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Nuclear Security and Nuclear Convenience

24 Thu Mar 2016

Posted by in Nuclear, Security, United States

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With an important nuclear conference – the last Nuclear Security Summit – about to start in a week, this is usually the time when articles criticising aspects of non-Western nuclear programmes coincidentally begin to appear. India has been a favoured subject recently, inspiring thoughtful prose before the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, biennial meetings of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation, and annual Nuclear Suppliers Group plenaries. It is a lot of ink that only serves to reiterate what VC Trivedi, India’s ambassador to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in the mid-1960s, called nuclear apartheid.

The NSS has addressed issues that have not received sufficient attention in existing fora. Juicier topics such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive related technology have their own fora in the NPT and NSG communities as well as the United Nations and other regional and bilateral frameworks. By contrast, the safety of nuclear materials seems like plain police work and has largely been left to individual states and industry to handle. Agreements such as the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are rare and safety regime so far inadequate. Nonetheless, participants at the NSS have taken a creative approach to nuclear safety and security, raising the possibility of even stepping away entirely from the use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It is in this expanded and comprehensive view of safety and security that we should also consider policy and not just the technicalities of nuclear weapons, energy, and commerce.

First, it is clear that the United States needs reminding that it presently possesses a stockpile of around 7,000 nuclear weapons. This, if you can believe it, is actually the result of years of disarmament from an all-time high level of almost 30,000 nuclear weapons. Since the nuclear ayatollahs have always told us that more weapons mean more danger, it seems obvious that significantly reducing that stockpile is the place to start.

Russia and the United States each have about the same number of nuclear weapons, estimated to be some 25 times (!) that of the next nuclear power, France. By contrast, India is estimated to have 120 nuclear weapons. Even granting Russia and the United States a temporary 10:1 advantage, they would still need to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpile by half before they enter the realm of reason.

Second, the nuclear modernisation drive that all the treaty nuclear powers are on does not augur well for the reputation of the non-proliferation regime. Were a cynical attitude to develop among member states, international cooperation would be made even more difficult; the difficulty in having a common sensical amendment to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is clear indication that faith in the global nuclear framework is eroding. During the long negotiations with Iran that recently culminated in a favourable agreement, a fear that repeatedly arose was the lack of faith in international institutions as neutral arbiters of law. India’s objection to intrusive inspections that allow fuel tracking through its nuclear complex is also along similar lines of security and questionable impartiality.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran was a truly commendable diplomatic effort. The Islamic republic had taken creative license with its Article IV right under the NPT to enrich uranium and the international community persuaded Tehran of its obligations to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities for verification. It would be even more commendable were a similar effort put behind reminding the N5 – the five nuclear powers recognised by the NPT – of their long-pending Article VI obligation towards nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. Until now, there seems to be no sign that the N5 have even recognised this promise. Such double standards weaken the nuclear regime that will find a challenger in every Iran and North Korea when their geopolitical situation demands it.

Such hypocrisy is not new – even before NPT opened for signing, the United States kept it quiet that its interpretation of Articles I and II of the treaty allowed for nuclear sharing between NATO countries; US nuclear weapons could thus be deployed to non-nuclear states such as Italy, Turkey, and West Germany. The US role in the Israeli and Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons, of omission or commission, certainly marks it as one of the most irresponsible nuclear powers in the world. China’s overt assistance to the Pakistani nuclear programme puts it in the same company. If the world community is to accept that nuclear weapons present an unbearable risk and their proliferation must be prevented,  Washington’s reckless behaviour from the 1960s to the 1980s does little to convince the sceptics.

A different kind of recklessness is revealed in Eric Schlosser’s Command and Control, a terrifying book about the several close calls the United States had in handling nuclear weapons. To be sure, it is praiseworthy that the United States is an open society where such research was possible – other nuclear weapons states are far more hesitant to allow such information to be made public. Nonetheless, when Washington finds research in Trombay or Kalpakkam risky, it has little ground to stand on. The recent scandals involving the United States’ missile men shows that this plague of poor maintenance and readiness is not yet over.

Even if the attendees at the NSS were willing to let history remain in the past, there remain some serious questions regarding present US nuclear policy. Washington believes, for example, that reprocessing, even under safeguards, is an unacceptable proliferation risk and the nuclear fuel cycle must remain open. In effect, the United States believes that it is safer to bury radioactive nuclear waste for some 29,000 years than to recycle it until the most dangerous radioactive elements are burned up and store a fraction of the waste for 300 years or less. Such faith in our engineering capabilities will require some proselytism, especially when the other option promises energy security and expands fuel availability by several thousand years.

Perhaps a genuine drive for nuclear safety would include the mainstreaming of thorium reactors for energy. There is plenty of intelligent speculation among nuclear energy enthusiasts that the Molten Salt Reactor programme was abandoned in the 1960s because it was not fissile material-friendly. MSRs do not remove all risk – nothing does – but they substantially reduce the security and safety implications present in light water reactors. Admittedly, nuclear research in the United States is more and more in private hands but a CCC-like (Conference on Climate Change) effort to mobilise international will and resources would address multiple concerns simultaneously. The NSS would not be the appropriate forum for such a venture but issues as grave as nuclear safety and security can know no boundaries.

There is plenty to be said about the United States and N5 behaviour regarding nuclear weapons and energy, a lot of it not laudatory. This would be nice to remember the next time a column raises alarm about some allegedly new development in India. It would put the alarm in context, and chances are, the world will still be here tomorrow.

This post appeared on FirstPost on March 26, 2016.

Reading the NTI’s Nuclear Materials Security Index

09 Thu Jan 2014

Posted by in India, Nuclear, South Asia

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The Nuclear Threat Initiative released its Nuclear Materials Security Index for 2014 on January 8. After the positive response to the index when launched in 2012, the NTI and the Economist Intelligence Unit sought feedback from experts and incorporated several new indicators and sub-indicators to produce this year’s report. Given the paucity and unreliability of data the NTI and EIU have had to work with, the outcome is indeed laudable. Furthermore, the creation of some sort of measurement for nuclear materials safety is most welcome and one hopes that the index will be expanded to cover nuclear safety and proliferation risks in the future.

That said, the findings of the report must be taken with a grain of salt. This is not for any fault on the part of NTI or the EIU but the subjective nature of some indicators. One of the key findings for Indians from the latest NMSI is that India now ranks below even China and Pakistan in the security of its nuclear material. Undeniably, there are many concerns about how Delhi is running its nuclear programme, but the NMSI’s ratings must be put in context.

Countries with weapons-usable nuclear materialsThe NMSI covers 25 countries with weapons-usable fissile material and 151 countries without (less than one kilogramme). The latter group is part of the study because terrorists will target areas which are most vulnerable, not most plentiful, in nuclear material. However, there exist substantial differences between the two groups that considering their results together would skew the findings. It is important to point out that the NMSI does not address proliferation risks, disarmament, nuclear safety, or the threat of sabotage of nuclear facilities. Rather, it restricts itself to evaluating the potential of theft of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Countries without weapons-usable nuclear materialsEven within this circumscribed ambit, the NMSI does not consider the theft of radiological material or lightly enriched uranium used in many civilian reactors – as the study accepts, these are also dangerous materials but would do damage on a vastly smaller scale than weapons-usable fissile material; additionally, they “require a different analytical approach and represent different challenges.” However, the NMSI does not make a distinction between military use and civilian use of fissile material unlike the International Atomic Energy Agency; this brings the 85% of nuclear materials that are for non-civilian use and outside the scope of the IAEA’s inspections within the purview of the NMSI. As the report reminds us, the IAEA’s mandate is strictly civilian and is restricted further by budgetary constraints and the discretion of nuclear weapons states in opening their civilian facilities to inspections.

NTI IndexThe NMSI evaluates risk across five categories – 1. Quantities and Sites (16%), 2. Security and Control Measures (29%), 3. Global Norms (17%), 4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity (20%), and 5. Risk Environment (18%). Each of these categories are weighted differently as indicated in parentheses and have further sub-indicators. Countries were ranked within their respective categories, out of 25 and out of 151.

In the first category, Argentina and Australia came first, with Iran in fourth place, France in 18th, the United States in 20th, India, Japan, and Pakistan sharing 22nd, and the United Kingdom closed the list; in terms of security and control measures, the United States took pole position, China 15th, Iran and Pakistan 23rd, and India sealed the bottom; Australia, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all led the pack in following global norms while the United States was 13th, India 18th, and Pakistan 20th; when it came to domestic commitments and capacity, not one nuclear weapons state made it into the top 10, with France at 11, the United States at 17, Pakistan 20th, China 21st, and India 23rd; nuclear weapons states maintained their nuclear material in riskier environments than non-nuclear weapons states did with France being the highest ranked NWS at 8, the United States 10th, India 22nd, and Pakistan at rock bottom on 25. Overall, Australia’s nuclear materials were deemed safest, the French were 7th safest, United States 11th, Chinese 20th, Pakistani 21st, and Indian fissile material was 23rd safest.

Nuclear Materials Security Index Methodology
Categories and Sub-Indicators Scoring Weightage
NTI methodology NTI scoring NTI weighting

These results may be statistically sound but raise questions about their implicit assumptions. For example, “Quantities and Sites” makes the statistically understandable assumption that more material or sites raises risk. This basis inherently biases the category against closed fuel cycles, nuclear propulsion, accession to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and in India’s case, its three-phase nuclear programme.

Weapons-Usable Fissile MaterialThe logic of more-is-worse is similar to arguing that everyone who drinks is an alcoholic. The peculiarities of each national nuclear programme prevents it from certain decisions. For example, India needs plutonium to fire up its thorium reactors and is therefore investing in breeder technology. India’s closed fuel cycle is not a cause for concern if security considerations are integrated into every stage. Furthermore, India has recently launched the INS Arihant, a nuclear-powered submarine whose reactor operates with 40% enriched uranium. India plans an additional two to four more such vessels and the maintenance of this fleet precludes a high score for India in the first category of the NMSI. Finally, India has hesitated to sign the FMCT because the treaty would limit its fissile material stockpile while committing no other power to disarm (Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty worked out very well).

India’s “Security and Control Measures” remain weak as the Comptroller and Auditor General has already reported in 2012. Record-keeping, the ability to detect and prevent theft on nuclear material, periodic background checks on personnel, licensing, regular assessments, and internal surveillance all remain wanting but there is a silver lining – an International Atomic Energy Agency assessment in November 2012 found India’s reactors in Rajasthan to be safe and the facility to have sound procedures. Delhi’s problem is not a lack of awareness in these matters but an irrational devotion to secrecy and limited qualified manpower to implement all the safety precautions immediately.

NTI IndiaSimilarly, “Global Norms” seeks membership to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and other such regimes. The section also measures safety by considering contributions to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, much like papal indulgences once upon a time. However, there may be reasons a state might not want to accede to a treaty but may still behave in a responsible manner, sometimes even more so than signatories to the treaty. A classic example is the NPT – India has been a better non-signatory member of that treaty than either the United States or China. It is also highly unlikely that a state would allow a terrorist to go unpunished if its nuclear facilities were attacked because it was a non-signatory to an international treaty affirming the same.

Perhaps India’s single gravest failing is, as “Domestic Commitments and Capacity” highlights, the failure to have an independent nuclear regulatory authority. This was also mentioned in the 2012 CAG report but secrecy and inertia have meant that the country’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is yet to develop any teeth. However, India has committed to and implemented other standards such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 as well as the CPPNM.

“Risk Environment” tries to measure political stability and regional conflict but has its own problems. For one, public unrest and violence has varying reasons – the Taliban attack on a Pakistani military base housing nuclear material, for example, is quite different from the large demonstrations that rocked India after the gangrape of a woman in Delhi last year, the Taksim Square protests, or the Occupy movement. The Airin Riots in Osaka in 1990 or the Koza Riot on a US military base in Okinawa in 1970 hardly put Japan’s fissile material or US nuclear weapons on the island in any danger. If disputes, tensions, and armed conflict were truly a criterion, the United States would be close to the bottom of the chart for the talented multitasking it does in this department.

None of this is to disparage the NMSI – the report attempts to create a broad framework in which to understand the safety of nuclear materials, and in this it has been successful. There is little doubt that India’s nuclear establishment needs to be more forthright on transparency, regulations, and security, that India lags behind Japan or the United States in these matters as the NMSI indicates. To read the report with greater accuracy than it promises is unfair and one’s understanding would be compromised due to the various reasons that have been pointed out. A comprehensive report on any country that factors in its individual peculiarities would require significantly more heft and would only attract experts, leaving policymakers and educated citizens in the dark. The NMSI is an excellent first step towards forming a global evaluation system for nuclear safety but it should be read with discernment and an awareness of its limitations.