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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: EU

This is an Indian Democracy, Kaul*!

20 Sat Feb 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on This is an Indian Democracy, Kaul*!

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Avadhnama, Dadri, democracy, EU, Europe, European Union, freedom of expression, India, Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU, Jyllandsposten, liberalism, Malda, MF Hussain, multiculturalism, Sri Ram Sene, Sudheendra Kulkarni, United States, Vishwaroopam, Wendy Doniger

Every few months, India gets into a tizzy about freedom of expression. The recent drama on Jawaharlal Nehru University’s campus, the pulping of Wendy Doniger’s book on Hinduism, the mob violence at Dadri, the smearing of black paint on Sudheendra Kulkarni, a writer, the antics of fringe groups like the Sri Ram Sene, and other events have occupied the headlines and television studio airtime in their turn. Less honoured have been the riots in Malda, the shuttering of Bombay’s Avadhnama, the censorship of Vishwaroopam, and a long list of other incidents.

As anyone following the freedom of expression debate in India knows by now, Article 19(2) of the Indian constitution introduces seven criteria which may limit expression. One factor that complicates the debate further is that the implementation of these laws have not been uniform over the years – an MF Hussain is met with sympathy while a reprint of the Danish Jyllandsposten cartoons is met with riots and media outcry. Despite this hypocrisy, a precious few free speech advocates are of the opinion that all restrictions should be done away with and India should adopt a Brandenburg v. Ohio standard of free expression, referring, of course, to the landmark 1969 case in the United States Supreme Court.

In principle, this sounds excellent. In practice, however, India is a far more complicated beast to govern. The evolution of the Brandenburg benchmark occurred over centuries of not just juridical but also political and social evolution. The values enshrined in that decision not only reflected those held by the American people but also were capable of being enforced by the American state. The United States was aided in part also by circumstance: they had the luxury of starting tabula rasa, without any historical baggage, the distance and strict immigration laws ensured a certain homogeneity pace the melting point myth, and the participatory nature of their democracy was allowed to increase only gradually.

India’s leaders at independence, however, chose to rush headlong into democracy with universal adult suffrage. Its leaders at the founding – at least those who held sway – preferred abstract theories to the exhausting reality of the new republic. The price of this decision would be borne by future generations of Indians every day of their lives. This is not to say that India should abandon democracy – it is too late for that now. Once the masses have tasted power, they are loathe to give it back. However, it does mean that Indians approach the implementation of other ideals concomitant with democracy with more caution as the country inches forward towards prosperity, liberty, security, and stability.

But first, what is democracy? Etymologically and historically, it has come to mean a system of government in which rulers are chosen by the people for fixed intervals. There is no commitment to Liberalism, even implicitly, in such a system. The checks and balances that have evolved in most democracies to protect minorities from the excesses of the majority came from cultural values over time and were institutionalised via other non-electoral avenues. Universal suffrage has had no role in the creation of a system of civil liberties. India’s leaders did not understand that a liberal democracy – and, by implication, free speech – cannot take root in a society that has not first become free and liberal-minded; only those who have drawn poorly from history can suppose otherwise.

A stable liberal democracy presupposes a people assured of their identity as a society as well as individuals within that society. People divided by opinions on public policy may equally find themselves in the majority or minority but are not so  in perpetuity. Yet those who see divisions based on ethnic or religious markers do not experience similar fluctuations. This dynamic explains the formation of democratically-minded nation-states along rather singular ethnic, religious, and even linguistic lines.

Liberty and MisesIndia’s continued governance by Anglicised elites after independence brought to power a group who had no sense of their own history and hence their own strengths and limitations. Adding a democracy based on universal suffrage to the mix when India’s national identity was inchoate at best, as the politics surrounding Partition amply demonstrated, was a recipe for disaster. This was compounded by separate law codes and reservations in education and employment for certain communities. Over time, aided by changing demographics, demands from these special communities have become more economic and political in their nature. No longer were the provisions seen as catalysts towards equality but as permanent and rightful dispensations. It should be no surprise, then, that the natural core majority resents this situation because it militates against their sense of fairness.

The weakness of Indian liberal democracy, then, stems from the failure of the nation-building project that has left large sections of society uncertain about their identities and rights. As Karl Marx had argued that socialism would develop as the high point of industrialisation and capitalism, pluralism and multicultural stability can arise only as the high point of core majority stability. It is folly to assume that the demonisation of the majority is the way to achieve this.

Another weakness of Indian liberal democracy comes from the failure of its institutions. For decades after independence, they were ravaged by the Congress for political reasons and have lost the trust of the citizens. Traditionally, liberalism has been closely related to democracy because both aimed at restricting the power of the absolute state. This went hand in hand with the increasing rule of law and social trust. Seen closely, however, modern democracy increased only political liberty but not social liberty. This, it can be argued, is the contribution of a robust judiciary that took both the constitution and contemporary community standards into account. Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Limited, Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Eweida v British Airways plc, Roe v Wade, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, and other cases have defined the scope of civil liberties and pushed against more restrictive executive and legislative practices. In contrast, Indian courts have generally served the narrow political interests of the governing elite and done little to gradually expand civil liberties in India. To be fair to the judiciary, other factors prohibited such a role too.

Democracy and FDRWhy was the spread of universal suffrage so slow? There were two reasons: one was that the overwhelming majority was illiterate, ignorant, and incapable of forming an informed opinion on state matters. The second was the belief that only those with property were sufficiently vested in the community to truly consider its best interests. The expansion of democratic rights, therefore, coincided with the expansion of secondary education. With the changing nature of the economy, intellectual contribution and conscription joined property as criteria by which investment in the nation-state was measured. India’s early governments deserve some blame for failing to raise functional literacy rates quickly but it is also true that the education of hundreds of millions of people was going to take some time. Despite lacking the prerequisites for a democracy, let alone a liberal democracy, Indian leaders of the day rushed headlong into a bold yet ultimately ill-timed social experiment. Had successive governments governed wisely and without favouritism between various social groups, the impact on the country’s liberal evolution might yet have been mitigated.

In the age of globalisation, European multiculturalism has come under threat; unable to assimilate newcomers into the European ideal, the Union is facing a crisis as the continent’s core majority opposes the influx of refugees and even increased economic aid to the financially weaker members of the Union at the expense of the more prosperous member states. This is a tension India has lived with since its inception and watching the reaction of a mature polity such as Europe over the past few years only dampens hope in the Nehruvian idea of India even further.

[DIVERSION] The internet has also produced pressures nation-states were not designed to handle. With the rise of multinational activism and communications, ever more people are participating in political processes without necessarily any stakes in local communities. Democracy presumes civic participation in its institutions; that is the price of membership for receiving the economic and social goods of the state. Instead, contemporary democracy has lost all tethering to any sense of obligation or duty and is merely a one-way relationship for the redistribution of wealth and favours. In many cases, these disproportionately benefit those who have made no contribution to the prosperity of the whole.

This might also be an argument for the return to a certain elitism in democracy as the number and complexity of issues before a government increase dramatically in the 21st century, allowing those with greater knowledge, experience, and skin in the game to contribute more meaningfully to national and global discussions. [/DIVERSION]

Above all, governance must be about stability and order. Activists have the luxury of preaching a one-point agenda, however noble, but the state machinery must consider the overall picture before implementing policy. Let us, for example, consider the ramifications of implementing a Brandenburg standard free speech law overnight in India: the very next cartoon about Islam’s prophet will give rise to angry mobs visiting havoc upon cities and towns. If the plight of the Rohingyas in Burma could inspire the Azad Maidan riots in Bombay in 2012 for no fault of the Indian state, there is no reason to expect more sanity from the community now.

The activist argument would be to crack down on the rioters and arrest and prosecute those responsible for violence. However, when India is over 500,000 policemen short and over 90 per cent of the police force works over eight hours a day, law and order is bound to suffer. Furthermore, many of these policemen may stand by in sympathy. The training and sufficient arming of the force is also necessary. While the government works to improve the police force, not to mention the jails and judiciary, countless crores  and lives would have been lost in damages. Will free speech activists compensate for the losses incurred?

All systems have prerequisites and boundary conditions. The digital age already poses sufficient challenges to nation-states that blind adherence to shibboleths need not compound. Indians have never discussed whether they prefer a Singaporean or even Japanese style democracy to a Western democracy and perhaps that should be first on the agenda before a model is copy-pasted from elsewhere. Either way, India would still need to substantially upgrade its state capacity and reforms would have to keep those limitations in mind. India certainly has problems with its democracy as well as its free speech provisions – unequal application, state capacity, unprepared citizenry – but to demand a swift imposition of a standard radically alien to the cultural context is simply myopic and an invitation to unrest.


*: The title of this post is a reference to Yes, Prime Minister, Series 2, Episode 5: Power to the People, in which Sir Humphrey Appleby chastises Bernard Woolley for suggesting that every person has a right to power in a democracy. SK Kaul is the prime minister’s private secretary in Ji, Mantriji, a Hindi re-make of the BBC original.

This post appeared on FirstPost on February 22, 2016.

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Iran’s Nuclear Deal

14 Tue Jul 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

≈ Comments Off on Iran’s Nuclear Deal

Tags

Additional Protocol, AP, Arak, E3+3, enrichment, EU, European Union, Fordow, heavy water, IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Natanz, nuclear, plutonium, reprocessing, United Nations Security Council, United States, UNSC, uranium

Historically, negotiations have rarely resulted in the complete capitulation of one side to the other side’s demands. Even military force, for that matter, has provided only uncertain results – Carthage paid off the war indemnity levied by Rome after the Second Punic War ahead of schedule but Berlin proved a far more tightfisted customer after World War I. The Japanese, even after losing two cities to nuclear bombing, refused to surrender unconditionally to the United States in World War II. With that background in mind, the nuclear deal agreed upon by Iran and the E3+3 (Britain, France, Germany + United States, Russia, China) is the praiseworthy outcome of 23 months of hard bargaining between the two sides. Politics demands playing to the home crowd and that each side emphasise the gains it made in the talks but the agreement is remarkably fair and a model for future non-proliferation risk scenarios.

Iran nuclear mapThe nuclear deal, however, thankfully depends upon the exact terms and conditions laid out in the agreement and not the rhetorical interpretation of either side. To that end, the terms are a logical extension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed upon in July this year. The final JCPOA, running to 159 pages, consists of the terms and conditions between Iran and the E3+3 as well as a detailed timeline of implementation and dispute arbitration mechanisms. The deal achieves balance also in that it is progressively implemented in a staggered manner, allowing each side to gain confidence in the other’s intentions. The agreement reflects Iran’s practical needs and research ambitions aside the international community’s desire for circumscription, transparency, and verification. A Joint Commission (JC) reporting to the United Nations Security Council and comprised of a representative from each of the negotiating parties as well as one from the European Union, will oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal and serve as a forum for dispute arbitration.

As US President Barack Obama said in his speech, the JCPOA is not based on trust but on verification. As such, it has two aims: to extend Iran’s breakout time – the time required for Iran to acquire a nuclear device after it expels international observers from its facilities – as much as possible and give the international community time to respond, and to make sneakout – a clandestine parallel programme designed to provide Iran with a nuclear weapon – virtually impossible. Towards this end, Iran will accept limitations on its uranium enrichment and research & development for the first eight years after which it will be gradually allowed to begin enrichment activities and research. Tehran is restricted to using its first generation centrifuges, the IR-1, for 10 years; enrichment will not be allowed beyond 3.67 per cent and all such activity will be restricted to just one facility – Natanz – for 15 years, where 5060 IR-1s will be installed and the rest kept in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring. Failed or damaged centrifuge machines may be replaced from storage.

However, Iran is allowed to conduct research in future generations of centrifuges, the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8, at a small scale in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium and isotope separation will be limited. Work on IR-4 is restricted to a cascade of 10 machines and one machine for the IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8. After 8.5 years, the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades may be expanded to 30 machines. The manufacture of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors will be allowed then in consultation with the JC. At no point is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium in any form to exceed 300 kilogrammes. Any excess quantities must be sold on the international market or downblended to natural uranium level. These combined restriction on stockpile, enrichment, and rate of production serve as technical barriers to an Iranian breakout bomb.

Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre where an additional 1044 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed in six cascades. Two of these will be used for isotope production for medical, industrial, and research purposes and the other four will remain idle. Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned to use lightly enriched uranium (LEU), minimise plutonium production, and operate at 7 MW instead of the 40 MW it was originally designed for. No more heavy water reactors will be constructed in the country for 15 years and surplus heavy water will be exported.

What is a remarkable achievement for the West is that Tehran has agreed to not only ship out all spent fuel from Arak but also from all of its other research and power reactors. Furthermore, Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing, construct a facility capable of reprocessing, or conduct any research in the area except for isotope production. Iran has also acquiesced to not acquiring fissile metals or conduct research on their machining, casting, and metallurgy for 15 years. This effectively shuts down a second, plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. What may be of concern to Iran, however, is that this limits its options in any future interest in fast reactors.

Javad ZarifThe JCPOA also makes it incumbent upon Iran to apply the Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement within a timeframe. Another remarkable feature of the JCPOA is that Iran will resolve all its issues regarding past and present activities with the IAEA within the next six months. These, along with other stipulations agreed upon by both parties, will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the various non-proliferation measures. The IAEA will have a long-term presence in Iran, monitor its uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years, maintain surveillance on enrichment machinery such as bellows and centrifuge rotors for 20 years, and install monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities that will provide a measure of transparency for 15 years. This surveillance will make an Iranian dash for the bomb more difficult even as its more advanced centrifuges start to come online after 10 years.

The nuclear agreement draws out a timeline stretching at least ten years for complete sanctions relief. Staggered between Finalisation Day (conclusion of negotiations), Adoption Day (endorsement of the JCPOA by the UNSC), Implementation Day (IAEA verification of Iranian implementation of nuclear-related measures), Transition Day (eight years from Adoption Day when the IAEA should have reached a Broader Conclusion regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions and Iran seeks ratification of the AP), and Termination Day (ten years from Adoption Day when the UNSC closes its Iran file based upon interim progress), nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States will be repealed contingent upon Iran meeting its end of the bargain.

During the implementation of the JCPOA, ff there is any suspicion of Iran possessing illicit nuclear material, a complaint may be filed with the JC. Iran must respond quickly and if its answer is not satisfactory, an on-site visit by the IAEA can be ordered. However, Iran has the option of suggesting other methods by which its compliance can be reassured. This entire exchange must occur within 14 days, allowing the monitoring agency timely access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the short timeframe in which this process is to occur, it gives little time for Iran to conceal evidence of potential wrongdoing and is as close to anytime access as can be reasonably expected of Iran.

Until the last few days, the E3+3 were divided amongst themselves on the automatic reapplication of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. Russia and China viewed automatic sanctions as a violation of their veto rights in the UNSC while the United States worried that it may not be possible to hold the international community and the permanent members of the UNSC together on the subject. This difficulty has been ingeniously resolved in the final agreement. Once a complaint has been filed, the JC has 35 days to resolve the matter satisfactorily. If it fails to do so, the matter may be brought up before the UNSC again. To prevent sanctions from returning, the Security Council would have to pass a resolution declaring that sanctions should not be reapplied. If this resolution does not pass within 30 days, sanctions snap back on Iran. Given the negative wording of the resolution, a veto would not be able to block reapplication of sanctions within 65 days of the initial notification.

In exchange for Iran returning to a nuclear stature it committed to in the NPT, the E3+3 will cooperate with Iran in matters of civil nuclear technology and ensure that the country meets international standards in nuclear safety and security. Iran will also receive assistance in attaining global guidelines in the export of nuclear materials. Initially, these cooperative ventures are meant to hasten Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s terms but they also signal Iran’s return to good standing that makes it eligible for such cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal tried to add missile proliferation and even human rights concerns to the agenda but that would have in all likelihood scuttled the deal. Strictly speaking, neither of those issues bear a strong relationship to Iran’s nuclear programme; Iran’s ballistic missile programme has incurred sanctions of its own apart from the nuclear restrictions. To critics, it is unsatisfying that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions altogether; it is also unrealistic.

Iran nuclear deal leadersWhatever else the JCPOA may be, it is not a victory for non-proliferation efforts. Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva were merely different battlegrounds for the geopolitical struggle between Iran and the United States. Washington has tried to interpret the NPT to its convenience and deny Iran its enrichment rights under the treaty but this is a farcical attempt. Besides the NPT being fundamentally unequal, even a quick glance at the debates in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that led to the NPT would reveal that non-proliferation was only a tangential goal. Furthermore, when convenient, Washington has not found it difficult to look the other way when its allies are busy acquiring nuclear arsenals. Yet a nuclear Iran threatens Western interests and also their security as Tehran’s missiles reach farther and farther.

The successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean that the West has a new ally in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington and other Western capitals will be busy trying to reassure their friends in the region that the deal is not an indication of a new geopolitical alignment or in any way threatening to them. The fear in Arab capitals will be that an Iran free from crippling sanctions is bound to alter the balance of power between itself and its Arab neighbours. Already, events in Iraq have seen Tehran’s influence grow and its grip on Syria does not seem to be loosening despite four years of civil war. The United States and the European Union will continue to struggle against Iranian ambitions in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan. While Washington still remembers the Tehran Embassy hostage crisis vividly, Iran has yet to come to terms with the US-sponsored coup in 1953, the tacit US approval of two nuclear programmes in Israel and Pakistan, and the arming of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons in the 1980s which he used with impunity on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War.

Despite these recriminations, both sides were able to reach an amicable settlement that prevented yet another war in the Middle East. If implemented according to plan, the JCPOA is a very good deal for both sides. Iran has given up one path to nuclear weapons, its breakout time has been extended to at least a year, and continuous IAEA presence has made sneakout very difficult. For all its alleged flaws, it would be no surprise if the negotiators of the JCPOA were to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. As for the nuclear apartheid codified in the NPT, Iran signed and ratified the treaty – perhaps next time, it should think before making a commitment of such gravity. The sanctions and the limitations on its nuclear programme are the price Tehran now has to pay.


This post first appeared on Swarajya on July 15, 2015.

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Death in the Mediterranean

26 Sun Apr 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Europe

≈ Comments Off on Death in the Mediterranean

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Canary Islands, Ceuta, Convention on Refugees, Dublin Regulation, EU, European Union, Greece, illegal immigration, Italy, Lampedusa, Libya, Malta, Mediteranean, Melilla, Operation Mare Nostrum, Operation Triton, Schengen, Sicily, Spain, Syria, UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, visa

The Mediterranean Sea is no stranger to maritime deaths, particularly of irregular migrants from North Africa and the Middle East who seek to enter the European Union for purposes of employment illegally. However, the number of casualties has spiked astronomically in the last four years as have the number of people trying to cross the sea. Interestingly, European newspapers have so far portrayed the stories of the tragedies at sea as the usual tale of irregular migrants seeking a better life in Europe. The overwhelming conformity to this terminology, especially in light of the events of the past four years, is suspect.

Migration to EuropeMigration to Europe from Africa across the Mare Nostrum is a complex story yet no different from many other similar situations such as across the Mexican border with the United States. In both cases, the prosperous states do not take into account the factors responsible for illegal immigration while formulating their immigration policies. Consequently, these policies are found to be ineffective to stem the human tide of the neighbouring poor. Historically, irregular migrants have tried to enter Europe through four points – the Spanish Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa, Malta and the Italian islands of Sicily and Lampedusa, and Greece and the Balkans.

Soon after World War II, Europe was desperately short of labour to rebuild a shattered continent. The Marshall Plan fuelled the economic miracles, usually known as the golden decade, in several countries and there was a free flow of labour from Africa and the Middle East into Europe. During this first wave of migration, the European destinations of choice had been France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. However, this situation began to change after the Energy Crisis of 1973 and European countries began to have increasingly strict restrictions on visa issuances. The 1985 Schengen Treaty, for example, made it difficult for workers from the eastern and southern Mediterranean rim countries to seek employment in its member states – France, Germany, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). In response to the demand for low-skilled labour in southern Europe and the closed markets of the traditional destinations, Spain and Italy saw an increase in immigration until the early 1990s when they too introduced visa requirements for immigrants from the Maghreb.

Despite the tightening of visa controls, there has always been a demand for unskilled labour in the informal sector in Europe; this has kept the flow of migrants going. Contrary to the common perception of irregular migrants, most are fairly well-educated and from middle class families. However, their qualifications are often not recognised in Europe and migrants therefore fulfill the demand in domestic service, agriculture, fisheries, and janitorial work. This is an advantage for their employers, who find semi-skilled workers for lower salaries. Again, contrary to common perception, the majority of irregular migrants do not enter Europe via the Mediterranean. Many overstay their legal visas, others travel with false documentation, and some hide away in vehicles and containers.

The crises that erupted in the Middle East and North Africa around 2011 augmented the usual flow of people into Europe. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of people fleeing to Italy in 2009 was 9,573; this had rocketed to 61,000 by 2011. Similarly, Greece, which had seen about 10,000 people attempt to reach its shores in 2005 saw the number climb up to 60,000 in 2011. For whatever reason, Italy seems to be bearing the brunt of this immigration surge – in 2010, some 4,500 migrants left Libya for Italy but by 2014, that number had soared to 170,000. By contrast, the land route into Greece and the Balkans from Turkey saw about 51,000 people smuggle across in 2008, approximately the same number as in 2014. According to UNHCR estimates, some 219,000 people crossed the Mediterranean into Europe last year and 3,419 died at sea. By March this year, some 36,000 are expected to have entered Europe and the casualties already number 1,750.

Many blame Europe for the deaths. One immediate reason is that the EU scaled down maritime patrol operations in the Mediterranean which saved thousands of lives. In response to the drowning of over 300 people off the coast of Lampedusa in October 2013, Rome had launched Operation Mare Nostrum, a series of extended patrols and devotion of military assets to rescue operations. Funded at slightly over $12 million per month, it is estimated to have saved some 150,000 people in its short duration of a year. In the midst of a financial crisis itself, Italy could not afford to fund the efforts alone and asked for support from its EU partners. Additionally, the EU’s Dublin Regulation puts the cost of processing of illegal migrants entirely upon the country of first arrival, making border states of the federation more vulnerable. However, the EU refused to support Rome by arguing that Mare Nostrum had made the central Mediterranean route safer and hence encouraged even greater migration. Instead, Operation Triton was was launched, a programme that receives barely a third of the funding of Mare Nostrum and patrols only close to European waters rather than the entire Mediterranean. This, however, has not dissuaded people from attempting to cross the Mediterranean and given that most of the shipwrecks occur near Libyan waters, only increased casualties. Another reason Europe is blamed for the exacerbated irregular migration crisis is that European capitals encouraged or conducted operations in North Africa and the Levant that toppled local governments and sent the region into paroxysms of violence that has caused the dislocation.

To be fair, there are reasons beyond Europe’s control for the tragedies. Human traffickers crowd boats beyond the safety limit and deploy unseaworthy vessels to ferry irregular migrants across the Mediterranean. If the boats capsize or are wrecked, under maritime law, it is the legal obligation of anyone who sees the castaways to rescue them. Thus, traffickers shirk their responsibilities for safe passage onto European navies. Furthermore, the sheer number of boats put to sea at a time means that Italian naval vessels operating in the region have received over a dozen distress calls at a time. Underfunded and undermanned as the patrol operations are, it is simply impossible to rescue everyone. While the entire focus and blame as been on Europe, it is also a fact that African governments and media have remained silent and indifferent to the regular tragedies in the Mediterranean except to blame their northern neighbours across the sea. Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte asked that Africa must also collectively pick up its share of the responsibility; “Last time I checked Libya was in Africa, not Europe,” he said.

If Europe is to blame, however, it is not for the quotidian failures of its naval officers but for its refusal to acknowledge the realities of the problem it faces. Like the proverbial ostrich that buries its head in the sand, European governments have not cared to distinguish between the the regular inflow of illegal labour across their southern sea and the significant increase of migration in the last four years. European media and government still refer to the rescued and the victims as migrants rather than refugees, as if the primary motive of the Syrians and Libyans flooding into Europe now is gainful employment and remittance back home rather than physical safety. Yet the word ‘refugee’ is rarely seen in the discussion of the deaths in the Mediterranean.

The probable reason for this is that there are legal implications in the choice between these two words. Rooted in the horrors of the Holocaust and the denial of immigration to ships carrying Jewish refugees, the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol governs how the dislocated may be treated. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights also guarantees a right to seek asylum from political crimes. Activists have tried to expand this to include economic deprivation but that would be so broad as to render the convention meaningless. It has become a basic principle of international law that countries are obligated to take in refugees of political violence and conflict and the treaty prohibits refoulement – forcing a refugee to return to a country where his life is threatened. The onus of proof of persecution is upon the refugee and asylum may be denied under specific circumstances. However, it is difficult to argue that Syrians and Libyans in particular do not have legitimate grounds for asylum presently.

Attaining the ‘refugee’ tag hardly guarantees a life of comfort – usually, it is followed by life in massive government camps awaiting resettlement. Some refugees are indeed given the opportunity to stay and work in their host country but this is a minuscule number. For example, of the 2.5 million refugees of the Syrian civil war in 2013, the United States accepted 36 for resettlement. Nevertheless, even such a life of rations and make-shift homes is preferable to the hundreds of thousands fleeing the Levant and North Africa. Of course, many try to escape the camp and disappear into the country, finding employment and lodging below the state’s net. This leaves them vulnerable to exploitation but few of the dislocated have anything left to lose and the even the leaking boats on the Mediterranean offer more hope than life back at home.

European law does give special consideration to certain categories of refugees – minors, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant women, single parents accompanied by minors, and victims of torture and sexual violence. Beyond non-refoulement, these include the right to information in a language they understand, a renewable residence permit valid for at least three years, travel within and outside the country that granted refugee status, employment, education and vocational training, access to medical care, access to appropriate accommodation, and access to programmes facilitating integration into the host society. An irregular migrant, on the other hand, receives no such benefits; he may be deported and employment is forbidden.

It is ironic that the continent that led the charge on the Right to Protect (R2P) now even refuses to acknowledge refugees. The humanitarian rhetoric of R2P is reserved for justifying the bombardment of other states but does not seem to apply to one’s own immigration policies. One can take this blame game even further back in history to the era of imperialism and blame the white man’s rapacity in the colonies but that does hardly any good at present. The humanitarian crisis in genuine and Europe needs all the international support it can get to alleviate the depressing and gut-wrenching plight of the refugees from the conflict zones in the Levant and Africa.

It must also be recognised that Europe does have legitimate grievances about its inability to handle the entire influx of refugees from the Greater Middle East. One possible approach to the Mediterranean crisis is an international commitment to resettle the refugees. Preference might be given to stable neighbours first, the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development next, and finally the rest of the world. Those unwilling to take people may contribute by way of financial assistance. Even if some of the refugees are dispatched through this programme, it will reduce the burden on the camps in Turkey, Jordan, and elsewhere. It is unlikely that the conflict in Libya or Syria/Iraq will be resolved soon by diplomacy or by force and though efforts should be made towards that end, the future of the dislocated cannot be pinned on such hopes in the short term.

International affairs is filled with rhetoric about our mutual obligations to one another. One such duty might perhaps be not to let the refugee protection system collapse for those are the neediest among us. Let too many institutions and ideals wither away on economic and “practical” grounds and eventually there will be nothing left to preserve in an anomic world. The first step, however, is for Europe to accept that the thousands of people risking life to cross the Mediterranean Sea are refugees and not irregular migrants.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on April 28, 2015.

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