing fruits, observers noted that the pivot might have simply been wishful thinking but it was unlikely that the United States would be able to unravel itself from the Middle East and redeploy in Asia in the near future.

Though the United States has not lived up to the full range of its anticipated deployment to Asia, it has not left the region completely unattended. Beyond developing the much-discussed Air-Sea Battle strategy, Washington has been trying to bring together its (potential) allies in the Indo-Pacific region under the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The United States has also increased its presence in Australia even if only symbolically, and Washington has opened the taps on weapons sales to the Indo-Pacific countries in recent years. Defence-related exports – hardware, infrastructure, training – has seen a steady increase, much to the satisfaction of domestic industries.

Obama’s strategy bears a close resemblance to the Nixon Doctrine. Almost 45 years ago, on July 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon elucidated in an informal chat with newsmen in Guam a new US approach in the struggle against world communism. In what would later be known as the Nixon Doctrine, the president declared that the United States would assist in the defence and development of its allies but not undertake the entire task on its own. This decision opened the weapons floodgates to countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East as well as the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, South Korea, and others in Asia.

The advantage of such an approach, then as now, is that the cost of providing security is off-loaded onto regional allies while simultaneously providing a boost to one’s own economy. Another condition that recommends the Nixon Doctrine in a situation like the pivot to Asia is that there is little enthusiasm in the US Congress or among US citizens to engage substantially in an unknown part of the world over the long haul; nor can the US economy presently afford a Europe post-1945 style entrenched defence of Asia. The sale of advanced weaponry, such as the eight AH-64s to Indonesia in August this year, pleases US allies and states with closer relations could be enticed with manufacturing under license or even transfers of technology.

Another advantage of a Nixon Doctrine in the Indo-Pacific is that it limits US commitment to any state, a wise strategy by Washington given the regional reticence to side unequivocally with the United States against a potential Chinese threat. Even Japan, South Korea, and India, the three states with the most to be concerned about China’s increasing muscle, are playing both sides. If Washington is not careful, Asian states will very likely shift the greater burden of their defence – or at least freedom from Chinese interference in their affairs – onto the United States as Europe did during the Cold War. To be fair, the United States has been at odds with India throughout the Cold War and suffers from a deficit of trust despite warming of relations, and other states in Southeast Asia have their own reasons to want to maintain some distance from Washington.

Yet another advantage for the United States of leading in Asia from afar is that its allies cannot pull it into their conflicts, as one worries about Taiwan or Japan, albeit with correspondingly lesser control over their actions. In Asia, where inter-state grievances are based not only on national interest but also on decades- or ever centuries-old offences, this may work in the United States’ favour.

Critics may argue that Beijing will see this as provocative and step up the modernisation of its armed forces but that is to naïvely assume that China would not modernise without the pivot – as India can attest from experience, that is patently false.

Analogy hunters may jump up and down screaming about how the analogy of the Cold War does not hold; they should understand that no analogy, if broken down sufficiently, will hold. Taken to its logical conclusion, this implies that we cannot learn from history – an endeavour I am not ready to give up on just yet. So is it really a second Cold War? In that the two sides have not come to blows, target each other with their nuclear arsenals, actively spy on each other, try to gather allies to balance the other, and have intractable conflicts, yes. Perhaps it will be mellower than the first one, but a Nixon Doctrine appears to be the strategy the White House has chosen for its spitting contest with China.

After two Gulf Wars, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the slow tempo of a Nixon Doctrine might catch observers off guard, but seeing US actions in Asia from such a prism, it might reasonably be concluded that the Obama administration is indeed pursuing its security goals but treading softly. While heeding the warning of a self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict with China, the United States has nevertheless not abandoned its interests in Asia, nor has it waited until it is too late. Capability-building can hardly be done overnight, and these small steps meet the Goldilocks requirement. Given the financial constraints, local suspicions, and domestic unwillingness, this is the best option available to US planners.

Staying in Power: A How-To Guide for Would-be Dictators

15 Wed Feb 2012

Posted by in Middle East

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By many accounts, the Arab Spring all started with a fruit vendor in Tunisia (December 17, 2010). Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed youth who had taken to selling fruits to make ends meet, set himself on fire in public when he was harassed by state officials for conducting commerce without a license. Within a month of the daring protest, Tunisian leader Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was ousted, ending his 23-year rule. To the chagrin of dictators all over the Middle East, the revolt – or rather, the idea of it – spread like wildfire, first to Egypt (January 1, 2011), then to Algeria (January 7), Libya (January 14), Yemen (January 23), Lebanon (January 25), Palestine (January 28), Jordan (January 28), Iran (February 14), Bahrain (February 14), Morocco (February 21), Iraq (February 25), Saudi Arabia (March 6), and Kuwait (November 17). Relatively minor protests were seen in Mauritania, Oman, Sudan, and the Western Sahara as well. Within a year, four of these leaders (Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Qaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh) were replaced while those that managed to stay in power were forced to make serious concessions in the face of public pressure.

The astute Middle East observer may notice that while the West (some permutation of the United States, the European Union, and NATO) strongly supported the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran, intervened militarily in Libya, and are contemplating doing so in Syria, other countries have managed to stay below their radar. This may have had partly to do with the size and length of protests as well as casualties. Or not. Bahrain, for example, despite conceding to reforms, suppressed the revolt with Saudi and Pakistani troops. Protests lasted for approximately five months until late June/early July and 72 people were killed although the situation is still far from resolved (The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry also found that almost 2,000 people had been tortured, 3,000 wounded, and another 3,000 arrested). Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, the situation remains tense although most of the violence has stopped. Official figures put the casualties at 10 dead with 200 arrests, but news reports have risen that Saudi security agencies have removed bodies to ‘hide evidence of the crime.’

Despite revolutions in over 20 countries in the Greater Middle East and Africa, so far, only five leaders (Ivory Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo) have been deposed. If you are in the dictatorship business, it should relieve you that the rebels so far enjoy merely a less than 25% success rate. Nonetheless, here are a few things that one can do to bolster the prospect of maintaining one’s grip on one’s state:

1. The Resource Card: Ideally, your state should have some precious or critical resource that everyone wants. However, this is not enough on its own – ask Saddam Hussein. It is vital to maintain close relations with at least one of the UNSC Five – historically, the US has been uncomfortably fickle and should not be the only option. Similarly, the UK and France may succumb to US pressure. Although Russia and China are far more reliable UNSC-wise, they may exact a heavier price than you are willing to pay. Role model – Saudi Arabia

2. The Geography Card: It may be too much to hope that Americans ever learn geography, but do not underestimate their military – whether a senator can find Bushehr or not, a Tomahawk cruise missile certainly could! These men in uniform are perfectly capable of reporting to their leaders the implications of geography on policy. For example, if you were a tiny island nation close to a state the US has designated as one of the “axis of evil,” and your state has a large minority of people with a similar demographic category as the neighbouring AoE state, let’s say Shi’a, the political consequences of their rise in power and your demise would be too high to bear. Bonus points if you can also buy American (F-16s, oil machinery, etc.), and lots of it. Role model – Bahrain

3. The Opportunities Card: This card is in some ways a combination of the first two cards. Sometimes, your state may not possess any resources of its own in abundance, nor will it have the fortune of being placed right next to an AoE state (a list which, after all, is constantly changing). However, you may be blessed with being in a strategic location that makes your state the easiest conduit to such fields of wealth. Pipelines for oil and gas, water, etc. must all cross your land before they can be shipped to their far off destinations. Entering into multi-billion dollar contracts will force states (of the UNSC Five) to put their commitment to you in writing. After all, it would take a very brave politician to abandon a billion-dollar pipeline, causing job loss in his country and a loss of resource…especially after he’s paid for it. Such opportunity can also come through influence – some non-state entities might agree to talks with state actors only if you are at the table. As a facilitator, your role could be indispensable. Role model – Syria

4. The Discrimination Card: Don’t play this card – it only makes you look stupid. Although there is ample ground to accuse other state leaders of xenophobia, racism, and now Islamophobia, most of them are smart enough not to allow it to get in the way of common sense politics. The US certainly didn’t hesitate to withdraw support from Ian Smith (white dude) or Manuel Noriega (Christian brother). Chances are, people just don’t like you. Besides, if your own people are against you, it would be difficult to convince the world press that the infidel is out to get you. Role model – Iran…seriously Tehran, WTF?

5. The Timeliness Card: If it comes down to the use of force, it is best to act quickly and quietly. The Venetian Republic, for example, would visit opposition leaders quietly and late at night lest their busy day schedule be disturbed. If that is not possible (social media and the internet have made censorship and surveillance so much harder), it is best to act when everyone is distracted by something else – turmoil in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, sectarian violence, missile defence, the Superbowl, Lindsay Lohan…there are many options. Act quickly and brutally but leave as little mark as possible. Once they get a whiff, human rights groups can be quite persistent and annoying. It is best to portray your actions as defending law and order – that gives you much room to squeeze through all kinds of repression under the guise of cultural norms. Role model – Saudi Arabia

6. The Nuclear Card: This is the most difficult card to play in the Successful Dictator’s set. For one, acquiring nuclear capability has become much harder unless you get China to give you blueprints under the table. Secondly, even if you acquired such weaponry, it cannot be used indiscriminately – the first time you use it will most definitely be your last, so bluff very cautiously. There is a reason Stalin and Mao stopped spouting drivel after their nuclear tests. Role model – North Korea

7. If-you-shoot-us-we-will-die Card: This is an exceptionally potent card that works best with the US (Russia and China seem too bloody-minded). Always project yourself as the only sane and stable ally in the region, particularly in your own country. Quietly dispose of the opposition to make sure that is at least partly true. Portray a scenario of doom and gloom if you were replaced. Bonus points if you have weapons of mass destruction. Role model – Pakistan…wow, pure genius!

8. The Where-the-hell-are-you Card: If your country is poor and does not have enough resources of any kind to make it worthwhile to learn your name and location, rest assured, you will not be deposed. But then, why would you yourself want to stay in such a place? Role model – a lot of inner African states

Hopefully, this brief guide will keep you and yours in power for years to come. Don’t worry, international affairs has never been about morality, human rights, or, in the updated 21st century jargon, R2P (right to protect). For those of you trying to figure out why the world wanted to sanction Syria and not Bahrain, why they invaded Libya but not Saudi Arabia, or why the Arab Spring turned into an Islamic Winter, I hope you learned something too…arrivederci.