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Iran’s Nuclear Deal

14 Tue Jul 2015

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Historically, negotiations have rarely resulted in the complete capitulation of one side to the other side’s demands. Even military force, for that matter, has provided only uncertain results – Carthage paid off the war indemnity levied by Rome after the Second Punic War ahead of schedule but Berlin proved a far more tightfisted customer after World War I. The Japanese, even after losing two cities to nuclear bombing, refused to surrender unconditionally to the United States in World War II. With that background in mind, the nuclear deal agreed upon by Iran and the E3+3 (Britain, France, Germany + United States, Russia, China) is the praiseworthy outcome of 23 months of hard bargaining between the two sides. Politics demands playing to the home crowd and that each side emphasise the gains it made in the talks but the agreement is remarkably fair and a model for future non-proliferation risk scenarios.

Iran nuclear mapThe nuclear deal, however, thankfully depends upon the exact terms and conditions laid out in the agreement and not the rhetorical interpretation of either side. To that end, the terms are a logical extension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed upon in July this year. The final JCPOA, running to 159 pages, consists of the terms and conditions between Iran and the E3+3 as well as a detailed timeline of implementation and dispute arbitration mechanisms. The deal achieves balance also in that it is progressively implemented in a staggered manner, allowing each side to gain confidence in the other’s intentions. The agreement reflects Iran’s practical needs and research ambitions aside the international community’s desire for circumscription, transparency, and verification. A Joint Commission (JC) reporting to the United Nations Security Council and comprised of a representative from each of the negotiating parties as well as one from the European Union, will oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal and serve as a forum for dispute arbitration.

As US President Barack Obama said in his speech, the JCPOA is not based on trust but on verification. As such, it has two aims: to extend Iran’s breakout time – the time required for Iran to acquire a nuclear device after it expels international observers from its facilities – as much as possible and give the international community time to respond, and to make sneakout – a clandestine parallel programme designed to provide Iran with a nuclear weapon – virtually impossible. Towards this end, Iran will accept limitations on its uranium enrichment and research & development for the first eight years after which it will be gradually allowed to begin enrichment activities and research. Tehran is restricted to using its first generation centrifuges, the IR-1, for 10 years; enrichment will not be allowed beyond 3.67 per cent and all such activity will be restricted to just one facility – Natanz – for 15 years, where 5060 IR-1s will be installed and the rest kept in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring. Failed or damaged centrifuge machines may be replaced from storage.

However, Iran is allowed to conduct research in future generations of centrifuges, the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8, at a small scale in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium and isotope separation will be limited. Work on IR-4 is restricted to a cascade of 10 machines and one machine for the IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8. After 8.5 years, the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades may be expanded to 30 machines. The manufacture of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors will be allowed then in consultation with the JC. At no point is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium in any form to exceed 300 kilogrammes. Any excess quantities must be sold on the international market or downblended to natural uranium level. These combined restriction on stockpile, enrichment, and rate of production serve as technical barriers to an Iranian breakout bomb.

Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre where an additional 1044 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed in six cascades. Two of these will be used for isotope production for medical, industrial, and research purposes and the other four will remain idle. Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned to use lightly enriched uranium (LEU), minimise plutonium production, and operate at 7 MW instead of the 40 MW it was originally designed for. No more heavy water reactors will be constructed in the country for 15 years and surplus heavy water will be exported.

What is a remarkable achievement for the West is that Tehran has agreed to not only ship out all spent fuel from Arak but also from all of its other research and power reactors. Furthermore, Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing, construct a facility capable of reprocessing, or conduct any research in the area except for isotope production. Iran has also acquiesced to not acquiring fissile metals or conduct research on their machining, casting, and metallurgy for 15 years. This effectively shuts down a second, plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. What may be of concern to Iran, however, is that this limits its options in any future interest in fast reactors.

Javad ZarifThe JCPOA also makes it incumbent upon Iran to apply the Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement within a timeframe. Another remarkable feature of the JCPOA is that Iran will resolve all its issues regarding past and present activities with the IAEA within the next six months. These, along with other stipulations agreed upon by both parties, will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the various non-proliferation measures. The IAEA will have a long-term presence in Iran, monitor its uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years, maintain surveillance on enrichment machinery such as bellows and centrifuge rotors for 20 years, and install monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities that will provide a measure of transparency for 15 years. This surveillance will make an Iranian dash for the bomb more difficult even as its more advanced centrifuges start to come online after 10 years.

The nuclear agreement draws out a timeline stretching at least ten years for complete sanctions relief. Staggered between Finalisation Day (conclusion of negotiations), Adoption Day (endorsement of the JCPOA by the UNSC), Implementation Day (IAEA verification of Iranian implementation of nuclear-related measures), Transition Day (eight years from Adoption Day when the IAEA should have reached a Broader Conclusion regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions and Iran seeks ratification of the AP), and Termination Day (ten years from Adoption Day when the UNSC closes its Iran file based upon interim progress), nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States will be repealed contingent upon Iran meeting its end of the bargain.

During the implementation of the JCPOA, ff there is any suspicion of Iran possessing illicit nuclear material, a complaint may be filed with the JC. Iran must respond quickly and if its answer is not satisfactory, an on-site visit by the IAEA can be ordered. However, Iran has the option of suggesting other methods by which its compliance can be reassured. This entire exchange must occur within 14 days, allowing the monitoring agency timely access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the short timeframe in which this process is to occur, it gives little time for Iran to conceal evidence of potential wrongdoing and is as close to anytime access as can be reasonably expected of Iran.

Until the last few days, the E3+3 were divided amongst themselves on the automatic reapplication of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. Russia and China viewed automatic sanctions as a violation of their veto rights in the UNSC while the United States worried that it may not be possible to hold the international community and the permanent members of the UNSC together on the subject. This difficulty has been ingeniously resolved in the final agreement. Once a complaint has been filed, the JC has 35 days to resolve the matter satisfactorily. If it fails to do so, the matter may be brought up before the UNSC again. To prevent sanctions from returning, the Security Council would have to pass a resolution declaring that sanctions should not be reapplied. If this resolution does not pass within 30 days, sanctions snap back on Iran. Given the negative wording of the resolution, a veto would not be able to block reapplication of sanctions within 65 days of the initial notification.

In exchange for Iran returning to a nuclear stature it committed to in the NPT, the E3+3 will cooperate with Iran in matters of civil nuclear technology and ensure that the country meets international standards in nuclear safety and security. Iran will also receive assistance in attaining global guidelines in the export of nuclear materials. Initially, these cooperative ventures are meant to hasten Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s terms but they also signal Iran’s return to good standing that makes it eligible for such cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal tried to add missile proliferation and even human rights concerns to the agenda but that would have in all likelihood scuttled the deal. Strictly speaking, neither of those issues bear a strong relationship to Iran’s nuclear programme; Iran’s ballistic missile programme has incurred sanctions of its own apart from the nuclear restrictions. To critics, it is unsatisfying that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions altogether; it is also unrealistic.

Iran nuclear deal leadersWhatever else the JCPOA may be, it is not a victory for non-proliferation efforts. Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva were merely different battlegrounds for the geopolitical struggle between Iran and the United States. Washington has tried to interpret the NPT to its convenience and deny Iran its enrichment rights under the treaty but this is a farcical attempt. Besides the NPT being fundamentally unequal, even a quick glance at the debates in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that led to the NPT would reveal that non-proliferation was only a tangential goal. Furthermore, when convenient, Washington has not found it difficult to look the other way when its allies are busy acquiring nuclear arsenals. Yet a nuclear Iran threatens Western interests and also their security as Tehran’s missiles reach farther and farther.

The successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean that the West has a new ally in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington and other Western capitals will be busy trying to reassure their friends in the region that the deal is not an indication of a new geopolitical alignment or in any way threatening to them. The fear in Arab capitals will be that an Iran free from crippling sanctions is bound to alter the balance of power between itself and its Arab neighbours. Already, events in Iraq have seen Tehran’s influence grow and its grip on Syria does not seem to be loosening despite four years of civil war. The United States and the European Union will continue to struggle against Iranian ambitions in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan. While Washington still remembers the Tehran Embassy hostage crisis vividly, Iran has yet to come to terms with the US-sponsored coup in 1953, the tacit US approval of two nuclear programmes in Israel and Pakistan, and the arming of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons in the 1980s which he used with impunity on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War.

Despite these recriminations, both sides were able to reach an amicable settlement that prevented yet another war in the Middle East. If implemented according to plan, the JCPOA is a very good deal for both sides. Iran has given up one path to nuclear weapons, its breakout time has been extended to at least a year, and continuous IAEA presence has made sneakout very difficult. For all its alleged flaws, it would be no surprise if the negotiators of the JCPOA were to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. As for the nuclear apartheid codified in the NPT, Iran signed and ratified the treaty – perhaps next time, it should think before making a commitment of such gravity. The sanctions and the limitations on its nuclear programme are the price Tehran now has to pay.

This post first appeared on Swarajya on July 15, 2015.

We Have A Framework!

03 Fri Apr 2015

Posted by in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

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Late in the night, Indian Standard Time, news emerged from Lausanne that a framework for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany Britain + Russia, United States, China) had been agreed upon. Lausanne, the small and picturesque Swiss town on the shores of Lac Léman, has been the latest host to dozens of diplomats, lawyers, and nuclear scientists involved in the long and difficult negotiations over the state of Iran’s nuclear obligations. A short joint press conference by Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, and Federica Moghierini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced to the world that a significant milestone had been reached and that an agreement would be drafted by June 30. More than elation, tiredness marked the faces of the two diplomats. This last phase of discussions had gone late into the night for the previous two days and even these were only the tip of an 18-month long conversation between Iran and the E3+3.

The outcome of the negotiations has been hailed in the expected corners as well as condemned by the usual suspects. If this framework holds and a final agreement is inked by June 30, this will be one of the few times in recent memory that diplomacy has held sway over force. Barring the Cuban Missile Crisis, few major international squabbles in the past century have been solved through negotiations. So much so that we might have even forgotten what compromise looks or feels like – either side is satisfied but not content. The same is the case with the Iran talks. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Republicans might prefer total supplication and abject surrender from Iran but there is as much chance of achieving that – even through war – as there is of the West giving Iran a clean chit on its nuclear activities.

The framework is far more elastic than it appears at first sight. Though the United States has released a fact sheet and the US Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, made a statement, these are just US interpretations of what has been agreed upon and Iran has not signed off on them yet. Iran’s only public commitment is stated in the joint statement made by Zarif and Moghierini. Troubling to some, the framework has been portrayed in a different light by Iranian leaders in Persian to their domestic audience than Western negotiators have to their citizens. This was also seen in November 2013 when the Joint Plan of Action was first agreed to and is nothing to be alarmed about. It would hardly be healthy for the life of the framework if Iranian President Hasan Rouhani portrayed the JCPOA to the clerics and common Iranians as an American victory or an Iranian submission any more than for US President Barack Obama to tell the US Congress that Iran outwitted the United States and the Europeans in the negotiations. Such diplomatic license must be allowed in reading the behaviour of politicians.

Nonetheless, that statement still gives several reasons for optimism. The parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, at the very least, assures the world that Iran’s Heavy Water Reactor at Arak will not be used to make weapons-grade plutonium, that its enrichment capacity, level, and stockpile will be limited for a specified duration, and that there will be no enrichment facility other than at Natanz. Reprocessing is forbidden Iran and spent fuel will be exported. Tehran will also accept the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements of the International Atomic Energy Agency and nuclear-related sanctions will be removed upon IAEA verification of Iran’s safeguards.

The Devil, as they say, is in the details and these will not be known until the final agreement is drafted. Iran hawks warn that the JCPOA does not go far enough but several experts seem to have confidence that the agreement will lead to something more substantial by the end of June. Many are in fact surprised that Iran conceded so much at all though they will hold the champagne until the deal is signed and implemented. To get into specifics, first, Iran will retain the right to enrich uranium. Yet it has agreed to limit this to 3.67 percent for at least 15 years and not build any new enrichment facilities for at least as long. Tehran is allowed only 6,104 centrifuges under the agreement, a far cry from the 19,000 operational presently. The excess centrifuges will be stored under IAEA supervision and will be accessed only as replacement for operating centrifuges. In addition, all operational centrifuges will be IR-1, that is, Iran’s more inefficient first generation equipment. It has also been agreed that Iran will not maintain a stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent greater than 300 kgs; presently, the country has 10,000 kgs of low-enriched uranium. It is not clear whether the excess will be downblended or exported but either way, it will not go into the Iranian nuclear programme in its present state. In conjunction, it is estimated that were Iran to try and make a nuclear device – it will certainly not be a bomb – the breakout time would be at least a year as opposed to the three months at present.

Second, Fordow – the secret site that was revealed by the United States, France, and Britain in 2009 – will be converted into a research centre. It may work on nuclear related matters but not enrichment research for at least 15 years. The facility will neither enrich nor store uranium for the same period. Almost two-thirds of the nuclear infrastructure at Fordow will be removed; it will have 1,044 centrifuges remaining but these will not be used to enrich uranium and will be placed under IAEA safeguards. This means that the only facility at which Iran can enrich uranium is Natanz, where 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed to operate. The thousand IR-2M centrifuges will be removed and placed in safeguarded storage for 10 years. Iran’s other more advanced centrifuges are similarly prohibited for ten years. Research related to the development of advanced centrifuges will be limited for ten years and after that, subject to IAEA supervision.

Third, the IAEA will have regular and even continuous access in some cases to Iran’s entire nuclear fuel cycle. Its uranium mines will be under continuous surveillance for 25 years and its centrifuge manufacturing facilities for 20 years.Natanz and Fordow will, of course, come under safeguards and all of Iran’s technological and material procurements will be channeled through the IAEA. The JCPOA suggests that Iran will implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements with the IAEA; this requires it to give early notification to the IAEA when it constructs new nuclear facilities. The statement released by the United States says that Iran will accept the IAEA’s Additional Protocol but the joint press release suggests that this acceptance will be provisional and temporary. One can guess that Iran’s provisions refer to other promises made by the E3+3 but what it means by temporary acceptance is yet unclear. Though the US statement says that the IAEA will have the authority to investigate suspicious activities, Iran will likely question the definition of “suspicious activities.” The US seems to be sure that Iran will confess to its past work on the possible military dimensions of nuclear research but this is unlikely. This is also, thankfully, the least bothersome of the clauses and may be honoured more in the breach than the observed if the other clauses are satisfactorily implemented.

Fourth, Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild the HWR at Arak. The core of the IR-40 will in fact be removed and destroyed, making it impossible to produce weapons-grade plutonium in the reactor. Iran has agreed not to reprocess fuel and will export its spent fuel out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime. Tehran has agreed to abjure from building any more HWRs for the next 15 years and it will not accumulate heavy water in quantities greater than is needed for the operation of the research reactor at Arak.

These are substantial compromises from Iran. In exchange, the nuclear-related sanctions against it will be removed upon verification by the IAEA that Iran has livedup to its safeguards and transparency commitments. UN Security Council resolutions shall be lifted under similar conditions. Interestingly, the greatest hurdle in the rapid re-imposition of sanctions upon an Iranian breach of faith would come not from Iran but Russia, a member of the E3+3. Moscow has long stated that snap-back sanctions bypass the veto in the UNSC and it is not willing to give up that right. From Russia’s point of view, it may no longer be interested in maintaining sanctions on Iran or it might want to leverage it against the United States if the geopolitics has shifted significantly at a later date. How the United States and its European allies convince the Russians to agree to a snap-back remains to be seen.

The details in the JCPOA has surprised many observers as have Iran’s substantial compromises. A two-thirds reduction in the number of centrifuges, the restriction on enrichment, a small stockpile, and the unprecedented access promised to the IAEA were beyond what anyone had expected. This has led many to wonder if there are any major discrepancies between the Iranian understanding of the framework and the US interpretation. However, when asked on Twitter, Gérard Araud, the French ambassador to the United States, said that the Iranians had agreed to the detailed parameters of the US interpretation. The discussions over the final draft will address how much sanctions relief and when is appropriate for how much safeguards. If even three quarters of this framework is implemented, it will still be an excellent outcome.

To those who remain unconvinced, it might be useful to reflect on the idea that no guarantee is absolute and no agreement is perpetual. Iran may well manage to develop a nuclear device on the sly despite all these safeguards. Geopolitical alignments may change and it may become convenient to look the other way as was the case with Israel and Pakistan. No country will ever adhere to an agreement that runs contrary to its national interests. That is a reality one must come to terms with.

Finally, the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is not about its sovereign right to engage in such endeavours. These long negotiations are about Iran’s failure to keep its word once it signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One wonders what would have happened in a world where the Shah of Iran was not persuaded by Richard Nixon to accede to the NPT. As for the hypocrisy of the “recognised” nuclear powers in their disarmament and proliferation obligations, power is the ultimate arbitrator.

This post appeared on FirstPost on April 04, 2015.

Peace In Our Times?

24 Sun Nov 2013

Posted by in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

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Sunday morning brought with it news that a major breakthrough had been achieved in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – United States, France, Russia, Britain, China – and Germany, Iran’s key trading partner), and that an interim agreement had been reached. Temporarily, at least, the war drums had been silenced.

The deal has its critics on both sides of the fence – Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, did not make matters easy with his outbursts (though he has hailed the deal after the fact), nor do Iran hawks in the US Congress with talk of additional sanctions. In that sense, many suspect that it will be harder for US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to sell the deal to the more conservative elements in their own countries than to each other. Saudi and Israeli opposition to the deal as an outline emerged after last week’s talks in Geneva has also been consistent and vocal. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian announcement of the interim agreement came together with the usual symbolic defiance – the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran declared its plans to construct two more power reactors at Bushehr.

The interim deal is, all things considered, a fair one; Iran receives some sanctions relief and the P5+1 are assured that Iran does not continue to inch closer towards nuclear weaponisation. The deal is set to expire after six months, giving time for negotiators to hammer out the terms and conditions for the next phase of a complete resolution to the Iranian nuclear question.

Towards the P5+1’s non-proliferation goals, the deal promises to:

  • halt enrichment at 5% and dilute all higher-enriched material to below that level
  • not add or upgrade centrifuges and limit production to repairs only
  • not increase stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium
  • not commission or fuel the Arak heavy water reactor
  • halt fuel assembly for Arak and not install additional components to the reactor
  • not transfer heavy water or fuel to reactor site
  • not construct a reprocessing plant

In effect, these measures shut down Iran’s potential plutonium path to a nuclear weapon as well as severely curtail its uranium enrichment. Even if talks were to fall apart in a few months, Iran’s breakout time will have been substantially increased.

Towards the P5+1’s verification goals, the deal promises to:

  • provide the IAEA access to centrifuge and rotor assembly and storage facilities
  • provide the IAEA access to uranium mines and mills
  • provide the IAEA with Arak reactor designs
  • install surveillance cameras at Natanz and Fordow and provide daily access
  • provide frequent access to the Arak reactor

The increased transparency of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, not to mention centrifuges, mines, mills, and storage facilities, make it very difficult for Iran to develop nuclear weapons on the sly. If these conditions are implemented and made permanent, Iran would effectively need an entire clandestine, parallel nuclear programme to bypass international scrutiny – the possibility of which is next to nil.

In return for the non-proliferation and verification Iran has agreed to, the country will be granted temporary, limited, relief totalling approximately $7 billion in the form of:

  • no new sanctions during the period of the deal
  • suspension of sanctions on gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, and auto sector to the tune of $1.5 billion
  • payment in installments, totalling $4.2 billion, from the sale of Iranian oil at present levels
  • unfreezing of $400 million for Iranian government tuition assistance to its international students
  • safety-related repairs of Iranian airlines

It is important to note that these measures will remain active for only a fixed period – after that, unless extended, Iran will again come under sanctions. This gives P5+1 negotiators time to discuss the complex issues involved with their Iranian counterparts without being accused at home of allowing Iran to creep up to the bomb. It also shows Iranian negotiators that P5+1 demands to halt the Iranian nuclear programme during talks is not a backdoor to shutting down the programme permanently if negotiations drag on endlessly.

Second, Iran receives limited relief from sanctions – the bulk of the sanctions architecture remains in place and only a tiny spigot is loosened to allow Tehran access to its own funds. Not only is the time period for relief small, the amount of relief is also small and not external to Iran’s revenue stream.

A point of concern is that the interim deal has already been interpreted differently by the two sides. Furthermore, the text of the Interim Nuclear Agreement and the US State Department’s Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program, bear some discrepancies. A document of this import would certainly have gone through lawyers and translators to eliminate any grounds for misunderstanding. Yet, there exist some discrepancies with potentially enormous consequences on not only the interim agreement but the future of nuclear negotiations with Iran:

  • the Iranian document mentions that half of the 20% enriched uranium will be retained for fuel fabrication for the Tehran Research Reactor, of which there is no mention in the US document
  • the Iranian document suggests that this is a first step towards a comprehensive solution to the nuclear imbroglio which both parties will conclude within one year of this agreement but the US document sets the countdown at six months without mention of possibility of renewal
  • the Iranian document suggests that the final agreement would “[i]nvolve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs.” This line is not present in the US text and is of utmost importance in the understanding of this interim agreement.

Many observers are wondering what this deal means beyond its nuclear aspect. For now, there is no ‘beyond’ the nuclear deal. In fact, there are already many doubts about this deal. However, Iran might choose to ignore the question hanging over recognition of its right to enrich uranium and avail of the sanctions relief while insisting on its position during further discussions.

An interesting admission both the Iranian and US releases make is that the complete resolution will have to consider, among other things, UNSC resolutions. Ignoring the final position on Iran’s enrichment rights for now, the interim nuclear agreement allows Tehran, albeit not explicitly, to enrich uranium up to 5%. Does this acceptance violate UNSC Chapter VII Resolutions 1696 and 1737 (legally binding), both of which call for a suspension of Iran’s enrichment activity during negotiations? This may be one reason that Kerry declared that Iran’s enrichment has not been recognised. Were Zarif’s interpretation of the treaty accepted, it would not only recognise Iran’s right to enrich under the Article IV of the NPT but also nullify the ruling of the UNSC resolutions. This is a question for the lawyers, but one solution would be for the UNSC to pass a resolution supporting the interim agreement; another would be to maintain the façade of Kerry’s interpretation until a comprehensive agreement is reached.

If the interim nuclear agreement does not accept Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the P5+1 have given away next to nothing to achieve a temporary halt in Iran’s nuclear march and will gain a better knowledge of the Arak reactor. Seen in this light, the agreement tilts convincingly in favour of the P5+1; after all, $7 billion of relief over six months (or a year) is minuscule in comparison to the $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets globally or the $4 billion per month in lost oil revenue.

If the interim nuclear agreement does recognise Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the additional transparency measures Iran has agreed to will still go a long way in building confidence in Tehran’s intentions. However, Iran will have severely dented the US 123 Agreement Gold Standard and carved out a place in the non-proliferation hierarchy somewhere above non-nuclear weapon states (who have no enrichment and reprocessing rights) and below India (which has military nuclear facilities too). From this perspective, if Iran’s assertions that it does not want nuclear weapons are true, the deal favours Tehran’s unenumerated rights reading of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

There are many questions the interim nuclear deal does not answer, such as research on weaponisation or other questionable facilities like Parchin. Critics will also point out that these safeguards hold true only for facilities discovered or declared and that Iran can continue a secret nuclear weapons project. This, however, would remain true even with full and unrestricted access – if a state really wants a bomb, the diffusion of technology makes it almost impossible to prevent proliferation. Nonetheless, through strict export controls and transparent facilities, it can be made extremely difficult. In any case, these issues, among others, are exactly what the second phase is for. As the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day.

Most importantly, the success of Geneva breaks the psychological indisposition to fruitful negotiations with Iran. If this agreement were to fail in six or twelve months, the P5+1 would have lost nothing; if it leads to further meaningful compromises, then everyone would have gained from this first step. Even those with misgivings about the NPT must concede that Iran has signed the treaty and all negotiations must be based on that fact; this is simply the price Iran has to pay for being party to the NPT. Could this deal have come earlier? Perhaps, but its time had not yet come.

[I have been asked by many what this interim deal means for India. My answer is, not much. India is an attractive trading partner for Iran presently because the sanctions have severely reduced the number of partners. Iran would, no doubt, like to have business relations with India, but if it had to prioritise where to spend its $7 billion in relief, Western markets would the first place Tehran goes shopping. Iran needs technology which India cannot provide, and it needs investment on a scale and at a pace that is inconceivable in the Indian political environment. As a result, Western, Russian, and Chinese markets would be Iran’s first choice.

Additionally, while many fantasise about the political space the Interim Nuclear Deal may open up for India (particularly in Chabahar), such imagination must also counter-balance desires with the fact that Delhi has always been singularly obstinate in not involving itself in the global security commons.

Does this agreement affect India’s relations with Pakistan? No. While the achievement of the interim nuclear agreement certainly does not lack in its power to inspire, the dynamics between Iran and the West are different from those between the subcontinent’s two nuclear rivals. The first relationship has a strong element of coercion – economic sanctions and the threat of military force, while the second relationship has neither the economic nor the military arm-twisting.

If the interim agreement lives up to its promise and delivers a comprehensive solution to the Iranian problem by the end of next year, it can certainly have a major impact on the region. The spillover will not only affect Syria, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, but also India and Pakistan. The removal of sanctions on ties to Iranian petrochemicals, shipbuilding, infrastructure, insurance, and other sectors will allow Delhi to aggressively pursue, if it wishes, the full development of Chabahar port and related projects. This will have a significant impact on trade with Afghanistan and potentially alter the security dynamics in Central Asia. However, Indian firms will have to compete in an open market with other countries unlike the last few years. This is all, however, a very big ‘if’ based on what happens in the next six months.]

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on November 25, 2013.