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Tag Archives: defence

Namaskar, Abe-san!

11 Fri Dec 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Namaskar, Abe-san!

Tags

bullet train, CEPA, Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, defence, economy, India, infrastructure, Japan, Narendra Modi, nuclear, Shinkansen, Shinzo Abe, US-2 ShinMaywa

Japan’s Shinzo Abe is in India for his third prime ministerial visit and it has the feeling of a meeting between friends rather than between the leaders of two major states. On the morning of his arrival, the Times of India ran an article by the Japanese prime minister in which he briefly outlined the history of India-Japan relations. Calling India a key international player and a natural partner who shared Japan’s values, Abe stated his belief that the two countries held the greatest potential of any bilateral relationship in the 21st century and declared his intention of “dramatically developing” the bonds between India and Japan. Not to be outdone in a show of warmth, the Indian prime minister tweeted, “India is all set to welcome its great friend & a phenomenal leader, PM @AbeShinzo. His visit will further deepen India-Japan relations.”

The rise of Abe in Japan and of Narendra Modi in India tells an interesting tale. Both men are nationalists leading nations that had retreated from the international spotlight during the Cold War, Japan via its pacifism and India through its non-alignment. Both nations have seen a generation pass and the younger crowd does not share the sentimentality of the old, though vast numbers yet remain unsure whether the risks of a more dominant global role are worth taking. Both leaders seek to remake their countries but face substantial opposition at home.

Relations between the two prime ministers go back to Modi’s chief ministerial days. This is the fifth meeting between the two men, the initial one being in 2007 when Abe was in his first term as prime minister. Modi and Abe connected well, or at least understood that they needed each other as the post-Cold War honeymoon drew to a close. Their personal chemistry has certainly helped Modi domestically: at a time when the West was trying to isolate him over the 2002 Godhra riots, Japanese firms made major investments in Gujarat’s infrastructure and industry. It is partly the successful outcome of these projects that propelled Modi to the top position in the country in May 2014.

Abe is in India for three days to attend the ninth annual India-Japan Summit talks. These talks broadly encompass three shared strategic interests: Indian infrastructural and economic development, civil nuclear cooperation, and defence ties. Expectations of the summit are big this year, something to top Japan’s promise in August 2014 to invest $34 billion in the Indian economy over five years. And Abe might deliver – it has been reported that the summit will likely see India and Japan seal an agreement for the latter to provide the former $15 billion at 0.5 per cent interest over 50 years to construct India’s first high speed rail line connecting Bombay to Amdavad. India is expected to adopt Japan’s Shinkansen technology and invest at least 30 per cent of the soft loan back into the Japanese economy. Construction is expected to start in 2017 and service by 2024; it has even been suggested that the line might, at a later date, be extended to Delhi as part of India’s Diamond Quadrilateral scheme to link its four metropoles with 10,000 kms of track. Besides this big ticket item, Japan has taken a role in developing the Amdavad and Madras metro projects and is negotiating its involvement in several highway undertakings, airport construction, industrial townships in Tumkur, Ghilot, Mandal, and Supa, and other infrastructural ventures.

An issue that has received less attention in the press is the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the two nations. For several reasons, the full potential of this agreement has not been realised and the Indian and Japanese delegations would do well to ponder this. India is eager to enter the services sector in Japan, not just in information technology; meanwhile, it wishes Japan to give Indian Small and Medium Enterprises a closer look. The individual transactions may not be as headline worthy as nuclear cooperation or bullet trains but the impact over the entire economy will be greater. As India continues to grow and develop into a manufacturing hub as well, its markets promise to revitalise a flagging Japanese economic story.

While there are few hurdles on the economic front, civil nuclear cooperation is much more complicated. The Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 readmitted India to international nuclear trade circles after four decades of nuclear apartheid and the South Asian country has since concluded several agreements for supplies of uranium for its small fleet of nuclear reactors. It had been hoped that Japan would also promptly begin to engage in nuclear commerce with India but that has not been the case. Tokyo has strict policies governing nuclear commerce, and one of them prohibits any such relations with a country that is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Delhi will not sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and allowing it to join as a nuclear weapons state will in all likelihood mean the collapse of the international non-proliferation regime. Over the years, India has worked to persuade Japan of its trustworthiness and it is rumoured that Abe is closer to accepting the Indian view.

Truth be told, the value of a nuclear agreement between the two countries has been blown out of proportion. This is entirely because of the symbolic significance India has placed on international recognition of its nuclear credentials as a safe and reliable state. However, even if Abe and Modi were to be able to come to an agreement on this issue, it is unlikely that India will gain anything owing to its unique interpretation of nuclear liability. Japan has become an important manufacturing node in the international nuclear supply chain with major nuclear vendors in France and the United States depending upon vital components from the island. Yet the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) has brought India’s nuclear renaissance to a screeching halt and GE has refused to enter the country’s nuclear sector. Westinghouse has been silent too and Areva has slowed down its activities in Jaitapur, awaiting clarification on some of the problematic clauses of the CLNDA. If Modi successfully closes a nuclear deal with Abe, the only possible benefit to India in the near future is access to the high quality forging of reactor pressure vessels by Japan Steel Works. This will not bring back the foreign vendors but will at least indigenous nuclear industry the option to accelerate its expansion.

The third leg of the India-Japan relations triad is defence ties. This is a difficult subject for Japan: since World War II, the country has been avowedly pacifist – albeit under a US nuclear umbrella – and has abjured from any military activity outside Japan’s boundaries. Tokyo also forbade itself from selling defence equipment to other countries, even allies. It is only recently that there has been a thaw in this position: in 2011, Abe managed to pass several amendments to Japanese law that now allow him to engage in defence trade. This allowed Japan’s ShinMaywa to respond to Delhi’s Request For Information for nine amphibious aircraft capable of search and rescue operations, radar surveillance, and transportation of cargo. India and Japan set up a Joint Working Group in 2013 to explore the possibility of manufacturing the US-2 ShinMaywa together. Though a new era has begun for the Japanese defence industry, it is still early days and Abe faces strong domestic opposition to his reforms. Even an agreement on joint manufacture of the US-2 will not herald a rapid expansion of Indo-Japanese defence trade in the near future. However, such a deal is to be welcomed as a step in the right direction.

It cannot be ignored that the urgency motivating closer relations between two of Asia’s largest economies is the mutual perception of the threat of a more powerful and assertive China. Both Delhi and Tokyo have looked on with concern as Beijing strengthened its military on the back of a booming economy over the last two decades. China’s show of muscle in the South China Sea, its noxious relations with Pakistan, the quest for assets around the Indian Ocean, and the rapid modernisation and expansion of its military have not only pushed the nations of Southeast Asia together but also raised warning flags for the United States. However, neither Delhi nor Tokyo wish to antagonise Beijing too much just yet for both have substantial economic relations with their troublesome neighbour. An open and aggressive alliance is to neither country’s benefit, at least just yet, and both India and Japan hold out hope that their blossoming security relations will dampen the Middle Kingdom’s impetus for expansionism.

The silent partner in Indo-Japanese security relations is the United States. Washington indicated its willingness to pivot to Asia in 2011 but found little local support for it for no South, East, or Southeast Asian mouse wanted to bell the Chinese cat. Robust ties between Delhi and Tokyo offer the most viable foundation for a quiet US pivot to Asia and the several recent naval exercises between these three nations indicates the substance of this invisible partnership. Australia has been another quiet comrade, making the troika into a quartet. Before the guns start roaring, however, Modi and Abe have astutely chosen to strengthen economic and military ties, coordinate policies, and support regional security architecture as a hint to Beijing to desist from its threatening behaviour.

The outcome of this summit appears positive on the economic front, cautiously optimistic in the security arena, and uncertain in the nuclear field. Yet what still makes it pleasing for Modi to engage with Abe is the shared values and intellectual framework between Indians and Japanese. As the inheritors of a similar set of ancient Asian cultural values, the two countries make ready partners in an Asian century. Mutual security concerns and economic complementarities only further highlight the logic of a close relationship between India and Japan, even if this summit does not deliver all that observers expect of it. There may be no permanent friends in international affairs, but Shnizo Abe and Japan are probably as close to it as India can get in the short and medium term.

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A Quick Reflection on the BJP Manifesto: Nuclear, Foreign, and Defence Policies

07 Mon Apr 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Opinion and Response

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Bharatiya Janata Party, defence, foreign policy, India, Narendra Modi, nuclear

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s long-awaited manifesto was finally released today as the first phase of polls for the 2014 general elections opened in India’s northeast. Though delayed, the BJP’s guiding document has revealed itself to be quite impressive in terms of new thinking and foci of the Party. Moving beyond staid 20th century mantras, the BJP promises to explore the implementation of carbon credits, green technology, and participate in international efforts to reduce global warming.

Overzealous analysts need to be reminded at times that a manifesto is not a policy document but a declaration of guiding principles; a manifesto does not usually dwell on intricate field-specific details as a bill might but states broad outlines of a vision. To expect more is not just foolish but a failure to understand the medium and platform.

Nuclear Policy

The BJP’s manifesto declares that the Party’s government will pursue nuclear power as a part of India’s energy mix. In conjunction with the section on environmental protection, this is heartening news. With well over 100,000 deaths per annum in India as a result of coal power-induced air pollution, the BJP’s open mind to nuclear power is welcome from an ecological and health perspective as well as in terms of energy security.

The manifesto also mentions India’s ambitious thorium programme which, after decades of research, is beginning to show some promise with work on India’s Advanced Heavy Water Reactor scheduled to break ground in 2017. While thorium research gets barely two or three lines in the manifesto, it indicates that some effort has gone into the framing of the policy – the issue gets a complete miss in the manifestos of other parties.

Nuclear policy has two components – energy and defence. On defence, the BJP promises to regularly update India’s nuclear doctrine and maintain a minimum credible deterrent whose definition may change with evolving geostrategic realities. Interestingly, the Congress Party manifesto skips the word ‘minimum’ – however, considered alongside Congress policy over the last ten years, it is unlikely that this omission hints at a nuclear arms race and was probably just a drafting error. The BJP’s manifesto implies the welcome measure of constant review and fine-tuning to the country’s nuclear doctrine.

Foreign Policy

The BJP’s manifesto promises a fundamental reboot and reorienting of India’s foreign policy. BJP prime ministerial hopeful Narendra Modi had indicated a pivot to Asia in his speeches and it is reflected in the manifesto as well. The BJP states its intention to ignore big power interests and focus on Asia via the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation instead. In fact, the United States does not even get a mention in this new orientation. A Modi-led government would seek solutions to most of its problems – cross-border terrorism, narcotics trafficking, climate change, infrastructure development – in its own neighbourhood.

A truly refreshing factor in the BJP manifesto is that it abandons the formulaic homage to non-alignment and socialism which the Congress manifesto continues to do. Instead, the BJP wishes to build a web of allies further India’s national interests, a marked departure from Jawaharlal Nehru’s avoidance of such groupings and pacts.

Rather than rely on a strictly materialist foundation of trade, the BJP intends to reach out to South and Southeast Asia via cultural ties, tourism, and educational links as well as economic tethering. The BJP will also reach out to the Indian diaspora internationally as liaisons between their adopted or host countries and their country of origin. This will create more substantial people-to-people relations than merely state-to-state and capitalise on Indian soft power.

The BJP also avoids the pitfall of doctrinaire brotherhood with any country or people unlike the Congress which promises support to Palestine and speaks of the goodwill of socialist countries. The BJP also ignores the issue of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, confident that India’s economic and military achievements will more surely bring it the seat than diplomatic hankering alone.

The BJP is also aware of the poor state of the country’s foreign service. The manifesto promises that the service strength will be augmented but given the shortage and underdevelopment of skilled labour in related fields, this must be a long-term goal.

Defence Policy

A positive sign in the BJP’s manifesto is that it discusses full-spectrum defence. Not content with merely clearing defence hardware procurement backlogs and a hat-tip to indigenous production, the BJP raises issues of self defence, civil defence, shortage of personnel, technology, streamlining of bureaucratic processes, research, and private sector involvement in defence. This is a comprehensive agenda to say the least, but given the track record of previous governments and the infamous Indian legislative and administrative systems, perhaps a little too ambitious for one term.

Foreign policy is primarily an intellectual exercise and nuclear policy is the same with a significant scientific addendum. As such, they are fairly simple to formulate and execute. However, defence policy is a gargantuan beast of interlocking dependencies and much harder to tackle. The BJP’s plans for Indian defence have a significant dependence on several other sectors – education, labour, energy, research & development, foreign policy, industry, and law to name just a few. To deliver on defence, the BJP will have to also deliver on all the interlocking fields to a considerable extent. Nonetheless, vision knows no limits on scope or political term and as a directional guide for Indian defence, the BJP’s agenda is commendable.

*     *     *     *     *

Every expert wishes manifestos carried more details in his or her area of expertise, but keeping in mind the limitations of the exercise, the BJP’s manifesto in foreign, nuclear, and defence policies is fairly thorough. A reevaluation of foreign states in their relative importance to India is promised and a complete overhaul of the defence sector is also envisaged. On nuclear policy, despite the slight difference in wording, more of the same can be expected from both the BJP and the Congress. However, the BJP has not hinted at abandoning the policy of minimum credible deterrence and has rejected fixed notions of what constitutes “minimum” by promising constant evaluation. In this sense, the BJP’s policy is more dynamic and responsive but the esoteric nature of the field means that little impact will be noted on a day-to-day basis.

In the battle of manifestos, the BJP showed up late but with definitely the most impressive document. Older political warhorses, deadened by the experience of previous elections and manifestos, will consider the BJP’s election promises cynically; the youth, not yet robbed of their optimism, will dare to dream. No matter, as the Good Book tells us, where there is no vision, the people perish (Míshlê 29:18); this is a good vision to have.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on April 07, 2014.

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Indian Defence in the Doldrums

28 Fri Mar 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Security, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

AgustaWestland, AK Antony, artillery, Cyber Command, defence, DK Joshi, India, indigenisation, INS Sindhurakshak, INS Vikramaditya, insurgency, Israel Aircraft Industries, israel Military Industries, Ordnance Factory Board, Rheinmetall, Scorpene, SP Tyagi, Space Command, Tatra, Tejas, terrorism, United Progressive Alliance, UPA, VK Singh

If anyone ever wanted a patron saint for incompetence, they need look no further than India’s defence minister, AK Antony. Ostensibly given the portfolio by the United Progressive Alliance in October 2006 because of his clean image, the country’s defence preparedness has plummeted to rock bottom during Antony’s tenure. By presiding over an era marked by policy inertia, procurement paralysis, and administrative fumbling, the UPA has brought India’s defence preparedness to its lowest point since October 1962.

Policy

In the past five years, the Indian military has emerged as the largest importer of weapons. The failure to develop indigenous manufacturing and research is partly due to little support by the Ministry of Defence to private firms wishing to enter the defence sector, low research & development budgets, and the inability to recruit the best talent.

The heavy reliance on imports has left defence procurements at the mercy of the exchange rate. Several of India’s acquisitions have had to be put on hold due to the sudden spike in the rupee-dollar rate last year, and the uncertainty has wreaked havoc on budgets as well as preparedness. As a result, modernisation of India’s armed forces is also lagging behind; the Air Force is still flying MiG-21s, the Tejas is yet to be produced in significant numbers, the contract for France’s Rafale has not yet been signed after two years of negotiations, and half of India’s Sukhois are undergoing repairs at any given time.

The Navy has had its own share of modernisation problems, including delays in the deployment of the indigenously built nuclear submarine INS Arihant, troubles with the boilers of the newly inducted aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and the loss of the recently refurbished diesel submarine INS Sindhurakshak.

The crash of the Indian Air Force’s latest acquisition, the Rs.1,000-crore C-130J Super Hercules raises questions about training and maintenance in Antony’s army. The IAF’s pilot-to-cockpit ratio is already the lowest among India’s foes and India has had trouble with training aircraft as well as flight time given to each pilot.

In addition to indigenisation, modernisation, and training, Antony’s MoD has done little to develop a military of the future. Fewer states engage in large-scale warfare with tanks and infantry across open plains as they used to even 50 years ago. The Indian Army has done little to develop new doctrines for fighting low-intensity conflict, insurgencies, or terrorism. Coordination between what exists in the name of cyber operations, intelligence gathering, and special operations remains weak.

Procurement

The most visible failure of the UPA government has been in procurement. The AgustaWestland helicopter scandal may have garnered the most media attention because of the most high profile of its suspect list, but several other scandals have also rocked the UPA government: the Tatra trucks scam, the Ordnance Factory Board scandal, and the Rolls Royce flam to name the most recent. Antony’s policy to immediately freeze any transaction at the slightest hint of corruption has denied the military much-needed equipment and ammunition. The blacklisting of any firm involved has turned away some of India’s major partners such as Israel Military Industries and Rheinmetall.

The PA’s policy of blacklisting firms also has ripple effects in India’s suppliers network: for example, putting all contracts with Rolls Royce on hold will have implications on India’s purchase of the US-2i ShinMaywa from Japan as the aircraft relies on four Rolls Royce engines. A more obvious problem with the UPA’s strategy is that it leaves the military desperately short of munitions as was the case with the Barak missile. Worse, some of the accusations have been found to be false or the Central Bureau of Investigation could not find any evidence of wrongdoing after a thorough investigation such as in the Scorpene deal allegations. These procedures add years to the procurement timeline during which time the Armed Forces are vulnerable and costs go up.

Administration

One might argue that structural changes in defence take time. Yet that does not answer for the UPA’s lehargy in implementing administrative reforms in the armed services designed to improve chain of command, efficiency, and flow of information. Despite ten years at the helm, the UPA has made little movement on the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee and Antony has effectively ignored the Naresh Chandra Review Committee’s report. Furthermore, proposals to streamline the bureaucracy and involve the military in decision-making, such as the creation of a Joint Chief of Staff or the integration of the service headquarters with the MoD, have been resisted. As a result, the military is not just under the civilian control of the minister but also the poorly informed civil service bureaucracy.

A critical improvement Antony could have pursued is the simplification, transparency, and swiftness of the defence procurement process. Even without scandals, the laborious and labyrinthine procurement process can take years, be it assault rifles or aircraft carriers. Over $100 billion of hardware purchases has been stalled for a decade and resulted in the degradation of the military’s fighting capability. As one naval officer described the situation aboard some of India’s seafaring vessels, “it is like treading in a minefield.”

Although India’s defence budget has technically risen under the UPA, factoring in inflation and exchange rates – since over 70% of the equipment is imported – the rise is barely enough for salaries, pensions, and other fixed costs, leaving little for modernisation or R&D. The Army’s desperate appeals for artillery have gone unanswered as has the Navy’s urging to acquire six more submarines.

Civil-Military Relations

The relations between the military and their civilian masters have reached a nadir under the UPA. Delhi’s fear in January 2012 that a coup was taking place just before the Republic Day parade indicates the gravity of this problem.  While the loss of three senior men in uniform – General VK Singh, Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi, and Admiral DP Joshi – was not entirely of the UPA’s doing, one wonders if the defence minister could not have done more to handle matters in-house, at least in the case of the general and admiral. Antony’s excessive reliance on the civil service and his personal indecisiveness has endeared him to the military either.

* * * * *

Admittedly, India’s defence woes stem from decades of negligence and a lack of strategic thinking. To expect that to be overturned overnight is too big an ask. However, the UPA has been in power for a decade, long enough to start implementing a chain of reforms that could move the country in the right direction. Despite the umpteen signs of trouble brewing in the armed forces, the UPA retained its defence minister, who by the way, has held the post for longest. The price of this step-motherly treatment was seen upon the Chinese incursion into India in April 2013 and in the many wasted opportunities when India could not field a military option even if desired. Given the force levels and combat readiness the UPA has brought the Indian military to, its only hope of victory is that India’s neighbours are in a greater state of disrepair. The supreme irony is that it is in a corruption-saturated UPA decade that AK Antony showed us honesty alone is not enough.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on March 31, 2014.

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