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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

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Tag Archives: Balochistan

Modi’s Balochistan Gambit

20 Tue Sep 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Pakistan, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Modi’s Balochistan Gambit

Tags

Afghanistan, Ajit Doval, Armenia, Balochistan, China, genocide, India, Iran, Kashmir, Narendra Modi, Pakistan

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s mere mention of Balochistan in his Independence Day speech probably caused more flutter than any actual Indian policy ever has. An earlier reference to the western Pakistani province by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval at the 10th Nani Palkhivala Memorial Lecture in February 2014 had already set the tone – in rhetoric, at least – of the Modi administration towards misadventures from its western neighbour. In the wake of the terror attack in Uri, these comments have acquired greater salience among the public.

To be sure, these utterances represent some bold and out-of-the-box thinking by anyone in the Indian government. However, supporting an insurgency – in whichever country – is a complicated and messy affair that cannot be dismissively relegated to a mere talking point. There is interest in many quarters about the feasibility of Indian support to Balochistan, especially since it appears at first glance to be analogous to the situation in Kashmir. Yet appearances can be deceptive and if Modi & Co. are serious about the option, there are some questions they must first consider.

Henry Kissinger is famously said to have asked, “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?” The same is true for Balochistan. Whom does the prime minister – or his national security advisor – call if he wants to call the Balochi rebels? The Balochi struggle, such as it is, remains deeply fractured and it is difficult to identify one clear leader or even someone who could potentially unify the different factions against their common oppressor. Needless to say, Islamabad would have picked off such a person at the earliest had one emerged.

Uniting factions in service of a common cause is not easy as even the United States with its several carrots found out in Syria. Even supporting the two or three major factions is a recipe for disaster as intra-faction fighting can quickly sap international sympathy and India’s patience.

Even if the Baloch were able to come together, what would India’s aid look like? The rebels would be committing suicide with small arms alone and heavy arms would only encourage the Pakistani Army to bring in even heavier arms such as armour and air support; Delhi can hardly supply the rebels commensurately. Yet India’s struggle to even overtly train and arm the Afghan Army puts the country’s role as an arms supplier to the Baloch in question.

There is also this to be considered: who stands guarantee to the suitability of Baloch targets? So far, India has had the advantage of international confidence that it does not distinguish between good and bad terrorists. Were Balochi fighters to target Pakistani civilians, especially schools or hospitals, it could tarnish India’s reputation for no apparent gains. This is not an unlikely situation – Baloch anger at their harsh treatment by Islamabad so far would only naturally boil over and lash out at the first instance it can strike where it hurts. Wars seldom remain kosher for long.

An armed and active Baloch insurgency would cause alarm in the neighbourhood – Tehran, Kabul, and Beijing at the very least. Historically, the Baloch people have lived in what is today western Pakistan, eastern Iran, and southwestern Afghanistan. If the insurgency were to excite dormant aspirations among Balochis outside Pakistan, it would very well sour India’s relations with Iran and Afghanistan. Baloch leaders would have to promise to abandon any dreams of an akhand Balochistan and even if they were to, could they be trusted? For how long?

Beijing would have its own concerns with a Baloch uprising. After having invested heavily is propping up a teetering state like Pakistan, China would be loathe to see its interests washed away. First, they would lose the strategically important port of Gwadar; second, they would have to abandon their economic corridor into Pakistan; third, and most vitally, their dagger pointed at India’s back would be blunted. It is highly unlikely that China’s leaders would sit idly by for long if Baloch fighters gained momentum against Islamabad’s forces, with or without India’s help.

The international community would have its own nightmares – it is not often that a state possessing nuclear weapons succumbs to such a virulent separatist movement. There would be immense pressure on India – if links were established – to cut all support to the Baloch rebels and to do so quickly.

Allowing for the moment that a Baloch insurgency is successful and Kalat regains its independence, how would it benefit India? Pakistan would lose approximately five percent of its population and 45 percent of its territory; electoral results suggest that it is unlikely that this would excite other separatist movements such as in Sindh. Will the new Balochistan tilt towards India? Delhi’s experience with Bangladesh in 1972 suggests that even this is not a given.

The nuclear arsenal, India’s primary concern, will in all likelihood remain in Punjabi hands. Punjab, the brightest ember in Pakistan’s fire of anti-India hatred, will emerge even more concentrated and certainly in no mood for negotiations henceforth. While the new situation may affect the tactical military situation, there would be little impact strategically except perhaps to lower the nuclear threshold even more and make the subcontinent an even more dangerous place.

Finally, if answers to all these convolutions do already exist somewhere in South Block, is it really wise to announce Indian support for an independent Balochistan so publicly? Declaratory wars have not been in fashion for over a century now. Plausible deniability is a very effective strategy; if Indian fingerprints were indeed found on a resurgent Baloch insurgency, there is no guarantee that it will not cross Pakistan’s nuclear threshold…especially if the insurgency makes initial gains.

None of this is to say that Modi should not extend support to the Baloch. The first step, however, might be to regularly highlight their plight on the international stage. If indirect funding could be made available for the diaspora and others to produce documentaries, organise conferences, and lobby important politicians in major capitals, it would create momentum around their cause. Exaggeration and too shrill a tone, however, would only set back the cause. A model one might learn from is how Armenians got the massacres of 1915-1917 internationally recognised as genocide. Such recognition opens several legal avenues for concerned states as well as affected people to take against Islamabad’s policies.

If aid were to ever include weapons, the Indian government would do well to closely consider the impediments to their action, potential fallout, and certain blowback.


This post appeared on FirstPost on September 21, 2016.

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Dealing With A Pariah

23 Sun Aug 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Pakistan, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Dealing With A Pariah

Tags

Ajit Doval, All Party Hurriyat Conference, APHC, Balochistan, diplomacy, Hurriyat, India, National Security Advisor, NSA, Pakistan, Pashtun, Sartaj Aziz, terrorism

The cancellation of the scheduled talks between the national security advisors of India and Pakistan, Ajit Doval and Sartaj Aziz, felt like euthanasia – unpleasant but a welcome respite given the lack of alternatives. Rawalpindi’s persistence in sabotaging talks – terrorist attacks, cross-border shelling, infiltration attempts, and insisting on talking to Kashmiri separatists, the All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) – ultimately paid off.

There will be an outpouring of concern in editorials over the next few days over how recklessly Narendra Modi is steering the country’s foreign policy with regard to Pakistan, but it is difficult to imagine the editorials remaining silent had talks continued – in all likelihood, the Modi government would have been criticised for continuing with talks despite repeated and deadly provocations, not to mention an inexplicable and sudden softness in its Pakistan policy. As such, these opinions are worthless for the goal appears to be more Modi-bashing and less critical thought.

The drama of the past few days is uncannily similar to events almost exactly a year ago, when the new Modi government cancelled talks with Pakistan over the meeting of Abdul Basit, the latter’s High Commissioner, with Kashmiri separatists in Delhi just before the talks. Such consultations have been a longstanding tradition but the actions of the Modi government indicate that India has reconsidered its policy on the acceptability of foreign leaders meeting with separatists. So much for continuity of foreign policy…

There is a large constituency in Delhi that support diplomatic engagement with Pakistan no matter the circumstances. However, it remains to be asked what benefits India has ever accrued from its umpteen talks with its troublesome neighbour over the past decades. Not one achievement can be recalled that validates, even partially, the efforts of Indian diplomats. The question naturally arises, why should India continue to engage with Pakistan seriously, or why Delhi should even maintain a full diplomatic mission in Islamabad. It might even be argued that India should not be emollient with Pakistan any longer but take a tougher stance. As the oft-quoted wisdom goes, repeating the same thing and expecting different results is a sign of insanity.

A tough policy, to lay rest to the caricature at the outset, does not mean a military invasion or even a large cross-border raid. Due to certain acts of Chinese commission and US omission, use of force against Pakistan above an ambiguous threshold is fraught with risks. Besides, there are several options India can consider before the ultimate argument of kings.

If Pakistan cannot conduct itself in the manner befitting the basis of diplomatic exchange, there is no reason to accord them that privilege. In fact, there is little reason for Delhi to maintain a full mission in Islamabad. India can request the United States, Pakistan’s great benefactor, to host an Indian diplomatic interests section within its embassy; all critical communications can be relayed out of the section without having to maintain the charade of normal relations.

Diplomatic links may be progressively reestablished as signs emerge that effective measures are being taken against non-state actors along the border and that Pakistani troops have been ordered to stand down from indiscriminate cross-border shelling. Pakistan must be made to earn the right to participate in talks. If Islamabad cannot promise to curtail its army or its terrorists, what is the purpose of keeping on talking?

India can also use its diplomatic influence at every international forum to push for counter-terrorism commitments in every aid package to Pakistan. In all likelihood, this is unlikely to reap rich rewards but it will put pressure on Islamabad and constantly remind the international community about questions regarding the safe haven for terror networks in Pakistan. Islamabad would be forced to expend diplomatic capital and lobbying effort to counter India’s narrative of its conduct.

Taking the fight to the enemy, India also retains the option of encouraging Baloch and Pashtun sentiments on independence. This is a delicate matter which has diplomatic, cultural, and military dimensions to it and the risk of blowback is high. For example, Baloch separatism may ring alarm bells in Iran, a country important to India’s Central Asia and energy strategies. Similarly, Pashtun sentiments must be balanced against Afghan repercussions. Nonetheless, it is an option worth exploring and pursuing, albeit with caution.

As far as terrorists of interest are concerned, India would stand to profit from the development of covert operations capabilities to carry out surveillance, infiltration, and targeted assassinations. From all reports, India is years away from fielding such skills and even then, such tactics usually cause only disruption rather than bring resolution. No matter, it is best to keep available the widest range of options and such considerations should not stop Delhi from developing a force capable of such missions. Furthermore, the occasional public spectacle of a successful clandestine operation serves a psychological purpose among civilians and combatants alike.

The usual word of caution in taking any hawkish stance on Pakistan is a reminder of the nuclear shield behind which Pakistan conducts its nefarious asymmetric operations. As the United States tries to impress upon India, Pakistan’s political and economic stability is in Indian interests too for turmoil in the country would put the custody of approximately 120 nuclear warheads in question. Yet it must also be borne in mind that none of what has been suggested as part of India’s offensive panoply represents anything more than a minuscule show of arms; most of Delhi’s tactics remain diplomatic and economic with only the slightest armed assistance.

As regards the survival of a unitary (West) Pakistani state, the secession of Balochistan and a Pashtun region – to consider the extreme outcomes – may not be a flowering of democracy and peace but it will certainly restrict Pakistan militarily, geographically, and strategically as several strategic assets move out of its jurisdiction. Punjabi control over the state apparatus, its army and its nuclear arsenal, will certainly be weakened and circumscribed but not threatened. Given the ethnic paranoia that drives Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that any critical nuclear facilities are far beyond the borders of Punjab. A truncated Pakistan will leave an irate nuclear stump of Punjab and Sindh who would be less willing to negotiate with India but Delhi can find some solace in that the new state would have lesser economic, geographic, and demographic resources to conduct its vendetta against India. A weakened Pakistan would also limit the scale of China’s ambitions in India’s rear.

There are those who argue that the strongest weapon in India’s arsenal is economic growth. India should keep negotiations with Pakistan ongoing while expanding its own options by simultaneously growing the economy. Whatever else might be said about this, it is an unsound theory in the sense that Karl Popper would define the term – it is unfalsifiable. While it seems intuitive that an economy of $5 trillion comes with more options than an economy of $2.5 trillion, the disparity in wealth did not achieve for the United States its aims in Cuba despite decades of sanctions. Similarly, it was not the United States’ stronger economy that secured a nuclear agreement with Iran.

Indeed, an economy growing at nine per cent per annum would be enormously beneficial to India. Yet that will not change the nature of Pakistan’s relations with China, the United States, or terrorist organisations. As Christine Fair argued recently, even Kashmir is merely a symptom – the real problem lies in the conception of the Pakistani state itself.

The latest flashpoint in diplomacy between India and Pakistan has arisen over the role of the Hurriyat. It is argued that they are the Kashmiri voice in the negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad and that consulting with them is an old Pakistani diplomatic tradition. Yet this status has been accepted only by Islamabad. The Modi government has done well in its insistence that separatists have no standing in India’s international affairs, and far from being a minor matter of protocol and decorum, diplomatic recognition is in fact a significant thing.

As columnists impotently bemoan the latest tragedy in India-Pakistan relations and condemn India’s hawkish NSA and government, there will be at least one small voice in the country wondering why Modi Sarkar is still so soft on Pakistan. Even if this entire premise is flawed, can India possibly lose more than it does already?


This post first appeared on Swarajya on August 23, 2015.

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A Persian Puzzle

31 Tue Jan 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Iran, Middle East, Nuclear, Security, South Asia, United States

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Afghanistan, Balochistan, France, India, Iran, MMRCA, nuclear, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Rafale, United States

In the past week, India announced two major policy decisions – the first was to continue trade (in rupees and gold instead of dollars) with the Islamic Republic of Iran despite European and American sanctions, and the second was to award the $20-billion contract for Multi-role Medium Range Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), the world’s largest such open tender aviation deal to date, to the French company Dassault for its Rafale fighter jet. Both these decisions have been received with much dismay among India watchers. In an article titled, “India to US: Not too close!”  at The American Interest blog, Walter Russell Mead is a explains, “Its European allies drove the US crazy during the Cold War; new Asian friends and allies will be no easier to work with in the Pacific era now under way. India wants to be a superpower in its own right rather than a character actor in an American John Wayne movie.” Sadanand Dhume, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, argues in the Wall Street Journal (Weaning India Off Iran) that the Indian government has been stupendously shortsighted in its dealings with Iran and the United States. Although US officials may be willing to “give India a pass” when she purchases Rafales over American jets, or even when the Indian parliament passes a nuclear civil liability bill that effectively shuts out US firms, Iran’s nuclear programme is seen across party lines as a critical security threat to US interests and is not an “issue where friends can agree to disagree.”

There is much merit in this point of view – after all, if India is concerned about Chinese ambitions in the neighbourhood, there is no better security than to be associated, even loosely, with a US-led fraternity of nations aimed at containing China. Despite weaponising its latent nuclear force in 1998 and developing (nuclear-capable) missiles that have brought all of China but Manchuria within range, India stands significantly behind her larger northeastern neighbour in military capabilities. Furthermore, a US vote is critical if India wishes to realise her ambition of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. With trade between India and the United States standing at around $45 billion, the figure is a far more significant portion of India’s GDP than it is the United States’ – the United States is India’s third-largest trading partner whereas India is the United States’ twelfth. Dollars and cents aside, what India hopes to gain most from the United States is advanced technology in various fields, thereby slashing time in indigenous development. India has expressed particular interest in access to US know-how in space, nuclear energy, high technology, and missile defence, all channelled through the framework of the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), established in 2003.

It is not merely a matter of US positives for India. Dhume rightly argues that India cannot feel safe with yet another nuclear power in the region, that too an unstable Islamic one. Additionally, if an Iranian nuclear bomb pushes Saudi Arabia (and perhaps Egypt and Turkey) across the nuclear Rubicon, a nuclear arms race in the Middle East would only serve to further destabilise the region. Most importantly in the post-9/11 world, “in the long war against radicalism, India ought to welcome the weakening of a regime synonymous with Islam’s revolutionary potential, the abuse of human rights and support for terrorism.”

The question so far, however, has been “How can India help the United States (maintain the pax Americana)?” From New Delhi’s perspective, it is only fair that this query be reversed and we ask, “How can the US help India (create a pax Indica)?” For all the hype about the Indo-American strategic honeymoon (vis-a-vis China), precious little has moved forward. And expectedly so – decades of mutual suspicion can hardly be wiped away in less than two election cycles. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) under which the HTCG operated, did not represent a real departure from traditional US policy – because the changes contemplated were merely at the policy level and not the legal level, the strategic steps have smacked more of strategic hesitancy. Still, even if such benefits were forthcoming, the operational advantages to Indian defense, as Ashley Tellis pointed out, would remain quite meager for a while.

While Foggy Bottom and countless political pundits wonder about how reliable an ally India is to the US, it would behoove us to ask how conscientious a partner the US has been to India – the look of betrayal US officials portray upon India’s decision to maintain relations with Iran is comical compared to the pig’s breakfast the US has made of South and Central Asia. The United States has been Pakistan’s primary supplier of armaments until 2001, and although China has taken over that mantle from the United States, Pakistan remains the largest buyer of US weapons. This remains the case despite Islamabad’s innumerous breaches of faith, not the least of which was the AQ Khan case, the Osama bin Laden residency, or covert support to the Taliban by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). For all the rhetoric about curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and Wahhabist ideology, Washington seems to have done a fine job of supporting both until now.

The withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan marks another instance of US vacillation on its commitments to the world order it seems to want to preserve. After a long and costly war to destroy al-Qa’ida and root out the Taliban in the mountainous Central Asian country, Western forces are now in a rush to hand over power to Afghan security forces (possibly by the end of 2013). The present plan sees the last NATO troops leave Afghanistan by 2014 after which support for Hamid Karzai’s government is questionable at best. As things stand, the neither the Afghan-Pakistan-Taliban nor the US-Taliban negotiations seem to be producing results. Karzai, understandably, is not keen on talks with the Taliban, but Pakistan’s insistence and NATO withdrawal from his country has forced his hands. NATO’s reasons are primarily financial – with Western economies in the doldrums, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify a war in a far off land, especially after the death of bin Laden. Understandable though the US/NATO decision is, the region lurches over a precipice due to the Western decision. If the Taliban are allowed to reorganise and regain their strength (which they probably will, given that they are the only group in the region with a sponsor – the ISI), Kabul could yet again be source of worry for India in Kashmir and elsewhere. As a Shia power, Iran shares India’s concern more than the US does – Tehran has allowed New Delhi to develop road and rail links to Afghanistan and Central Asia, denied to her by Pakistan, from the Indian-upgraded port of Chabahar in Iranian Balochistan.

The Indo-US nuclear deal unveiled in 2005 was touted as an important step in bringing India and the United States closer to each other. While New Delhi has reiterated that US-India relations were not meant as a counterbalance to a rising China (and how could they not, as South Block seems to be unsure as to what their policy is in the first place), pro-India officials in the United States had seen the deal as exactly that. Unfortunately for them, India has turned out not to be a traditional ally. This is not to say that the US gained little to nothing through its re-engagement with India – the increased military cooperation that arose as a result of US policy towards India under George W. Bush has certainly helped both countries in various subtle ways. A more muscular India can help alleviate the pressure on US forces in the Pacific by forcing the Chinese to redeploy part of its military away from the Pacific and in the Tibet region. In addition, if India can be persuaded to recognize her potential to become a net provider of constructive airpower in the Indian and Pacific oceans as she has with her navy, India can be a source of stability and security in the global commons – a single midair refueling can give the IAF an operating radius from the Straits of Malacca to the Persian Gulf.

A crucial reason India cannot afford to antagonise Iran too much comes in over 425,000 barrels per day – crude oil. Not only is Iran India’s second largest supplier of oil, but India is one of the largest investors in the Iranian petrochemicals industry. Indian companies such as ONGC, IOC, OIL, the Tatas, the Essar Group, and the Hindujas are all busy in exploring for and developing oil and gas reserves in Iran. As a result, India supplies approximately 40% of Iran’s processed hydrocarbon fuels. Direct India – Iran trade stands at $13 billion, but this figures balloons to $30 billion if trade through third parties is also considered. Although it is not impossible for India to find other sources of oil, it is probable that Indian investments in Iranian oil may be frozen if India gets on the US sanctions bandwagon against Iran. It is to be noted that the United States would not be directly affected by sanctions against Iran as its own top three suppliers are Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia – and the US has shown great sensitivity to the needs of its Arabian oil connection despite all evidence connecting Saudi money to world terror and the Arab kingdom’s foray into nuclear power despite its dubious connections with Pakistani and Iraqi nuclear programmes. In contrast, Iran, the target of stringent sanctions, has broken no law but has been accused of being close to manufacturing a nuclear weapon since 1979 when it was under America’s ally, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Politics should not be a game of spite or revenge – all too often it results in cutting the nose off to spite the face. Therefore, while India must overlook the fickleness of US policy during the Cold War, the recent decade should very much be kept in mind as an indicator of US intentions – after all, we are still in the post-9/11 era. In this period, US foreign policy has justifiably served to further US interests, if at times beholden to domestic concerns (as Trita Parsi reveals in his Treacherous Alliance, Iran made overtures to the US throughout the 1990s and early 2000s but the US was unable to capitalise on them). Similarly, Indian foreign policy should serve Indian interests and none other. The deal with Dassault gives India some important technology transfers that neither the US nor the Europeans offered. It is also possible that the MMRCA deal is seen by South Block mandarins as a sweetener for France when India goes  to Paris to raise money for nuclear reactors – $100 billion over 20 years, of which at least $25 billion will come from France, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry hopes. The US and India have much in common they can work on, but they have many differences too – seeing each spat as the death knell of the Indo-US rapprochement is amateurish and becomes tiresome after a while. While the US suspects India of being an unreliable ally in the future, India knows that the US has been an unreliable partner in the past. To be sure, not all elements in Iran’s theocracy see a mutually beneficial relationship with India and support Kashmiri separatism. Neither can yet another Islamic bomb fail to make South Block queasy. Nonetheless, to present the case as a choice India has to make between the US and Israel on the one hand or Iran on the other is what philosophers call an argument of the excluded middle (which is just a technical term for a poor case). India need not make this choice and indeed should not, given the present geopolitical conditions. The balance sheet at present weighs towards an Indian Iran policy that is independent of the US and the EU. That may change in the future, but as Lord Palmerston said, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” There is no need for New Delhi to walk on eggshells because of its Iran policy.

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