Tag Archives: enrichment

Iran’s Nuclear Deal

14 Tue Jul 2015

Posted by in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

≈ Comments Off on Iran’s Nuclear Deal

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Historically, negotiations have rarely resulted in the complete capitulation of one side to the other side’s demands. Even military force, for that matter, has provided only uncertain results – Carthage paid off the war indemnity levied by Rome after the Second Punic War ahead of schedule but Berlin proved a far more tightfisted customer after World War I. The Japanese, even after losing two cities to nuclear bombing, refused to surrender unconditionally to the United States in World War II. With that background in mind, the nuclear deal agreed upon by Iran and the E3+3 (Britain, France, Germany + United States, Russia, China) is the praiseworthy outcome of 23 months of hard bargaining between the two sides. Politics demands playing to the home crowd and that each side emphasise the gains it made in the talks but the agreement is remarkably fair and a model for future non-proliferation risk scenarios.

Iran nuclear mapThe nuclear deal, however, thankfully depends upon the exact terms and conditions laid out in the agreement and not the rhetorical interpretation of either side. To that end, the terms are a logical extension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed upon in July this year. The final JCPOA, running to 159 pages, consists of the terms and conditions between Iran and the E3+3 as well as a detailed timeline of implementation and dispute arbitration mechanisms. The deal achieves balance also in that it is progressively implemented in a staggered manner, allowing each side to gain confidence in the other’s intentions. The agreement reflects Iran’s practical needs and research ambitions aside the international community’s desire for circumscription, transparency, and verification. A Joint Commission (JC) reporting to the United Nations Security Council and comprised of a representative from each of the negotiating parties as well as one from the European Union, will oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal and serve as a forum for dispute arbitration.

As US President Barack Obama said in his speech, the JCPOA is not based on trust but on verification. As such, it has two aims: to extend Iran’s breakout time – the time required for Iran to acquire a nuclear device after it expels international observers from its facilities – as much as possible and give the international community time to respond, and to make sneakout – a clandestine parallel programme designed to provide Iran with a nuclear weapon – virtually impossible. Towards this end, Iran will accept limitations on its uranium enrichment and research & development for the first eight years after which it will be gradually allowed to begin enrichment activities and research. Tehran is restricted to using its first generation centrifuges, the IR-1, for 10 years; enrichment will not be allowed beyond 3.67 per cent and all such activity will be restricted to just one facility – Natanz – for 15 years, where 5060 IR-1s will be installed and the rest kept in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring. Failed or damaged centrifuge machines may be replaced from storage.

However, Iran is allowed to conduct research in future generations of centrifuges, the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8, at a small scale in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium and isotope separation will be limited. Work on IR-4 is restricted to a cascade of 10 machines and one machine for the IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8. After 8.5 years, the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades may be expanded to 30 machines. The manufacture of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors will be allowed then in consultation with the JC. At no point is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium in any form to exceed 300 kilogrammes. Any excess quantities must be sold on the international market or downblended to natural uranium level. These combined restriction on stockpile, enrichment, and rate of production serve as technical barriers to an Iranian breakout bomb.

Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre where an additional 1044 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed in six cascades. Two of these will be used for isotope production for medical, industrial, and research purposes and the other four will remain idle. Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned to use lightly enriched uranium (LEU), minimise plutonium production, and operate at 7 MW instead of the 40 MW it was originally designed for. No more heavy water reactors will be constructed in the country for 15 years and surplus heavy water will be exported.

What is a remarkable achievement for the West is that Tehran has agreed to not only ship out all spent fuel from Arak but also from all of its other research and power reactors. Furthermore, Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing, construct a facility capable of reprocessing, or conduct any research in the area except for isotope production. Iran has also acquiesced to not acquiring fissile metals or conduct research on their machining, casting, and metallurgy for 15 years. This effectively shuts down a second, plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. What may be of concern to Iran, however, is that this limits its options in any future interest in fast reactors.

Javad ZarifThe JCPOA also makes it incumbent upon Iran to apply the Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement within a timeframe. Another remarkable feature of the JCPOA is that Iran will resolve all its issues regarding past and present activities with the IAEA within the next six months. These, along with other stipulations agreed upon by both parties, will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the various non-proliferation measures. The IAEA will have a long-term presence in Iran, monitor its uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years, maintain surveillance on enrichment machinery such as bellows and centrifuge rotors for 20 years, and install monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities that will provide a measure of transparency for 15 years. This surveillance will make an Iranian dash for the bomb more difficult even as its more advanced centrifuges start to come online after 10 years.

The nuclear agreement draws out a timeline stretching at least ten years for complete sanctions relief. Staggered between Finalisation Day (conclusion of negotiations), Adoption Day (endorsement of the JCPOA by the UNSC), Implementation Day (IAEA verification of Iranian implementation of nuclear-related measures), Transition Day (eight years from Adoption Day when the IAEA should have reached a Broader Conclusion regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions and Iran seeks ratification of the AP), and Termination Day (ten years from Adoption Day when the UNSC closes its Iran file based upon interim progress), nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States will be repealed contingent upon Iran meeting its end of the bargain.

During the implementation of the JCPOA, ff there is any suspicion of Iran possessing illicit nuclear material, a complaint may be filed with the JC. Iran must respond quickly and if its answer is not satisfactory, an on-site visit by the IAEA can be ordered. However, Iran has the option of suggesting other methods by which its compliance can be reassured. This entire exchange must occur within 14 days, allowing the monitoring agency timely access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the short timeframe in which this process is to occur, it gives little time for Iran to conceal evidence of potential wrongdoing and is as close to anytime access as can be reasonably expected of Iran.

Until the last few days, the E3+3 were divided amongst themselves on the automatic reapplication of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. Russia and China viewed automatic sanctions as a violation of their veto rights in the UNSC while the United States worried that it may not be possible to hold the international community and the permanent members of the UNSC together on the subject. This difficulty has been ingeniously resolved in the final agreement. Once a complaint has been filed, the JC has 35 days to resolve the matter satisfactorily. If it fails to do so, the matter may be brought up before the UNSC again. To prevent sanctions from returning, the Security Council would have to pass a resolution declaring that sanctions should not be reapplied. If this resolution does not pass within 30 days, sanctions snap back on Iran. Given the negative wording of the resolution, a veto would not be able to block reapplication of sanctions within 65 days of the initial notification.

In exchange for Iran returning to a nuclear stature it committed to in the NPT, the E3+3 will cooperate with Iran in matters of civil nuclear technology and ensure that the country meets international standards in nuclear safety and security. Iran will also receive assistance in attaining global guidelines in the export of nuclear materials. Initially, these cooperative ventures are meant to hasten Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s terms but they also signal Iran’s return to good standing that makes it eligible for such cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal tried to add missile proliferation and even human rights concerns to the agenda but that would have in all likelihood scuttled the deal. Strictly speaking, neither of those issues bear a strong relationship to Iran’s nuclear programme; Iran’s ballistic missile programme has incurred sanctions of its own apart from the nuclear restrictions. To critics, it is unsatisfying that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions altogether; it is also unrealistic.

Iran nuclear deal leadersWhatever else the JCPOA may be, it is not a victory for non-proliferation efforts. Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva were merely different battlegrounds for the geopolitical struggle between Iran and the United States. Washington has tried to interpret the NPT to its convenience and deny Iran its enrichment rights under the treaty but this is a farcical attempt. Besides the NPT being fundamentally unequal, even a quick glance at the debates in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that led to the NPT would reveal that non-proliferation was only a tangential goal. Furthermore, when convenient, Washington has not found it difficult to look the other way when its allies are busy acquiring nuclear arsenals. Yet a nuclear Iran threatens Western interests and also their security as Tehran’s missiles reach farther and farther.

The successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean that the West has a new ally in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington and other Western capitals will be busy trying to reassure their friends in the region that the deal is not an indication of a new geopolitical alignment or in any way threatening to them. The fear in Arab capitals will be that an Iran free from crippling sanctions is bound to alter the balance of power between itself and its Arab neighbours. Already, events in Iraq have seen Tehran’s influence grow and its grip on Syria does not seem to be loosening despite four years of civil war. The United States and the European Union will continue to struggle against Iranian ambitions in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan. While Washington still remembers the Tehran Embassy hostage crisis vividly, Iran has yet to come to terms with the US-sponsored coup in 1953, the tacit US approval of two nuclear programmes in Israel and Pakistan, and the arming of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons in the 1980s which he used with impunity on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War.

Despite these recriminations, both sides were able to reach an amicable settlement that prevented yet another war in the Middle East. If implemented according to plan, the JCPOA is a very good deal for both sides. Iran has given up one path to nuclear weapons, its breakout time has been extended to at least a year, and continuous IAEA presence has made sneakout very difficult. For all its alleged flaws, it would be no surprise if the negotiators of the JCPOA were to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. As for the nuclear apartheid codified in the NPT, Iran signed and ratified the treaty – perhaps next time, it should think before making a commitment of such gravity. The sanctions and the limitations on its nuclear programme are the price Tehran now has to pay.

This post first appeared on Swarajya on July 15, 2015.

We Have A Framework!

03 Fri Apr 2015

Posted by in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

≈ Comments Off on We Have A Framework!

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Late in the night, Indian Standard Time, news emerged from Lausanne that a framework for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany Britain + Russia, United States, China) had been agreed upon. Lausanne, the small and picturesque Swiss town on the shores of Lac Léman, has been the latest host to dozens of diplomats, lawyers, and nuclear scientists involved in the long and difficult negotiations over the state of Iran’s nuclear obligations. A short joint press conference by Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, and Federica Moghierini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced to the world that a significant milestone had been reached and that an agreement would be drafted by June 30. More than elation, tiredness marked the faces of the two diplomats. This last phase of discussions had gone late into the night for the previous two days and even these were only the tip of an 18-month long conversation between Iran and the E3+3.

The outcome of the negotiations has been hailed in the expected corners as well as condemned by the usual suspects. If this framework holds and a final agreement is inked by June 30, this will be one of the few times in recent memory that diplomacy has held sway over force. Barring the Cuban Missile Crisis, few major international squabbles in the past century have been solved through negotiations. So much so that we might have even forgotten what compromise looks or feels like – either side is satisfied but not content. The same is the case with the Iran talks. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Republicans might prefer total supplication and abject surrender from Iran but there is as much chance of achieving that – even through war – as there is of the West giving Iran a clean chit on its nuclear activities.

The framework is far more elastic than it appears at first sight. Though the United States has released a fact sheet and the US Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, made a statement, these are just US interpretations of what has been agreed upon and Iran has not signed off on them yet. Iran’s only public commitment is stated in the joint statement made by Zarif and Moghierini. Troubling to some, the framework has been portrayed in a different light by Iranian leaders in Persian to their domestic audience than Western negotiators have to their citizens. This was also seen in November 2013 when the Joint Plan of Action was first agreed to and is nothing to be alarmed about. It would hardly be healthy for the life of the framework if Iranian President Hasan Rouhani portrayed the JCPOA to the clerics and common Iranians as an American victory or an Iranian submission any more than for US President Barack Obama to tell the US Congress that Iran outwitted the United States and the Europeans in the negotiations. Such diplomatic license must be allowed in reading the behaviour of politicians.

Nonetheless, that statement still gives several reasons for optimism. The parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, at the very least, assures the world that Iran’s Heavy Water Reactor at Arak will not be used to make weapons-grade plutonium, that its enrichment capacity, level, and stockpile will be limited for a specified duration, and that there will be no enrichment facility other than at Natanz. Reprocessing is forbidden Iran and spent fuel will be exported. Tehran will also accept the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements of the International Atomic Energy Agency and nuclear-related sanctions will be removed upon IAEA verification of Iran’s safeguards.

The Devil, as they say, is in the details and these will not be known until the final agreement is drafted. Iran hawks warn that the JCPOA does not go far enough but several experts seem to have confidence that the agreement will lead to something more substantial by the end of June. Many are in fact surprised that Iran conceded so much at all though they will hold the champagne until the deal is signed and implemented. To get into specifics, first, Iran will retain the right to enrich uranium. Yet it has agreed to limit this to 3.67 percent for at least 15 years and not build any new enrichment facilities for at least as long. Tehran is allowed only 6,104 centrifuges under the agreement, a far cry from the 19,000 operational presently. The excess centrifuges will be stored under IAEA supervision and will be accessed only as replacement for operating centrifuges. In addition, all operational centrifuges will be IR-1, that is, Iran’s more inefficient first generation equipment. It has also been agreed that Iran will not maintain a stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent greater than 300 kgs; presently, the country has 10,000 kgs of low-enriched uranium. It is not clear whether the excess will be downblended or exported but either way, it will not go into the Iranian nuclear programme in its present state. In conjunction, it is estimated that were Iran to try and make a nuclear device – it will certainly not be a bomb – the breakout time would be at least a year as opposed to the three months at present.

Second, Fordow – the secret site that was revealed by the United States, France, and Britain in 2009 – will be converted into a research centre. It may work on nuclear related matters but not enrichment research for at least 15 years. The facility will neither enrich nor store uranium for the same period. Almost two-thirds of the nuclear infrastructure at Fordow will be removed; it will have 1,044 centrifuges remaining but these will not be used to enrich uranium and will be placed under IAEA safeguards. This means that the only facility at which Iran can enrich uranium is Natanz, where 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed to operate. The thousand IR-2M centrifuges will be removed and placed in safeguarded storage for 10 years. Iran’s other more advanced centrifuges are similarly prohibited for ten years. Research related to the development of advanced centrifuges will be limited for ten years and after that, subject to IAEA supervision.

Third, the IAEA will have regular and even continuous access in some cases to Iran’s entire nuclear fuel cycle. Its uranium mines will be under continuous surveillance for 25 years and its centrifuge manufacturing facilities for 20 years.Natanz and Fordow will, of course, come under safeguards and all of Iran’s technological and material procurements will be channeled through the IAEA. The JCPOA suggests that Iran will implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements with the IAEA; this requires it to give early notification to the IAEA when it constructs new nuclear facilities. The statement released by the United States says that Iran will accept the IAEA’s Additional Protocol but the joint press release suggests that this acceptance will be provisional and temporary. One can guess that Iran’s provisions refer to other promises made by the E3+3 but what it means by temporary acceptance is yet unclear. Though the US statement says that the IAEA will have the authority to investigate suspicious activities, Iran will likely question the definition of “suspicious activities.” The US seems to be sure that Iran will confess to its past work on the possible military dimensions of nuclear research but this is unlikely. This is also, thankfully, the least bothersome of the clauses and may be honoured more in the breach than the observed if the other clauses are satisfactorily implemented.

Fourth, Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild the HWR at Arak. The core of the IR-40 will in fact be removed and destroyed, making it impossible to produce weapons-grade plutonium in the reactor. Iran has agreed not to reprocess fuel and will export its spent fuel out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime. Tehran has agreed to abjure from building any more HWRs for the next 15 years and it will not accumulate heavy water in quantities greater than is needed for the operation of the research reactor at Arak.

These are substantial compromises from Iran. In exchange, the nuclear-related sanctions against it will be removed upon verification by the IAEA that Iran has livedup to its safeguards and transparency commitments. UN Security Council resolutions shall be lifted under similar conditions. Interestingly, the greatest hurdle in the rapid re-imposition of sanctions upon an Iranian breach of faith would come not from Iran but Russia, a member of the E3+3. Moscow has long stated that snap-back sanctions bypass the veto in the UNSC and it is not willing to give up that right. From Russia’s point of view, it may no longer be interested in maintaining sanctions on Iran or it might want to leverage it against the United States if the geopolitics has shifted significantly at a later date. How the United States and its European allies convince the Russians to agree to a snap-back remains to be seen.

The details in the JCPOA has surprised many observers as have Iran’s substantial compromises. A two-thirds reduction in the number of centrifuges, the restriction on enrichment, a small stockpile, and the unprecedented access promised to the IAEA were beyond what anyone had expected. This has led many to wonder if there are any major discrepancies between the Iranian understanding of the framework and the US interpretation. However, when asked on Twitter, Gérard Araud, the French ambassador to the United States, said that the Iranians had agreed to the detailed parameters of the US interpretation. The discussions over the final draft will address how much sanctions relief and when is appropriate for how much safeguards. If even three quarters of this framework is implemented, it will still be an excellent outcome.

To those who remain unconvinced, it might be useful to reflect on the idea that no guarantee is absolute and no agreement is perpetual. Iran may well manage to develop a nuclear device on the sly despite all these safeguards. Geopolitical alignments may change and it may become convenient to look the other way as was the case with Israel and Pakistan. No country will ever adhere to an agreement that runs contrary to its national interests. That is a reality one must come to terms with.

Finally, the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is not about its sovereign right to engage in such endeavours. These long negotiations are about Iran’s failure to keep its word once it signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One wonders what would have happened in a world where the Shah of Iran was not persuaded by Richard Nixon to accede to the NPT. As for the hypocrisy of the “recognised” nuclear powers in their disarmament and proliferation obligations, power is the ultimate arbitrator.

This post appeared on FirstPost on April 04, 2015.

Reading the NTI’s Nuclear Materials Security Index

09 Thu Jan 2014

Posted by in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Reading the NTI’s Nuclear Materials Security Index

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Nuclear Threat Initiative released its Nuclear Materials Security Index for 2014 on January 8. After the positive response to the index when launched in 2012, the NTI and the Economist Intelligence Unit sought feedback from experts and incorporated several new indicators and sub-indicators to produce this year’s report. Given the paucity and unreliability of data the NTI and EIU have had to work with, the outcome is indeed laudable. Furthermore, the creation of some sort of measurement for nuclear materials safety is most welcome and one hopes that the index will be expanded to cover nuclear safety and proliferation risks in the future.

That said, the findings of the report must be taken with a grain of salt. This is not for any fault on the part of NTI or the EIU but the subjective nature of some indicators. One of the key findings for Indians from the latest NMSI is that India now ranks below even China and Pakistan in the security of its nuclear material. Undeniably, there are many concerns about how Delhi is running its nuclear programme, but the NMSI’s ratings must be put in context.

Countries with weapons-usable nuclear materialsThe NMSI covers 25 countries with weapons-usable fissile material and 151 countries without (less than one kilogramme). The latter group is part of the study because terrorists will target areas which are most vulnerable, not most plentiful, in nuclear material. However, there exist substantial differences between the two groups that considering their results together would skew the findings. It is important to point out that the NMSI does not address proliferation risks, disarmament, nuclear safety, or the threat of sabotage of nuclear facilities. Rather, it restricts itself to evaluating the potential of theft of weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Countries without weapons-usable nuclear materialsEven within this circumscribed ambit, the NMSI does not consider the theft of radiological material or lightly enriched uranium used in many civilian reactors – as the study accepts, these are also dangerous materials but would do damage on a vastly smaller scale than weapons-usable fissile material; additionally, they “require a different analytical approach and represent different challenges.” However, the NMSI does not make a distinction between military use and civilian use of fissile material unlike the International Atomic Energy Agency; this brings the 85% of nuclear materials that are for non-civilian use and outside the scope of the IAEA’s inspections within the purview of the NMSI. As the report reminds us, the IAEA’s mandate is strictly civilian and is restricted further by budgetary constraints and the discretion of nuclear weapons states in opening their civilian facilities to inspections.

NTI IndexThe NMSI evaluates risk across five categories – 1. Quantities and Sites (16%), 2. Security and Control Measures (29%), 3. Global Norms (17%), 4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity (20%), and 5. Risk Environment (18%). Each of these categories are weighted differently as indicated in parentheses and have further sub-indicators. Countries were ranked within their respective categories, out of 25 and out of 151.

In the first category, Argentina and Australia came first, with Iran in fourth place, France in 18th, the United States in 20th, India, Japan, and Pakistan sharing 22nd, and the United Kingdom closed the list; in terms of security and control measures, the United States took pole position, China 15th, Iran and Pakistan 23rd, and India sealed the bottom; Australia, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all led the pack in following global norms while the United States was 13th, India 18th, and Pakistan 20th; when it came to domestic commitments and capacity, not one nuclear weapons state made it into the top 10, with France at 11, the United States at 17, Pakistan 20th, China 21st, and India 23rd; nuclear weapons states maintained their nuclear material in riskier environments than non-nuclear weapons states did with France being the highest ranked NWS at 8, the United States 10th, India 22nd, and Pakistan at rock bottom on 25. Overall, Australia’s nuclear materials were deemed safest, the French were 7th safest, United States 11th, Chinese 20th, Pakistani 21st, and Indian fissile material was 23rd safest.

Nuclear Materials Security Index Methodology
Categories and Sub-Indicators Scoring Weightage
NTI methodology NTI scoring NTI weighting

These results may be statistically sound but raise questions about their implicit assumptions. For example, “Quantities and Sites” makes the statistically understandable assumption that more material or sites raises risk. This basis inherently biases the category against closed fuel cycles, nuclear propulsion, accession to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and in India’s case, its three-phase nuclear programme.

Weapons-Usable Fissile MaterialThe logic of more-is-worse is similar to arguing that everyone who drinks is an alcoholic. The peculiarities of each national nuclear programme prevents it from certain decisions. For example, India needs plutonium to fire up its thorium reactors and is therefore investing in breeder technology. India’s closed fuel cycle is not a cause for concern if security considerations are integrated into every stage. Furthermore, India has recently launched the INS Arihant, a nuclear-powered submarine whose reactor operates with 40% enriched uranium. India plans an additional two to four more such vessels and the maintenance of this fleet precludes a high score for India in the first category of the NMSI. Finally, India has hesitated to sign the FMCT because the treaty would limit its fissile material stockpile while committing no other power to disarm (Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty worked out very well).

India’s “Security and Control Measures” remain weak as the Comptroller and Auditor General has already reported in 2012. Record-keeping, the ability to detect and prevent theft on nuclear material, periodic background checks on personnel, licensing, regular assessments, and internal surveillance all remain wanting but there is a silver lining – an International Atomic Energy Agency assessment in November 2012 found India’s reactors in Rajasthan to be safe and the facility to have sound procedures. Delhi’s problem is not a lack of awareness in these matters but an irrational devotion to secrecy and limited qualified manpower to implement all the safety precautions immediately.

NTI IndiaSimilarly, “Global Norms” seeks membership to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and other such regimes. The section also measures safety by considering contributions to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, much like papal indulgences once upon a time. However, there may be reasons a state might not want to accede to a treaty but may still behave in a responsible manner, sometimes even more so than signatories to the treaty. A classic example is the NPT – India has been a better non-signatory member of that treaty than either the United States or China. It is also highly unlikely that a state would allow a terrorist to go unpunished if its nuclear facilities were attacked because it was a non-signatory to an international treaty affirming the same.

Perhaps India’s single gravest failing is, as “Domestic Commitments and Capacity” highlights, the failure to have an independent nuclear regulatory authority. This was also mentioned in the 2012 CAG report but secrecy and inertia have meant that the country’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is yet to develop any teeth. However, India has committed to and implemented other standards such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 as well as the CPPNM.

“Risk Environment” tries to measure political stability and regional conflict but has its own problems. For one, public unrest and violence has varying reasons – the Taliban attack on a Pakistani military base housing nuclear material, for example, is quite different from the large demonstrations that rocked India after the gangrape of a woman in Delhi last year, the Taksim Square protests, or the Occupy movement. The Airin Riots in Osaka in 1990 or the Koza Riot on a US military base in Okinawa in 1970 hardly put Japan’s fissile material or US nuclear weapons on the island in any danger. If disputes, tensions, and armed conflict were truly a criterion, the United States would be close to the bottom of the chart for the talented multitasking it does in this department.

None of this is to disparage the NMSI – the report attempts to create a broad framework in which to understand the safety of nuclear materials, and in this it has been successful. There is little doubt that India’s nuclear establishment needs to be more forthright on transparency, regulations, and security, that India lags behind Japan or the United States in these matters as the NMSI indicates. To read the report with greater accuracy than it promises is unfair and one’s understanding would be compromised due to the various reasons that have been pointed out. A comprehensive report on any country that factors in its individual peculiarities would require significantly more heft and would only attract experts, leaving policymakers and educated citizens in the dark. The NMSI is an excellent first step towards forming a global evaluation system for nuclear safety but it should be read with discernment and an awareness of its limitations.