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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Fordow

Iran’s Nuclear Deal

14 Tue Jul 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

≈ Comments Off on Iran’s Nuclear Deal

Tags

Additional Protocol, AP, Arak, E3+3, enrichment, EU, European Union, Fordow, heavy water, IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Natanz, nuclear, plutonium, reprocessing, United Nations Security Council, United States, UNSC, uranium

Historically, negotiations have rarely resulted in the complete capitulation of one side to the other side’s demands. Even military force, for that matter, has provided only uncertain results – Carthage paid off the war indemnity levied by Rome after the Second Punic War ahead of schedule but Berlin proved a far more tightfisted customer after World War I. The Japanese, even after losing two cities to nuclear bombing, refused to surrender unconditionally to the United States in World War II. With that background in mind, the nuclear deal agreed upon by Iran and the E3+3 (Britain, France, Germany + United States, Russia, China) is the praiseworthy outcome of 23 months of hard bargaining between the two sides. Politics demands playing to the home crowd and that each side emphasise the gains it made in the talks but the agreement is remarkably fair and a model for future non-proliferation risk scenarios.

Iran nuclear mapThe nuclear deal, however, thankfully depends upon the exact terms and conditions laid out in the agreement and not the rhetorical interpretation of either side. To that end, the terms are a logical extension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed upon in July this year. The final JCPOA, running to 159 pages, consists of the terms and conditions between Iran and the E3+3 as well as a detailed timeline of implementation and dispute arbitration mechanisms. The deal achieves balance also in that it is progressively implemented in a staggered manner, allowing each side to gain confidence in the other’s intentions. The agreement reflects Iran’s practical needs and research ambitions aside the international community’s desire for circumscription, transparency, and verification. A Joint Commission (JC) reporting to the United Nations Security Council and comprised of a representative from each of the negotiating parties as well as one from the European Union, will oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal and serve as a forum for dispute arbitration.

As US President Barack Obama said in his speech, the JCPOA is not based on trust but on verification. As such, it has two aims: to extend Iran’s breakout time – the time required for Iran to acquire a nuclear device after it expels international observers from its facilities – as much as possible and give the international community time to respond, and to make sneakout – a clandestine parallel programme designed to provide Iran with a nuclear weapon – virtually impossible. Towards this end, Iran will accept limitations on its uranium enrichment and research & development for the first eight years after which it will be gradually allowed to begin enrichment activities and research. Tehran is restricted to using its first generation centrifuges, the IR-1, for 10 years; enrichment will not be allowed beyond 3.67 per cent and all such activity will be restricted to just one facility – Natanz – for 15 years, where 5060 IR-1s will be installed and the rest kept in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring. Failed or damaged centrifuge machines may be replaced from storage.

However, Iran is allowed to conduct research in future generations of centrifuges, the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8, at a small scale in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium and isotope separation will be limited. Work on IR-4 is restricted to a cascade of 10 machines and one machine for the IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8. After 8.5 years, the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades may be expanded to 30 machines. The manufacture of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors will be allowed then in consultation with the JC. At no point is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium in any form to exceed 300 kilogrammes. Any excess quantities must be sold on the international market or downblended to natural uranium level. These combined restriction on stockpile, enrichment, and rate of production serve as technical barriers to an Iranian breakout bomb.

Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre where an additional 1044 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed in six cascades. Two of these will be used for isotope production for medical, industrial, and research purposes and the other four will remain idle. Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned to use lightly enriched uranium (LEU), minimise plutonium production, and operate at 7 MW instead of the 40 MW it was originally designed for. No more heavy water reactors will be constructed in the country for 15 years and surplus heavy water will be exported.

What is a remarkable achievement for the West is that Tehran has agreed to not only ship out all spent fuel from Arak but also from all of its other research and power reactors. Furthermore, Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing, construct a facility capable of reprocessing, or conduct any research in the area except for isotope production. Iran has also acquiesced to not acquiring fissile metals or conduct research on their machining, casting, and metallurgy for 15 years. This effectively shuts down a second, plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. What may be of concern to Iran, however, is that this limits its options in any future interest in fast reactors.

Javad ZarifThe JCPOA also makes it incumbent upon Iran to apply the Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement within a timeframe. Another remarkable feature of the JCPOA is that Iran will resolve all its issues regarding past and present activities with the IAEA within the next six months. These, along with other stipulations agreed upon by both parties, will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the various non-proliferation measures. The IAEA will have a long-term presence in Iran, monitor its uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years, maintain surveillance on enrichment machinery such as bellows and centrifuge rotors for 20 years, and install monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities that will provide a measure of transparency for 15 years. This surveillance will make an Iranian dash for the bomb more difficult even as its more advanced centrifuges start to come online after 10 years.

The nuclear agreement draws out a timeline stretching at least ten years for complete sanctions relief. Staggered between Finalisation Day (conclusion of negotiations), Adoption Day (endorsement of the JCPOA by the UNSC), Implementation Day (IAEA verification of Iranian implementation of nuclear-related measures), Transition Day (eight years from Adoption Day when the IAEA should have reached a Broader Conclusion regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions and Iran seeks ratification of the AP), and Termination Day (ten years from Adoption Day when the UNSC closes its Iran file based upon interim progress), nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States will be repealed contingent upon Iran meeting its end of the bargain.

During the implementation of the JCPOA, ff there is any suspicion of Iran possessing illicit nuclear material, a complaint may be filed with the JC. Iran must respond quickly and if its answer is not satisfactory, an on-site visit by the IAEA can be ordered. However, Iran has the option of suggesting other methods by which its compliance can be reassured. This entire exchange must occur within 14 days, allowing the monitoring agency timely access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the short timeframe in which this process is to occur, it gives little time for Iran to conceal evidence of potential wrongdoing and is as close to anytime access as can be reasonably expected of Iran.

Until the last few days, the E3+3 were divided amongst themselves on the automatic reapplication of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. Russia and China viewed automatic sanctions as a violation of their veto rights in the UNSC while the United States worried that it may not be possible to hold the international community and the permanent members of the UNSC together on the subject. This difficulty has been ingeniously resolved in the final agreement. Once a complaint has been filed, the JC has 35 days to resolve the matter satisfactorily. If it fails to do so, the matter may be brought up before the UNSC again. To prevent sanctions from returning, the Security Council would have to pass a resolution declaring that sanctions should not be reapplied. If this resolution does not pass within 30 days, sanctions snap back on Iran. Given the negative wording of the resolution, a veto would not be able to block reapplication of sanctions within 65 days of the initial notification.

In exchange for Iran returning to a nuclear stature it committed to in the NPT, the E3+3 will cooperate with Iran in matters of civil nuclear technology and ensure that the country meets international standards in nuclear safety and security. Iran will also receive assistance in attaining global guidelines in the export of nuclear materials. Initially, these cooperative ventures are meant to hasten Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s terms but they also signal Iran’s return to good standing that makes it eligible for such cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal tried to add missile proliferation and even human rights concerns to the agenda but that would have in all likelihood scuttled the deal. Strictly speaking, neither of those issues bear a strong relationship to Iran’s nuclear programme; Iran’s ballistic missile programme has incurred sanctions of its own apart from the nuclear restrictions. To critics, it is unsatisfying that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions altogether; it is also unrealistic.

Iran nuclear deal leadersWhatever else the JCPOA may be, it is not a victory for non-proliferation efforts. Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva were merely different battlegrounds for the geopolitical struggle between Iran and the United States. Washington has tried to interpret the NPT to its convenience and deny Iran its enrichment rights under the treaty but this is a farcical attempt. Besides the NPT being fundamentally unequal, even a quick glance at the debates in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that led to the NPT would reveal that non-proliferation was only a tangential goal. Furthermore, when convenient, Washington has not found it difficult to look the other way when its allies are busy acquiring nuclear arsenals. Yet a nuclear Iran threatens Western interests and also their security as Tehran’s missiles reach farther and farther.

The successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean that the West has a new ally in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington and other Western capitals will be busy trying to reassure their friends in the region that the deal is not an indication of a new geopolitical alignment or in any way threatening to them. The fear in Arab capitals will be that an Iran free from crippling sanctions is bound to alter the balance of power between itself and its Arab neighbours. Already, events in Iraq have seen Tehran’s influence grow and its grip on Syria does not seem to be loosening despite four years of civil war. The United States and the European Union will continue to struggle against Iranian ambitions in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan. While Washington still remembers the Tehran Embassy hostage crisis vividly, Iran has yet to come to terms with the US-sponsored coup in 1953, the tacit US approval of two nuclear programmes in Israel and Pakistan, and the arming of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons in the 1980s which he used with impunity on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War.

Despite these recriminations, both sides were able to reach an amicable settlement that prevented yet another war in the Middle East. If implemented according to plan, the JCPOA is a very good deal for both sides. Iran has given up one path to nuclear weapons, its breakout time has been extended to at least a year, and continuous IAEA presence has made sneakout very difficult. For all its alleged flaws, it would be no surprise if the negotiators of the JCPOA were to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. As for the nuclear apartheid codified in the NPT, Iran signed and ratified the treaty – perhaps next time, it should think before making a commitment of such gravity. The sanctions and the limitations on its nuclear programme are the price Tehran now has to pay.


This post first appeared on Swarajya on July 15, 2015.

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Peace In Our Times?

24 Sun Nov 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

123 Agreement, AEOI, Arak, Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Britain, Bushehr, China, enrichment, Fordow, France, Geneva, Germany, Iran, Natanz, non-proliferation, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, nuclear, P5+1, Parchin, plutonium, reprocessing, Resolution 1696, Resolution 1737, Russia, Tehran Research Reactor, TRR, United Nations Security Council, United States, UNSC, uranium

Sunday morning brought with it news that a major breakthrough had been achieved in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – United States, France, Russia, Britain, China – and Germany, Iran’s key trading partner), and that an interim agreement had been reached. Temporarily, at least, the war drums had been silenced.

The deal has its critics on both sides of the fence – Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, did not make matters easy with his outbursts (though he has hailed the deal after the fact), nor do Iran hawks in the US Congress with talk of additional sanctions. In that sense, many suspect that it will be harder for US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to sell the deal to the more conservative elements in their own countries than to each other. Saudi and Israeli opposition to the deal as an outline emerged after last week’s talks in Geneva has also been consistent and vocal. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian announcement of the interim agreement came together with the usual symbolic defiance – the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran declared its plans to construct two more power reactors at Bushehr.

The interim deal is, all things considered, a fair one; Iran receives some sanctions relief and the P5+1 are assured that Iran does not continue to inch closer towards nuclear weaponisation. The deal is set to expire after six months, giving time for negotiators to hammer out the terms and conditions for the next phase of a complete resolution to the Iranian nuclear question.

Towards the P5+1’s non-proliferation goals, the deal promises to:

  • halt enrichment at 5% and dilute all higher-enriched material to below that level
  • not add or upgrade centrifuges and limit production to repairs only
  • not increase stockpile of 3.5% enriched uranium
  • not commission or fuel the Arak heavy water reactor
  • halt fuel assembly for Arak and not install additional components to the reactor
  • not transfer heavy water or fuel to reactor site
  • not construct a reprocessing plant

In effect, these measures shut down Iran’s potential plutonium path to a nuclear weapon as well as severely curtail its uranium enrichment. Even if talks were to fall apart in a few months, Iran’s breakout time will have been substantially increased.

Towards the P5+1’s verification goals, the deal promises to:

  • provide the IAEA access to centrifuge and rotor assembly and storage facilities
  • provide the IAEA access to uranium mines and mills
  • provide the IAEA with Arak reactor designs
  • install surveillance cameras at Natanz and Fordow and provide daily access
  • provide frequent access to the Arak reactor

The increased transparency of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, not to mention centrifuges, mines, mills, and storage facilities, make it very difficult for Iran to develop nuclear weapons on the sly. If these conditions are implemented and made permanent, Iran would effectively need an entire clandestine, parallel nuclear programme to bypass international scrutiny – the possibility of which is next to nil.

In return for the non-proliferation and verification Iran has agreed to, the country will be granted temporary, limited, relief totalling approximately $7 billion in the form of:

  • no new sanctions during the period of the deal
  • suspension of sanctions on gold, precious metals, petrochemicals, and auto sector to the tune of $1.5 billion
  • payment in installments, totalling $4.2 billion, from the sale of Iranian oil at present levels
  • unfreezing of $400 million for Iranian government tuition assistance to its international students
  • safety-related repairs of Iranian airlines

It is important to note that these measures will remain active for only a fixed period – after that, unless extended, Iran will again come under sanctions. This gives P5+1 negotiators time to discuss the complex issues involved with their Iranian counterparts without being accused at home of allowing Iran to creep up to the bomb. It also shows Iranian negotiators that P5+1 demands to halt the Iranian nuclear programme during talks is not a backdoor to shutting down the programme permanently if negotiations drag on endlessly.

Second, Iran receives limited relief from sanctions – the bulk of the sanctions architecture remains in place and only a tiny spigot is loosened to allow Tehran access to its own funds. Not only is the time period for relief small, the amount of relief is also small and not external to Iran’s revenue stream.

A point of concern is that the interim deal has already been interpreted differently by the two sides. Furthermore, the text of the Interim Nuclear Agreement and the US State Department’s Fact Sheet: First Step Understandings Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program, bear some discrepancies. A document of this import would certainly have gone through lawyers and translators to eliminate any grounds for misunderstanding. Yet, there exist some discrepancies with potentially enormous consequences on not only the interim agreement but the future of nuclear negotiations with Iran:

  • the Iranian document mentions that half of the 20% enriched uranium will be retained for fuel fabrication for the Tehran Research Reactor, of which there is no mention in the US document
  • the Iranian document suggests that this is a first step towards a comprehensive solution to the nuclear imbroglio which both parties will conclude within one year of this agreement but the US document sets the countdown at six months without mention of possibility of renewal
  • the Iranian document suggests that the final agreement would “[i]nvolve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs.” This line is not present in the US text and is of utmost importance in the understanding of this interim agreement.

Many observers are wondering what this deal means beyond its nuclear aspect. For now, there is no ‘beyond’ the nuclear deal. In fact, there are already many doubts about this deal. However, Iran might choose to ignore the question hanging over recognition of its right to enrich uranium and avail of the sanctions relief while insisting on its position during further discussions.

An interesting admission both the Iranian and US releases make is that the complete resolution will have to consider, among other things, UNSC resolutions. Ignoring the final position on Iran’s enrichment rights for now, the interim nuclear agreement allows Tehran, albeit not explicitly, to enrich uranium up to 5%. Does this acceptance violate UNSC Chapter VII Resolutions 1696 and 1737 (legally binding), both of which call for a suspension of Iran’s enrichment activity during negotiations? This may be one reason that Kerry declared that Iran’s enrichment has not been recognised. Were Zarif’s interpretation of the treaty accepted, it would not only recognise Iran’s right to enrich under the Article IV of the NPT but also nullify the ruling of the UNSC resolutions. This is a question for the lawyers, but one solution would be for the UNSC to pass a resolution supporting the interim agreement; another would be to maintain the façade of Kerry’s interpretation until a comprehensive agreement is reached.

If the interim nuclear agreement does not accept Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the P5+1 have given away next to nothing to achieve a temporary halt in Iran’s nuclear march and will gain a better knowledge of the Arak reactor. Seen in this light, the agreement tilts convincingly in favour of the P5+1; after all, $7 billion of relief over six months (or a year) is minuscule in comparison to the $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets globally or the $4 billion per month in lost oil revenue.

If the interim nuclear agreement does recognise Iran’s right to enrich uranium, the additional transparency measures Iran has agreed to will still go a long way in building confidence in Tehran’s intentions. However, Iran will have severely dented the US 123 Agreement Gold Standard and carved out a place in the non-proliferation hierarchy somewhere above non-nuclear weapon states (who have no enrichment and reprocessing rights) and below India (which has military nuclear facilities too). From this perspective, if Iran’s assertions that it does not want nuclear weapons are true, the deal favours Tehran’s unenumerated rights reading of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

There are many questions the interim nuclear deal does not answer, such as research on weaponisation or other questionable facilities like Parchin. Critics will also point out that these safeguards hold true only for facilities discovered or declared and that Iran can continue a secret nuclear weapons project. This, however, would remain true even with full and unrestricted access – if a state really wants a bomb, the diffusion of technology makes it almost impossible to prevent proliferation. Nonetheless, through strict export controls and transparent facilities, it can be made extremely difficult. In any case, these issues, among others, are exactly what the second phase is for. As the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day.

Most importantly, the success of Geneva breaks the psychological indisposition to fruitful negotiations with Iran. If this agreement were to fail in six or twelve months, the P5+1 would have lost nothing; if it leads to further meaningful compromises, then everyone would have gained from this first step. Even those with misgivings about the NPT must concede that Iran has signed the treaty and all negotiations must be based on that fact; this is simply the price Iran has to pay for being party to the NPT. Could this deal have come earlier? Perhaps, but its time had not yet come.

[I have been asked by many what this interim deal means for India. My answer is, not much. India is an attractive trading partner for Iran presently because the sanctions have severely reduced the number of partners. Iran would, no doubt, like to have business relations with India, but if it had to prioritise where to spend its $7 billion in relief, Western markets would the first place Tehran goes shopping. Iran needs technology which India cannot provide, and it needs investment on a scale and at a pace that is inconceivable in the Indian political environment. As a result, Western, Russian, and Chinese markets would be Iran’s first choice.

Additionally, while many fantasise about the political space the Interim Nuclear Deal may open up for India (particularly in Chabahar), such imagination must also counter-balance desires with the fact that Delhi has always been singularly obstinate in not involving itself in the global security commons.

Does this agreement affect India’s relations with Pakistan? No. While the achievement of the interim nuclear agreement certainly does not lack in its power to inspire, the dynamics between Iran and the West are different from those between the subcontinent’s two nuclear rivals. The first relationship has a strong element of coercion – economic sanctions and the threat of military force, while the second relationship has neither the economic nor the military arm-twisting.

If the interim agreement lives up to its promise and delivers a comprehensive solution to the Iranian problem by the end of next year, it can certainly have a major impact on the region. The spillover will not only affect Syria, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, but also India and Pakistan. The removal of sanctions on ties to Iranian petrochemicals, shipbuilding, infrastructure, insurance, and other sectors will allow Delhi to aggressively pursue, if it wishes, the full development of Chabahar port and related projects. This will have a significant impact on trade with Afghanistan and potentially alter the security dynamics in Central Asia. However, Indian firms will have to compete in an open market with other countries unlike the last few years. This is all, however, a very big ‘if’ based on what happens in the next six months.]


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on November 25, 2013.

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Blind Man’s Bluff

04 Sun Mar 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

≈ Comments Off on Blind Man’s Bluff

Tags

al Kibar, Arak, enrichment, Fordow, GBU, heavy water, ICBM, Iran, Minuteman, Mivtza Opera, MOAB, MOP, Natanz, non-proliferation, nuclear, Osirak, Tomahawk, Trident, TTPV, United States, uranium

In a recent interview with Atlantic magazine, President Barack Obama declared that as president of the United States, he doesn’t bluff when it comes to the use of military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. He went on,

I also don’t, as a matter of sound policy, go around advertising exactly what our intentions are. But I think both the Iranian and the Israeli governments recognize that when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say.

Dismissing the idea that the United States does not have the capability to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the President also stated that Iran represents a profound national security threat to the United States even if Israel were not part of the equation; Obama reiterated that Iran has been and is a state sponsor of terrorism and an Iranian nuclear weapon could trigger a domino effect in the Middle East, resulting in a Saudi, Turkish, and perhaps even Egyptian nuclear weapons programme.

Was Obama’s interview merely an election year gimmick or is there mettle in his words? Is a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities in fact possible? The President seemed quite confident of a successful US strike against Iranian facilities were he to give it the green light, but given the insurmountable difficulties such a mission entails, it is difficult to accept Obama’s words at face value. Beheading the Iranian nuclear monster is not a fraternity challenge that one enters into inebriated – it is an exceedingly complicated task that will take enormous resources, may cost many lives, will have unintended consequences, and for all that, has a low probability of genuine resolution of the Iranian problem. It would be wise to consider fully the many obstacles to victory.

1. Evidence: Neither the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) nor American intelligence has yet come across any conclusive evidence that Iran is proceeding towards nuclear weapons. There have indeed been many false calls in the past regarding the function of specific Iranian laboratories such as at Chalus and Lavizan. An assault on Iran only to find that there were indeed no nuclear weapons would rekindle the acrimony caused by President George W. Bush’s search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq a decade earlier. Is President Obama willing to take the risk of starting another war on mere suspicion?

2. Cost of War: Unless US forces land in Iran, there can be no confirmation of either the presence or destruction of nuclear weapons research. This would entail tens of thousands of troops with all the implied support – logistical, armour, air cover, etc. – in hostile terrain. Given the size of the country and dispersion of its nuclear sites, it is highly unlikely that any operation could take less than six months – even this time frame is assuming virtually uncontested terrain and large teams of scientists and engineers to maximise speed. Although the White House would not intend the war with Iran to involve occupation, that is effectively what it will be, for Iran’s nuclear facilities stretch from their easternmost at Narigan in central Iran to Bonab in the west, almost at the Iran-Iraq-Turkey border – a distance of 1,600 kms. Controlling such a huge swath of land is not impossible or even necessarily difficult for US forces, but it could become expensive in lives and dollars. Juan Cole estimates, somewhat absurdly, that a war with Iran would cost $3 trillion, but even sensible calculations would put the costs near $80 billion (assuming similar troop concentrations and costs as in Iraq) for a six-month operation. These costs will be above the regular defence budget – the figures the Cost of War project has produced calculate only incremental funds that are expended due to the war. For example, soldiers’ regular pay is not included but combat pay is included. Potential future costs, such as future medical care for soldiers and veterans wounded in the war, are not included. These figures also do not include additional interest payments on the national debt that will result from higher deficits due to war spending. Factoring in these costs would raise the bill for a six-month 170,000 troops-strong deployment to near $250 billion (using the same methodology as the Joint Economic Committee of Congress). Meanwhile, temperatures between May and October in Iran range from the mid-40s to 50°C. Is President Obama willing to subject the US economy, already struggling with sluggish growth and unemployment, to further strains of such magnitude?

3. Geography: The full Iranian nuclear establishment is spread over 23 known sites, out of which five have attracted the attention of the media and nuclear wonks as critical installations: the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, the heavy water factory at Arak, the uranium enrichment laboratories at Natanz and Fordow, and the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan.

Iranian nuclear facilities Critical Iranian nuclear facilities
Figure 1: Complete (known)
Iranian nuclear facilities
Figure 2: Critical Iranian
nuclear facilities

Of these, the two most important sites, Fordow (near Qom) and Natanz, are hardened facilities, meaning they are buried underground and the roof is constructed of reinforced concrete. Bushehr, the site of Iran’s first reactor (purchased from the US in 1967), is more of a symbolic target as most experts now agree that an LWR (Light Water Reactor) poses little threat of proliferation on its own since its production of fissile plutonium is minuscule. Of course, any of the other sites are liable to military strikes as well and if the US does embark upon the military option, it would be foolish not to damage the other sites responsible for mining, milling, isotope separation (uranium enrichment with the use of lasers), ballistics tests, and research.

What is obvious from the maps is that these sites are, unlike Osirak in Iraq and al Kibar in Syria, multiple and far apart. To allow unimpeded precision bombing of these sites, total air superiority and the elimination of air defences will have to be achieved for the duration of the operation. Although not impossible, even a layperson will see that an Iranian adventure will have nothing covert and surgical about it but will be a longer, more thorough, and more expensive operation. Has President Obama considered the size and tasks of an Iranian excursion even achieving minimum results? More importantly, does he have the complete list of Iranian nuclear sites or will he be striking blindly?

4. Capability: Some doubts have surfaced whether the US military arsenal contains ordinance that is physically capable of destroying Iran’s underground nuclear complex. But most of these analyses assumes a one-bomb kill scenario, which would indeed be impossible. However, as former IAF commander Major General Eitan Ben-Eliyahu explains, “even if one bomb would not suffice to penetrate, we could guide other bombs directly to the hole created by the previous ones and eventually destroy any target.” Analysing the mission requirements and available arsenal, after a few simple calculations, it appears that Obama was correct in dismissing the rumours that Iran’s fortified sites are invulnerable to presently available munitions. Back-of-the-envelope calculations against the core Iranian installations (with 75% reliability, assuming reinforced concrete ranging from 35-75 MPa) suggest the following:

  • Isfahan (100,000 sqft, overground) – 5 GBU-27s, requiring a similar number of F-16s
  • Natanz (646,000 sqft, underground) – 50 GBU-28s, requiring 25 F-15s if each can carry two bombs
  • Arak (55,000 sqft, overground) – 8 GBU-10s, requiring a similar number of F-16s
  • If missile sites close to nuclear targets (Bakhtarun, Khorramabad, Manzariyah, Hasa, Qom) were included, 4 GBU 27s and GBU 10s per site can be used, adding another 10 F-16s to the mission

The armada for just a small portion of Iran’s nuclear structure adds up to 50 F-15s and 23 F-16s. Add at least another 50 F-16s to provide escort and suppress enemy air defences, and the total shoots up to 123 aircraft (as a comparison, the Israeli air force has 72 F-15s and 248 F-16s – though not impossible, contrary to the rhetoric, the IAF would be hard-pressed to conduct a strike against Iran on its own). Additionally, depending upon the attack plan, KC-135 tankers will be required for mid-air refuelling. For an armada of 123 aircraft, that would amount to approximately 15 KC-135s. Again, this is just to strike three nuclear sites and five missile sites right next to them – any expansive operation targeting all nuclear sites would demand more air power. Finally, factoring in air defences, missile sites, radar operators, etc. would place an exceptional burden upon the US air force.

The US has in its arsenal the GBU-43B and the GBU-57B, both of which can be delivered only by the B-2, B-52, or a C-130. Using fighters with the smaller but more numerous bombs allows greater manoeuvrability in the air (though there is the added element of stealth with the B-2). Of course, any attack can be augmented by a barrage of missiles raining down upon the targets, but these are not likely to be as effective as the bombs. The most powerful payload, 315 kgs of high explosives, is carried by the Tomahawk (RGM/UGM-109C TLAM-C) and slightly more than the GBU-28’s 290 kgs. However, the TLAM-C is not as effective a penetrator as the GBU-28, and the Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant (TTPV), RGM-109H, has not yet been battle-tested.

It is possible, however, that Iran has used ultra-high performance concrete (UHPC) in the construction of facilities for its national jewel, the nuclear programme. This type of concrete is relatively new but old enough to be off the drawing board. Like its regular cousin, UHPC is a mix of sand and cement, but doped with polymer fibres and pure powdered quartz. Australian studies in 2006 involving six tonnes of TNT and UHPC panels showed that the panels were fractured but not shattered – Israeli declarations that repeated bombing would soften the facilities seem dubious in light of this study. Furthermore, it is not sure how the GBU-57B, penetrating 9m of 69 MPa reinforced concrete would perform against UHPC (or is classified). This leaves only the most powerful (and hopefully sure) option – ballistic missiles.

It is most likely that Israel has also considered the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) against Iranian structures given the difficulty of an aerial assault. This is certainly an option that is open to the US, but one that requires a leap of imagination – ICBMs have never been used in a war until now (Scuds are theatre missiles), and may be seen as overkill by many opposed to a military option. Nevertheless, a logistically simpler option does remain open to the US, that of conventionally-tipped ICBMs. The Trident, with its 2,800-kg throw-weight and the Minuteman III with 1,150-kg throw-weight deliver a far more significant punch than any other weapon in the US arsenal. Of course, the Trident costs $70 million per unit and the Minuteman III $7 million per piece, with circular error probables (CEP) of 90 m and 150 m.

Undoubtedly, the surest way of turning Iran’s nuclear facilities into craters (and a guaranteed way) is deploying special forces. But this method connects directly to duration of conflict, safety of troops, cost, and the fog of war.

Thus, in terms of capability, President Obama is probably not bluffing. Even accounting for the strongest defence, Iranian facilities are not impregnable if the political will to expend significant assets and resources is there. But after such tremendous effort, it is likely that the Iranian nuclear programme is set back, at most, a decade. Is President Obama willing to authorise the use of such force against Iran only to delay their programme a handful of years?

5. Law of Unintended Consequences: Through Thucydides, the Greeks tell us,

Think too of the great part that is played by the unpredictable…; think of it now, before you are actually committed…the longer a [crisis] lasts, the more things tend to depend on accidents. Neither you nor we can see into them: we have to abide their outcome in the dark.1

The Romans warn us by way of Tacitus, “Once killing starts, it is difficult to draw the line.2” Any leader would do well to heed these warnings from the Ancients, for no strike on Iran will be confined within the borders of Iran, nor will the repercussions be merely within the realm of conventional warfare. Some of the fallout of a US strike on Iran could be

  • Withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): This is almost a certainty; citing the need to deter further aggression by the US (or Israel or one of its other neighbours), Iran will withdraw from the NPT as Article X.1 allows: “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.” This shall make any future negotiations about nuclear issues with Iran all the more difficult.
  • Iran will become even more determined to acquire nuclear weapons. If, indeed, its programme was purely civilian up until now, it will become a military programme and clandestine one at that too. A very likely scenario is one in which Iran emerges as a major buyer on the nuclear black market – financially susceptible states like North Korea and Pakistan would be tempted by Iranian oil credits and pose a greater proliferation risk.
  • With Iran embroiled in a war, oil prices will shoot up – sanctions have already driven up oil prices to $120 per barrel, and experts say that oil could easily hit $150 per barrel before the end of 2012 if fighting breaks out.
  • It is possible that Iran might strike out at Israel with its Shahab missiles, targeting civilian centres and military bases as well as Israel’s own nuclear infrastructure. Iran might also strike out at oil facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in an effort to send oil prices skyrocketing. After all, the Kingdom did allow Israel to fly over its territory if the latter were striking Iran.
  • Tehran’s connection to Hamas, the Hezbollah, and the Mahdi Army are well-known. Any US strike on Iran will see the latter on the short end of the stick; as in any situation when faced with overwhelming conventional might, a state might make use of asymmetric strategies. Targets could be any US or Israeli asset worldwide, as attacks on Israeli embassies in Argentina (1992), India (2012), and Georgia (2012) have shown. Furthermore, Hamaz and Hezbollah could increase their rocket attacks on Israel in conjunction with Iranian missile attacks.
  • Tehran could also increase support of Shi’a insurgencies in Iraq, Bahrain, and Qatar, throwing the entire Middle East into turmoil.
  • Even if Iran’s nuclear fangs are successfully removed, it will leave behind an emaciated state, hurting from decades of sanctions and the ravages of two wars. US intervention has already eliminated Iraq as a source of regional power. This power vacuum could raise tensions as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel rush to fill the gap. This state of disequilibrium is also ideal for the increase of Russian and Chinese influence in the region, as well as the spread of non-state actors.

Unless executed to the standards of perfection of a French chef, the game in the Middle East could very well turn out to be Russian roulette with a faulty pistol. Is President Obama willing to assume these risks in exchange for negotiating with Iran?

6. International Law: There is, of course, a small matter of international law involved (and it is indeed small). As Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota reminded the United Nations Secretary General, “One sometimes hears the expression, ‘all options are on the table.’ But some actions are contrary to international law.” Although Patriota is absolutely correct in his observation, the fact remains that no one is willing to nor has the power to punish the United States for attacking Iran unilaterally. To put this fact of realpolitik (or is it machtpolitik?) in legalese, the argument would be that national security is ultimately a sovereign right and the United States has already designated Iran’s nuclear programme as a serious national security threat. Critics who argue that such unilateral actions weaken the international system should realise that the system is only what its most powerful members wish it to be. While Pakistan and North Korea have escaped decapitating blows against their nuclear establishments and India has been awarded an nuclear deal that makes it a de facto if not de jure member of the Nuclear Club, Iran has been singled out as as example in defence of the non-proliferation cause. There is nothing President Obama has to worry about on this front – US restraint in the Iranian case will certainly not be a factor in a future Chinese decision to crush a Tibetan uprising or a Russian invasion of Belarus.

7. Result: Ultimately, after all the money has been spent and all the blood has been spilled, this is not a permanent resolution. Critics have argued that preemptive strikes against nascent nuclear states have never been successful, not even in the famed Operation Opera. In defence of such strikes, Amos Yidlan, one of the eight Israeli pilots that took part in Mivtza Opera, argues with some merit, “Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years — hence any successful strike would achieve a delay of only a few years.” The Iraqi nuclear programme ended not in 1981 after the Israeli strike on Osirak, but in 2003 when the US invaded the country. Similarly, no matter how much the White House tries its “shock and awe” routine, a guarantee of success cannot be achieved without boots on the ground – tens of thousands of them and for a while. Anything less will mean another US president facing the same dilemma ten years down the line. Is President Obama willing to countenance a risky military option with not only the uncertainty of success but the fair probability that the outcome will be half-baked?

Thankfully, Obama has shown wisdom beyond that required to wag a six-shooter. Whether he knows the twisted history of US-Iran relations or not, someone in his staff certainly does, and one can only hope his military planners have taken into account all the hurdles they will have to face if war does break out. In his interview, the president explained his preferred policy with Iran,

Our argument is going to be that it is important for us to see if we can solve this thing permanently, as opposed to temporarily, and the only way historically that a country has ultimately decided not to get nuclear weapons without constant military intervention has been when they themselves take [nuclear weapons] off the table. That’s what happened in Libya, that’s what happened in South Africa.

If Obama intends to demonstrate such sound foresight, then what is it that he is not bluffing about? Will the White House allow the demands of an election year tie their hands on Iran? Or will the president have the freedom and courage to make the right decisions? That President Obama is not bluffing (on the military option) may well be his bluff (to the Iranians) – but which game of bluff is the president playing? Is it Blind Man’s Bluff, the poker variant, or the childrens’ game? The former may be chancy, but the latter could be deadly.

——–

1: The History of the Peloponnesian Wars, 1.78
2: The Histories, 1.39

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