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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: climate change

From Russia, With Love

26 Sat Dec 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Andhra Pradesh, Areva, climate change, GE, General Electric, India, Kovvada, Kudankulam, Larsen & Toubro, Narendra Modi, nuclear, nuclear energy, Rosatom, Russia, Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reaktor, VVER, Westinghouse

Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia yielded 16 agreements ranging from defence, energy, space cooperation, manufacturing, and education. Of particular interest to some has been the announcement regarding the purchase of Russian nuclear reactors for Kudankulam as well as a yet-to-be-decided site. Modi swept into office promising electrification and ample energy for all; his visit to the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in July 2014, just two months after taking office, his party’s manifesto promise of aggressively pursuing thorium reactor technology and deployment, and his discussions with US president Barack Obama in January 2015 that led to a convoluted arrangement that partially resolved apprehensions about India’s nuclear nuclear liability law all indicated that the prime minister would actually deliver on his promises.

However, little moved on the nuclear front over the past 18 months; in fact, it would not be amiss to say that things actually slid back a little with the chief executive officer of General Electric, Jeffrey Immelt, announcing that he would not risk exposing his company to India’s nuclear liability law and that GE would not be in the Indian nuclear business. Even the much hyped nuclear understanding with Japan has not yet turned out to mean much, and the prime minister made no mention of nuclear power at the international climate change conference in Paris a couple of weeks ago. Nuclear developments from the Russia trip, then, were a much welcome bit of news. As is typical of the Indian government, the announcement was just a stub, even in the official press releases, and not much has been spelled out about India’s new Russian purchase.

In his statement, the prime minister announced that India was keen to acquire twelve Russian reactors for two sites. The first of these sites is Kudankulam, where one Russian 1,000 MW VVER is already operating (though on suspiciously long maintenance downtime) and another is about to achieve criticality in a few weeks. This site was originally finalised in 1989 for two reactors with the option of expanding to eight units. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, an Indian economic downturn, and anti-nuclear protests delayed work and the first reactor went online only last year in 2014. Confirming six reactors at Kudankulam does not utilise the 1989 understanding to its maximum but it is nonetheless a significant departure for Indian nuclear policy, and one for the better: for reasons unknown to outsiders, it has been the practice of the Department of Atomic Energy to sanction two reactors at a time. Reactors in India have always been built in pairs at each site – Narora, Kaiga, Kakrapar, Tarapur, Madras, and Rawatbhata. This may seem like an insignificant deviation but as the United Arab Emirates’ recent experience has shown, building more reactors of the same type simultaneously improves the efficiency of construction. This is further supported by industry analyses of why the construction of the EPR at Olkiluoto went completely off the rail.

The second site for six more of Russia’s reactors, it is being reported, is in Andhra Pradesh though the exact spot is yet to be determined. These are thought to be the slightly larger VVERs, rated at 1,200 MW. Interestingly, Andhra is already in line to receive six of GE’s 1,520 MW Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) reactors at Kovvada. Does the prime minister’s announcement mean that Kovvada has now been handed over to the Russians, especially in light of Immelt’s outburst in September 2015? If this is not the case, Andhra Pradesh will be home to twelve reactors. Hyderabad’s interest in procuring Russian reactors is no secret. Earlier this year, in June, when West Bengal balked at having two Russian VVERs at Haripur, chief minister Chandrababu Naidu offered his state as a potential home for the displaced reactor plans. This marks a sharp departure from the state’s earlier decision to rely on oil & gas to meet its energy needs.

Modi’s Russian nuclear package also comes with a ‘Make in India’ bonus: Rosatom, the Russian nuclear reactor manufacturer, will be sourcing more components from Indian vendors. The joint statement read, “India and Russia will expand their cooperation in science and technology, industry, localization of equipment and spares, uranium mining, fabrication and supply of nuclear fuel, management of spent fuel and in other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.” It is not clear if this entails technology transfers as the deal with Areva at Jaitapur has meant for Larsen & Toubro: the French concern has agreed to help L&T upgrade its forging capacity to produce components suitable for the EPR. Rosatom may well ask Indian companies to assemble knocked-down kits as Russian defence contractors have done in the past with Indian industry.

From a governmental perspective, the most positive aspect of this deal is that it will go through. India’s nuclear liability law, enacted in 2010, delayed or scuttled many other promising ventures such as the ones at Mithi Virdhi and Kovvada; Jaitapur has also had its share of delays to the extent that its environmental clearance license expired last month. Rosatom has been the only international vendor that has stuck with India, though it has worked in a substantial hike in the price of its reactors in a renegotiated contract: while Kudankulam I and II cost the Indian taxpayer approximately Rs. 17,300 crores, Kudankulam III and IV will cost them in the vicinity of Rs. 39,500 crores. Not all of that 130 per cent hike can be explained away by inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, there are doubts whether Rosatom will actually pay damages in the extremely unlikely event of a nuclear accident at Kudankulam: although the operator is committed to a no-fault liability, supplier liability can easily get bogged down for decades in courts under a mountain of technical data and legal manoeuvres.

Overall, however, the deal is good for India. Russia’s VVER reactors are among the more advanced Gen III+ designs and will provide clean, cheap, and reliable energy. The real drawback of the outcome in Moscow is that India’s joint vision with Russia on nuclear energy cooperation envisages only 12 reactors over the next 20 years. With the construction of high speed rail networks planned in India, a growing economy, and increasingly affluent citizens, these reactors will be a mere drop in the bucket. As the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and France in the 1980s and 1990s, demonstrated, achieving a safe construction pace of three to five reactors per year is very much within the realm of possibility. India’s nuclear ambitions ought to mirror China’s building spree and 12 reactors ought to be ready by 2020 at the latest. The real question is, what do we do after that, Mr. Modi?


This post appeared on FirstPost on December 27, 2015.

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Fast Forwarding to Thorium

19 Mon Oct 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Nuclear

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, AHWR, climate change, development, energy, energy poverty, Fast Breeder Reactor, FBR, India, nuclear, plutonium, pollution, reprocessing, thorium, uranium

What is the single greatest factor that prevents the large-scale deployment of thorium-fuelled reactors in India? Most people would assume that it is a limitation of technology, still just out of grasp. After all, the construction of the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) – a 300 MW, indigenously-designed, thorium-fuelled, commercial technology demonstrator – has been put off several times since it was first announced in 2004. However, scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre have successfully tested all relevant thorium-related technologies in the laboratory, achieving even industrial scale capability in some of them. In fact, if pressed, India could probably begin full-scale deployment of thorium reactors in ten years. The single greatest hurdle, to answer the original question, is the critical shortage of fissile material.

A fissile material is one that can sustain a chain reaction upon bombardment by neutrons. Thorium is by itself fertile, meaning that it can transmute into a fissile radioisotope but cannot itself keep a chain reaction going. In a thorium reactor, a fissile material like uranium or plutonium is blanketed by thorium. The fissile material, also called a driver in this case, drives the chain reaction to produce energy while simultaneously transmuting the fertile material into fissile material. India has very modest deposits of uranium and some of the world’s largest sources of thorium. It was keeping this in mind that in 1954, Homi Bhabha envisioned India’s nuclear power programme in three stages to suit the country’s resource profile. In the first stage, heavy water reactors fuelled by natural uranium would produce plutonium; the second stage would initially be fuelled by a mix of the plutonium from the first stage and natural uranium. This uranium would transmute into more plutonium and once sufficient stocks have been built up, thorium would be introduced into the fuel cycle to convert it into uranium 233 for the third stage. In the final stage, a mix of thorium and uranium fuels the reactors. The thorium transmutes to U-233 as in the second stage, which powers the reactor. Fresh thorium can replace the depleted thorium in the reactor core, making it essentially a thorium-fuelled reactor even though it is the U-233 that is undergoing fission to produce electricity.

After decades of operating Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), India is finally ready to start the second stage. A 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam is set to achieve criticality any day now and four more Fast Breeder Reactors have been sanctioned, two at the same site and two elsewhere. However, experts estimate that it would take India many more FBRs and at least another four decades before it has built up a sufficient fissile material inventory to launch the third stage. The earliest projections place major thorium reactor construction in the late 2040s and some put the date past 2070. India cannot wait that long, and neither can the world. If the quality of life of 1.2 billion Indians starts to approach European levels without nuclear power, the goal of keeping global warming below two degrees Celsius will seem a hare-brained fantasy.

The obvious solution to India’s shortage of fissile material is to procure it from the international market. As yet, there exists no commerce in plutonium though there is no law that expressly forbids it. In fact, most nuclear treaties such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) address only U-235 and U-233, presumably because plutonium has so far not been considered a material suited for peaceful purposes. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) merely mandates that special fissionable material – which includes plutonium – if transferred, be done so under safeguards. Thus, the legal rubric for safeguarded sale of plutonium already exists. The physical and safety procedures for moving radioactive spent fuel and plutonium also already exists – France and the UK have operated commercial reprocessing facilities since the late 1960s that have served several countries such as Japan, Italy, and Germany.

If India were to start purchasing plutonium and/or spent fuel, it would immediately alleviate the pressure on countries like Japan and the UK who are looking to reduce their stockpile of plutonium. Other countries like South Korea would also be able to relieve their stores of spent fuel to countries who possess reprocessing facilities and have a need for separated plutonium. India is unlikely to remain the only customer for too long either. Thorium reactors have come to be of great interest to many countries in the last few years, and Europe yet remains intrigued by FBRs as their work on ASTRID, ALFRED, and ELSY shows. Additionally, Russia is building the BN-800 and already operating the BN-600 at Beloyarsk.

The unseemly emphasis on thorium technology has many reasons. First, thorium reactors produce far less waste than present-day reactors; two, they have the ability to burn up most of the highly radioactive and long-lasting minor actinides that makes nuclear waste from Light Water Reactors a nuisance to deal with; three, the minuscule waste that is generated is toxic for only three or four hundred years rather than thousands of years; four, thorium reactors are cheaper because they have higher burnup; and five, thorium reactors are significantly more proliferation resistant than present reactors. This is because the U-233 produced by transmuting thorium also contains U-232, a strong source of gamma radiation that makes it difficult to work with. Its daughter product, thallium-208, is equally difficult to handle and easy to detect.

The mainstreaming of thorium reactors worldwide thus offers an enormous advantage to proliferation resistance as well as the environment. Admittedly, the technology is no magic pill and there still remains a proliferation risk – albeit significantly diminished – but these can be addressed by already existing safeguards. This makes newcomers to nuclear energy lesser risks. For India, it offers the added benefit that it can act as a guarantor for the lifetime supply of nuclear fuel for reactors if it chooses to enter the export market, something it is unable to do for uranium-fuelled reactors.

It is clear that India stands to profit greatly from plutonium trading but what compelling reason does the world have to accommodate India? After all, self-professed hard-nosed realists are unlikely to settle for climate change and proliferation resistance. The most significant carrot would be that all of India’s FBRs that are tasked for civilian purposes can come under international safeguards in a system similar to the Indo-US nuclear deal. There is little doubt that India will one day have a fleet of FBRs and large quantities of fissile material that can easily be redirected towards its weapons programme. This will limit how quickly India can grow its nuclear arsenal to match that of Pakistan or China. Delhi has shown no inclination to do so until now but the world community would surely prefer that as much as possible of India’s plutonium was locked under safeguards.

The United States could perhaps emerge as the greatest obstacle to plutonium commerce. Washington has been resolutely opposed to reprocessing since the Carter administration, preferring instead the wasteful once-through, open fuel cycle. Although the United States cannot prevent countries from trading in plutonium, it has the power to make it uncomfortable for them via sanctions, reduced scientific cooperation, and other mechanisms. The strong non-proliferation lobby in the United States is also likely to be nettled that a non-signatory of the NPT would now move to open and regulate trade in plutonium. The challenge for Delhi is to convince Washington to sponsor rather than oppose such a venture, if not internationally then at least bilaterally. In this, a sizeable portion of the nuclear industry could be Delhi’s allies.

Any list of the greatest challenges facing the world this century is bound to have energy poverty and climate change in the top five slots. For developing economies like India, the relationship between the two is likely to be an added concern: on the one hand, energy consumption bears a strong correlation with development and wealth while on the other, historically, material advancement has not occurred without placing a significant burden on the environment. Scientists also predict that the impact of climate change will be worse on India, particularly on coastal cities with high population densities. Even if one is not inclined to accept the data on climate change, the detrimental health effects and the poor quality of air and water cannot be denied. Bringing forward the deployment of thorium reactors by four to six decades via a plutonium market might be the most effective step we take towards curtailing carbon emissions and development this century.


A version of this post appeared in The Hindu on November 03, 2015.

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