Tag Archives: Central Asia

730 Days…

26 Thursday May 2016

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When Narendra Modi swept to power in May 2014, nobody could have dreamed that he would mould India’s foreign policy so decisively. Observers foreign and domestic all opined that Modi would not focus on international affairs much, choosing to pay attention to the domestic Augean stables he inherited instead. The wisdom was that, at most, Modi’s India might modestly reach out in its own neighbourhood but anything beyond the region was going to be primarily to buttress the country’s faltering economy.

If one is looking for unqualified and substantial successes, there is little the Modi government can boast about. Yet this is not to say that there have been no successes – rather, India’s track record in translating words into deeds has been poor throughout its history and it would be foolhardy to bet on noises in the pipeline too soon.

The achievements of the Modi government are also weighed down by the burden of public expectations – the Indian media has published report cards on the government’s performance after its first 100 days in office, at the six month mark, the one year mark, and now at the end of the second year in office. No other administration has ever faced such close scrutiny. Furthermore, the gargantuan scale of what needs to be done to bring the country in line with the ambitions of the younger generation dwarfs into insignificance any accomplishment of the National Democratic Alliance.

The general tenor on Modi’s India has been positive. The optimism in the international mood can be gauged from the increase in the flow of foreign investments into India; Japan has made substantial investments in infrastructure, the most visible project being the high speed rail project connecting Bombay to Amdavad. Similarly, France is playing an active role in developing smart cities in India as more and more of the country urbanises over the next few decades. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also expressed interest in India’s road, maritime, and riverine infrastructure. All this is in line with expectations that Modi would focus on rebuilding India’s economy and developing the infrastructure needed for it to emerge as a regional power.

The past two years have also seen India take a greater interest in its backyard, Central and West Asia. Counter-terrorism and energy topped the agenda but Delhi’s pockets are not deep enough to spur breakneck development on visible markers of progress such as gas pipelines. India is also one of the largest investors in African countries. While previous administrations have also sought similar goals, the Modi government has brought an energy to the negotiations that leaves many observers cautiously optimistic of movement.

Frequent visits to the country by US defence officials also indicates the initial flowering of a mature security relationship that will have consequences for the entire greater Indian Ocean region. The US-India relationship that had been reincarnated by the George W Bush White House and stagnated since received new impetus once Modi took office. The Defence Technology and Trade Initiative has moved forward as Washington has been keen to help India build better aircraft carriers and talks have been going on to manufacture the M777 ultralight-weight howitzer in India under the Make-in-India scheme. Recently, there has even been talk of Boeing establishing a manufacturing line for its F-16s and F-18s in India and offering the F-35 to Delhi.

In the last two years, India has lost some of its timidity in participating in the Malabar naval exercises with the United States and Japan. Delhi is close to concluding a military logistics agreement with the United States that could significantly expand its influence over the Indian Ocean region. The Indian Navy – in the midst of a massive expansion and modernisation programme – may well evolve as the face of Indian soft power and diplomacy in the region as its augmented capabilities allow it to provide services such as security, search & rescue, and humanitarian relief for the regional commons. This will integrate India more closely with the ASEAN and SAARC nations who will become accustomed to seeing Indian power as a benign force.

In the neighbourhood, the Modi government can certainly report Bangladesh and Bhutan as success stories of its foreign policy. The border agreement and several agreements on energy, infrastructure, transportation, trade, and nuclear cooperation have made Bangladesh more comfortable with its parent state. However, things have been a mixed bag in Sri Lanka and disappointing in the Maldives and Nepal. These are difficult customers, trying to profit from playing India off against China as India tried – and failed – to do with the US and USSR during the Cold War. Without significant economic leverage, these states will continue to be a nuisance to Delhi.

Modi’s greatest diplomatic failure is alleged to have happened with Pakistan and China. Nothing could be further from the truth: while Pakistan sees India as an existential threat, China views its southern neighbour as eventually capable of sabotaging its rise and competition with the United States. The incursion by Chinese troops into Indian territory during a state visit by Xi Jinping to Delhi, not to mention Bejing’s obstructin of Indian accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the UN Security Council as a permanent member, indicates that the Middle Kingdom is content to allow relations to simmer for now. The overtures to Islamabad, unequivocally rebuffed at Pathankot, suggests an ugly truth that Modi – and perhaps South Block – cannot admit publicly: that Pakistan is not a problem that can be solved with patient diplomacy. It is naïve to expect any improvement of relations with either of these two neighbours.

The Modi administration has done well in showcasing India economically and has also achieved a modicum of success on security matters given the options available to it. Afghanistan is an illuminating example: it can hardly be denied that it is in India’s interests that the war against Islamists, be they al Qa’ida, ISIS, or a Pakistani proxy, is best fought with Afghan sinew. Yet Delhi has been reticent to generously supply Kabul with training and material because of its own shortcomings. After decades of material and intellectual neglect, it would not be surprising if India’s armed forces find themselves shackled more by their own politicians than by the enemy.

Modi’s foreign policy has not stopped with nation-states – he has reached out to the Indian diaspora, multinational corporations, and potential technology disruptors to accelerate India’s growth. At the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris in December 2015, India played a key role in promoting solar energy as an alternative to fossil fuels by committing to expand solar energy to 100 GW (installed capacity) by 2022. The International Solar Alliance, launched by the prime minister, will keep the country at the centre of innovation and regulations concerning solar energy.

While India has been content to involve itself in international and regional groups such as the G-20, BRICS, ASEAN, SAARC, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation until now, the Modi government has taken the policy one step further and started to nurture groups in which it could assume leadership roles such as the 1997-established Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Bhutan Bangladesh India Nepal . Delhi has also started to bypass Pakistan in SAARC via multilateral treaties with other neighbouring states such as the connectivity project between Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and itself which Modi revived in November 2014; the BBIN Initiative was established in 1997 as the South Asian Growth Quadrangle but little had been accomplished since.

In the two years of the Modi government, Delhi has strengthened its foreign policy along all axes – economic, security, and diplomatic leadership. While it is easy to be impatient with the rate of progress, the limitations on India’s economic, military, and diplomatic power also ought to be borne in mind. With continued progress, the several frustrations observers feel with the elephant will gradually dissipate.

This post appeared on FirstPost on May 27, 2016.

A View From Central Asia

14 Wednesday May 2014

Posted by in Central Asia, India, South Asia

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After month-long elections in nine phases, the Bharatiya Janata Party is returning to power in India after a decade in Opposition. Led to its highest ever Lok Sabha tally by Narendra Modi, it is the first time since 1984 that the BJP or any party has secured a majority on its own. This will, observers hope, bring a new decisiveness to the Prime Minister’s Office that has been lacking for the past ten years.

In his election campaign, Modi talked about India’s relations with its neighbours in terms of trade and security. Departing from India’s traditional emphasis on ties with the superpowers, Modi focussed on India’s immediate neighbours in Asia, particularly the members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Japan. Though Central Asia did not feature prominently in the Prime Minister Elect’s speeches, it would be unwise to read too much into this – no matter its place amidst campaign promises, the region has geographic proximity and remains vital to Indian trade and security interests.

Until now, both sides have been subdued over the potential for better relations. The Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan – used to see India from the perspective of the Soviet Union, a friendly state which received aid and preferential economic treatment from Moscow. However, since India’s economic liberalisation began to bear fruit by the end of the previous millennium, the country has switched roles to having the capability of being a donor state to the Central Asian republics (CAR). Despite this switch, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Tashkent have been disappointed to see India defer to Russia in taking an active role in the region.

Central Asian capitals have a generally positive view of India; some of the old hands from the Soviet era still populate the bureaucracy and remember the country fondly. More importantly, India has not used its image as the world’s largest democracy to push for liberalism and democracy in the region, preferring instead to instruct by example. India’s tiny footprint in Central Asia is not seen as threatening whereas China’s economic involvement in the region is viewed with suspicion. Russia is not much liked either due to dissatisfaction over its geopolitical domination over the five -stans. The United States is also suspect because its commitment to the region, combined with its constant harangues about human rights, is not trusted.

Other smaller players like Iran and Turkey have had limited success due to their finite means to provide solutions to the region’s problems. India’s military weakness compared to the other major actors – it still depends on Russia and other foreign suppliers for an overwhelming portion of its military equipment – in Central Asia and its growing economy makes it an ideal partner for prosperity and to balance Great Power designs.

Some of Central Asia’s positive view of India is also due to the several common goals they share. All parties are worried about the threat of Islamism which may boil over from Afghanistan and Pakistan; there is eagerness to develop energy infrastructure that can deliver oil and gas to India’s growing economy; interest also exists in expanding cooperation beyond mere energy and security. In no area is there a direct conflict of interest between India and the CARs.

Despite the goodwill and potential for a rewarding relationship, the CARs remain uncertain about Indian policy towards them. How will Delhi’s alignment with the United States and the European Union on the one hand and Russia and China on the other affect them? India is proud of its non-alignment but what would that mean for the region? What is India willing to offer that others cannot? How does India see Central Asia? These questions need clarification from Delhi.

Frustration also mounts from the lethargic pace of Indian business. The perception in Central Asia is that not only are Indian investments paltry compared to Chinese projects, but India is extremely slow in its delivery mechanism. India’s political dillydallying and sluggish bureaucracy has put in doubt the country’s seriousness and ability to be a reliable partner. While several memoranda of understanding have been signed between India and the CARs, the former is not even in the top ten countries exploring the region for oil and gas. Trade between the two regions at the end of 2012 remained at a paltry $700 million while that between China and the CARs topped $46 billion. South Block’s ambitious Connect Central Asia initiative and the International North-South Trade Corridor connecting South Asia to Europe by road, ship, rail, and pipeline via Central Asia and the Caucasus has not materialised yet.

China, on the other hand, has invested tens of billions of dollars in road, rail, and pipeline projects, all linking Central Asia to China. In 2000, China launched the Great Western Development Plan, which has made Xinjiang a vital trade and energy corridor along the New Silk Road. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as bilateral agreements, China has invested over $30 billion in Kazakhstan to purchase MangistauMunaiGas and in its Kashagan oil field, the world’s largest discovery of oil in the last 30 years. Beijing has signed a $15 billion deal with neighbouring Uzbekistan for oil, gas, and uranium, and it has started production at Galkynysh in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gasfield. In addition, Beijing has lent Ashgabat $4 billion to develop the gasfield at South Yolotan and extended $10 billion to the whole region during the international economic recession through the SCO. Furthermore, China is working on its New Silk Road to connect the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Once completed, it will lower cost of transport, bring Central Asia transit fees, and bypass India in the economic development of the region.

Interestingly, despite the enormous flow of investments from Beijing, there is very little trust of its motives among the Central Asian republics. The Chinese practice of using its own labour force, for example, has not eased tensions with local communities who are themselves migrant labourers in Russia due to unemployment back home. In addition, many think it is only a matter of time before Chinese immigrant workers settle in the Central Asian republics and take away more jobs. China’s brutal repression of the Uighur in Xinjiang has not gone unnoticed; despite its Soviet past, Central Asia remains a tribal society and old loyalties run deep. It is also unlikely that Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, or Kyrgyzstan will soon forget that they ceded land to China to maintain the peace, particularly when the ensuing protests removed the Kyrgyz president from office. A couple of years ago, Kanat Ibragimov, a Kazakh performance artist, symbolically decapitated a toy panda to protest against Chinese expansionism into his country.

It is in this light that the partnership with India has proven disappointing. Its failure to reap a bonanza so far has pushed Central Asia closer to the Chinese economy and kept their energy exports vulnerable to Russian transit policies by denying them access to the southern seas via Afghanistan and Iran. However, in India’s defence, one must also consider the fractious nature of the region. Rivalry, corruption, social polarisation, poverty, crime, narco-trafficking, and the lack of stable institutions has made central Asian states politically unstable and daunting to business.

Although India and China are both concerned by Islamism in the region, China would like to curtail Indian influence in Central Asia as it would eventually undermine Beijing’s goals vis-a-vis Pakistan. Similarly, though Russia might prefer India as a partner in Central Asia to balance China, it is loathe to share its backyard with anyone. The current Ukraine crisis has made China more useful to Russia while India’s diversification of its weapons suppliers in recent years has irked Moscow. As a result, India can expect little cooperation from either power in the joint development of energy and transportation infrastructure in Central Asia. Similarly, the United States and India cannot see eye-to-eye in Central Asia because of the former’s antipathy towards Iran and its ambiguous position towards Pakistan and its Islamist networks. India’s own military hesitation mean that Central Asia will continue to depend on the CSTO and the SCO for its security in the immediate future.

With a new prime minister, India has fresh impetus to pursue its mutual interests with Central Asia. A new government with a clear mandate from the people and no baggage is ideally positioned to forge stronger ties with Central Asia. First, India must recognise that it needs individual policies for each of Central Asia’s five states – each have their own priorities, problems, and the rivalries between them must be kept in mind. Second, India has so far played up its historical ties to the region and that is good soft power. However, soft power alone does not build partnerships. If it did, Turkey and Iran would be the dominant powers in Central Asia and not Russia and China. India must acknowledge that Central Asian leaders are pragmatic about security and trade bottom lines in their dealings.

Third, India needs to shift focus from the mega-projects to smaller, localised projects that will build trade relations across a spectrum of fields. India can lend its expertise in chemical equipment, electronics, telecommunications, mining, IT, services, tourism, environmental technology, education, healthcare, construction, and agriculture. Cooperation in archaeology, space, and the nuclear field is also possible. This is for two reasons: 1. it will be difficult to break into oil & gas exploration and development at this late date without even having a clear idea of how the pipelines from Central Asia will run to India, and 2. rivalries between the CARs, such as that between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan over hydropower and water, will also delay hydrocarbon transit; early successes are important to boost confidence and inspire greater engagement.

The single most important long-term project India can undertake in Central Asia is the INSTC. This trade corridor is not dependent on just hydrocarbons for its profitability but also minerals, produce, and manufactured goods. India’s PM-Elect has campaigned aggressively on infrastructural development within India. India undoubtedly has the skills required to build the INSTC but has been lacking the political will to do so. With Iran becoming less of an international pariah, Modi only needs the political will to expand his infrastructural vision to India’s near abroad for the benefit of all concerned.

PM Elect Modi has suggested that India’s foreign policy will be intertwined with trade and focus more on the immediate neighbourhood such as SAARC, ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea under him. He has prioritised infrastructural development within India as well as with important trading partners such as Burma. Central Asia also fits comfortably within Modi’s rubric of a co-prosperity sphere for the region and will enhance the stability and security in Central and South Asia. All that is required now is for Modi to “Look North.”

This post appeared in the June 2014 issue of the Diplomatist.

Non-State Actors and the Great Game

11 Friday Apr 2014

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There has been some speculation after the Kunming attack in March this year about how terrorism in Central Asia might result in strange bedfellows. The knife attack in the southern Chinese city left 33 dead, including the assailants, and 143 wounded. The attack – pre-meditated, methodical, and outside Xinjiang – does not fit the previous pattern of Uighur violence and China has been quick to place the ultimate blame on Islamic terror from Central Asia. After initial reluctance, the United States also declared the Kunming attack an act of terrorism.

Some observers believe that such unrest in Central Asia will reorient geopolitical alliances in the region. China will move closer to the United States to fight the common enemy, Islamic terrorism, and become warmer towards India. Simultaneously, rifts will appear in China’s relations with Pakistan over the latter’s alleged training of Uighur militants and as well as Beijing’s common cause with Delhi.

It is unlikely, however, that such an alliance will materialise. The complex relations between the countries in the region – their mutual animosity and suspicion – raise the threshold for cooperation above the potential for Islamic terrorism in Central Asia to be a serious threat.

China has long claimed the unrest in Xinjiang province to have an Islamist dimension with ties to cells in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan but there have been few takers for these accusations. Several of the more infamous incidents – the Ürümqi bus bombing in 1997, the Aksu bombing in 2010, and the Hotan and Kashgar attacks in 2011 were all carried out by Uighurs, a persecuted ethnic minority in northwestern China. None of the violence so far has revealed the modus operandi of al Qa’ida or its affiliates and has therefore received no attention from the international community. The United States initially hesitated to declare even the Kunming attacks an act of terrorism and did so only upon chiding from Beijing.

India

To gain sympathy for its fight, China may reach out to its neighbours. India, long a target of Islamic militancy, is a natural partner in the war against Islamism in Central Asia. Furthermore, like Beijing, India has high hopes for energy investments in the region and would not like to see an increase of militancy there. However, any partnership with India is likely to be more on paper than on the ground; India has steadfastly refused to take up a greater role in Afghan security despite its own assets in the country repeatedly coming under attack.

Delhi also has its own problems with Beijing: geopolitical rivalries aside, China invaded India in 1962 and still holds Indian territory in Aksai Chin. Beijing is also laying claim to even more in Arunachal Pradesh. In addition, Beijing has liberally armed Pakistan against India with the exchange of even nuclear weapons designs and missiles (though more of this came from North Korea). China’s stance on terrorism in Kashmir, from Delhi’s perspective, also leaves a lot to be desired. There is little reason for India to want to exert itself in coming to China’s aid in Central Asia if its neighbour can be distracted elsewhere.

Pakistan

China’s strategic and regional partner, Pakistan, cannot offer much assistance either. Islamabad may have little to do with the attacks in China, and the Inter Services Intelligence has less perfect control over all the groups it trains and funds than is commonly thought. If aid is flowing to the Uighurs from the badlands of Pakistan’s northwest, it may be without the approval or even knowledge of Islamabad.

While Beijing can threaten to curtail military and economic aid to Pakistan, China has long used the Islamic republic as a counterweight to India. It is unlikely that this policy will be reconsidered short of a minor revolution in Xinjiang. Pakistan also knows that it remains one of Beijing’s few reliable allies in the region and a reasonably sized market for China’s wares, including weapons and nuclear reactors. The symbiotic relationship that Beijing and Islamabad have nurtured over decades will require much more than a body count in the low two digits to rupture.

The United States

The United States is already embroiled in wars against Islamist forces in several places in the world, and in many others, it is actively giving aid to opposing forces. Unhindered by regional rivalries, Washington would seem an ideal partner for China’s war against the Uighurs. Unfortunately for Beijing, the United States’ present involvements have already strained its treasury and Washington is not trawling for another conflict to get involved in.

Despite the rhetoric of the Global War on Terror, the United States is very flexible in its designation of terrorism. After the attacks of September 2001, Washington declared al Qa’ida and the Taliban as terrorist organisations and US forces flew half way around the world to invade Afghanistan and kill Osama bin Laden. However, despite much evidence that points to Pakistan as a hotbed of terrorist activity, Islamabad remains one of the United States’ closest non-NATO allies. Washington has continually ignored Indian warnings about cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and maintains its arms sales to the country.

Similarly, while the United States has waged an under-reported drone war in Yemen, it has removed the Iranian Mojahedin-e-Khalq from the list of terrorist organisations and rationalised support to “moderate” Islamists in Syria against Bashar al Assad. To cover its retreat from Afghanistan with some dignity, Washington has come up with some fascinating new vocabulary such as “good Taliban.” Simply put, the United States is interested in fighting only its own terrorists.

There is little awareness, let alone sympathy, for the Uighur cause in the United States; however, if the Uighurs were to limit their violence to Chinese targets alone and avoid flamboyant displays of links with the Taliban, al Qa’ida, or its affiliates, they might find private pockets of sympathy in the United States; neither would it be detrimental to Washington’s interests to have its Great Power rival distracted by domestic security concerns.

There is also this to be considered: for over a decade now, the United States has been opposed to China having a larger role in Afghan security. The Uighur trail will inevitably do exactly that, not just in Afghanistan but also in the former Soviet Central Asian republics. There is no compelling reason for the United States to change that position on China as long as the threat does not grow much beyond China.

Others

China’s overtures to the United States and India are bound to cause concern in Moscow and Tehran. Though both Iran and Russia desire the demise of terror groups in Central Asia, neither would be too keen in seeing renewed US presence in the region. For that matter, neither would Beijing. With ambitious plans in the offing for the revival of the ancient Silk Road and Sino-Russian energy ties, Beijing will have to take regional dissatisfaction over its closer ties to the United States into consideration.

The United States must also take into consideration its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. With recent friction in the South China Sea between China and its neighbours, Seoul and Tokyo would be looking to the United States for reassurance. Furthermore, a second US rapprochement with China may imperil Washington’s pivot to Asia and validate in Asian capitals their scepticism over US commitments to the region’s security.

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The notion that an arrival of Islamist terrorism in Central Asia will alter regional geopolitics is premised upon two questionable assumptions: 1. that Islamism is a greater threat than mutual rivalries; and 2. that the Islamism is genuine and not a cover for an undercurrent of ethnic grievances indulged only by Islamist groups. This is all, of course, assuming that China’s claims of Islamist links are true. For now, however, no one will play Beijing’s game.

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on April 13, 2014.