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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Bhavini

Making Sense of India’s Plutonium Stocks

22 Tue Jan 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Making Sense of India’s Plutonium Stocks

Tags

AEC, Bhavini, energy, FBR, India, Kalpakkam, NPCIL, nuclear, PFBR, PHWR, plutonium, RGPu, safeguard, WGPu

It was recently reported that the commissioning of the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam has been further delayed, this time due to a shortage of plutonium. Touted as a one-of-a-kind reactor, the PFBR boasts of some of the latest safety mechanisms and will use a mixed oxide fuel of PuO2-UO2. India’s Atomic Energy Commission intends to follow the PFBR with two more Commercial FBRs whose construction will start in 2017, and three more CFBRs by 2020 before scaling up to 1,000 MW reactors. However, with the PFBR, cost overruns have been as high as 62%, raising initial estimates of Rs. 3,500 crores to a final Rs. 5,677 crores.

Ignoring the wonders of thorium for now, it is indeed puzzling why India would have a shortfall of plutonium. India has been operating multiple reactors capable of generating plutonium as a byproduct – Cirus (1960-2010) and Dhruva (1985) for weapons grade plutonium, and 17 Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors, of which only six are under safeguards (RAPS I, II with Canada, Tarapur I, II with US, and Kudankulam I, II with Russia). This leaves about 4,000 MW of India’s 5,730 MW nuclear capacity unsafeguarded, an important consideration since India has refused to designate the PFBR as a civilian facility. A separation of Indian nuclear facilities, civilian or military, is mandated by the agreements the country entered into in 2008 with the United States, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and as per the nuclear non-proliferation concept of “contamination,” any unsafeguarded material that goes through a safeguarded facility comes under safeguards.

The amount of plutonium – or any fissile material – a country has is difficult to calculate precisely, particularly a country like India that, until recently, fell outside the non-proliferation regime. Experts estimate Cirus to be capable of producing about 9.2 kgs and Dhruva of 23 kgs of weapons-grade plutonium per annum if run at a reasonable 70% load factor. Thus, Cirus should have yielded about 359 kgs of WGPu by the time it was decommissioned in 2010, and Dhruva 552 kgs until the end of 2012. In addition to the 911 kgs of WGPu (some 130 kgs of which has been used in India’s six nuclear tests as well as to fuel some of India’s test reactors such as Purnima), India’s PHWRs have also contributed to the overall national stockpile with their reactor-grade plutonium. The amount of RGPu produced by the PHWRs over the years is even harder to ascertain with any certainty since Indian PHWRs have been used to experiment with various fuel cycles to conserve India’s small uranium reserves, the outputs of which are not the same. Assuming the use of natural uranium only and a load factor of 73%, approximately 16 tonnes of RGPu should have been produced. The actual figure is likely to be lower – nine tonnes according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials – due to use of depleted uranium and recycled uranium from LWRs, as well as U-PU and Th-Pu MOX fuel cycles. Nonetheless, even the lower range estimates do not point to a potential plutonium shortfall for the PFBR.

However, plutonium stockpiles are measured in terms of reprocessed fissile material, not spent fuel. India’s fuel reprocessing facilities, the Power Reactor Reprocessing Plant (PREFRE) at Tarapur and the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant (KARP), are capable of handling 150 tonnes and 100 tonnes respectively of spent fuel per annum. However, Kr-85 plumes – used for nuclear monitoring – from both sites are far below expectations for plants running at maximum potential. If claims that the PFBR project has been delayed due to shortage of plutonium are true, it would mean that India’s reprocessing facilities have been operating at less than 20% capacity. Even low estimates of spent fuel produced and the amount of RGPu contained therein indicate a healthy stockpile for a small nuclear power. Though India’s rickety nuclear infrastructure is known to have interminable hiccoughs, less-than-20% efficiency would represent a new low.

The shortage in plutonium for the PFBR is highly unlikely to be due to a diversion of RGPu to India’s weapons stockpile; nor is a “loan” from the military stockpile likely to help the reactors much. The former is unlikely due to the higher percentage of Pu-240 and Pu-241 in RGPu; Pu-240 is unreliable for weapons as it experiences spontaneous fission and could result in a premature explosion, while Pu-241’s relatively short half-life makes it unsuitable for long storage (fissile core may not retain criticality). Similarly, though supplementing RGPu with WGPu even temporarily is technically possible, it gives diminished results – RGPu contains Pu-240 which gets converted to Pu-241, a better fissile material than Pu-239.

Under the Separation Plan that New Delhi has agreed to under the framework of the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, India will be placing most of its PHWRs under IAEA safeguards. This will reduce RGPu supplies to approximately 50% of pre-Plan levels by 2014. The PFBR itself will not be safeguarded, nor will the reprocessing plants. This seems to be to retain a secondary plutonium source for India’s military programme, which would normally be catered to by dedicated military reactors such as Dhruva (as an aside, though Cirus was shut down in 2010, there is no news of the planned Dhruva II). If there are shortages of plutonium with more reactors free of safeguards, the situation could become quite acute when supplies are reduced. The hope that the PBFR will itself be a source of plutonium will have to remain a hope for a few more years as experts have questioned the doubling time – the time it takes for the reactor to generate enough plutonium to start a second similar reactor – that has been projected. This means that India’s ambitious plans of having five CFBRs by 2020 will join the list of overly optimistic declarations India’s nuclear establishment has made an art form out of.

One can hope that as India’s civilian-designated reactors come under IAEA safeguards through 2014, there will be a little more transparency in their operation. Right now, the Government of India has conflated secrecy with security and the nuclear establishment remains impervious to outside scrutiny. To be fair, there may be some justification to this opacity as capital cities world over are notorious for information leaks. However, it defeats the purpose when secrecy becomes a hindrance in intra-department or intra-agency operations and hurts the outcome. Nuclear concerns like the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd, and Bhavini are ultimately responsible to the Atomic Energy Commission, which in turn is answerable to the Prime Minister’s Office. That is where the ossification starts, and that is where the first step towards efficiency must be taken.


This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on January 23, 2013.

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India Glowing

02 Sun Dec 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

AEC, AERB, ASN, Bhavini, CSR, DAE, electricity, energy, ENSREG, EPP, EPZ, IAEA, India, INES, INSAG, KKNPP, Kudankulam, NPCIL, NRC, nuclear, PMANE, power

Two days ago, a proposal by the Government of India to sell a 10% stake in the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd (NPCIL) and list the utilities company on the bourses was revealed. NPCIL’s worth is evaluated at Rs. 25,428 crores, with a turnover of Rs. 7,914 crores and a net profit of Rs. 1,906 crores last year. The largest nuclear power company in India (the GoI also owns Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd, or Bhavini, which is in charge of India’s fast reactors), NPCIL operates 21 reactors including the newly started facility and Kudankulam I and generates 5,780 MW of power, with five more reactors under construction that would provide an additional 3,800 MW. NPCIL generates 10 MW from windmills, also at Kudankulam.

Normally, this would be a moment of great expectations; the argument for a gradual privatisation of the nuclear energy sector is strong, and it may be hoped that a 10% divestment is the first step in such a direction. Yet, as is often the case in India, no good news comes untainted. The cause of concern in this case is the abysmal state of nuclear regulatory mechanisms in the country. Whether one calls it the arrogance of babudom, the conflation of secrecy and security, or pseudo-democracy, the functioning of India’s Atomic Energy Commission leaves even ardent supporters of nuclear power (such as myself) quite underwhelmed.

France obtains almost 80% of its electricity from nuclear power; the United States, though deriving a lesser percentage of overall electricity from nuclear power than France, nonetheless operated over 100 commercial reactors. The reliance of both these countries on nuclear power is based on the involvement of the private sector in the industry and good regulatory mechanisms. As in many sectors, private firms have shown greater efficiency in running utility companies, nuclear as well as with other fuels. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States) and Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (France) work in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s International Nuclear Safety Group and/or the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group to ensure effective safety precautions at every step of the nuclear energy generation process. These safety standards extend not just to nuclear power plant workers but also the citizenry in the immediate vicinity, comprising of safety gear, medical facilities, and even evacuation plans as a last resort.

For example, INSAG’s Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants recommends that “emergency plans are prepared before the startup of the plant, and are exercised periodically to ensure that protection measures can be implemented in the event of an accident.” These measures are to be “taken on and off the site to protect the public from any serious releases of radioactive materials from the plant.” What the ASN and INSAG call ‘Defence in Depth’ is a policy that seeks to primarily prevent any accident, and failing that, to limit its consequences. Procedures have the three-stage goal of trying to compensate for human error and machine failure, containing damage to the plant itself, and protecting the nearby public and environment in a worst-case scenario.

Safety is not viewed in merely tactical terms but is also built into policy. INSAG’s Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants states that a regulatory body must provide “critical self-assessment and correction.” The regulatory body must monitor facilities; it must take action if the safety management system is found to be inadequate or ineffective; it should strive to remain non-bureaucratic and technically competent, as well as ensure competence of workers at nuclear facilities; any safety policy must be clear, as must be the procedures it tries to institute. At a governmental level, another document, Safety Culture, asks, is the regulatory body satisfactory? Are there unnecessary impediments to its functioning? Does the body have an adequate budget that keeps up with inflation and allows it to hire the appropriate talent? Is there sufficient safety research? Are there effective collaborations with other bodies on safety? Is there undue influence on the regulatory body?

This brief overview of French and US safety standards indicates why they have not hesitated to open their industry to private players such as American Electric Power, Duke Energy, Southern Company, and others. France’s Areva, despite a large government share, has a number of minority partners, even international ones.

In India, the scene is dismal – a recent report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India found the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India’s version of the ASN or NRC, to be an abject failure in its responsibilities. No authority was given to AERB to create, modify, or discard rules on nuclear safety and security; there was no comprehensive nuclear safety policy; licensing of radiological equipment was found to be deficient; regulatory inspections were not performed.

The recent demonstrations against the nuclear power plant coming up at Kudankulam have attracted much attention. The facility presently accommodates two Russian VVER-1000 reactors. This reactor has four layers of radioactive containment as well as a passive safety system, making it a fairly safe design. While the broad opposition of the People’s Movement Against Nuclear Energy is nonsensical, one cannot but consider their case on grounds of an incompetent nuclear conclave in India – technology is, after all, only as good as the people operating it.

A recent RTI filed against the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant reveals that no plans have been made in case of a Level 7 (on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale) accident. Furthermore, the NPP’s Emergency Preparedness Plan did not envisage any duties outside the plant and is hence an internal document of the NPCIL. Accordingly, no offsite emergency drills had been conducted – in fact, no evacuation has even been envisaged. In fact, beyond the 1.5-kms radius exclusion zone, the responsibility of relief in case of accident has been put on the district administration. This lackadaisical approach to safety violates not only INSAG guidelines but even common sense.

 NPCIL RTI 1  NPCIL RTI 2  NPCIL RTI 3  NPCIL RTI  4
 NPCIL RTI 5  NPCIL RTI 6  NPCIL RTI 7

In terms of Corporate Social Responsibility, government sources say that the amount allocated for the surrounding areas has been paltry. V. Narayanasamy, Minister of State in the PMO, told Parliament earlier this year that a mere Rs. 11 crores had been released over four years, adequate only for a handful of classrooms and a computer laboratory to serve as a photo opportunity for the government and NPCIL. However, Narayanasamy also mentions an additional Rs. 500 crores that had been sanctioned for the improvement of the environs of the KKNPP but not a penny of this has yet been seen.

It is such carelessness that gives even the most vociferous advocate of nuclear power pause. Development is indeed important, but not at the risk of nuclear contamination. Such practices cannot be allowed as private operators, who can be expected to implement only the minimum legal requirements, enter the nuclear market. Most shocking is that this neglect of nuclear safety is not done to cut corners and save on costs as one might expect in a shady private operation; it is done out of sheer incompetence and lack of accountability. What is more, the cloak of secrecy that protects everything nuclear in India, be it a stationary requisition order or a bomb design, will dutifully conceal that which the public have a right to know. This is the danger of nuclear power in India – the management, not the technology. At this rate, India’s babus will certainly have India glowing, but it may be a radioactive glow.


This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on December 5, 2012.

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