Tag Archives: electricity

Nuclear Power – Not If, But How Quickly

25 Sun Jan 2015

Posted by in Nuclear

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There has been much debate over the expansion of nuclear energy in India, the arguments covering a gamut of angles from safety and environmental concerns to liability, security, and affordability. However, whether India should go down the nuclear path is a moot question. The issue is not if India needs nuclear energy but how quickly it can expand its capacity. To understand this, a few data points about its present situation need to be kept in mind.

As of November 2014, India generates 255 GW of electricity. Of this, some 71 per cent comes from thermal energy, 15 per cent from hydroelectric power, 12 per cent from renewable energy, and a mere two per cent from nuclear energy. Industry consumes 45 per cent of the total capacity, agriculture takes 17 per cent, domestic consumption is 22 percent, and the rest goes to railways, commercial use, and other odds and ends. India’s per capita consumption of power is approximately 917 kWh and over 300 million people in India still have no access to electricity. By way of comparison, the United States consumes over 13,000 kWh and the countries of Western Europe such as France, Germany, and Britain approximately 8,500 kWh.

The connection between energy consumption and economic growth cannot be overemphasised. The present definition of rural electrification employed by the government of India is that a village is considered electrified if 10 per cent of the households have at least one electric point. Even functional electrification – televisions, refrigerators, computers, mobile phones, air conditioning, fans – to all without considering any increase in industrial and other demands would require a mammoth increase in generating capacity no matter how conservatively electricity is used.

The demand for electricity will only increase as India’s economy and population grow, with greater manufacturing capability and a more prosperous citizenry desirous of the many comforts of life. Several studies have predicted that India’s electricity needs will have risen some eight times by the middle of this century. In a 2006 study by Ravi Grover and Subhash Chandra, both then of the Strategic Planning Group within the Department of Atomic Energy, a seven per cent growth trajectory was calculated to require the electricity generating potential of 1,400 GW by 2060. This would still be around 5,300 kWh per capita, considerably less than the consumption in other developed countries. Even with a robust, easily achievable and sustainable growth target of six per cent, India’s energy needs would still more than quintuple over the next half century.

Energy growth Energy growth per capita

These numbers do not sound like much out of context; adding capacity will be a challenge, but surely not one beyond India’s reach? The final data point that must be considered in this regard is the limitation of traditional energy sources such as coal. Presently, India consumes some 2.5 per cent of the world’s hydrocarbons and six per cent of its coal; those figures will rise to ten per cent and 45 per cent by the mid-21st century.

Over 45 per cent of the cargo by way of tonnage on India’s railway network is coal. The entire network is already creaking due to these massive shipments and it is difficult to envision even greater volumes of coal being transported by Indian Railways without completely paralysing all other services. Expanding the network is not a complete solution either for two reasons: the sheer quantity of coal required will render all but the most ambitious railway network expansions inadequate, and the subservience of the Railways to the country’s energy needs will restrict other services and goods transport that need to be improved in their own right.

Environmental and all other considerations aside, this purely physical bottleneck is one of the greatest arguments for the aggressive expansion of nuclear power in India. The difference in the energy release of chemical and nuclear processes is several orders of magnitude higher for the latter. The fission of one atom of uranium releases as much energy as the combustion of 33 million atoms of carbon. This means that uranium is far more energy dense than carbon, making transportation far easier than the fossil fuel.

The rapid expansion of nuclear power and a gradual shift from coal will free enormous capacity in Indian transportation infrastructure, saving billions in unnecessary expansion costs for roads, railroads, and ports. This is from merely the logistical benefits of shifting from coal to nuclear – other equally compelling factors have not been considered in this article for reasons of brevity and focus.

Can this not be achieved via other means, such as solar or wind power? The short answer is no. It is one thing to reduce the burden on the grid by installing solar panels on residential buildings but domestic electricity consumption represents only 22 per cent of the total. Scaling up renewable energy to meet the demands of the next century is a challenge of an entirely different magnitude. Again limiting ourselves to analysing logistical difficulties alone, mining the rare earths for the solar paneling and energy storage required is well beyond global manufacturing capabilities.

If India is to have ample energy for its economic growth and that story includes high speed rail, electric cars, and other substitutions of electrical power for fossil fuels, it cannot afford not to get bullish on nuclear power. At present, some 40 reactor projects are on going or have been stalled due to legal complications but Delhi should not be thinking about 30 or 40 reactors – it should be considering 300 or 400. Even with such a massive investment over the next 50 years, nuclear power will still amount to less than 35 per cent of India’s total energy mix. Indeed, the United States represents a similar energy mix today with a hundred reactors for its 315 million people.

Contemplating 400 reactors may seem lunacy at first but a closer consideration of the circumstances shows that these numbers are not fantastic. The ill-informed debate around nuclear energy – and admittedly the less than desired transparency of the government – has diverted attention from the scale of the energy crisis that awaits India. It is high time the authorities unequivocally embrace nuclear power and initiate a vocal programme to inform the public of the risks and benefits of the technology.

This article first appeared in the February print edition of Swarajya.

Romancing the Crane

26 Sun Jan 2014

Posted by in India, South Asia

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Today, India commemorates its 65th Republic Day today with pomp, fanfare, and a display of its paradomania worthy of any military dictatorship. This year, Delhi’s chief guest to its premier annual function is Japan’s prime minister, Shinzo Abe. Analysts have read much significance into this invitation due to stormy climes in the neighbourhood and several high-level visits between India and Japan over the past couple of years.

Just last week, Japanese Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera made a four-day trip to Delhi and invited his Indian counterpart to visit Japan. Last month, His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Akihito and his wife, Empress Michiko, visited India for a week, and six months earlier, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh had led a delegation to Japan. Several lower level exchanges have also taken place between the two governments.

The benefits of a symbiotic relationship between India and Japan have been stated often and there is little benefit in repetition. In fact, the more pertinent question is why such a fruitful partnership has not yet materialised. In a 2013 poll in India, 80% said that they saw their country’s relations with Japan as very friendly or friendly; 95% thought Japan would be a reliable friend and desired greater Japanese business presence in India. In a similar poll in Japan, 42% had a positive view of India and only 4% – the lowest percentage anywhere – had a negative image. While the makings of a beautiful friendship exist, Abe and Singh – or whoever is prime minister in three months – have more work to do at home in creating the ambiance for partnership than with each other, both strategically and economically.

While large-scale Japanese investment in Indian industry and infrastructure interests both sides, India’s ability to absorb investments, aid, and technology are in doubt. Delhi’s laws on labour, manufacturing, land acquisition, and foreign investments are a veritable chamber of horrors, not to mention crippling inadequacies in water, electricity, road and rail networks, and legal protections. The eight-year delay POSCO suffered is not an exception but the rule in Indian industry. Vedanta is another cautionary tale to foreign businesses as is the retroactive tax the Indian government slammed Vodafone with recently.

The decades of neglect India has shown its manufacturing sector means that it is ill-equipped to handle any truly transformative economic agenda that may result from an Indo-Japanese romance. Even with technology transfers, India will still have to import machinery and equipment in the near future until it can develop its own capacity. This expansion needs to be sustained by skilled and semi-skilled manpower which India is already struggling with. Japanese companies will be reluctant to invest wholeheartedly in India until these bottlenecks are resolved.

To Japan, India represents not only an enormous market but also another source of raw materials. Japan is particularly desperate to find a reliable source for rare earth metals, vital to its electronics industry, as it currently depends on China for 90% of its supply. Keeping this in mind, optimists point to increasing trade between India and Japan (approximately $18 billion in 2013) as signs of a blossoming relationship but the paltry amount is a better indicator of how badly trade has floundered between the two states. For a country of India’s size and the complementarity of its economy to that of Japan’s, trade ought to have been at least the order of a magnitude higher. The increase in trade more likely represents streamlining and greater efficiency by industry rather than improved relations just yet. Close relations are built on content of trade more than volume; China is a larger trading partner for the United States than Britain is but one would hardly hazard a suggestion that Beijing is close, let alone closer, to Washington. Similarly, India’s $65 billion annual trade with China is also an indicator of economic efficiency without good relations.

Nuclear commerce straddles the strategic and industrial divide, and India stands to benefit greatly with closer ties to Japan’s nuclear industry. Though not a large vendor of complete reactors, Japanese industry has cornered the market on certain key components for Western reactor designs. Japanese cooperation with India would not only simplify nuclear trade with France and the United States (who depend on Japan in their supply chain), but it would also improve India’s ability to design and build safer and better reactors. Collaboration on Generation III and IV reactor designs is another arena for cooperation.

Japan has historically refused to engage in nuclear commerce with states who have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 has carved out a special place for India in the nuclear hierarchy. However, Tokyo wishes for Delhi to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before it concludes a bilateral nuclear deal. This is beyond what the United States demanded of India, and India has used its agreement with the United States as a template for all its other nuclear deals (France, South Korea, Canada, Australia, Russia, Kazakhstan).

Japan would need to accept India’s non-negotiable position on the CTBT and NPT if any deal is to be struck between the two, something unlikely in the near future. There is, however, some hope as the New Komeito Party, perceived to be against nuclear exports to India, recently backed a civil nuclear pact between the two countries and called for a more flexible approach. For its part, Delhi must reconsider its recalcitrance over its nuclear liability law before nuclear trade can flourish between the two states – another difficult needle to thread.

Many analysts point to a strategic imperative for India to develop close ties with Japan. China’s recent belligerence, it is suggested, will push India and Japan closer. Sadly, this is more an expression of desire than any concrete observation. Unlike trade, however, Japan has reservations about strategic relations beyond the US nuclear umbrella and is yet to make up its mind on the role it wants to play in an era of receding US power.

Despite Article 9 of Japan’s constitution which prohibits the maintenance of a military, India’s defence budget of $37.4 billion (2013) is less than Japan’s budget of $45.9 billion (2013). However, Japan’s constitution permits a self-defence force and Tokyo followed an unofficial guideline to restrict defence spending to below 1% of the Gross Domestic Product until 1986.

Due to India’s failures in defence manufacturing, the country has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer. Indigenous production has been the buzzword in Delhi for a while with little to show for it yet. It is hoped that cooperation with Japan in defence research and manufacturing will help India reduce its imports bill while lowering the cost of Japanese equipment due to economies of scale. Contrary to popular perception, the land of the rising sun is hardly the epicentre of high-tech weaponry – corporations and universities have usually shied away from military research. Nonetheless, there is ample scope in application of dual use technologies such as carbon fibre, radar, engines, avionics, and microchips.

However, Japan’s reluctance to engage in substantial military commerce is a hindrance. Yet recent developments in North Korea and China have caused Tokyo to rethink its minimalist stance on security and ruling Liberal Democratic Party is considering major reforms in the country’s defence posture as well as its strict arms export policy. The difficulty in carrying out these reforms should not be underestimated – there is strong opposition to the LDP’s proposal in the Diet (Japanese parliament) as well as among the Japanese citizenry who fear that Tokyo’s arms sales would weaken Japan’s neutrality and make it a seeming participant in conflicts that are not its own. Until Japan pacifies the ghosts from its past, there is little possibility for defence ties to grow much beyond joint military exercises and cooperation on piracy and terrorism.

A thriving relationship with Japan is a commonsensical quest for reasons of trade and security. There exists among some, perhaps, also a sense of civilisational affinity. Though this is superficial and deceptive, it cannot hurt foster better ties. Yet given the difficulties on both sides, strong ties will take time well beyond the tenure of either Abe or the next Indian prime minister to develop. Besides, any lasting relationship must be institutional and not based on personality alone – while Abe appears keen to prioritise India on his agenda, his successor may not have the same patience.

Despite such strong impetus from both sides currently, there are fundamental difficulties that need to be addressed. Japan needs to decide whether the strategies of the past are still relevant to it in a new world order and if it is ready to jettison them if not; India needs to realise that announcing a yojana is not the same as implementing it – for far too long, India has been long on promises but short on delivery. As Thucydides reminds us, one is “convinced by experience that very few things are brought to a successful issue by impetuous desire, but most by calm and prudent forethought.”

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on January 26, 2014.

India Glowing

02 Sun Dec 2012

Posted by in India, Nuclear, South Asia

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Two days ago, a proposal by the Government of India to sell a 10% stake in the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Ltd (NPCIL) and list the utilities company on the bourses was revealed. NPCIL’s worth is evaluated at Rs. 25,428 crores, with a turnover of Rs. 7,914 crores and a net profit of Rs. 1,906 crores last year. The largest nuclear power company in India (the GoI also owns Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd, or Bhavini, which is in charge of India’s fast reactors), NPCIL operates 21 reactors including the newly started facility and Kudankulam I and generates 5,780 MW of power, with five more reactors under construction that would provide an additional 3,800 MW. NPCIL generates 10 MW from windmills, also at Kudankulam.

Normally, this would be a moment of great expectations; the argument for a gradual privatisation of the nuclear energy sector is strong, and it may be hoped that a 10% divestment is the first step in such a direction. Yet, as is often the case in India, no good news comes untainted. The cause of concern in this case is the abysmal state of nuclear regulatory mechanisms in the country. Whether one calls it the arrogance of babudom, the conflation of secrecy and security, or pseudo-democracy, the functioning of India’s Atomic Energy Commission leaves even ardent supporters of nuclear power (such as myself) quite underwhelmed.

France obtains almost 80% of its electricity from nuclear power; the United States, though deriving a lesser percentage of overall electricity from nuclear power than France, nonetheless operated over 100 commercial reactors. The reliance of both these countries on nuclear power is based on the involvement of the private sector in the industry and good regulatory mechanisms. As in many sectors, private firms have shown greater efficiency in running utility companies, nuclear as well as with other fuels. However, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States) and Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (France) work in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency‘s International Nuclear Safety Group and/or the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group to ensure effective safety precautions at every step of the nuclear energy generation process. These safety standards extend not just to nuclear power plant workers but also the citizenry in the immediate vicinity, comprising of safety gear, medical facilities, and even evacuation plans as a last resort.

For example, INSAG’s Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants recommends that “emergency plans are prepared before the startup of the plant, and are exercised periodically to ensure that protection measures can be implemented in the event of an accident.” These measures are to be “taken on and off the site to protect the public from any serious releases of radioactive materials from the plant.” What the ASN and INSAG call ‘Defence in Depth’ is a policy that seeks to primarily prevent any accident, and failing that, to limit its consequences. Procedures have the three-stage goal of trying to compensate for human error and machine failure, containing damage to the plant itself, and protecting the nearby public and environment in a worst-case scenario.

Safety is not viewed in merely tactical terms but is also built into policy. INSAG’s Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants states that a regulatory body must provide “critical self-assessment and correction.” The regulatory body must monitor facilities; it must take action if the safety management system is found to be inadequate or ineffective; it should strive to remain non-bureaucratic and technically competent, as well as ensure competence of workers at nuclear facilities; any safety policy must be clear, as must be the procedures it tries to institute. At a governmental level, another document, Safety Culture, asks, is the regulatory body satisfactory? Are there unnecessary impediments to its functioning? Does the body have an adequate budget that keeps up with inflation and allows it to hire the appropriate talent? Is there sufficient safety research? Are there effective collaborations with other bodies on safety? Is there undue influence on the regulatory body?

This brief overview of French and US safety standards indicates why they have not hesitated to open their industry to private players such as American Electric Power, Duke Energy, Southern Company, and others. France’s Areva, despite a large government share, has a number of minority partners, even international ones.

In India, the scene is dismal – a recent report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India found the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India’s version of the ASN or NRC, to be an abject failure in its responsibilities. No authority was given to AERB to create, modify, or discard rules on nuclear safety and security; there was no comprehensive nuclear safety policy; licensing of radiological equipment was found to be deficient; regulatory inspections were not performed.

The recent demonstrations against the nuclear power plant coming up at Kudankulam have attracted much attention. The facility presently accommodates two Russian VVER-1000 reactors. This reactor has four layers of radioactive containment as well as a passive safety system, making it a fairly safe design. While the broad opposition of the People’s Movement Against Nuclear Energy is nonsensical, one cannot but consider their case on grounds of an incompetent nuclear conclave in India – technology is, after all, only as good as the people operating it.

A recent RTI filed against the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant reveals that no plans have been made in case of a Level 7 (on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale) accident. Furthermore, the NPP’s Emergency Preparedness Plan did not envisage any duties outside the plant and is hence an internal document of the NPCIL. Accordingly, no offsite emergency drills had been conducted – in fact, no evacuation has even been envisaged. In fact, beyond the 1.5-kms radius exclusion zone, the responsibility of relief in case of accident has been put on the district administration. This lackadaisical approach to safety violates not only INSAG guidelines but even common sense.

 NPCIL RTI 1  NPCIL RTI 2  NPCIL RTI 3  NPCIL RTI 4
 NPCIL RTI 5  NPCIL RTI 6  NPCIL RTI 7

In terms of Corporate Social Responsibility, government sources say that the amount allocated for the surrounding areas has been paltry. V. Narayanasamy, Minister of State in the PMO, told Parliament earlier this year that a mere Rs. 11 crores had been released over four years, adequate only for a handful of classrooms and a computer laboratory to serve as a photo opportunity for the government and NPCIL. However, Narayanasamy also mentions an additional Rs. 500 crores that had been sanctioned for the improvement of the environs of the KKNPP but not a penny of this has yet been seen.

It is such carelessness that gives even the most vociferous advocate of nuclear power pause. Development is indeed important, but not at the risk of nuclear contamination. Such practices cannot be allowed as private operators, who can be expected to implement only the minimum legal requirements, enter the nuclear market. Most shocking is that this neglect of nuclear safety is not done to cut corners and save on costs as one might expect in a shady private operation; it is done out of sheer incompetence and lack of accountability. What is more, the cloak of secrecy that protects everything nuclear in India, be it a stationary requisition order or a bomb design, will dutifully conceal that which the public have a right to know. This is the danger of nuclear power in India – the management, not the technology. At this rate, India’s babus will certainly have India glowing, but it may be a radioactive glow.

This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on December 5, 2012.