• Home
  • About
  • Reading Lists
    • Egypt
    • Great Books
    • Iran
    • Islam
    • Israel
    • Liberalism
    • Napoleon
    • Nationalism
    • The Nuclear Age
    • Science
    • Russia
    • Turkey
  • Digital Footprint
    • Facebook
    • Instagram
    • Pocket
    • SoundCloud
    • Twitter
    • Tumblr
    • YouTube
  • Contact
    • Email

Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Bangladesh

730 Days…

26 Thu May 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on 730 Days…

Tags

Afghanistan, ASEAN, Bangladesh, BBIN Initiative, Bhutan, Central Asia, China, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, DTTI, economy, foreign policy, France, India, Indian Ocean Rim Association, International Solar Alliance, IORA, Japan, Middle East, Narendra Modi, Nepal, NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, SAARC, SCO, security, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, United Nations Security Council, UNSC

When Narendra Modi swept to power in May 2014, nobody could have dreamed that he would mould India’s foreign policy so decisively. Observers foreign and domestic all opined that Modi would not focus on international affairs much, choosing to pay attention to the domestic Augean stables he inherited instead. The wisdom was that, at most, Modi’s India might modestly reach out in its own neighbourhood but anything beyond the region was going to be primarily to buttress the country’s faltering economy.

If one is looking for unqualified and substantial successes, there is little the Modi government can boast about. Yet this is not to say that there have been no successes – rather, India’s track record in translating words into deeds has been poor throughout its history and it would be foolhardy to bet on noises in the pipeline too soon.

The achievements of the Modi government are also weighed down by the burden of public expectations – the Indian media has published report cards on the government’s performance after its first 100 days in office, at the six month mark, the one year mark, and now at the end of the second year in office. No other administration has ever faced such close scrutiny. Furthermore, the gargantuan scale of what needs to be done to bring the country in line with the ambitions of the younger generation dwarfs into insignificance any accomplishment of the National Democratic Alliance.

The general tenor on Modi’s India has been positive. The optimism in the international mood can be gauged from the increase in the flow of foreign investments into India; Japan has made substantial investments in infrastructure, the most visible project being the high speed rail project connecting Bombay to Amdavad. Similarly, France is playing an active role in developing smart cities in India as more and more of the country urbanises over the next few decades. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also expressed interest in India’s road, maritime, and riverine infrastructure. All this is in line with expectations that Modi would focus on rebuilding India’s economy and developing the infrastructure needed for it to emerge as a regional power.

The past two years have also seen India take a greater interest in its backyard, Central and West Asia. Counter-terrorism and energy topped the agenda but Delhi’s pockets are not deep enough to spur breakneck development on visible markers of progress such as gas pipelines. India is also one of the largest investors in African countries. While previous administrations have also sought similar goals, the Modi government has brought an energy to the negotiations that leaves many observers cautiously optimistic of movement.

Frequent visits to the country by US defence officials also indicates the initial flowering of a mature security relationship that will have consequences for the entire greater Indian Ocean region. The US-India relationship that had been reincarnated by the George W Bush White House and stagnated since received new impetus once Modi took office. The Defence Technology and Trade Initiative has moved forward as Washington has been keen to help India build better aircraft carriers and talks have been going on to manufacture the M777 ultralight-weight howitzer in India under the Make-in-India scheme. Recently, there has even been talk of Boeing establishing a manufacturing line for its F-16s and F-18s in India and offering the F-35 to Delhi.

In the last two years, India has lost some of its timidity in participating in the Malabar naval exercises with the United States and Japan. Delhi is close to concluding a military logistics agreement with the United States that could significantly expand its influence over the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Navy – in the midst of a massive expansion and modernisation programme – may well evolve as the face of Indian soft power and diplomacy in the region as its augmented capabilities allow it to provide services such as security, search & rescue, and humanitarian relief for the regional commons. This will integrate India more closely with the ASEAN and SAARC nations who will become accustomed to seeing Indian power as a benign force.

In the neighbourhood, the Modi government can certainly report Bangladesh and Bhutan as success stories of its foreign policy. The border agreement and several agreements on energy, infrastructure, transportation, trade, and nuclear cooperation have made Bangladesh more comfortable with its parent state. However, things have been a mixed bag in Sri Lanka and disappointing in the Maldives and Nepal. These are difficult customers, trying to profit from playing India off against China as India tried – and failed – to do with the US and USSR during the Cold War. Without significant economic leverage, these states will continue to be a nuisance to Delhi.

Modi’s greatest diplomatic failure is alleged to have happened with Pakistan and China. Nothing could be further from the truth: while Pakistan sees India as an existential threat, China views its southern neighbour as eventually capable of sabotaging its rise and competition with the United States. The incursion by Chinese troops into Indian territory during a state visit by Xi Jinping to Delhi, not to mention Bejing’s obstructin of Indian accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN Security Council as a permanent member, indicates that the Middle Kingdom is content to allow relations to simmer for now. The overtures to Islamabad, unequivocally rebuffed at Pathankot, suggests an ugly truth that Modi – and perhaps South Block – cannot admit publicly: that Pakistan is not a problem that can be solved with patient diplomacy. It is naïve to expect any improvement of relations with either of these two neighbours.

The Modi administration has done well in showcasing India economically and has also achieved a modicum of success on security matters given the options available to it. Afghanistan is an illuminating example: it can hardly be denied that it is in India’s interests that the war against Islamists, be they al Qa’ida, ISIS, or a Pakistani proxy, is best fought with Afghan sinew. Yet Delhi has been reticent to generously supply Kabul with training and material because of its own shortcomings. After decades of material and intellectual neglect, it would not be surprising if India’s armed forces find themselves shackled more by their own politicians than by the enemy.

Modi’s foreign policy has not stopped with nation-states – he has reached out to the Indian diaspora, multinational corporations, and potential technology disruptors to accelerate India’s growth. At the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in December 2015, India played a key role in promoting solar energy as an alternative to fossil fuels by committing to expand solar energy to 100 GW (installed capacity) by 2022. The International Solar Alliance, launched by the prime minister, will keep the country at the centre of innovation and regulations concerning solar energy.

While India has been content to involve itself in international and regional groups such as the G-20, BRICS, ASEAN, SAARC, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation until now, the Modi government has taken the policy one step further and started to nurture groups in which it could assume leadership roles such as the 1997-established Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Bhutan Bangladesh India Nepal . Delhi has also started to bypass Pakistan in SAARC via multilateral treaties with other neighbouring states such as the connectivity project between Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and itself which Modi revived in November 2014; the BBIN Initiative was established in 1997 as the South Asian Growth Quadrangle but little had been accomplished since.

In the two years of the Modi government, Delhi has strengthened its foreign policy along all axes – economic, security, and diplomatic leadership. While it is easy to be impatient with the rate of progress, the limitations on India’s economic, military, and diplomatic power also ought to be borne in mind. With continued progress, the several frustrations observers feel with the elephant will gradually dissipate.


This post appeared on FirstPost on May 27, 2016.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

100 Days of Narendra Modi

28 Thu Aug 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on 100 Days of Narendra Modi

Tags

100 Days, ASEAN, Australia, Bangladesh, Bharatiya Janata Party, Bhutan, BJP, BRICS, FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Lok Sabha, Napoleon, Narendra Modi, National Democratic Alliance, NDA, Nepal, Rajya Sabha, SAARC, Sushma Swaraj, United States, Vietnam

It was US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt who borrowed the term ‘100 Days’ from Napoleonic history to describe the feverish working of the 73rd US Congress which had sat for a 100 days from March 09 to June 17, 1933. The term was first used in a radio address on July 24 of the same year and contrary to popular belief, it does not refer to FDR’s first 100 days in office – he was sworn in five days earlier – but that session of Congress.

Since then, 100 Days has gone on to become a barometer of performance of all US presidents, much to their chagrin, and now an Indian prime minister. Few leaders have enjoyed the sort of control FDR and the Democrats had over the House and Senate in 1933 – a 196-vote margin in the former and a 23-vote margin in the latter. Unfortunately for Modi, he holds a small majority of 64 in the Lok Sabha but is 67 votes short of a majority in the Rajya Sabha.

Beyond numbers, the 100 Days barometer is unsuited to a system of government wherein the Executive is not as powerful as it is in a presidential system. Furthermore, the short time frame is not as fair a judge of a new government as an annual address to the nation, taking stock of the achievements, shortcomings, and ambitions of the next year, would be…the first one after a full year in office. As Sir Humphrey would have reminded his audience, diplomacy is about surviving until the next century whereas politics is about surviving until Friday afternoon.

In the realm of foreign policy, Modi’s 100 days have been been interesting; right off the bat, he invited the leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to his inaugural address and spent time each of them the day after his swearing-in ceremony. It was an interesting choice of guests, shunning all the major powers and even strategic partners like Israel or Japan. However, it appeared to be the first play of the new prime minister’s decision to pivot India towards Asia. During his conversation with Nawaz Sharif, Modi pushed Sharif again on the granting of Most Favoured Nation status by Pakistan to India, which has been pending for almost two decades. This initial optimism towards Pakistan was dampened after India cancelled foreign secretary-level talks after the Pakistani high commissioner to Delhi met with the leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders.

In line with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s manifesto to reinvigourate SAARC, Modi’s first international visit was to Bhutan, followed by a visit to Nepal; his foreign minister, Sushma Swaraj, also visited Bangladesh. The flurry of foreign visits to the neighbours, has resulted in agreements on Indian aid, the joint development of hydroelectic power, and discussions on any grievances such as the India-Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950.

Another major foreign policy initiative by Modi Sarkar came during the BRICS summit at Fortaleza right after the World Cup finals. The New Development Bank was established, with India as its first chairman and its headquarters in Shanghai. The bank provides yet another avenue for India to develop its soft power while fostering new markets for its goods and services. Modi had previously met with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in Delhi regarding Beijing’s investment in Indian manufacturing and special economic zones. China has also accepted India’s full inclusion into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

True to the election manifesto, Modi’s international contacts so far have prioritised economic development. Beyond BRICS and SAARC, India set a delegation to Vietnam, a country that will play a strategic role in any “Look East Policy.” Easier trade with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was also promised. However, his rejection of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement despite pressure from the United States and other Western states has cooled the ardour for Modi’s reforms in the West. It indicates, however, a clear awareness India’s problems and the solutions it would need to develop. In fact, Modi’s medium-paced economic reforms show far more wisdom and maturity than many of his followers’ urgent appeals do.

The new government has also played host to several international leaders. Swaraj met with her Omani counterpart and Russian counterparts in her first month in office, as well as French (Laurent Fabius), German, British (William Hague, George Osborne), and American (John McCain, William Burns, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel) leaders. The international community’s eagerness to do business with India is a heartening sign that the acerbic rhetoric before the elections has given way to pragmatism in foreign capitals and boardrooms.

Two international crises intruded on Modi’s 100 Days – the kidnapping of Indians by ISIS in Iraq and Israeli action against Hamas in Gaza. Delhi’s response was deemed slow but there were hardly any options either. Thankfully, the crisis was resolved with many of the Indians returning home. On Gaza, the government initially refused to even hold a parliamentary discussion but in a very unpopular move with BJP supporters, eventually voted against Israel at a United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

India has also sealed a nuclear deal with Australia which is to be signed in September. Also on the books for the month just beyond his 100 Days is a visit to Washington DC and one to Tokyo, where the Indian delegation has already signed a historic defence agreement with Japan and has agreed to institute a 2+2 dialogue (foreign and defence minister) between them; Japan has such dialogues only with the United States, France, Australia, and Russia.

Modi has earned a reputation for being a meticulous planner and it shows; India’s initiatives with its neighbours and other partners have proceeded according to a plan and gone well. However, Delhi’s slow and muddled response to sudden crises reveals a weakness in the Ministry of External Affairs, one that has been known for decades. If Modi is to rely on his MEA over the next five years, some attention should be paid to acquring area studies, language, and cultural experts on regions of interest to India.

In the realm of security, Modi Sarkar has sped up clearance for critical border roads along the frontier with China and moved to strengthen troop deployment as well as civilian settlements in the region. Over ₹30,000 crores of procurement proposals have been cleared and 100% FDI in the defence sector has been allowed. Given the long gestation period of defence development, these initial steps indicate that the government is headed in the right direction – a little long-term reform without ignoring the pressing needs of the day.

On the whole, it has been a decent 100 Days. Compared to the lethargy of the previous administration, Modi Sarkar has indeed set a refreshing pace. While the list of concrete achievements may be small, Modi’s period in office has been equally small. By reaching out to SAARC and BRICS first, Modi did exactly what he had said he would during his campaign. The slight surprise was, however, his warm response to US overtures of friendship; many analysts had predicted a sour relationship between the two democracies given the visa imbroglio. Modi has proven to be a far more pragmatic leader than his critics or even his supporters had thought.

The most important task for Modi in his first 100 days in office was to maintain the enthusiasm about India, both within and without – India was the land of opportunity, the next growth miracle. The prime minister had to make people believe that the country is headed in the right direction; in that, he has succeeded. The barometer is inadequate for anything more substantial. As they say, Rome was not built in a day.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on September 01, 2014.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

Linking India’s Rivers

03 Tue Jun 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Linking India’s Rivers

Tags

agriculture, AGWR, artificial groundwater recharging, Bangladesh, Betwa, Brahmaputra, Bundelkhand, China, dairy, desalination, drip irrigation, energy, environment, environmental flow, Farakka, feed grains, food grains, Ganga, Gansu, genetically modified crops, GM crop, Godavari, hydroelectric power, IBT, India, Inner Mongolia, Inter-Basin Transfer, Jogighopa, Ken, kharif, Krishna, livestock, micro irrigation, National River Linking Project, Ningxia Hui, NRLP, nuclear power, Pepsee irrigation, Polavaram, poultry, Qinghai, rabi, rainwater harvesting, river pollution, RWH, Shaanxi, Shanxi, South-North Water Transfer Project, sprinkler irrigation, subsidies, transportation, Vaippar, water, World Trade Organisation, WTO, Xinjiang, Yangtse

The water understands
Civilization well;
It wets my foot, but prettily,
It chills my life, but wittily,
It is not disconcerted,
It is not broken-hearted:
Well used, it decketh joy,
Adorneth, doubleth joy:
Ill used, it will destroy,
In perfect time and measure
With a face of golden pleasure
Elegantly destroy.

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

Water works are almost as old as human settlements. The Ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Romans, Cholas, and virtually every civilisation in between built canals and dams to irrigate their farmlands. In the modern era, the Colorado River Aqueduct (US), the National Water Carrier (Israel), the Cutzamala System (Mexico), and the as yet incomplete South-North Water Transfer Project (China) are examples of large national inter-basin transfer (IBT) projects aimed at improving agriculture, alleviating floods, and providing drinking water to parched areas.

NRLPIn comparison, India’s National River Linking Project (NRLP) is nothing short of modern-day pyramid-building: at its completion, the NRLP will have 30 river links, 3,000 storage structures, a canal network of almost 15,000 kms, generate 34 GW of hydroelectric power, create some 87 million acres of irrigated land, and would transfer a mind-boggling 174 trillion litres of water per annum. This would be four times larger than China’s ongoing multi-decade project. The project is also expected to displace 580,000 people. The total cost of the NRLP is estimated to be ₹5.6 lakh crores.

About 33% of India around its northern river basins have access to 62% of the country’s annual freshwater while the remaining 67% of the country in the south and west have to make do with the remaining 38% of the water.

It is difficult to boil down a project of this magnitude that has so many variables to deliver a simple for or against verdict unless one is an activist. There are some very good arguments in favour of the NRLP as well as equally legitimate concerns. The BJP government’s announcement of its plans to go ahead with a ₹25,000 crore plan to create a national waterway grid by linking the Ganga, Brahmaputra, Mahanadi, and Godavari rivers is a good excuse to revisit this issue.

Water

India’s water situation is precarious at best. With an increasing population, ecological pressure has been increasing steadily. Groundwater has sustained agriculture and urban populations for the past three decades but the strain is showing as bore wells dry up and water tables deplete. Interestingly, India has four per cent of the world’s total renewable water resources (TRWR), the seventh largest. Of this amount, only 58% is the potentially usable water resource (PUWR). By 2050, the PUWR is expected to be only 22% of what it was at independence due to population growth, poor development of water resources, and bad policies. Despite India’s generous water resources, its per capita storage is staggeringly low at a mere 200 m3 per person whereas it is 5,960 m3 per person in the United States and 2,486 m3 in China.

The NRLP, when complete, will boost per capita PUWR storage as well as provide surface irrigation for irrigation, thereby helping to recharge the impoverished groundwater supplies. Water policies other than IBT, such as rainwater harvesting (RWH) and artificial groundwater recharging (AGWR), have been suggested to meet these goals and tried with varying levels of success. Both these methods work at the local level and are less helpful in water-scarce regions. Moreover, aggressive RWH or AGWR upstream can impact users downstream. Additionally, given the reliance of these methods on short spells of precipitation, it is unclear how well they can augment PUWR. Furthermore, groundwater depletion in semi-arid regions cannot be reversed by relying on annual rainfall.

Agriculture

India’s agricultural boom since the mid-1980s has been sustained by groundwater. Decreasing public investment in irrigation, low oil prices, and subsidised electricity all contributed to the development of groundwater irrigation. However, due to excessive depletion of some basins and escalating energy prices, expansion of the net irrigated area has slowed down in recent years. Small farmers can ill-afford to periodically dig deeper wells to access the plummeting water table, nor can they afford the diesel to run their water pumps. Also, neither the power companies nor the the government can bear the subsidy bill for the agricultural sector and reforms are desperately needed. The NRLP hopes to reverse this trend by providing surface irrigation as well as replenishing water tables.

The major challenge facing the water sector in India is how to increase the groundwater stocks to arrest the declining groundwater tables. Several alternative proposals to the IBT have been considered to resolve the rising demand for agricultural water. One is to improve irrigation efficiency through micro-irrigation. Studies show that agricultural yield is significantly improved with drip or sprinkler irrigation yet despite the availability of subsidies, neither has spread much. The high initial investment requirement, combined with subsidised diesel and electricity, have discouraged farmers from pursuing micro irrigation en masse. The small size of the average farm holding in India discourages not just micro-irrigation but also other modernisation involving pesticides, fertiliser, mechanisation, and crop storage. After decades of the technology being available, drip and sprinkler irrigation remains limited to a minuscule 5% of the potential area suited for such techniques. This only reiterates the historical and global experience that surface irrigation is the single most determinant factor in agricultural growth.

Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that consumption of food grains in India is expected to fall in the coming years as a result of increasing urbanisation and increased variety in diet. By 2050, food grains will be less than 50% of the average Indian’s food basket, the remainder going to fruits, vegetables, dairy, and poultry. As a result, there will be a greater demand for feed grain to sustain the livestock required to provide the dairy and meat. The increase in demand for water will therefore come not from food grain but from feed grain livestock.

Other technologies that may mitigate the need for NRLP are desalination and the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops. However, neither seem to have a bright future in India. A cost-effective method of desalination is to complement nuclear power plants with desalination plants. Given India’s power and water shortage, this would seem a symbiotic match made in heaven; excess thermal energy from nuclear power operations can be used to desalinate water more cheaply than conventional reverse osmosis. However, there is strong opposition to nuclear power in India and the sector has so far under-performed on every benchmark.

The GM debate in India is largely restricted to cotton but is slowly reaching other crops. While environmentalists are not yet sold on the technology, there is even greater concern about the corporate practices of corporations like Monsanto. Lack of adequate regulations regarding food safety and poor enforcement is another reason there has been vocal opposition to GM crops in India.

The failure to adopt alternative means to resuscitate Indian water resources and agriculture does not necessarily mean that IBT is the only remaining option. A cursory study of the Polavaram reservoir, for example, tells a cautionary tale. First, it underscores the need to study monthly if not weekly water flow in the river and canals rather than take the annual average. Studies indicate that though the Polavaram reservoir and link canal will reduce seasonal water shortage in the target area of the reservoir, it will only shift the water shortage further down the Godavari Delta during the rabi harvest and summer months. Rather than an expensive IBT, changing cropping patterns – paddy during monsoon and low wtaer intensive crop such as pulses in the drier season – might provide a better option for the region’s farmers.

Similarly, at the Ken-Betwa link, plans to provide irrigation and augment farming during the kharif harvest are unlikely to be met with much success as few farmers need irrigation then. The cropping pattern of the region is such that the cultivated area during kharif is only a small portion of the region’s cultivable area. Some farmers prefer to keep the fields fallow in preparation for wheat cultivation during rabi; others prefer crops such as pulses and oilseeds which require less water, have a shorter gestation period, and have as high a value as paddy. The evolution of this cropping pattern does not appear to have much to do with rainfall and soil moisture, for farmers preferred shorter duration crops that need less water even in areas where groundwater was plentiful. As a result, the proposed irrigation transfers during kharif will do little to boost farm production.

Polavaram and Ken-Betwa are not typical of all segments of of the NRLP, nor do they override other benefits of the project. However, they do serve as a healthy reminder not to be swayed by the state-technocratic triumphalism of such a massive project.

Transportation

The NRLP is not merely an IBT project; it is also meant to create a waterway grid that connects the Brahmaputra to the Vaippar. The linking canals, planned to be between 50 and 100 metres wide and six metres deep, would provide another means of transporting goods within India and reduce the pressure on roads and railways. The riverway will reduce India’s oil consumption and hopefully offer a better and faster means of moving goods. In conjunction with improved storage, this should reduce cost of produce and increase exports.

This vision is, however, dependent on the availability of sufficient water in the canals perennially to maintain a waterway. This may not be a problem during the monsoons but the drier months may put pressure on the water grid – a minimum amount of water, known as an ecological reserve on environmental flow, must be maintained in each river basin to provide for the ecology of that river basin. As one scholar wrote, “Flows are needed for maintaining the river regime, making it possible for the river to purify itself, sustaining aquatic life and vegetation, recharging groundwater, supporting livelihoods, facilitating navigation, preserving estuarine conditions, preventing the incursion of salinity, and enabling the river to play its role in the cultural and spiritual lives of the people.” Given the poor environmental laws in India, there is some concern that this philosophy may not be adhered to.

Environmental flows are not merely about the amount of water in a basin but also about when the water should be flowing and at what rate. All components of the hydrological regime have certain ecological significance: high flows are important for channel maintenance, bird breeding, wetland flooding, and maintenance of riparian vegetation, while moderate flows are critical for cycling of organic matter from river banks and for fish migration. Similarly, low flows are necessary for algae control and water quality maintenance. This holistic approach to river ecology may not be possible with the water transfers the NRLP proposes.

Ecology

Perhaps the most obvious criticism of the NRLP is its ecological footprint. The transfer of such enormous amounts of water will inundate forests and land for reservoirs, and the weight of billions of litres of water may even have seismic implications in the Himalayan region. Proponents argue that waters from areas of abundance will only be transferred to regions of scarcity and the waters of the Brahmaputra will merely reimburse the areas water was diverted from. Thus, the IBT is a chain of substitutions in most places rather than the creation of seismic activity inducing reservoirs.

Nonetheless, there remains the problems associated with hypertrophication of water bodies, oxygen depletion, altering pH levels, increased salinity, disease vectors, evapotranspiration from the new reservoirs and canals, local ecological instability from the transfer of flora and fauna, and the spread of pollution. None of this is new or peculiar to the IBT but for an endeavour projected to be a boon to agriculture, little midnight oil seems to have been burned on water quality.

Solutions do exist – for example, Modi Sarkar has already started on cleaning the Ganga. Irrigated fields can be drained via pipes or channels into collector drains. Similar projects will need to be introduced throughout the national waterway. Some solutions will need to be rejigged – for example, covering canals with solar panels as has been done in Gujarat is not feasible as it will hinder the waterway! Yet the problem of pesticides and fertilizer leaching into the water remains, indicating that a comprehensive national waterway grid needs a comprehensive national environmental policy; the linking of rivers will make it of paramount importance that solutions are found and rigorously applied throughout the country.

Trans-Boundary Issues

The NRLP will have a tremendous impact beyond India’s borders. Countries that are part of the network of river basins such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh will be concerned about India’s plans to transfer river waters that might have come to them. As per international law, any upper riparian scheme would have to be discussed with lower riparian states. Bangladesh would be particularly concerned about the NRLP because the primary gravity link canal from Jogighopa to Farakka would be entirely within India and transfer some 15 trillion litres from the Brahmaputra to the Ganga. This could expose Bangladeshi farmers further down the Brahmaputra to rising salinity.

In addition, the NRLP allows India to completely control the livelihoods of some 20 million Bangladeshi farmers who rely on water from the Brahmaputra and the Ganga. If India releases too much water, the entire delta in Bangladesh could be flooded and if Delhi curbed the flow of water, crops could fail. However, given the annual flooding and loss of life in Bangladesh, Dhaka has reason to cooperate with India in creating a mechanism to release just the right amount of water at the right time. Ultimately, this remains a political rather than a technical question.

Further north, the shoe is on the other foot: India has viewed with some concern China’s SNWTP for some years. China’s project aims to transfer water from the Yangtse to Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia Hui. However, a spin-off has been under consideration which would not only build massive hydoelectric power stations at the Great Bend in the Brahmaputra but may also divert the river waters to the arid regions of Xinjiang and Gansu. Such a step would leave India and Bangladesh at China’s mercy.

Indian officials have so far played down China’s water transfer project, pointing out that a mere 7% of the total water entering the Brahmaputra is from precipitation in China via the Subansiri, Siang, and Lohit tributaries. However, other experts have questioned this assertion and as any other policy issue in India, the India-China clash on the sharing of the Brahmaputra waters remains nebulous to the public. What is obvious is that India and China have no water sharing treaties between them and Beijing is unlikely to make any grand gesture of fairness towards Delhi.

There is reason to hasten India’s NRLP in the Himalayan sector – theoretically, under international law, a country’s right over natural resources it shares with other nations becomes stronger if it is already putting them to use. However, the obvious counterpoint is that China is not a country known to follow international law. The Brahmaputra alone is responsible for approximately 29% of all of India’s river runoffs. If Beijing does divert 30% of the Brahmaputra water, India’s modern-day pyramids will truly be just that – a very expensive and elaborate tombstone.

The International Food Market

With increasing trade liberalisation, agricultural subsidy reductions are in India’s interests. The Food Security Act, for example, has forced India to defend its agricultural policy at the World Trade Organisation at the expense of negotiating space in other sectors of its economy. India’s still growing population is a considerable destabiliser of international prices and if the harvest fails, international food prices due to heavy imports by India. The domestic as well as international ripple effects of India’s failure to attain self-sufficiency in agriculture can be significant.

Engineering Challenges

As with all things in India, the buck stops with the question, “Can the government deliver on its promises?” The Indian government’s track record on the economy, defence, foreign policy, internal security, poverty alleviation, infrastructure, and almost every other sector is woeful. The NRLP already costs approximately ₹5.6 lakh crores and cost overruns for a project of this magnitude can have severe repercussions.

Beyond engineering, the social cost of displacing almost 600,000 people must also be considered. The state has been excruciatingly slow in previous large projects to compensate those displaced, up to ten years in some cases. Consequently, land acquisition is resented by local communities.

Some have suggested that rather than launch into this Herculean task, it might make more sense to construct the NRLP in phases, leaving time between each phase to observe the economic, social, and environmental effects. This may be plausible, but proponents argue that the benefits of the NRLP can be achieved only when complete. While some links may not be particularly well served by water transfers, they are required transit points in the larger system. Constructing only a few links of the NRLP for observation may paint a very different picture of the project than its final state. To borrow from John Dalton, the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts.

On the positive side, the project will generate massive employment and an upsurge in the construction industry. Over a million people are expected to be employed over at least ten years. That is of little use, however, if the NRLP does not benefit the country.

Conclusion

These are only some of the complexities involved in the NRLP. There are, no doubt, some significant advantages such as groundwater resuscitation and the construction of an inland waterway. There are equally alarming concerns about China’s plans on the Brahmaputra and the spread of river pollution. Some aspects, such as environmental flows and cropping patterns, require more research. There are undoubtedly many local solutions that may or may not work, but these have not been adopted for decades despite government subsidies. Furthermore, surface irrigation has been proven world over to benefit agriculture and India’s reliance on groundwater is only because of the state’s failure to provide adequate surface irrigation and water storage infrastructure.

Given the present data on the NRLP, or lack thereof, it is difficult to presently be for or against river linking; citizens can only monitor new research and developments for now and impinge upon the government to consider their concerns.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on June 07, 2014.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...
← Older posts

Chirps

  • Is this what it looks like when one 'goes full Trump'? twitter.com/Gil_Hoffman/st… 3 hours ago
  • Coalition tensions rise as Shaked, Gantz fight over Nation-State Law: bit.ly/3wsx3Dz | They act as if the… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 4 hours ago
  • Russia fired at Israeli planes over Syria: bit.ly/3FPSFMS | They can't handle Ukraine, now they want a piece of this? 4 hours ago
  • India and Europe build bridges over Ukraine divide: s.nikkei.com/3lcbm49 | The divide isn't nearly as great as it is portrayed by some 4 hours ago
  • Western architecture is worsening India's heatwave: bit.ly/3wknTJd | I'm sure the rampant cutting down of… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 4 hours ago
Follow @orsoraggiante

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 224 other followers

Follow through RSS

  • RSS - Posts

Categories

Archives

Recent Posts

  • The Mysterious Case of India’s Jews
  • Polarised Electorates
  • The Election Season
  • Does Narendra Modi Have A Foreign Policy?
  • India and the Bomb
  • Nationalism Restored
  • Jews and Israel, Nation and State
  • The Asian in Europe
  • Modern Political Shibboleths
  • The Death of Civilisation
  • Hope on the Korean Peninsula
  • Diminishing the Heathens
  • The Writing on the Minority Wall
  • Mischief in Gaza
  • Politics of Spite
  • Thoughts on Nationalism
  • Never Again (As Long As It Is Convenient)
  • Earning the Dragon’s Respect
  • Creating an Indian Lake
  • Does India Have An Israel Policy?
  • Reclaiming David’s Kingdom
  • Not a Mahatma, Just Mohandas
  • How To Read
  • India’s Jerusalem Misstep
  • A Rebirth of American Power

Management

  • Register
  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.com
Considerate la vostra semenza: fatti non foste a viver come bruti, ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

  • Follow Following
    • Chaturanga
    • Join 224 other followers
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • Chaturanga
    • Customise
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Report this content
    • View site in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar
loading Cancel
Post was not sent - check your email addresses!
Email check failed, please try again
Sorry, your blog cannot share posts by email.
 

Loading Comments...
 

    %d bloggers like this: