• Home
  • About
  • Reading Lists
    • Egypt
    • Great Books
    • Iran
    • Islam
    • Israel
    • Liberalism
    • Napoleon
    • Nationalism
    • The Nuclear Age
    • Science
    • Russia
    • Turkey
  • Digital Footprint
    • Facebook
    • Instagram
    • Pocket
    • SoundCloud
    • Twitter
    • Tumblr
    • YouTube
  • Contact
    • Email

Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: eudaimonia

Sprezzatura and Eudaimonia

01 Tue Mar 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Society

≈ Comments Off on Sprezzatura and Eudaimonia

Tags

Aristotle, Baldassare Castiglione, eudaimonia, humanism, Il Cortegiano, Italy, Kamasutra, Leonardo Bruni, Renaissance, sprezzatura, virtue

Salve, amici! Before we start, what thanum an dhul does the name of this column mean? Well, the Oxford English Dictionary describes sprezzatura as “studied carelessness, especially as a characteristic quality or style of art or literature” but it has also been explained as nonchalance, elegant self restraint, or grace. Simply put, sprezzatura is the art of doing something difficult – usually artistic – in a manner that perfectly conceals the effort required to master the skill. Coined by Baldassare Castiglione in his 1528 publication Il Cortegiano, the word is not Latin or Greek in origin but Italian though the idea was clearly inspired by classical values, particularly Cicero’s neglentia diligens and Ovid’s observation, Ars est celare artem (The purpose of art is to conceal itself).

Il Cortegiano was an important work during the Renaissance and has informed the Western conception of what it means to be a gentleman ever since. Structured as a series of conversations between courtiers of the Duke of Urbino over four days, Castiglione touches on the nature of nobility, humour, and love. The author was himself the Count of Casatico, a small principality near Mantua, and played advisor to the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and Popes Leo X and Clement VII. Though there is little that is truly original – East or West – by way of etiquette in Il Cortegiano, the book nevertheless captures the humanist spirit in the princely courts of Renaissance Italy; until then, the authors of the peninsula’s famed city-republics – Leonardo Bruni, most prominently – had only espoused a civic humanism.

Sprezzatura cannot be taught; rather, it must be observed and imitated. However, the clay for this creation comes from knowledge – of literature, music, art, philosophy, food, fashion and many of the things found in the third chapter of the Kamasutra. In the 21st century, that list may perhaps be extended to include travel, the assumption being that such a person would be urbane. But what is it all for? Being well-informed is undeniably a desirable trait but what is the fuss about, really?

One theory is that the Renaissance being a period of Classical discovery, was re-emphasising the old Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia. Translating approximately to “the good life,” Aristotle’s concept of what it meant to lead a flourishing life was that it had to be not just philosophised and articulated but reasoned and practiced. As one can imagine, several things fell in the ambit of leading a good life – ethical conduct, wisdom, friendship, wealth, pleasing appearance, health, and so on. Activity, for Aristotle, included much of what Castiglione suggests as the beginning of sprezzatura – practicing a musical instrument, composing poetry, athletic ability, intellectual pursuits on the humanities and the sciences, and so on. The emphasis on activity rather than idle belief is key, as is the idea that virtue alone is not enough but several other factors are required. The corollary is that these habits should be pursued not for happiness but that it is a byproduct of pursuing these activities. Eudaimonia, then, was not a dry and abstract theory of morality but one of engagement with the world. Sprezzatura, then, was not merely an affectation; it was a way to practice eudaimonia with grace, for an overt display of excellence might evoke jealously and be a social faux pas.

So…back to this column then. The focus of this feature will be to discuss all the things mentioned above. You may have noticed several news blogs lately that have taken to reporting only on positive events to balance the flood of negativity in the regular press. This will be a variation on that theme – in the midst of largely socioeconomic and political commentary, Sprezzatura will try and bring you tidbits of joy albeit with far less grace than I would like! What this column lacks in grace shall be compensated for, I hope, in its approachable style – by no means is this meant to be an academic discussion about a minute point in a musical performance or a philosophical technicality but a chatty pointer to matters of interest that readers may be piqued enough to pursue later on their own. At times, there may be a hint of whimsy while at others, a topic may be quite serious: as Seneca reminds us through Lucilius, res severa verum gaudium (true joy is a serious thing)!

Until next time, stammi bene!


This article first appeared in the March 2015 print edition of Swarajya. It was the pilot article in a new column, Sprezzatura.

 

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

Apathy Also Begins At Home

14 Sun Jul 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Society

≈ Comments Off on Apathy Also Begins At Home

Tags

Adam Smith, al-Farabi, anomie, Aristotle, Émile Durkheim, eudaimonia, jihad al-nafs, Plato, Qur'an, social justice, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, welfare

Perhaps not in the sense of foreboding that William Shakespeare meant it in his Richard III, but more in the metre of John Steinbeck’s message of moral decay and rhyming with Helmut Flieg’s (Stefan Heym) tale of utter despair, this really feels like the winter of India’s discontent. I am not sure if it has become worse these past few years, or whether it has just been a very long winter and we didn’t know about it.

It was not the malaise of the economy, the alarming security condition, a new multi-kharab (खरब) scandal, or even yet another encroachment upon my civil liberties by the state that brought about this melancholy – living in the Third World, one is inured to many such things. Rather, it was the gratitude of my maid when I brewed a fresh pot of coffee for her when she arrived for work early in the morning, wet from a pleasant Bangalore drizzle. What is there to be grateful about coffee for someone working in an economically solidly middle class home (upper middle by Indian standards, I suppose)?

The plain truth of the matter is that despite the loud support many of us express for India’s rampant welfarism – FSB, NREGA, RTE, UHC – we treat our own servants (domestic help for the politically correct, or, why not – domestic management executives?) quite inhumanely. Collectively, India’s financially better-off classes seem to suffer from a combination of a massive Genovese syndrome and apathy. We would prefer that the state stepped in and helped these poor wretches, that they not take up any more of our time than they absolutely have to. After all, what are our tax rupees doing?

The fundamental nature of domestic help has changed over the years. A couple of decades ago, the conditions were harsher but the master-servant relationship was warmer. Today, the circumstances are not as onerous but the association is transactional and cold. As many poor have seen their financial status inch up and more and more handouts, quotas, and also opportunities come their way, many have abandoned manual labour, or have placed conditions upon their employment. It is harder to find domestic help nowadays, but not only because of the slight financial upturn the poor have enjoyed. Few servants feel the same loyalty and attachment to their employers that their parents’ generation might have felt. When employers mistreat their employees or don’t invest in them, the same is reciprocated from the bottom up.

I am not restating the silly Bollywood fallacy of the pre-liberalisation era, that the rich are bad and the poor are good. If one were to step away from the strawman zone of either extreme to the more common and everyday centre, there are many matters of virtue, prudence, justice, and beneficence that deserve to be pondered.

This mistreatment of servants need not take extreme forms; indeed, as Søren Kierkegaard warns us of the slow and unnoticed process of losing one’s Self, the daily erosion of human dignity between master and servant nudges us closer towards the precipice. It is not uncommon nowadays to find children being rude to the help; after all, they probably observed and replicated the behaviour from their possibly nouveau riche parents. I have seen guests leave their hotel rooms in deplorable states because housekeeping will clean up the room later anyway. My servant, who could not expect a hot cup of coffee on a cold morning, also had stories to tell of homes in which it was near impossible to keep up with the owners’ constant littering around the house. Others, she said, were unhappy with the stale leftovers they were sometimes given at the homes they worked in, but owing to their poverty, accepted it anyway. Sometimes, they would not even get that simply because the memsahib had forgotten or was busy. Pay is a monthly battle, as inflation corrodes the purchasing power of a salary and employers resist the upward creep in demands from their employees. Any time off is deeply resented, though the masters themselves need their two-day weekend and year for the occasional long weekend.

These are just some of the seemingly insignificant frictions between the master and servant that are caused more by apathy than malice. India’s New Society – rapidly wealthy, sometimes double-income, individualist, Bacchean, greed-is-good mantra’ed – has unfortunately not been able to cope with the accompanying social shifts. Modes of social exchange have been transformed, whether for better or for worse, without full cognisance. In our parents’ generation, servants stayed employed to their masters for long periods, sometimes over multiple generations. They got little, but there was little to go around in our socialist republic then, the black market and long queues outside ration shops for substandard goods being the norm. Other social injustices such as caste discrimination were, no doubt, more common, but literacy was low and poverty high. As is wont when we leave theory for the real world, we lived in paradoxes –  as a child, I remember my grandmother making it a point to give the servants the same food we ate but serve them in their own special utensils that no one else would use. Despite having several servants, my grandfather used to insist that we clean up ourselves; several of my friend and cousins were also reprimanded for their rare rudeness with the help. Our neighbour, a severe taskmistress if I ever saw one, would ask me or my cousins to help the servants’ children with their homework and ask after their progress in school though never allow us to play with them; for some of our friends, money might have been tight but anyone who worked for them was additionally compensated in food, firewood, clothes, and sometimes even a place to stay during the monsoons. For all the handed-down caste bigotry previous generations exhibited, many were equally generous and built relationships with their workers.

This is not a nostalgic recounting of the “good old days,” nor is it an eternal damnation of the present. Then, as now, the experience is mixed; however, nowadays, the value of the relationship-building of yore seems to have been missed. Interestingly enough, some of the same apathetic people have also given substantial sums to charitable organisations (though I wonder about the purchase of social approbation), which points back to unthinking indifference rather than malice. Though coined by the French philosopher Jean-Marie Guyau, it was a sociologist from the same country, Émile Durkheim, who popularised the term Anomie to describe the dissipation of bonds between individuals in a society. Normally,

sensitivity to mutual needs promotes evolution in the division of labour. Producers, being near consumers, can easily reckon the extent of the needs to be satisfied. Equilibrium is established without any trouble and production regulates itself.

However, as we become a more transactional and impersonal society, these ties that bind begin to unravel. The breakdown in empathy between employer and employee, when replicated across society, carries with it unseen scars in much the same way as Basil Hallward’s painting did of Dorian Gray.

We don’t need philosophers to tell us that Man is a social animal, or that the good life is possible only through society. However, al-Farabi, the famous 9thcentury Islamic Neoplatonist polymath, goes a step further than self-interest of association (Plato) or even eudaimonia (Aristotle) to the soteriological dimension of cooperative – dare I say eusocial? – living. Unlike Plato or Aristotle, al-Farabi believed that happiness can be achieved by the masses as well as the elite. Some scholars think that al-Farabi’s theory of four-fold happiness (theoretical, deliberative, moral, practical arts) rests not only on the Greek thinkers but also on the Qur’an (9:71) and hadith (al-Tirmidhi 604, Muslim 496, 1774), but the philosopher himself, interestingly, steers clear of religious vocabulary in expressing similar ideas. Al-Farabi exhorts us, beyond philosophical enlightenment, physical skill, and mental excellence, to support each other in need as limbs cooperate with a body. Only thus can a good (perfect) state evolve.

Qur’an, Surat al-Tawbah (9:71): The believers, both men and women: they are guardians, confidants, and helpers of one another. They enjoin and promote what is right and good, and forbid and try to prevent the evil, and they establish prayer in conformity with its conditions, and pay the zakaat.Sahih Muslim, Hadith 1774: The believers, in their love, mutual kindness, and close ties, are like one body; when any part complains, the whole body responds to it with wakefulness and fever.

Another thinker who expressed similar communitarian ideas is none other than the father of capitalism, Adam Smith. In his oft-neglected The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith lays out the framework of what informs all his other writing. Rejecting reason alone as a guide to moral action, Smith informs his world view with psychology in an early echo of Antonio Damasio’s explication of the importance of emotion in higher rationality. Smith’s “invisible hand,” for long taken as an endorsement of market forces, also makes a case for concern for the welfare of your fellow citizen.

The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.

To return from my brief philosophical rambling to the topic at hand – apathy towards our servants – the importance of being nice, not just to service providers like maids, waiters, and receptionists, but to all, cannot be understated socially, morally, or even economically. Our present state of apathy is blamed on many things – sudden wealth, erosion of traditional values, internet isolationism, rampant materialism, postmodernism, delayed adulthood, constant distractions – and I have neither the expertise nor the space to open that can of worms. While a quick “good morning, how are you today?” or if you feel like it, a fresh warm meal, might not cost you much, it could go a long way in forming bonds whose value is not discernible today.


This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on July 24, 2013.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

Ayn Rand vs. Aristotle – Self Love, Selfishness, and Egoism

07 Tue Aug 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Theory & Philosophy

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Aristotle, Ayn Rand, egoism, eudaimonia, Nichomachean Ethics, objectivism, philautia, self love, selfishness, thumos

The phenomenon of friendship, with its richness and complexity, its ability to support but also at times to undercut virtue, and the promise it holds out of bringing together in one happy union so much of what is highest and so much of what is sweetest in life, formed a fruitful topic of philosophic inquiry for the ancients writes Lorraine Pangle in her introduction to Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. The fullest and most probing classical study of friendship is to be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which devotes more space to it than to any of the moral virtues, and which presents friendship as a bridge between the moral virtues, and the highest life of philosophy. Pangle contends that it is precisely in the friendships of mature and virtuous individuals that Aristotle saw human love not only at its most revealing, but also at its richest and highest.

Philosophy since Kant has largely followed him in understanding truly moral, praiseworthy human relations to be based on altruism, a wholly selfless benevolence towards others, guided either by absolute moral law or by a utilitarian pursuit of the greatest good for the greatest number. When compared to friendship, altruism directed to the good of humanity seems higher, more selfless, more rational, and more fair Today we reasonably assume that the enemy of morality is selfishness. Starting from self-interest, we would find acquisition, pleasure, and selfishness the primary threats to, and alternatives to, virtue. But is altruism really possible? How are our altruistic motives, related to our self-interested motives? If we normally act with a view to our own good, but sometimes choose actions that have nothing to do with our own good, or even oppose it — is there any higher, unifying principle or faculty of the soul that decides between these contrary principles of action, judging them by a common standard?

Ayn Rand rejected altruism, and in fact, blamed it for the plight of human civilization, and with the presumed backing of Aristotle, wrote fervently in support of self-interest and rational egoism in The Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged, and in her other writings. Aristotle assumes neither the possibility nor the impossibility of what we would call altruism, but instead offers a sustained and sympathetic exploration of what is really at work in the human heart when an individual seems to disregard his own good to pursue the good of others. Aristotle does not assume that the concern for a friend is necessarily tainted by partiality; he argues that friendship can be rooted in a true assessment of the friends’ worth and as such can be the noblest expression of human relationship. He nonetheless insisted that self-love was the highest love and maintained a conception of selfishness, such that it not only contributed to, but was requisite for, virtuous living. This particular understanding of selfishness is best explained in his chapters on friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, but it is also referred to in numerous other writings, such that there can be no doubt that he sincerely held this belief. Ayn Rand holds Aristotle in the highest regard and utilizes his conception of selfishness as the philosophical underpinning for her version of egoism and objectivism. While I agree that there are certain Aristotelian ideas of selfishness which might lend support to some aspects of her theory, for the most part, she has taken Aristotle out of context or has been represented to have done so by authors elaborating upon Rand’s ideas. My primary objective here, then, is to refute Rand’s claim of Aristotelian support for her beliefs and demonstrate how and where her interpretation went astray through a careful analysis of Aristotle’s conception of virtue and friendship

Aristotle

Central to Aristotle’s ethics is his concept of living well (eudaimonia), which he describes as living in accordance with the virtues. He places friendship as one of the virtues necessary for living well, an essential ingredient for attaining the virtuous life. Aristotle says, “A discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view of living”. “For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods” (1155a). In fact, Aristotle sees friendship as an essential aspect of a life of happiness and morality, “the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mold of the characteristics they approve” (1172a). Friendship seems to have an especially close connection with moral virtue, standing as a crucial link in a chain that the treatment of the separate virtues has not yet completed. In the lives of virtuous agents, friendship is far more involved and significant than just good will, actually aiding their progression towards fulfilling their ultimate end goal, which for Aristotle is human flourishing. Aristotle is committed to the unity of virtue and happiness and rejects the commonly held notion that what is really good for us is not what is most pleasant, and that what is right or noble is often neither good nor pleasant. Aristotle argues, to the contrary, that the activity of virtue is the very substance of human happiness and this unity for Aristotle seems best achieved within the context of serious friendship.

Aristotle also bases his political theory on friendship. Amity among people in the society is requisite for the proper function of the social order, which for him, of course, was the Athenian polis. Eugene Garver, in Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics, points out that “the task of the Politics is to show how nature and habit can produce citizens who care about the good life. The task of the Ethics is to show how our rational powers and our thumos can be fulfilled through virtuous activity.” A love of honour propels people into activities that are their own end rather than directed at given ends. Since, for Aristotle, activity is the ultimate expression of virtue, action motivated in this way serves, in addition to its external end, as an end in itself, furthering the individual’s habituation of virtuous decision-making. “Aristotle must show how the thumos will be fulfilled in doing virtuous actions for their own sake, not through theory alone, as Socrates argues, and not, as many of his students must have thought, through political ambition for domination. The Nicomachean Ethics is that demonstration.”

Alastair McIntyre writes in After Virtue that the type of friendship which Aristotle has in mind is that, which embodies a shared recognition of, and pursuit of, a good. It is this sharing which is essential and primary to the constitution of any form of community, whether that of a household or that of the city.

Lawgivers, says Aristotle, seem to make friendships a more important aim than justice (1155a24); and the reason is clear. Justice is the virtue of rewarding desert and of repairing failures in rewarding desert within an already constituted community; friendship is required for that initial constitution… Friendship on Aristotle’s view involves affection. But that affection arises within a relationship defined in terms of a common allegiance to and the common pursuit of goods. The affection is secondary, which is not in the least to say, unimportant. This contrasts with our modern perspective in which affection is often the central issue. Friendship has become for the most part the name of a type of emotional state, rather than that of a type of social and political relationship. Indeed, from an Aristotelian point of view, a modern liberal political society can appear only as a collection of unconnected men who have banded together for their common protection. That they lack the bond of friendship is of course bound up with the self avowed moral pluralism of such liberal societies.

One can clearly see from the aforementioned discussion that Aristotle’s ethics are rooted in a social context, in which the virtuous man participates with the other citizens to ensure a just and amicable social order. What a stark contrast to Ayn Rand’s character John Galt who, in Atlas Shrugged, rejects any obligation to his fellow man in a lengthy 60-page speech in which Rand introduced her view of egoism and her brand of philosophy which she called objectivism. Rand cannot cite Aristotle in support of her ethical prescription — “do what maximizes your self-interest”, or her assertion that “man must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself.” Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue and upon man’s attainment of the highest goal in life through virtuous action revolves around living in friendship and community with others, as a social creature.

Aristotle’s view of the world is teleological, and man’s telos is firstly that of rational animal, and secondly, and almost as importantly, that of social animal. This is the case for man, because in order to live a life of flourishing, which for Aristotle is man’s purpose, one requires the company of others with whom one stands in relation, such that, “by doing what is noble he will at once benefit himself and others.” Aristotle has also said that a friend is another self, and I see myself in him. Simply by interacting with others, one’s values when shared with another are revealed, thus providing a concrete experience of those traits valued abstractly by the individual. “Furthermore, it is quite true to say of the good man that he does many things for the sake of his friends, and his country and will even die for them if need be. He will throw away money, honor, and in a word all good things for which men compete, claiming the noble for himself.”

The contrast between these quotes of Aristotle and Rand seem to draw a distinction between Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Rand’s rational egoism. Much recent discussion in ethics has amassed around the edges of egoism, as renewed attention to virtue ethics, eudaimonia, and perfectionism naturally raises questions about the role of self-interest in a good life, notes Tara Smith in the introduction to Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics (Cambridge, 2006). She quotes Rosalind Hursthouse from her book, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford 1999), “much virtue ethics portrays morality as a form of enlightened self-interest.” Although the Aristotelian conception of ethics that is currently enjoying a revival does not fit stereotypes of egoism, admits Smith, she claims that it certainly does not advocate altruism. Smith has written an elegant and thorough text of Rand’s ethics in which she gives it a more robust and developed philosophical footing than Rand did herself. In fact, between Smith, Leonard Peikoff, and Fred Seddon, Rand’s ethics have become far more palatable and far less polemical. It is Smith who has borrowed heavily from Aristotle in fleshing out the ethics attributed to Rand. She asks a number of provocative questions, which I too would like to address: “ Is eudemonia a selfish end? What does selfishness actually mean? What sorts of actions does it demand? What are the implications of pursuing eudaimonia for a person’s relationships with others?” Aristotle has answered these questions in his ethical writing, particularly in the Nichomachean Ethics.

It is worth delving into Aristotle’s concept of character friendships, which are those friendships of the highest order and those in which selfishness plays a significant role, while concomitantly developing the egoism of Rand, distinguishing the similarities and differences between the two philosophers and addressing the questions raised above. Aristotle has crafted an ingenious theory, which results in the synthesis of selfishness and altruism. Aristotle’s idea of thumos is also quite important for us to better understand what he means by selfishness.

Friendship holds a very important position in Aristotle’s ethics, for his ethics are practical and are based upon the human goals and interrelationships commonly encountered in everyday life. The centrality of friendship extends beyond the personal life of the individual and even household relations to serve as the crux of political and societal flourishing and success. Aristotle’s definition of friendship, broadly speaking, is a practical and emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection, and pleasure. Through an analysis of end love in friendship, distinguishing it from means love, we can begin to unpack Aristotle’s notion of self-love and its primacy. For Aristotle, the highest most complete form of friendship is referred to as character friendship and is distinct in that friends love and wish each other well as ends in themselves, not solely or even primarily as a means to further ends. Friendship consists in loving and being loved (1381a1-2), but more in loving (1159a33-34). Aristotle claims that friendship is, in fact, necessary if we are to attain a life of flourishing. Initially, he explains this in the Magna Moralia, asserting that character friendship is necessary for self-knowledge and is essential for avoidance of self-delusion and false assessment of one’s own virtuousness. We need the objectivity of a friend to see what we cannot, or often do not, see in ourselves. Aristotle clearly is emphasizing our human vulnerability and weakness, for it is in the propensity to uncertainty and doubt about oneself that the need for such a friendship becomes clear. Aristotle is here acknowledging deficiencies in the psychological makeup of human nature, such that the individual, in isolation, is insufficient to achieve a life of virtue and happiness.

In this type of friendship, we care for our friends’ material health, spiritual health and state well-being as an end in itself and as an expression of our love. This level of caring concern has often been described as altruistic and cannot be achieved unless we distinctly recognize and love the moral goodness in the friend, viewing his life as worthwhile in the same way as our own. Aristotle feels that only in this way, and through such relationships, does one become able to love and value himself.

When asked whether it is right that a man love himself more than he loves others, Aristotle responds in the affirmative. He asserts that the prevailing theory that a good man, out of regard for his friend, neglects his own self-interest, disagrees with the facts, as well it should. He states that we would all agree that we should love him most who is most truly a friend and should wish him well for his own sake. All these characteristics that go to define a friend are found to the highest degree in oneself, and it is from our relationship with ourselves that our friendly relations are derived and man is his own best friend. A man must therefore love himself better than anyone else. The term self loving can be used as a criticism if a man takes more than his fair share of money, honor, and bodily pleasures for in this case he indulges his animal appetites and the irrational part of his nature. This, unfortunately, he says, applies to the mass of men. The man, who set himself on the course of justice and virtue, temperate, moderate, and noble, would not be called self loving by others, yet he is even more self loving for he takes for himself what is noblest and most truly good. For Aristotle, our reason and our rational self is most truly ourself and, when a man acts under the guidance of his reason, he is thought in the fullest sense to have done the deed himself and of his own free will. The good man, then, ought to be self loving, pursuing the virtuous and noble. The needs of the community would be perfectly satisfied, and simultaneously each individual would achieve virtue, which is the greatest of all good things. Such a man will surrender wealth to enrich a friend; for while his friend gets money, the man gets what is noble and thus takes the greater good for himself. Similarly, this holds with regard to honors and offices. (1168a29-1169)

For a character friend to be able to positively influence our growth requires that he have a deep knowledge and understanding of our true nature as well as the trust and connectedness necessary to be able to honestly criticize us. For Aristotle, self-assessment is a key ingredient in attainment of virtue and its habituation. He envisions this friendship as one in which much time is spent together both pursuing mutually enjoyable activities and in contemplation and conversation. This type of friendship obviously requires considerable time to develop and may have begun as a friendship of utility or amusement, growing into a deeper, mutual, commitment as the nature and depth of each character is revealed. Such a friendship is a lasting friendship and is based in part upon each individual’s integrity and in part upon mutual trust.

Garver notes that thumos is the source of ambition, aggression, love, and personal identity for Aristotle. People must be both intelligent (dianoetikous) and spirited (thumoeideis) if they are to be led easily toward virtue.

Thumos is the faculty of our souls, which issues in love and friendship. An indication of this is that thumos is more aroused against intimates and friends than against unknown persons. When it considers itself slighted…. both the element of ruling and the element of freedom, stem from this capacity for every one. (1327b40-1328a7)

In his chapter entitled “Passion and the Two Sides of Virtue”, Garver asks the question what is thumos, and how does it lead to such things? “I leave thumos untranslated, because spirit, ambition, anger and assertiveness all seem partially right, but more importantly, I need to leave open its status, possibly, as simply a posit. Maybe we refer affectionateness, the power to command, and the love of freedom to thumos, because we can’t explain them.” In a footnote, Garver writes that in Christian moral psychology, to oversimplify, thumos is replaced by the will as the supplement to reason and passion. In modern moral psychology, ‘thumos’ is replaced as the supplement to reason and passion by self-interest. It is the ‘thumos’ that renders the classical Aristotelian theory of friendship explicitly self- centered. The thumos, i.e. the prideful, self-vindicating and self-policing faculty or part of the soul, the part in which the sense of self most resides, also happens to be the part that creates affection.

Thumos then seems to provide an answer to why people generate personal ends and love the noble for its own sake. It is through this conception of ‘thumos’ that, for Aristotle, affection is seen as an extension of the self to encompass concern for another or for others. Aristotle’s ethical theory then addresses the contemporary egoist/altruist dilemma, implicitly, by denying that it exists. ‘Thumos’ does have a downside in Aristotle’s usage, and it is perhaps the interpretation of ‘thumos’ as “drive” which captures Aristotle’s concern that thumos, in the absence of virtue, may lead to the desire to rule despotically and live tyrannically. “Yet only ambition, and spiritedness (thumos), can push people from life into good life.” Without ambition, people would not have the ethical problems that the ethical virtues are designed to overcome. Coupled with this drive then, must be reason (logos), such that thumos then both allows us to love, and to engage in actions that are their own end (Garver, pg.120). Explaining why people should want to do things for their own sake is equivalent to explaining why good people should love and not just want to be loved.

All people or the majority of them wish noble things, but choose beneficial ones; and treating someone well, not in order to be repaid, is noble, but being the recipient of a good service is beneficial.” (1162b34-1163a1). “It is rather the part of virtue to act well than to be acted upon well. (1120a1112)

Rooting friendship in thumos has advantages over modern discussions of altruism. We today take selfishness as a given and then try to explain altruistic behavior. For Aristotle all friendship (philia) is rooted in self-love (philautia). The right kind of self-love is an achievement, love for what is best in us, motivated by self-love. Aristotelian friendship is unlike altruism in that there is no sacrifice of the self to others. Friendship and the desire for the noble then, are the good development of the thumos. Love for the noble, is senseless under the wrong conditions. Only in the right community, which for Aristotle is the polis, in which virtue is praised and vice punished and in which one’s natural ambition can be satisfied in activities within that community, can one reasonably choose to engage in activity for its own sake and thus pursue the noble. This sheds some light upon why the ideas of Aristotle were not readily adaptable to the tumultuous world of Ayn Rand.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle provides a comprehensive course on the meaning and significance of friendship. He addresses the possibility of altruism and egoism in the context of friendship, concluding that, “the prevailing theory is that a good man, out of regard for his friends, neglects his own self interest. However, the facts are not in harmony of these arguments, and that is not surprising (1168a29). In defense of this rather egoistic assertion, Aristotle posits the following argument:

it is said that we should love our best friend, and the best friend, is he who when he wishes for someone’s good does so for that person’s sake even if no one will ever know. Now a man has this sentiment, primarily toward himself, and the same is true of all the other sentiments of which a friend is defined. For as we have stated, all friendly feelings toward others are an extension of the friendly feelings a person has for himself. All these sentiments will be found chiefly in a man’s relation to himself, since a man is his own best friend, and therefore should have the greatest affection for himself. (1168b)

Aristotle goes on to clarify that the term self loving can be used as a criticism if a man takes more than his fair share of money, honor or bodily pleasures, for in this way he indulges his animal appetites and the irrational part of his nature:

Hence, the pejorative use of the term is derived from the fact that the most common form of self love is base, and those who are egoists in this sense are justly criticized.” “If a man were always to devote his attention above all else to acting justly himself, to acting with self-control, or to fulfilling whatever other demands virtue makes upon him, and if in general, he were always to try to secure for himself what is noble, no one would call him an egoist and no one would find fault with him. He assigns what is supremely noble and good to himself, he gratifies the most sovereign part of himself, and he obeys it in everything. Consequently, he is an egoist or self lover in the truest sense, who loves and gratifies the most sovereign element in him.” “His self love is different in kind from that of the egoist with whom people find fault: as different, in fact, as living by the guidance of reason is from living by the dictates of the emotion, and as different as desiring what is noble, is from desiring what seems to be advantageous. If all men were to compete for what is noble, and put all their efforts into the performance of the noblest actions, all the needs of the community will have been met, and each individual will have the greatest of goods, since that is what virtue is. Therefore a good man, should be a self lover, for he will profit, by performing noble actions, and will benefit his fellow man. It is also true that many actions of a man of high moral standards are performed in the interest of his friends and of his country, and if there be need, he will give his life for them. He will freely give his money, honors, in short, all the things that men compete for, while he gains the nobility for himself…. So we see that in everything praiseworthy a man of high moral standards assigns himself a larger share of what is noble. It is in this sense, then, as we said, that he ought to be an egoist or self lover, but he must not be an egoist in the sense in which most people are. (1168b20-33)

Selfishness for Aristotle does not hold negative connotation, when considered in the context of a good or virtuous man., but rather motivates human action. The development of rational goodness, through virtuous living, serves to produce alignment of his self interest with that of the community, such that his actions inure to the benefit of family, friends, and society. Aristotle is very clear when discussing selfishness in the context of character friendship to point out that it is only the good and virtuous, which are capable of having such character friendships and are thus capable of being selfish. This is the only way in which selfishness is appropriate and desirable for Aristotle. He quickly points out that those who are not good cannot have friendships of the highest type, and for them selfishness is most unacceptable.

When reading Aristotle’s chapters on friendship, if one were to cherry pick certain passages, one could easily fabricate an endorsement of egoism. In context, however, Aristotle is speaking selectively to men of the Athenian polis, and even more selectively to those citizens who are already leading a reasonably virtuous life. Even more selectively, because most of his writings indeed were lecture notes, Aristotle is speaking to the sons of the citizens of Athens, with instructions for their future lives as productive citizens of the polis. When we read the entirety of his treatment of friendship, we note that included in this context is the relationship of parent and child and the relationships within the household. I interpret Aristotle’s teaching regarding character friendship and self-love to be a prescription for developing and maintaining relationships in adulthood, which will continue to provide a similar form of feedback to that which one receives in childhood and adolescence from one’s parents and teachers.

It is not hard to see how a character friendship would be immeasurably beneficial in the attainment of, and furthering of, self-knowledge and virtue for those already aiming for a life of virtuous living. The modeling of virtuous behavior readily observable in our friend surely contributes to our ability to assimilate and habituate virtuous behaviors of our own. A study of Aristotle’s conception of virtue qua virtue, and of happiness, which derives from it, would be helpful at this point to understand more fully the interconnectedness of friendship and the virtuous life.

Aristotle identified two virtues of thought, otherwise known as moral virtues. The first is practical wisdom and is the virtue of the practical intellect truly inseparable from virtues of character. The second, which he calls philosophy, is the virtue of the speculative intellect. Practical wisdom enunciates the rules which virtues of character carry out. Particularly, if we wish to comprehend how Aristotle comes to the conclusion that friendship is indispensable for human happiness and flourishing we must understand how these two activities of the mind (soul) function as co-chairs, presiding over all other activities of the human being.

Practical wisdom exercises command and thus rules over desire, that is, over the body and its animalistic appetitive characteristics. Similarly philosophy, as the activity of contemplation has its own realm, namely that of spectator of itself. This function is regulative of action in a sense, issuing orders, and also serves to inform us about ourselves, but is not the initiator of any action. Parenthetically, one can readily see that this concept of reason was adopted by Kant. Practical wisdom perfects not only the subject and its desire by teaching it to obey well, but also perfects the mind teaching it to command well.

Virtues are for Aristotle, dispositions, and are developed through habituation. Virtue of character is a state of habit through which we are disposed toward the highest virtues in a certain way to a certain set of stimuli or situations. Virtue as habit is not innate, though certainly there is a predisposition to virtue in our human nature. Virtue has two aspects, an objective experiential one and a subjective or mental one. Actions for Aristotle are not virtuous (though they may have the appearance of virtuosity to the observer), unless they concomitantly emanate from a certain state of mind. This has alternatively been stated such that virtuous action requires right action for the right reasons in the right situation. Neither “good intentions” nor accidental good acts qualify as virtuous.

A more precise understanding of virtue should become evident as we look at its development in the life of the human subject, which is precisely where friendship comes into play for Aristotle. From the earliest points of development, the social and interactive nature of the human species is no more evident in Aristotle’s biology than in our learning, and particularly our learning to manifest our “predispositions” as “dispositions”, resulting in “right” or “virtuous” action. The very apparent mimicking and mirroring of the actions and attitudes of their parents by young children does not end in childhood from Aristotle’s point of view, but persists throughout life.

It is for this reason, that in his discussion of friendship he includes the relationship and philia of parents for children, and children for parents, in the category of friendship. Understanding the primary role of friendship is essential and necessary for attainment of the virtues, which then can be properly utilized toward the attainment of a life of flourishing.

The benchmark for assessing the virtuousness of an action is referred to as the mean, however Aristotle does not envision a quantitative mean, such as described by Plato and other pre-Socratics. For Aristotle, the mean simply represents the moral ought without a quantitative component, because virtue for Aristotle was situated between two vices but not necessarily equidistantly. “The mean is to do what one ought, when one ought, in the circumstances in which one ought, to the people to whom, which one ought, for the end for which one ought, in the way, that one ought.” Thus the “mean” is duty (1121b12), and “ought” is what the moral rule prescribes. The mean is to act as the “right rule” says, but what is the right rule for Aristotle? He certainly did not have in mind any underlying determinant measure such as Kant’s categorical imperative.

For Aristotle, the standard is the ideal of the “virtuous man” (1113a33; 1176a15-17). The virtuous man is also a wise man (1107a1-2) from whom practical wisdom generates the rule as specific for a given situation (1144b27-28).

All the virtues have as their object, interior passions and simultaneously exterior actions or activities, and they moderate certain passions in order to moderate certain activities. Aristotle however is not prone to overtly rely on this “golden mean” as the solution to all moral dilemmas, or as the basis for all “right action”. He is much more inclined to allow the “virtuous man”, properly prepared through the learned behaviors and attitudes acquired through social contact from childhood to the present, and through contemplative reflection, to properly and correctly interpret that which is at hand, and to choose that action, which is responsively indicated. One can see from this that we have formulated a description of what has come to be known as “Virtue Ethics”. Aristotle now has connected the necessity of friendship in achieving this virtuous living and a life of flourishing.

Ayn Rand

Tara Smith is clearly a proponent of Rand’s rational egoism, elucidating and defending it in her book. Rand did not write her moral philosophy in lengthy treatises. Rather her views were presented in her fiction, particularly in the speech by John Galt near the end of Atlas Shrugged, and in her single most important essay “The Objectivist Ethics”. In addition to The Fountainhead, and Atlas Shrugged, we should also look at two collections of her essays titled, The Virtue of Selfishness (Signet 1964) and The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought (Signet 1988) for a fuller understanding. Rand’s ethics can be summarised by directly quoting from her essay, “The Objectivist Ethics”:

The objectivist ethics, proudly advocates and upholds rational selfishness –which means: the values required for man’s survival qua man — which means: the values required for human survival. The Objectivist ethics holds that human good does not require human sacrifices and cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of anyone to anyone yet holds that the rational interests of men do not clash—that there is no conflict of interests among men who do not desire the unearned, who do not make sacrifices nor accept them, who deal with one another as traders, getting value for value. The principle of trade is the only rational ethical principle for all human relationships, personal and social, private and public, spiritual and material. Each trader is a man who earns what he gets and does not give or take the undeserved. He deals with man, by means of a free, voluntary, unforced, uncoerced exchange—an exchange which benefits both parties by their own independent judgment.

Love, friendship, respect and admiration are the emotional response of one man to the virtues of another, the spiritual payment given in exchange for the personal, selfish pleasure which one man derives from the virtues of another man’s character.

To love is to value. Only a rationally selfish man, a man of self – esteem, is capable of love—because he is the only man capable of holding firm, consistent, uncompromising, unbetrayed values. It is only on the basis of rational selfishness that man can be fit to live together in a free, peaceful, prosperous, benevolent, rational society.

The only proper, moral purpose of a government is to protect man’s rights, which means to protect them from physical violence. Today the world is facing a choice: if civilization is to survive, it is the altruist morality that men have to reject.

Aristotle would clearly stand in opposition to the conception of trader or to the belief that a man should neither give nor get the undeserved. Aristotle explicitly states that if the friendship is between unequals and the help or benefaction is mostly one way, that is, if one party is always giving and the other always receiving, then the giver’s affection grows as he invests both materially and emotionally in the other. The recipient must obviously do nothing to damage that bond, but benefactors can even come to care about recipients, ignorant of the source of their good fortune. In the end, the recipient becomes a part of the giver, partially a product of his activity and life. By way of example, if I have gone to the expense of helping to put someone through college, their successes after college give me more joy than if I had done nothing to help them.

Turning now to Rand’s philosophy of love and friendship, I will quote from her essay, “The Ethics of Emergencies”:

Love and friendship are profoundly personal, selfish values: love is an expression and assertion of self-esteem, a response to one’s own values in the person of another. One gains a profoundly personal, selfish joy from the mere existence of the person one loves. It is one’s own personal, selfish happiness that one seeks, earns and derives from love. Concern for the welfare of those one loves is the rational part of one’s selfish interests.

The proper method of judging when or whether one should help another person is by reference to one’s own rational self-interest. If it is the man or woman one loves, that one can be willing to give one’s own life to save him or her—for the selfish reason that life without the loved person would be unbearable.

The same principle applies to relationships among friends. If one’s friend is in trouble, one should act to help them by what ever non-sacrificial means are appropriate. But this is a reward, which men have to earn by means of their virtues. If he finds them to be virtuous, he grants them personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues.

Rand again seems to stumble over her conception of affection and love because of a false dichotomy which she has drawn with utility. Her need for the constant reassessment of the mutuality of benefit from the relationship, robs it of its spontaneity and its humanity.

I thought it most appropriate to quote Rand’s essay’s directly, and in context, thereby obviating the possibility of being subject to the complaints voiced by a number of her proponents. Those sympathetic to her philosophy, such as Fred Seddon who wrote Ayn Rand, Objectivists, and the History of Philosophy, and Tara Smith complain about how severely misunderstood and misinterpreted her writings have been. Regardless of their level of sympathy for Rand, they agree that she works from the premise that life does not require sacrifice. She is an egoist, and she preaches an ethic of rational self-interest. For her, the primary virtue is rationality, the ultimate value is life and the primary beneficiary is oneself. Both Seddon and Smith argue that when she speaks of ‘life’ as the standard of value, she means a flourishing life, Smith even using the Aristotelian word eudaimonia.

Throughout her writings, notably those cited above, Rand uses verbiage not dissimilar to that of Aristotle. There are significant differences however, in addition to the tone of her voice, which in itself is more contentious and abrasive. Rand wishes to hold friendship entirely hostage to self-interest and egoism, reducing it to the relationship between traders. Aristotle clearly describes this type of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics as a friendship of utility, which is not at all that which he refers to as character friendship. Each reference to feelings or emotions and relationships of friendship or of love, for Rand is immediately couched in self-interest and selfishness. One can’t help but interpret her as viewing all those with whom one may potentially be in relationship as objects, and as clearly other. Aristotle has attempted to describe the connectedness in the highest relationships as extensions of ourselves. Our friend becomes another self whom we love, nurture, and protect as we do ourselves. It is only in this way, that Aristotle justifies selfishness; interpreting the growth in virtue and nobility that we attain while giving freely of ourselves to our friends as taking the best for ourselves. This becomes then, an act of selfishness, but only in the highest sense.

It is interesting to note that Smith’s book primarily entails a description of the seven virtues, which, in addition to the Master virtue of rationality, are viewed as the cornerstones of her ethics. It is almost as if the Nicomachean Ethics have been rewritten in the language of a 20th century Objectivist. Smith even addresses friendship in the appendix of the book, describing it in the Aristotelian terms, which Aristotle himself used, “By friendship, I mean a relationship between two people marked by mutual esteem and affection, concern for the other’s well-being, pleasure in the other’s company and comparatively intimate levels of communication.” She goes on to state “I am here concerned with what Aristotle considers the best and truest type of friendship, sometimes called friendship of character.”

Smith and Rand seem to have different interpretations of Aristotle, and Smith seems to soften and humanize the seemingly more base egoism of Rand. Smith herself does claim that “for a rational egoist, to value something is to recognize it as in one’s interest, as personally beneficial in some way. Loving another person, in so far as it reflects valuing, is a thoroughly self-interested proposition.” These two statements sound very much like the position of Ayn Rand. Much of Smith’s book interprets Aristotle in a light with which I am far more sympathetic than I am with Rand. I will conclude this discussion of Rand’s philosophy with a quote from Atlas Shrugged taken from a speech of John Galt in which the bulk of her theory is expounded:

The symbol of all relationships among men, the moral symbol of respect for human beings, is the trader. Just as he does not give his work except in trade for material values, so he does not give the values of his spirit — his love, his friendship his esteem — except in payment and in trade for human virtues, in payment for his own selfish pleasure…. (pg.949)

Do you ask what moral obligation that I owe to my fellow men? None — except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects, and to all of existence: rationality. I seek or desire nothing from them except such relations as they care to enter of their own voluntary choice. It is only with their mind that I can deal and only for my own self interest. I win by means of nothing but logic and I surrender to nothing but logic. (pg.948)

To love is to value. Love is the expression of one’s values, the greatest reward you can earn for the moral qualities you have achieved in your character and person, the emotional price paid by one man for the joy he receives from the virtues of another. (pg.959).

Ayn Rand said of Aristotle, “If there is a philosophical Atlas who carries the whole of Western civilization on his shoulders, it is Aristotle”. “Whatever intellectual progress man had achieved rests on his achievements”. (Review of J. H. Randall’s Aristotle, “The Objectivist Newsletter”, May 1963, 18) From these statements it is clear that he has had a profound influence upon her and her philosophy. She was also greatly influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, though doesn’t seem to wish to acknowledge this fact. While I won’t claim that all of her conceptions of self-interest are Nietzschean, I do think there is a significant Nietzschean influence, which may be why her arguments do not seem fully consistent with Aristotle. The ethics of ’Objectivism’ has been regarded as self interest by Rand and is commonly referred to as rational egoism. It is interesting that she claims to find support and justification for this ethical theory in the teachings of Aristotle, with no mention of Nietzsche, “The only philosophical debt I can acknowledge is to Aristotle. I most emphatically disagree with a great many parts of his philosophy — but his definition of the laws of logic, and of the means of human knowledge is so great an achievement that his errors are irrelevant by comparison.” She goes on to claim that “there is no future for the world except through a rebirth of the Aristotelian approach to philosophy.” Leonard Peikoff, a student and follower of Rand for thirty years writes, “Aristotle and Objectivism agree on fundamentals and as a result on the affirmation of the reality of existence, of the sovereignty of reason, and of the splendor of man.”

In Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Rand writes, “Let us note the radical difference between Aristotle’s view of concepts, and the objectivist view, particularly in regard to the issue of essential characteristics. It is Aristotle who first formulated the principles of correct definition. It is Aristotle who identified the fact that only concretes exist. But Aristotle held that definitions refer to metaphysical essences, which exist in concretes as a special element or formative power, and he held that the process of concept-formation depends on a kind of direct intuition by which man’s mind grasps these essences and forms concepts accordingly. Aristotle regarded essence as metaphysical; objectivism regards it as the epistemological.

Placing Aristotle contextually in the great Athenian city-state has been necessary for a fuller appreciation of, and more accurate interpretation of, his writings. So too with Rand, a few words of contextualization are in order. Born Alissa Rosenbloom, in 1905 in St. Petersburg, Russia, where the social horizons of human possibility were shrinking around her. Her father had become a chemist, despite quotas on Jews studying at the university. She witnessed the first shots of the Russian Revolution from her balcony in 1917, and her family was virtually overnight reduced to crushing poverty. While a student at Petrograd State University, she was expelled at the age of 17 as anti-proletariat. Managing to escape Russia, she arrived in the United States in 1926. Her first novel, We the Living (1936) portrays life in post-communist Russia. In the preface Rand points out the autobiographical similarities between her own youth and the life of her protagonist. The Fountainhead, her first major success, was published in 1943 and epitomized American individualism in the character of architect Howard Roark. This novel first presented Rand’s provocative morality of rational egoism, in which Roark eventually triumphs over every form of “spiritual collectivism.”

In comparison to Aristotle, Ayn Rand’s driving relentless egoistic selfishness seems harsh, competitive, and antisocial, probably arising from the psychological trauma she must have experienced in her youth. She does allow for friendship, and even for love, but gives it value only when one is able to clearly see the benefit to self of the relationship. When one’s conception of relationship is that of trader, and one is continually asking the question—what’s in this for me? — the opportunity to achieve the type of character friendship envisioned by Aristotle seems remote, if not impossible. Egoism and selfishness in the Aristotelian sense seems rather to be only discernible when one carefully dissects man’s activities and relationships, recognizing that his ultimate goal is his own enlightenment, virtuousness, and eudaimonia. The actual behaviors and the day-to-day living of such a man would not be observable as selfishly motivated nor egoistic. For Aristotle, self-love and selfishness motivate us only in so far as the achievement of virtuousness and nobility result in our own self-fulfillment and happiness or eudaimonia. Rand’s egoism is overriding, demanding, and in-your-face. It is all about self-interest, self-preservation, and self-promotion. That she is also able to view the ultimate human goal as fulfillment of self does not justify drawing any significant similarity with Aristotle. These are two very different views of the self , its motivation, and its relationship to others. I see little or no justification for Rand’s claim to Aristotelianism as the root of her rational egoism or of her objectivism.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

Chirps

  • How California's Jewish community won the battle against the state's education system: bit.ly/2ZZ8pcg | Fi… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 55 minutes ago
  • US diplomat openly calls for Christian nation-states, rails against Jews: politi.co/3sxwl30 | I guess the "op… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 1 hour ago
  • Korean boy-band yet again the subject of racism in Germany: bit.ly/2ZXA8dm | Radio host at Bayern3 Matthia… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 17 hours ago
  • Today, in 2001, Mullah Omar issued a decree that ordered the destruction of all non-Islamic sanctuaries in Afghanis… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 1 day ago
  • China gives US diplomats anal Wuhan virus test: bit.ly/2ZTic3W | *seriously, no comment* 😷😶...🤣 1 day ago
Follow @orsoraggiante

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 213 other followers

Follow through RSS

  • RSS - Posts

Categories

Archives

Recent Posts

  • The Mysterious Case of India’s Jews
  • Polarised Electorates
  • The Election Season
  • Does Narendra Modi Have A Foreign Policy?
  • India and the Bomb
  • Nationalism Restored
  • Jews and Israel, Nation and State
  • The Asian in Europe
  • Modern Political Shibboleths
  • The Death of Civilisation
  • Hope on the Korean Peninsula
  • Diminishing the Heathens
  • The Writing on the Minority Wall
  • Mischief in Gaza
  • Politics of Spite
  • Thoughts on Nationalism
  • Never Again (As Long As It Is Convenient)
  • Earning the Dragon’s Respect
  • Creating an Indian Lake
  • Does India Have An Israel Policy?
  • Reclaiming David’s Kingdom
  • Not a Mahatma, Just Mohandas
  • How To Read
  • India’s Jerusalem Misstep
  • A Rebirth of American Power

Management

  • Register
  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.com
Considerate la vostra semenza: fatti non foste a viver come bruti, ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

loading Cancel
Post was not sent - check your email addresses!
Email check failed, please try again
Sorry, your blog cannot share posts by email.
Privacy & Cookies: This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Cookie Policy
%d bloggers like this: