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The Elephant and the Eagle at Sweet 16

05 Sunday Jun 2016

Posted by in India, South Asia, United States

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It has been 16 years since George W Bush fundamentally altered the way the United States looked at India. As the old Cold War with the Soviet Union receded into memory and a new one with China appeared imminent, at least to the Bush White House, India emerged as an important potential ally in the new world order. India’s economy had recently started down the road to liberalisation too, making the South Asian country attractive to US industry as well as the government.

Despite frequent kerfuffles in the media – and there have been plenty – India-US relations have moved from strength to strength over the past 16 years. From the Strategic Quartet – high technology trade, space cooperation, nuclear energy, and missile defence – through the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership to the historic Indo-US nuclear deal and the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, Washington and Delhi appear poised on the brink of a century-defining partnership. If state visits are any indication of warmth, prime minister Narendra Modi is visiting the United States at this moment for the fourth time in just two years – something his predecessor required nine years to necessitate.

Defence ties are usually the most prominent measure of relations between nations for obvious reasons: not only do they declare how much skin each state has in the other’s security, but they are also a statement of how much states trust each other with their prized technology. No wonder, then, that India’s defence purchases from the United States have attracted so much attention. Between CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apaches, C-17 Globemasters, and C-130J Super Hercules, India’s aggregate defence acquisitions from the United States has crossed $13 billion. The loss of India’s Multirole Medium Range Combat Aircraft contract disappointed Washington but under Modi’s Make in India programme, US defence firms are considering moving the production of the F-16 and F-18 to India.

The United States has moved beyond the role of being a mere supplier of weapons to India: officials have been engaged in talks that, if successful, would result in the co-production of systems. Under the DTTI, the next generation of Raven unmanned aerial vehicle will be jointly developed and produced. Other projects include intelligence gathering and reconnaissance pods for the C-130J, mobile electric hybrid power sources, helmet-mounted digital displays for aircraft and helicopter pilots, high energy lasers, and chemical and biological warfare protection gear for soldiers.

Washington has also been keen to assist India with core defence technologies such as the development of jet engines and the catapult launching system on board US aircraft carriers. India’s Kaveri programme has been a miserable failure and with Delhi’s increasing focus on maritime security, the US offer could provide a healthy boost to Indian capabilities.

India’s change of mind on what the Pentagon calls the foundational treaties – LSA, BECA, and CISMOA – has been a welcome surprise. These agreements formalise the sharing of logistical facilities and align communication protocols between the US military and their partners, greatly enhancing the range and capabilities of both forces in joint humanitarian or security missions. Although the agreements will remain unsigned during Modi’s visit this June, it is reported that they are close to conclusion.

The United States’ support for Indian admission to the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and technology export control groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Group gives some weight to Philip Zelikow’s statement in 2005 that the United States intends to help India become a major power.

Although both India and the United States have come a long way in defence cooperation, one cannot shake the feeling that both sides are still hedging from a complete commitment. India has lost no opportunity to stress that the signing of the foundational agreements with the United States will in no way erode its sovereignty, that it is happy to conduct numerous maritime joint exercises but will not be persuaded to conduct joint patrols, and that India sees itself as a friend and partner of the United States but not quite an ally. On the American side, senators questioned the wisdom of a bill that proposed elevating India to the status of a NATO ally in all but name given that the South Asian country did not see itself in that role. The US bill would have amended the Arms Export Control Act and made defence transfers to India quicker and smoother.

One hurdle in closer ties is Pakistan: India is displeased with the continued sale of US weapons to the Islamic republic despite ample evidence pointing to terrorist ties and an unhelpful disposition towards US goals in South and Central Asia. However, the dynamics of these ties have remained relatively unchanged since the 1950s: Pakistan provides services in the region that the United States cannot get elsewhere in return for White House forbearance on matters Islamabad sees as vital to its interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was basing privileges for US reconnaissance aircraft conducting missions over China and the Soviet Union; in the 1970s, Islamabad served as the channel to Beijing and a rapprochement with China; in the 1980s, it was the shipment of arms to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. In the 2010s, Islamabad has become the conduit to the Taliban, with whom Washington hopes to negotiate a “decent interval.” Even now, though the United States has been urging India to play a greater role in Afghanistan, Delhi has declined, choosing to involve itself more in important but not critical facets of Afghanistan’s development.

India’s reluctance to play a more significant role in its own interests may frustrate observers but this has, understandably, in large part to do with the country’s capabilities. Couched in the rhetoric of multipolarity and morality, India’s inaction misleads the casual observer. The ignored pachyderm in the room is that Delhi lacks the financial and industrial wherewithal to flex its military muscle in Central Asia or the South China Sea, and any attempt to persuade it to do so will fail. The remedy to this is economic growth, technological development, and strategic coalitions.

On the surface of it, economic relations seem to have grown substantially between India and the United States. Both countries are investing more in each other’s economies and trade between the two stands hovers around $70 billion. More and more US companies are setting up shop in India as Indian companies are expanding their business beyond the Atlantic. Washington is the lead partner for developing Allahabad, Ajmer, and Vishakapatnam as smart cities. There is still plenty of room to grow and Modi has ambitiously suggested aiming for $500 billion in trade in a few years. However, there are several issues that will plague relations. The first is subsidies: Washington recently won a case against India at the World Trade Organisation that prohibited the Indian government from giving preferential treatment to domestic solar panel manufacturers. US firms are also pushing Washington to act against subsidies the Indian Space Research Organisation gets from the government for its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle programme.

A second hurdle is intellectual property. In several sectors, India has brought its laws into alignment with US and international norms yet there remain significant differences in philosophy. Pharmaceuticals is one such field, where Indian courts have been hostile to the US practice of evergreening patents, instead seeing a social dimension to the industry. India has also had disagreements with the United States on its agricultural subsidies and food security programme.

A sector-specific yet politically potent point of friction is nuclear energy. Although the Indo-US nuclear deal was announced in 2005 and came into force in 2008, there has been little movement on that front since. India’s nuclear liability laws were found to be at odds with international norms and it was only in 2015 when US president Barack Obama visited India during the Republic Day celebrations that some headway was made in easing the logjam. The Indian side came up with a convoluted mechanism to bypass its own law without losing face and satisfied Washington but private companies are still uncomfortable with the provisions. As a result, a number of nuclear energy projects have stalled across the country; GE has flatly refused to participate in the Indian nuclear energy market as long as the present law stands and Westinghouse has delayed the submission of its project proposals. The sins committed by the BJP while in Opposition have been visited upon the BJP while in power.

A probable future cause for concern is the US creation of large trading spheres via the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. India is not party to either of these blocs and its efforts to forge free trade agreements with important partners such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has proceeded at a snail’s pace. There is a danger that the implementation of the TPP and TPIP will take trade away from Indian shores to within the bloc, dampening much-needed Indian economic growth.

Many of these frictions arise from the fact that the US and Indian economies are at different points: certain Indian policies may not optimize on economic efficiency but are geared towards lifting more of its population out of poverty or establishing its own industries firmly in the international arena. Delhi and Washington have much work to do to negotiate through the clashing policies that will certainly arise in the future and early recognition and amelioration will insulate relations from harsh market realities.

After 16 years, India-US relations are on a firm footing. Much has been accomplished though a lot more remains to be done. It was feared that the warmth between the two would dissipate after the exit of Bush and the election of Obama but despite the lull due to an international economic slowdown and a paralysed UPA government, ties have started to blossom again in the past two years since Modi took office. India enjoys bipartisan support in the US and Washington a hesitant embrace in Delhi. Can relations be derailed? There will always be swings and roundabouts but it seems to have dawned on both countries that the geopolitics of this century are best navigated as friends than estranged democracies.

This post appeared on FirstPost on June 06, 2016.

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This is an Indian Democracy, Kaul*!

20 Saturday Feb 2016

Posted by in India, Opinion and Response, South Asia

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Every few months, India gets into a tizzy about freedom of expression. The recent drama on Jawaharlal Nehru University’s campus, the pulping of Wendy Doniger’s book on Hinduism, the mob violence at Dadri, the smearing of black paint on Sudheendra Kulkarni, a writer, the antics of fringe groups like the Sri Ram Sene, and other events have occupied the headlines and television studio airtime in their turn. Less honoured have been the riots in Malda, the shuttering of Bombay’s Avadhnama, the censorship of Vishwaroopam, and a long list of other incidents.

As anyone following the freedom of expression debate in India knows by now, Article 19(2) of the Indian constitution introduces seven criteria which may limit expression. One factor that complicates the debate further is that the implementation of these laws have not been uniform over the years – an MF Hussain is met with sympathy while a reprint of the Danish Jyllandsposten cartoons is met with riots and media outcry. Despite this hypocrisy, a precious few free speech advocates are of the opinion that all restrictions should be done away with and India should adopt a Brandenburg v. Ohio standard of free expression, referring, of course, to the landmark 1969 case in the United States Supreme Court.

In principle, this sounds excellent. In practice, however, India is a far more complicated beast to govern. The evolution of the Brandenburg benchmark occurred over centuries of not just juridical but also political and social evolution. The values enshrined in that decision not only reflected those held by the American people but also were capable of being enforced by the American state. The United States was aided in part also by circumstance: they had the luxury of starting tabula rasa, without any historical baggage, the distance and strict immigration laws ensured a certain homogeneity pace the melting point myth, and the participatory nature of their democracy was allowed to increase only gradually.

India’s leaders at independence, however, chose to rush headlong into democracy with universal adult suffrage. Its leaders at the founding – at least those who held sway – preferred abstract theories to the exhausting reality of the new republic. The price of this decision would be borne by future generations of Indians every day of their lives. This is not to say that India should abandon democracy – it is too late for that now. Once the masses have tasted power, they are loathe to give it back. However, it does mean that Indians approach the implementation of other ideals concomitant with democracy with more caution as the country inches forward towards prosperity, liberty, security, and stability.

But first, what is democracy? Etymologically and historically, it has come to mean a system of government in which rulers are chosen by the people for fixed intervals. There is no commitment to Liberalism, even implicitly, in such a system. The checks and balances that have evolved in most democracies to protect minorities from the excesses of the majority came from cultural values over time and were institutionalised via other non-electoral avenues. Universal suffrage has had no role in the creation of a system of civil liberties. India’s leaders did not understand that a liberal democracy – and, by implication, free speech – cannot take root in a society that has not first become free and liberal-minded; only those who have drawn poorly from history can suppose otherwise.

A stable liberal democracy presupposes a people assured of their identity as a society as well as individuals within that society. People divided by opinions on public policy may equally find themselves in the majority or minority but are not so  in perpetuity. Yet those who see divisions based on ethnic or religious markers do not experience similar fluctuations. This dynamic explains the formation of democratically-minded nation-states along rather singular ethnic, religious, and even linguistic lines.

Liberty and MisesIndia’s continued governance by Anglicised elites after independence brought to power a group who had no sense of their own history and hence their own strengths and limitations. Adding a democracy based on universal suffrage to the mix when India’s national identity was inchoate at best, as the politics surrounding Partition amply demonstrated, was a recipe for disaster. This was compounded by separate law codes and reservations in education and employment for certain communities. Over time, aided by changing demographics, demands from these special communities have become more economic and political in their nature. No longer were the provisions seen as catalysts towards equality but as permanent and rightful dispensations. It should be no surprise, then, that the natural core majority resents this situation because it militates against their sense of fairness.

The weakness of Indian liberal democracy, then, stems from the failure of the nation-building project that has left large sections of society uncertain about their identities and rights. As Karl Marx had argued that socialism would develop as the high point of industrialisation and capitalism, pluralism and multicultural stability can arise only as the high point of core majority stability. It is folly to assume that the demonisation of the majority is the way to achieve this.

Another weakness of Indian liberal democracy comes from the failure of its institutions. For decades after independence, they were ravaged by the Congress for political reasons and have lost the trust of the citizens. Traditionally, liberalism has been closely related to democracy because both aimed at restricting the power of the absolute state. This went hand in hand with the increasing rule of law and social trust. Seen closely, however, modern democracy increased only political liberty but not social liberty. This, it can be argued, is the contribution of a robust judiciary that took both the constitution and contemporary community standards into account. Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Limited, Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner, A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Eweida v British Airways plc, Roe v Wade, Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München, and other cases have defined the scope of civil liberties and pushed against more restrictive executive and legislative practices. In contrast, Indian courts have generally served the narrow political interests of the governing elite and done little to gradually expand civil liberties in India. To be fair to the judiciary, other factors prohibited such a role too.

Democracy and FDRWhy was the spread of universal suffrage so slow? There were two reasons: one was that the overwhelming majority was illiterate, ignorant, and incapable of forming an informed opinion on state matters. The second was the belief that only those with property were sufficiently vested in the community to truly consider its best interests. The expansion of democratic rights, therefore, coincided with the expansion of secondary education. With the changing nature of the economy, intellectual contribution and conscription joined property as criteria by which investment in the nation-state was measured. India’s early governments deserve some blame for failing to raise functional literacy rates quickly but it is also true that the education of hundreds of millions of people was going to take some time. Despite lacking the prerequisites for a democracy, let alone a liberal democracy, Indian leaders of the day rushed headlong into a bold yet ultimately ill-timed social experiment. Had successive governments governed wisely and without favouritism between various social groups, the impact on the country’s liberal evolution might yet have been mitigated.

In the age of globalisation, European multiculturalism has come under threat; unable to assimilate newcomers into the European ideal, the Union is facing a crisis as the continent’s core majority opposes the influx of refugees and even increased economic aid to the financially weaker members of the Union at the expense of the more prosperous member states. This is a tension India has lived with since its inception and watching the reaction of a mature polity such as Europe over the past few years only dampens hope in the Nehruvian idea of India even further.

[DIVERSION] The internet has also produced pressures nation-states were not designed to handle. With the rise of multinational activism and communications, ever more people are participating in political processes without necessarily any stakes in local communities. Democracy presumes civic participation in its institutions; that is the price of membership for receiving the economic and social goods of the state. Instead, contemporary democracy has lost all tethering to any sense of obligation or duty and is merely a one-way relationship for the redistribution of wealth and favours. In many cases, these disproportionately benefit those who have made no contribution to the prosperity of the whole.

This might also be an argument for the return to a certain elitism in democracy as the number and complexity of issues before a government increase dramatically in the 21st century, allowing those with greater knowledge, experience, and skin in the game to contribute more meaningfully to national and global discussions. [/DIVERSION]

Above all, governance must be about stability and order. Activists have the luxury of preaching a one-point agenda, however noble, but the state machinery must consider the overall picture before implementing policy. Let us, for example, consider the ramifications of implementing a Brandenburg standard free speech law overnight in India: the very next cartoon about Islam’s prophet will give rise to angry mobs visiting havoc upon cities and towns. If the plight of the Rohingyas in Burma could inspire the Azad Maidan riots in Bombay in 2012 for no fault of the Indian state, there is no reason to expect more sanity from the community now.

The activist argument would be to crack down on the rioters and arrest and prosecute those responsible for violence. However, when India is over 500,000 policemen short and over 90 per cent of the police force works over eight hours a day, law and order is bound to suffer. Furthermore, many of these policemen may stand by in sympathy. The training and sufficient arming of the force is also necessary. While the government works to improve the police force, not to mention the jails and judiciary, countless crores  and lives would have been lost in damages. Will free speech activists compensate for the losses incurred?

All systems have prerequisites and boundary conditions. The digital age already poses sufficient challenges to nation-states that blind adherence to shibboleths need not compound. Indians have never discussed whether they prefer a Singaporean or even Japanese style democracy to a Western democracy and perhaps that should be first on the agenda before a model is copy-pasted from elsewhere. Either way, India would still need to substantially upgrade its state capacity and reforms would have to keep those limitations in mind. India certainly has problems with its democracy as well as its free speech provisions – unequal application, state capacity, unprepared citizenry – but to demand a swift imposition of a standard radically alien to the cultural context is simply myopic and an invitation to unrest.

*: The title of this post is a reference to Yes, Prime Minister, Series 2, Episode 5: Power to the People, in which Sir Humphrey Appleby chastises Bernard Woolley for suggesting that every person has a right to power in a democracy. SK Kaul is the prime minister’s private secretary in Ji, Mantriji, a Hindi re-make of the BBC original.

This post appeared on FirstPost on February 22, 2016.

Iran’s Nuclear Deal

14 Tuesday Jul 2015

Posted by in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

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Historically, negotiations have rarely resulted in the complete capitulation of one side to the other side’s demands. Even military force, for that matter, has provided only uncertain results – Carthage paid off the war indemnity levied by Rome after the Second Punic War ahead of schedule but Berlin proved a far more tightfisted customer after World War I. The Japanese, even after losing two cities to nuclear bombing, refused to surrender unconditionally to the United States in World War II. With that background in mind, the nuclear deal agreed upon by Iran and the E3+3 (Britain, France, Germany + United States, Russia, China) is the praiseworthy outcome of 23 months of hard bargaining between the two sides. Politics demands playing to the home crowd and that each side emphasise the gains it made in the talks but the agreement is remarkably fair and a model for future non-proliferation risk scenarios.

Iran nuclear mapThe nuclear deal, however, thankfully depends upon the exact terms and conditions laid out in the agreement and not the rhetorical interpretation of either side. To that end, the terms are a logical extension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed upon in July this year. The final JCPOA, running to 159 pages, consists of the terms and conditions between Iran and the E3+3 as well as a detailed timeline of implementation and dispute arbitration mechanisms. The deal achieves balance also in that it is progressively implemented in a staggered manner, allowing each side to gain confidence in the other’s intentions. The agreement reflects Iran’s practical needs and research ambitions aside the international community’s desire for circumscription, transparency, and verification. A Joint Commission (JC) reporting to the United Nations Security Council and comprised of a representative from each of the negotiating parties as well as one from the European Union, will oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal and serve as a forum for dispute arbitration.

As US President Barack Obama said in his speech, the JCPOA is not based on trust but on verification. As such, it has two aims: to extend Iran’s breakout time – the time required for Iran to acquire a nuclear device after it expels international observers from its facilities – as much as possible and give the international community time to respond, and to make sneakout – a clandestine parallel programme designed to provide Iran with a nuclear weapon – virtually impossible. Towards this end, Iran will accept limitations on its uranium enrichment and research & development for the first eight years after which it will be gradually allowed to begin enrichment activities and research. Tehran is restricted to using its first generation centrifuges, the IR-1, for 10 years; enrichment will not be allowed beyond 3.67 per cent and all such activity will be restricted to just one facility – Natanz – for 15 years, where 5060 IR-1s will be installed and the rest kept in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring. Failed or damaged centrifuge machines may be replaced from storage.

However, Iran is allowed to conduct research in future generations of centrifuges, the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8, at a small scale in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium and isotope separation will be limited. Work on IR-4 is restricted to a cascade of 10 machines and one machine for the IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8. After 8.5 years, the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades may be expanded to 30 machines. The manufacture of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors will be allowed then in consultation with the JC. At no point is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium in any form to exceed 300 kilogrammes. Any excess quantities must be sold on the international market or downblended to natural uranium level. These combined restriction on stockpile, enrichment, and rate of production serve as technical barriers to an Iranian breakout bomb.

Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre where an additional 1044 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed in six cascades. Two of these will be used for isotope production for medical, industrial, and research purposes and the other four will remain idle. Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned to use lightly enriched uranium (LEU), minimise plutonium production, and operate at 7 MW instead of the 40 MW it was originally designed for. No more heavy water reactors will be constructed in the country for 15 years and surplus heavy water will be exported.

What is a remarkable achievement for the West is that Tehran has agreed to not only ship out all spent fuel from Arak but also from all of its other research and power reactors. Furthermore, Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing, construct a facility capable of reprocessing, or conduct any research in the area except for isotope production. Iran has also acquiesced to not acquiring fissile metals or conduct research on their machining, casting, and metallurgy for 15 years. This effectively shuts down a second, plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. What may be of concern to Iran, however, is that this limits its options in any future interest in fast reactors.

Javad ZarifThe JCPOA also makes it incumbent upon Iran to apply the Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement within a timeframe. Another remarkable feature of the JCPOA is that Iran will resolve all its issues regarding past and present activities with the IAEA within the next six months. These, along with other stipulations agreed upon by both parties, will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the various non-proliferation measures. The IAEA will have a long-term presence in Iran, monitor its uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years, maintain surveillance on enrichment machinery such as bellows and centrifuge rotors for 20 years, and install monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities that will provide a measure of transparency for 15 years. This surveillance will make an Iranian dash for the bomb more difficult even as its more advanced centrifuges start to come online after 10 years.

The nuclear agreement draws out a timeline stretching at least ten years for complete sanctions relief. Staggered between Finalisation Day (conclusion of negotiations), Adoption Day (endorsement of the JCPOA by the UNSC), Implementation Day (IAEA verification of Iranian implementation of nuclear-related measures), Transition Day (eight years from Adoption Day when the IAEA should have reached a Broader Conclusion regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions and Iran seeks ratification of the AP), and Termination Day (ten years from Adoption Day when the UNSC closes its Iran file based upon interim progress), nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States will be repealed contingent upon Iran meeting its end of the bargain.

During the implementation of the JCPOA, ff there is any suspicion of Iran possessing illicit nuclear material, a complaint may be filed with the JC. Iran must respond quickly and if its answer is not satisfactory, an on-site visit by the IAEA can be ordered. However, Iran has the option of suggesting other methods by which its compliance can be reassured. This entire exchange must occur within 14 days, allowing the monitoring agency timely access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the short timeframe in which this process is to occur, it gives little time for Iran to conceal evidence of potential wrongdoing and is as close to anytime access as can be reasonably expected of Iran.

Until the last few days, the E3+3 were divided amongst themselves on the automatic reapplication of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. Russia and China viewed automatic sanctions as a violation of their veto rights in the UNSC while the United States worried that it may not be possible to hold the international community and the permanent members of the UNSC together on the subject. This difficulty has been ingeniously resolved in the final agreement. Once a complaint has been filed, the JC has 35 days to resolve the matter satisfactorily. If it fails to do so, the matter may be brought up before the UNSC again. To prevent sanctions from returning, the Security Council would have to pass a resolution declaring that sanctions should not be reapplied. If this resolution does not pass within 30 days, sanctions snap back on Iran. Given the negative wording of the resolution, a veto would not be able to block reapplication of sanctions within 65 days of the initial notification.

In exchange for Iran returning to a nuclear stature it committed to in the NPT, the E3+3 will cooperate with Iran in matters of civil nuclear technology and ensure that the country meets international standards in nuclear safety and security. Iran will also receive assistance in attaining global guidelines in the export of nuclear materials. Initially, these cooperative ventures are meant to hasten Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s terms but they also signal Iran’s return to good standing that makes it eligible for such cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal tried to add missile proliferation and even human rights concerns to the agenda but that would have in all likelihood scuttled the deal. Strictly speaking, neither of those issues bear a strong relationship to Iran’s nuclear programme; Iran’s ballistic missile programme has incurred sanctions of its own apart from the nuclear restrictions. To critics, it is unsatisfying that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions altogether; it is also unrealistic.

Iran nuclear deal leadersWhatever else the JCPOA may be, it is not a victory for non-proliferation efforts. Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva were merely different battlegrounds for the geopolitical struggle between Iran and the United States. Washington has tried to interpret the NPT to its convenience and deny Iran its enrichment rights under the treaty but this is a farcical attempt. Besides the NPT being fundamentally unequal, even a quick glance at the debates in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that led to the NPT would reveal that non-proliferation was only a tangential goal. Furthermore, when convenient, Washington has not found it difficult to look the other way when its allies are busy acquiring nuclear arsenals. Yet a nuclear Iran threatens Western interests and also their security as Tehran’s missiles reach farther and farther.

The successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean that the West has a new ally in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington and other Western capitals will be busy trying to reassure their friends in the region that the deal is not an indication of a new geopolitical alignment or in any way threatening to them. The fear in Arab capitals will be that an Iran free from crippling sanctions is bound to alter the balance of power between itself and its Arab neighbours. Already, events in Iraq have seen Tehran’s influence grow and its grip on Syria does not seem to be loosening despite four years of civil war. The United States and the European Union will continue to struggle against Iranian ambitions in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan. While Washington still remembers the Tehran Embassy hostage crisis vividly, Iran has yet to come to terms with the US-sponsored coup in 1953, the tacit US approval of two nuclear programmes in Israel and Pakistan, and the arming of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons in the 1980s which he used with impunity on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War.

Despite these recriminations, both sides were able to reach an amicable settlement that prevented yet another war in the Middle East. If implemented according to plan, the JCPOA is a very good deal for both sides. Iran has given up one path to nuclear weapons, its breakout time has been extended to at least a year, and continuous IAEA presence has made sneakout very difficult. For all its alleged flaws, it would be no surprise if the negotiators of the JCPOA were to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. As for the nuclear apartheid codified in the NPT, Iran signed and ratified the treaty – perhaps next time, it should think before making a commitment of such gravity. The sanctions and the limitations on its nuclear programme are the price Tehran now has to pay.

This post first appeared on Swarajya on July 15, 2015.