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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: ENR

Nuclear Monopolies

15 Sat Jun 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Austria, Britain, China, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, ENDC, ENR, enrichment, France, India, Ireland, Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, Netherlands, New Zealand, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Norway, NPT, NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, reprocessing, Russia, Switzerland, United Nations Security Council, United States, UNSC, Wassenaar Arrangement, Zangger Committee

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 2013 plenary meeting in Prague last week. Little of what transpired at the meet has trickled out, but it is known that Britain lobbied strongly for India’s membership into the exclusive nuclear club. After the meetings, a brief statement was issued that said that “only the NSG’s relationship with India was discussed.” An earlier meeting in March this year revealed that though four of the five Non-Proliferation Treaty sanctioned nuclear powers – France, Russia, Britain, and the United States – supported India’s membership, the proposal was opposed by China and a few other countries (most likely Austria, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand).

The NSG was established in the immediate aftermath of India’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” at Pokhran. From an initial seven members in 1975, the group today has 47 members that are all part of the nuclear cycle, be it ore, technology, or even important shipping hubs. The secretive body works on consensus, and its rulings are not legally binding but serve as guidelines to coordinate and regulate nuclear commerce between states.

Despite the Pokhran impetus behind the creation of the NSG, the Indo-US nuclear deal supported strongly by George W Bush brought about a thaw in civilian nuclear relations with India. The United States was able to arm-twist the few hesitant Participating Governments (PG) of the NSG into giving India a waiver for its non-NPT status. Yet this was only a quick fix – in the long-run, US pressure upon the NSG regarding India brought to the fore related tensions within the group over enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) and China.

India has publicly downplayed its interest in joining the NSG and other technology denying regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Nonetheless, its apparent nonchalance should not be misread: if anything, Delhi is extremely eager to have a seat at the “Big Boys’ Table.” Some analysts perceive this, quite narrow-mindedly, as a matter of prestige. However, these memberships are important to India as they provide a better platform from which to voice India’s views on nuclear commerce and non-proliferation and thereby protect its own nuclear establishment.

The NSG’s India Quandary

India critics are quite right in their warning that India does not see eye-to-eye with the NSG and the body’s opening its doors to the South Asian country will dilute its mission. Had anyone paid attention, this would have been obvious from the mid-1960s at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) negotiations over the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and at every opportunity to discuss nuclear issues since. The PGs must decide whether the nuclear status quo serves the world’s best interests (and risk being made irrelevant) or allow changes to reflect the realities which they had been in a position to ignore 40 years ago.

By allowing India into the NSG, the group also risks looking hypocritical, at least on paper, and losing credibility with trouble spots like Pakistan, Iran, and a slew of countries newly interested in nuclear power (29 according to the International Atomic Energy Agency). China has already not-so-obliquely hinted, however debatably, at the double standards exhibited by the group regarding India and Pakistan, and used the Indo-US nuclear deal as an excuse to make further sales to Pakistan under the, again debatable, pretext of ‘grandfathering’ its sales into a previous bilateral treaty between the two states.

However, by not letting in India, the NSG might be hastening its own demise – as India’s economy grows so will its nuclear energy sector. Increased confidence in designing, building, and running nuclear reactors will inevitably lead to India eventually becoming a nuclear exporter – it is already among the leading countries in fast breeder and thorium reactor research. At this point, Delhi will have little to hold it back from establishing its own criteria for safe nuclear commerce outside the scope of the NSG. Every country pursuing nuclear power has its own strategic equation, and if an Indian-led export regime is perceived as less intrusive and insulting to national sovereignty while offering similar benefits, the NSG may have few bargaining chips to use with India.

The View From Delhi

India’s dealings with the NSG have revealed two anti-India blocs – a small group of nations whose opposition is on ideological grounds, and China. The first group’s idealism prohibits it from accepting the sort of exceptions the NSG would have to make to allow India to become a member. This group also opposed the India-specific waiver in 2008 and would have voted against it had it not been for “tremendous pressure” exerted upon them by the White House.

India can, and has in the past, use persuasive diplomacy with the group of European states (and New Zealand) to convince them of the merit of India’s case. India can also count on the countries that have the most to gain from India’s unrestricted entry into the nuclear market to also speak on its behalf to these states. Though not easy, Delhi can probably persuade these states not to block its membership if not support it.

The bigger hindrance for Delhi is Beijing. Not only has China flouted NSG guidelines in its dealings with Pakistan, but it is also the main obstacle to India in several international fora including the NSG and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Strategists in Delhi must rue the day Jawaharlal Nehru refused a permanent seat on the UNSC (the US offered to support India’s bid in 1952 and again in 1955) in favour of China. If India expects its northeastern neighbour’s behaviour to change, it will have to wait long. These memberships amplify India’s voice on the world stage; they are diplomatic force multipliers that once given, cannot be taken back or negated. Beijing might be willing to make small and temporary concessions on the border and on its support to anti-India forces in the region but it will never accede to a place at the table for Delhi.

There is little doubt that China is using its clout to squeeze benefits out of the group for its protégé and several PGs accept the logic equating an unstable and nuclear black-marketeering Pakistan to India. Not only has Chashma 3 and 4 been grandfathered in soon after the announcement of the Indo-US nuclear deal, a new deal for two more reactors has been struck between China and Pakistan. Worse, the NSG has been unwilling (and unable) to take Beijing to task for its violations.

India’s Way Forward

There is little hope for India with regard to the NSG (or UNSC) while it faces what is practically a veto from China; the organisational structures of these groups do not allow for much room to manoeuvre. However, India can lobby the other members of the NSG hard and enter into bilateral deals with them as it tries to block Pakistan’s way up that same path. India’s booming economy and energy needs are an enticing carrot if deployed well, and few countries would be able to resist such an offer in an era of global economic slowdown.

India also needs to develop good relations with states not in the NSG that have significant nuclear activities, particularly Namibia, Niger, and Morocco, who are all major suppliers of uranium ore concentrates. The IAEA lists 72 countries with significant nuclear activity of which 47 are members of the NSG. The remaining 25 represent a market India can create, nurture, and develop outside the ambit of NSG restrictions. This is not to say that India should not insist upon IAEA safeguards; on the contrary, it should. However, India can write its own rules beyond IAEA protocols.

In all honesty, this is too bold a step for India’s nuclear establishment that struggles even to construct a reactor on time without finding substandard parts or accusations of incompetence. In addition, India’s political masters have never exhibited the mettle or vision required to work around such a diplomatic impasse. The threat of the evolution of an alternate nuclear control regime is the surest way to force members of the NSG to consider India’s views and membership, but the real question is if Delhi has the stomach for a long drawn out and demanding game of nuclear chess. My guess is no.

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The Peacemakers

15 Wed Aug 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

≈ Comments Off on The Peacemakers

Tags

ENR, enrichment, IAEA, Iran, non-proliferation, NPT, NSG, nuclear, uranium

Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God (Matthew 5:9)

The Nuclear Iran saga has so far developed quite predictably. Both sides have dug their heels in on their red lines – the United States (and Israel) will not accept a nuclear Iran, while the Islamic Republic will not surrender its right to enrich uranium. The West, with no diplomatic options left, passed sanctions against Tehran in the hope that unrest among the people would destabilise the regime and initiate a rethink on the country’s nuclear policy (let’s not pretend that generic economic sanctions do anything more than hurt the population). Simultaneously, the United States and Israel seem to be playing good cop, bad cop – Washington seems to be the only restraint on a Benjamin Netanyahu raring to have a go at Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is interesting to note that ex-servicemen are advocating more patience while those active in Israel’s intelligence and armed services are pushing for a strike “before it is too late.”

Iran analysts are generally agreed, Matthew Kroenig being the notable exception, that military action against the intractable ayatollahs would be inconceivable. Many are also opposed to the economic sanctions against Iran, arguing that its effect on the Iranian people will be disproportionately greater than on the nuclear conclave and the clerics. Yet while abhorring military action and rejecting sanctions, the peacemakers have not articulated any new solutions. Diplomacy, they say. But the United States (and Israel) will accept nothing short of an immediate cessation of uranium enrichment by Iran, preferably followed by negotiations wherein Iran would renounce its rights to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), and Iran is not about to give up what it sees as the only insurance against uninhibited US interference in its internal and regional affairs. The kind of far-reaching diplomacy that is being pushed is simply not possible in this climate; beyond the need to save face, Washington has spurned such offers in the past. Now, for either side to even consider the the other side’s proposal, there has to be an element of trust involved, a commodity in very short supply in the Middle East.

One also gets the sense that perhaps some peacemakers are questioning why Iran cannot legitimately pursue a nuclear power and/or propulsion programme. Such projects would certainly require enrichment technology, and it is unlikely that Iran would consent to importing enriched uranium in perpetuity due to the strategic dependency it would create. Yet if Iran acquired such technology or improved on it, it would put them within easy grasp of making nuclear weapons on short notice, known as breakout capability in the lingo. To truly institute a system whereby Iran (or any other country) can develop, posses, and enhance ENR would be a body blow to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it stands today; to make such an exception for Iran would result in similar damage. While George W Bush could argue in India’s case that India did not have ties to terrorist networks and did not engage in nuclear commerce outside of IAEA stipulations, any leader would be hard-pressed indeed to make the same case for Tehran.

If changing the NPT is indeed the veiled implication of the peacemakers, then they deserve much praise – scrapping or significantly modifying the NPT is a gargantuan and utterly thankless task, not to mention deeply unpopular among large sections of government, academia, and the policy bubble. Yet the NPT’s drawbacks are neither few nor insignificant, and the trouble the US is having in concluding “gold standard” nuclear cooperation agreements (123) with other states is indicative of more troubles still to come. The non-proliferation lobby, however, has been strenuously pushing for even stricter standards in nuclear commerce and were implacable in their opposition to the Indian exception (2008).

The idea of a more pragmatic NPT was indeed floated during Bush 43’s presidency. There was a small clique of senior officials who felt that the NPT was a relic of the Cold War and had outlived its usefulness. While disagreeing with Kenneth Waltz’s 15 ≤ n ≤ 20 (where n is the number of nuclear weapons states) idea, the sentiment was, nonetheless, that there was room within the spirit of the NPT to renegotiate the terms into a more inclusive framework that enhanced commerce but remained firm on non-proliferation goals. Amending the NPT, however, was ultimately seen as too big a task, a bridge too far.

As a thought exercise, one must ask what a world without the NPT would be like. If the NPT were scrapped today and the nuclear trade infrastructure was composed only of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols, the reduced framework would essentially be an end-user certificate. This is, in many ways, returning to the pre-NPT world of bilateral and multilateral agreements but with the added force of a community of nuclear materials suppliers. Such a system facilitates nuclear commerce and also maintains a check on nuclear facilities worldwide. Furthermore, it avoids the hypocrisy of nuclear apartheid that has been enshrined in the NPT (which, by the way, has done little to prevent Sino-Pakistani nuclear collusion). Most importantly, it recognises that as security concerns change, states become more or less willing to acquire nuclear weapons (Pakistan, South Africa). It would not be, as some like to portray, the end times, with every state a nuclear weapons state. States that do go down the weaponisation route will present diplomatic challenges (as they do now under the NPT regime) and will have to negotiated with on a case-by-case basis. However, such negotiations will not be under an odious and unequal law which allows some states to possess nuclear weapons and forbids others; it would not be a system that serves to reiterate that military strength is the ultimate gold standard.

Understandably, Iran is the case study du jour for the peacemakers. Yet if they do harbour some reservations about the NPT, they should not hesitate to voice them – at the very least, it will get more pragmatic minds thinking on the puzzle. So far, they have opposed bombing and economic sanctions, but they (or anyone else) have not noticed that there is no carrot in the diplomatic approach. Full-spectrum negotiations cannot be held in a hostile atmosphere, but if serious sweat was invested in a new treaty, an NPT 2.0, so to speak, it might signal that change was coming. Of course, if the peacemakers do not imply any of these and are simply relying upon hope that the crisis will defuse itself, they would do well to heed Thucydides’ lesson: You are convinced by experience that very few things are brought to a successful issue by impetuous desire, but most by calm and prudent forethought.

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