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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Haganah

In Blood and Fire Shall Judea Rise

11 Sat Mar 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Book Review

≈ Comments Off on In Blood and Fire Shall Judea Rise

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Anonymous Soldiers, Avraham Stern, Balfour Declaration, Bar Giora, Bruce Hoffman, Chaim Weizmann, David Ben-Gurion, David Raziel, Etzel, Ha Irgun Ha Tzvai Ha Leumi b'Eretz Yisrael, Haganah, Hashomer, havlagah, Hayalim Almonim, Irgun, Israel, Lehi, Loḥamei Ḥerut Yisrael, Menachem Begin, Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, Palestine Police Force, Palmach, Shlomo Ben Yosef, terrorism, Yitzhak Yezernitsky, Ze'ev Jabotinsky

Hoffman, Bruce. Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947. New York: Vintage Books, 2016. 672 pp.

Does terrorism work? That is the provocative question with which Bruce Hoffman begins his book. Although politicians such as Ian Smith, Ronald Reagan, and Margaret Thatcher and scholars such as Thomas Schelling, Caleb Carr, and Max Abrahms tend to answer in the negative, such a widespread belief in its ineffectiveness is not shared by terrorists themselves. Most terrorist groups have failed in achieving their political aims but the few success stories – Ireland (1922), Israel (1948), Cyprus (1960), and Algeria (1962) – mean that the phenomenon deserves closer scrutiny. No one doubts the ability of terrorism to spark off greater conflagrations – the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001 – but some terrorist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Hezbollah have achieved a modicum of success through their violent antecedents. Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917-1947 analyses one of the success stories, Israel, as the title suggests, to understand the reasons for its success.

Contrary to the traditional Israeli historiography that lays all the credit for the formation of the Jewish state at the feet of David Ben Gurion and the Jewish Agency, Hoffman argues that Israel might not have been possible without the efforts of its most notorious organisations, the Irgun Tzvai Leumi – known by its acronym as Etzel, or Irgun to Anglophones – and the Lohamei Herut Yisrael, or Lehi. These two groups relentlessly targeted British assets and personnel in Judea and made the British Mandate of Palestine simply untenable. Towards the end of British rule in the Levant, 100,000 soldiers – about the same number London had stationed in India – had been deployed in Judea to protect British assets and maintain law and order but to no avail.

The roots of unrest in the Fertile Crescent have to do with Jewish immigration into the region. For the longest time, despite the rhetoric of yearning for Zion and the pogroms in Europe, Jews had little interest in migrating to Palestine. The Ottoman Empire, though welcoming of Jews in other parts of its domains, had strictly curtailed Jewish immigration to the Holy Land. It was only after Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat in 1896 that the number of migrants rose to a trickle. The Balfour Declaration in 1917 was a tocsin to the local Arab population; already restless about increasing Jewish migration and land acquisition, the thought of these European interlopers getting their own state on Arab land was unacceptable. As a result, Jewish settlements began to come under frequent attack from marauding Arabs. In this phase, the Jewish population was largely dependent on the British and sought their protection.

Unfortunately for the Jews, the Palestine Police Force was inadequately manned and funded to be of much use. The community had to look within to organise their own defence. The Haganah was founded in 1920 but it was not the first such organisation: the Bar Giora, named after a leader of a Jewish rebel faction during the First Jewish-Roman War, was founded in 1907. This group became the Hashomer in 1909, which grew into the Haganah which would go on to become the core of the Israeli Defence Forces after independence. Despite its lack of training and arms, the Haganah became a fairly effective force against isolated Arab attacks. Against large disturbances, however, such as the Arab Riots of 1920-1, Britain was the sole guarantor of security.

Hoffman builds the narrative event by event, until the reader can not only feel the hope, fear, frustration, and political tension of the times but almost the desert heat and dust. In a marvellous telling, Anonymous Soldiers explains how London tried to balance two antithetical commitments to two people, Arabs and Jews, but failed in pleasing either. Mohammed Amin al-Husseini, appointed the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem by the British in 1921, invoked Islam into Arab nationalism and battle cries of “There is no God but Allah, Mohammad’s religion came by the sword” rang through Palestine. Interestingly, Husseini’s mobs identified themselves as Muslim and Arab but not Palestinian – that identity was yet to form.

The waves of Arab revolts – 1924, 1929, 1933, and 1936-9 – and what the Yishuv – Jewish settlements – saw as soft imperial policy against them convinced some Jewish elements to give up on havlagah, or restraint. Until then, the Jewish community had worked with the British in maintaining the peace despite disagreements over Jewish immigration. The Haganah even received rudimentary training from the British to help defend Jewish areas. Even Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the father of Revisionist Zionism, believed Britain to be a friendly power and the Jews’ natural ally in the Middle East.

The hanging of Shlomo Ben Yosef in 1938 for attempting to blow up a commuter bus containing Arabs was a turning point. Jabotinsky began to see the British as unduly harsh on the Jews in comparison to the Arabs in that Ben Yosef had been given the maximum sentence for his crime even though no one had been hurt while hundreds of Arabs had received lesser sentences for similar crimes during the riots. The Etzel, founded in 1931 to provide a muscular response to the Arabs as opposed to havlagah from the Haganah, turned on the British. Until then, they had only targeted Arabs but the Ben Yosef incident disillusioned Jabotinsky about London’s motives in Palestine.

There were plenty of anti-Semites in London but the reason Whitehall had been soft on the Arabs was that they feared the repercussions of an absolute crackdown across the Muslim world. Already, British policy in Palestine was causing unrest in Iraq and among Muslims in India. Hoffman mentions the strong British anti-Semitism prevalent in the inter-war period but does not think it the primary cause for its policies which were disadvantageous to the Jewish community. Nonetheless, British racial stereotypes of the Jews caused them to make strategic blunders in their bid to control Palestine.

The outbreak of World War II complicated matters. No doubt, Germany was an enemy of the Jewish people but Britain, opposed to the Nazis in Europe, were the local enemy in their curtailment of immigration and restricting Jewish land acquisition. The Jewish Agency saw this as a betrayal of the promise made in the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Shrewdly and opportunistically, however, the Haganah and Etzel threw in their lot with Britain in the war against Germany. The implicit demand was for a Jewish state once the war was over, and Jewish youth volunteered in the British army to receive training in several martial skills that would serve Israel well in 1948. Special units within the Haganah, Palmach, were established to be deployed in North Africa and other theatres of the war.

Chaim Weizzman. President, World Zionist Organisation; first president of Israel David Ben Gurion. Head of the Jewish Agency; first prime minister of Israel

The decision to cease hostilities against the British did not sit well with all of the Jewish commanders. Avraham Stern strongly disagreed with his Etzel comrades and led a split in the group to form Lehi in 1940. Surprisingly, Lehi sought alliances with Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Nazi Germany to fight against the British with the understanding that all of Europe’s Jews would be allowed to immigrate to Palestine. However, the alliance failed to take shape and Stern himself was captured in Tel Aviv and killed by the British in 1942.

In sharp contrast with modern Israeli covert services, Etzel and Lehi were sloppy and had several failures in the early years. It was only after Yitzhak Yezernitsky revived Lehi in 1944 and Menachem Begin took command of Etzel in 1943 that both groups began to have more of an impact on Mandatory politics.

Hoffman has tilled American, British, and Israeli archives for Anonymous Soldiers and his effort is evident. However, there are still some gaps in the story. The most obvious one is the relatively little attention the author has paid to Jabotinsky. Beyond his role in establishing organisations like Etzel in Palestine and Betar in Riga, Latvia, the Russian Zionist was the intellectual force behind a strand of Zionism that influenced many, including future prime minister Begin. What did a Jewish state mean to Jabotinsky in terms of its institutions and values?

The author’s focus on the Etzel and Lehi drowns out at least two other important voices – the Arabs and the Haganah. Anonymous Soldiers makes it seem as if the Arabs were passive spectators in the shaping of Palestine except for the riots. The Jewish community, however, had to keep one eye on their Arab neighbours even as they fought the British. The Haganah too, plays a secondary role in Hoffman’s tale but this is only partly true. For the most part, the Haganah was involved in smuggling in Jews beyond the quota allocated by the British and developing stockpiles of arms. These activities may not get the attention of, say, an assassination, but were nonetheless illegal and important to the Yishuv. Post World War II, Palmach units did carry out a series of anti-British operations that included freeing Jewish detainees, bombing British radar installations, sabotaging ships used to intercept or deport illegal Jewish immigration, destruction of vital bridges, disrupting rail services, and even an assassination.

Avraham Stern. Founder of Lohamei Herut Yisrael Yitzhak Yezernitsky. Leader, Lehi; seventh prime minister of Israel Menachem Begin. Commander, Irgun Tzvai Leumi; sixth prime minister of Israel

Part of the problem is that the book stops in 1947. Although the Haganah had always been involved in activities that went against British dictates, its most assertive phase started only after World War II. Hoffman wishes to separate the Etzel and Lehi from the Haganah but operations such as the sinking of the SS Patria in 1940 suggest that this cleavage is not as clean as is presented in Anonymous Soldiers. Perhaps the implicit assertion here is that, for a time, the Haganah collaborated with the British to hunt down Etzel and Lehi operatives with remarkable success.

Most disappointingly, Hoffman has chosen not to add an epilogue that discusses the terrorist legacy on Israel. After all, it has had two prime ministers, one from the Etzel and the other from Lehi, and a foreign minister who was the daughter of an important Etzel commander. Several other members of these organisations found their way into the Knesset and other important government institutions during their generation.

Finally, it is important to ponder on the meaning of terrorism: can the Etzel and Lehi truly be considered terrorists in an era when indiscriminate bombardment of civilians such as at Dresden was considered kosher? Some may object to this analogy, reminding us that the Allies were at war with Germany, but from the perspective of the Yishuv, they were also at war with Britain, an imperial, occupying power. Additionally, under the command of Begin, at least, the Etzel has always attempted to minimise unnecessary casualties, often calling in a bomb warning. As Hoffman mentions, Begin was shocked and horrified at the loss of life at the King David Hotel on July 22, 1946. Though Lehi has always been more indiscriminate, even they left warnings around the bombs that brought down the British embassy in Rome in October 1946.

By and large, Jewish militants were careful to target British assets and representatives of the Crown though there was undeniably some collateral damage. Yet theirs was not a campaign of wanton destruction of schools, pubs, buses, and supermarkets as the small size of the final body count for the years 1945-7 shows: some 300 people killed, most of them in one fateful attack. Wholesale slaughter was largely reserved for those who did the same to the Yishuv, namely, Arabs. These distinctions, meaningless to the victims though they may be, marks Zionist terror as different. In addition to the civilian control of the militia and the presence of a shadow government, Jewish settlers in Palestine behaved as if they already had their own state. Such oversight, and the havlagah that Etzel and Lehi scorned, makes the struggle for Israel a qualitatively different saga from the barbarism of modern terrorism. The institutional power of the Jewish Agency can be seen from the fact that upon independence, the various armed factions either disbanded or merged into the Israeli Defence Forces without any bitter and bloody internecine struggle for power.

Anonymous Soldiers is a detailed and gripping work despite some of the gaps it leaves. The title of the book, by the way, comes from Hayalim Almonim, a poem written by Stern in 1932 and also translated as ‘unknown soldiers.’ The book does not answer the question is started with – does terrorism work? The answer to that is beyond the scope of any one book. However, Hoffman’s analysis of the Israeli case puts forward a compelling hypothesis that done properly, using the right methods against the right targets, it is possible for terrorism to have at least a limited amount of success. And implicit in this revelation is that the same could be said for counter-terrorism. In this day and age, Anonymous Soldiers gives the reader much food for thought.

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Ariel Sharon – A Portrait in Blood and Sand

11 Sat Jan 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Israel, Middle East

≈ Comments Off on Ariel Sharon – A Portrait in Blood and Sand

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Ariel Scheinermann, Ariel Sharon, Battle of Abu-Ageila, Biscari, David Ben-Gurion, Disengagement Plan, Entebbe, fedayeen, Gadna, Gdudei No'ar, Gush Emunim, Haganah, Hassadeh, IDF, Israel, Israeli Defence Forces, Kadima, Kfar Milal, Lebanon War, Likud, Mapai, Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael, Mitla Pass, obituary, Operation Peace for Galilee, Phalangists, Pinhas Lavon, Qibya, Rheinwiesenlager, Sabra, settlements, Shatila, Six Day War, Suez Crisis, Unit 101, War of Attrition, War of Independence, Wilhelm Gesenius, Yom Kippur War

Ariel Sharon is dead. Warrior and politician, Arik, as he was known to his friends, was reviled, feared, and admired by many. He lived his life under a shadow of controversy and epitomised Israeli sabra culture – lacking in charm, eloquence, or idealism but having an abundance of self-reliance and no-nonsense, can-do grit.

Ariel Sharon 1966Born Ariel Scheinermann on February 26, 1928, in a family of Belorussian Jews in Kfar Malal, Sharon joined Hassadeh, a Zionist youth movement literally meaning the Field, at 10. At 14, he took the week-long training of the Gdudei No’ar (youth battalions), and participated in armed patrols of his moshav. Sheinermann joined the Haganah the same year, 1942, as the turbulence in Europe reached a frenzied pitch in the Middle East. With the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, the Haganah became the Israeli Defence Forces and the future prime minister was pulled into Israel’s first war. For his valour at the Battle of Latrun in which he was severely wounded, Israel’s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion bestowed upon the young Sheinermann the name of Sharon, meaning ‘body armour’ in Hebrew (it is unlikely that a Jewish audience would have taken theologian Wilhelm Gesenius’ meaning of Sharon as upright or just).

Sharon was regarded as a tough soldier and a brilliant commander which helped him rise rapidly through the ranks despite his frequent insubordination. By the end of Israel’s War of Independence, he was already a company commander; during the Suez Crisis, Sharon was a major. He rose to major-general rank by the Six-Day War, and in 1969, he was put in charge of the IDF’s Southern Command. Sharon retired from the military in 1973 just a few months before the Yom Kippur War to form the right-wing Likud party, a complete about-turn from his early inclinations towards the socialistic Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael, or Mapai. However, Sharon paused his political career to return to military service and fight in Israel’s most trying conflict.

As in his military career, Sharon moved through different positions in the government – special security advisor to Yitzhak Rabin, minister of agriculture and minister of defence under Menachem Begin, minister of national infrastructure and the foreign minister under Benjamin Netanyahu – until he rose to the highest office of the land in 2001. After losing the support of his own party in 2005 over the removal of Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, Sharon left the Likud to form the Kadima and called for general elections – elections he appeared poised to win had he not suffered a serious stroke in January 2006 and gone into a coma until his death.

It is not surprising that Sharon’s life was surrounded by bloodshed; his long military career and Israel’s troubled existence hardly allowed anything else. However, Sharon’s critics point to the several massacres by Israeli units under his watch in the military or in government. To them, Sharon is an unrepentant war criminal and a scheming politician whose actions were excessive even in times of war.

As head of Unit 101 in 1953, Sharon’s men were accused of massacring over 60 civilians at Qibya in Jordanian-occupied West Bank. However, this was in retaliation to the constant raids by Palestinian fedayeen into Israel – over 9,000 between 1948 and 1956 according to Israel – that had left dozens of Israelis dead and damaged agriculture and infrastructure. Moreover, the attack had received sanction from Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon and Ben-Gurion himself. Despite public perception, most of Unit 101’s raids were on military targets in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

Ariel SharonSharon’s aggressiveness got him into trouble as many times as it earned him accolades; his command came under strong rebuke during the Suez Crisis in 1956 for disobeying orders and provoking a battle with Egyptian forces at Mitla Pass, but his actions at Abu-Ageila proved decisive on the southern front during the Six Day War and received praise from strategists all around the world. In Israel, he was christened, The Lion of God (meaning of Ariel in Hebrew), and The King of Israel by the public. Similarly, during Israel’s darkest hour during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Sharon’s forces crossed the Suez into Africa and moved towards Ismailia and Cairo to cut off Egypt’s Second Army and encircle its Third Army in the Sinai. As a result, Sharon was seen as the architect of Israel’s military victory in the Sinai in 1973.

It was during the War of Attrition, that death-by-a-thousand-cuts period between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, that Sharon earned a reputation for being in favour of Israeli settlements in disputed and occupied territories. Not only was this a blatant violation of international law, but the settlements resulted in dispossession, deaths, and deportation of Palestinians from the areas. In 1971, as a measure to pacify the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Sharon had resorted to bulldozing hundreds of homes in the Gaza Strip. Again, although Sharon’s actions in the Gaza Strip did not have higher authorisation, he received full support from then prime minister Golda Meir and the evacuations were given post facto approval. As a new minister in Begin’s government, Sharon supported the Gush Emunim settler movement and doubled the number of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories before the end of the decade.

Perhaps the most controversial episode in Sharon’s career was the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Sharon, then defence minister, is thought to have masterminded the operation with the end goals of evicting the PLO from Lebanon, ending Syrian influence in the country, and installing a Christian pro-Israel government in Beirut. The war has a complex background and history with several paramilitary actors fighting alongside government forces, and in September 1982, the Phalangists, a Christian militia, entered the camps of Sabra and Shatila and massacred anywhere between 800 and 3,000 Palestinian men, women, and children with incredible brutality as revenge for the assassination of their leader, Bachir Gemayel. It was later learned that the assassination was masterminded by Syria and not the PLO.

The Knesset-appointed Kahan Commission, despite its many weaknesses, found that Ariel Sharon bore a personal if indirect responsibility for the massacre as he, along with Begin and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, had agreed to allow the Phalangists into the camps to search for terrorists. Given the ties between the IDF and the Phalangists, not to mention the IDF forward command post barely 200 metres southwest of Shatilla, it would be impossible for the Phalangists to have done their dastardly deed. However, a bodyguard of Phalangist commander Elie Hobeika wrote in his memoirs that the massacre at the camps had been carried out contrary to Israeli instructions. If this is true, it reduces Sharon’s culpability but the safety of the camps was, regardless, Israel’s responsibility as the occupying power and it is improbable that the IDF did not know what was happening just down the road.

Despite his aggressiveness on the battlefield, Sharon was ultimately a pragmatist. During the Camp David talks with Anwar Sadat, he advocated the dismantling the settlements in the Sinai if it bought peace. In 2003, Sharon accepted a Road Map to Peace proposed by the United States, European Union, and Russia. Israel adopted the Disengagement Plan the next year, and by August 2005, all Israeli settlements in Gaza and a few in the West Bank had been abandoned. Sharon faced strong opposition not only from the military and intelligence arms but also within his own party. Among the public, initial support for his plan was at nearly 70% but dropped to approximately 55% by the time the settlements had been removed, probably due to disenchantment with implementation.

Yet Sharon’s military record and reputation for aggressive strategy gave him credibility in any peace overture – few Israelis had forgotten that their prime minister had fought in every one of their country’s wars. In popular parlance, he was Israel’s Nixon who could go to China. To be clear, Sharon’s plan was no naïve utopia – it was merely a foundation upon which peace could be built if, as he stressed, he found a reliable partner for peace. Palestinians were not consulted in the removal of settlements, nor did Israel give up control over Gaza’s coast or airspace. Furthermore, the construction of the security fence was accelerated.

Sharon was a deeply controversial figure, a war criminal even, for those who think that life is quantifiable and can be neatly codified. A pertinent question to ask is whether Israeli history would have been different without Sharon. Given the country’s policies and other behaviour, at Entebbe for example, it is unlikely that Suez, the Six Day War, or Lebanon could have been avoided; it would just have been someone else instead of Sharon.

It is ironic that the final legacy of a man of war was peace – almost. After conquering land for Israel and expanding Jewish settlements throughout his career, Sharon’s last days were spent considering land for peace and giving up the settlements. The former Israeli prime minister has been made out to be a monster but his did nothing more than many generals in war. Even the haloed George S Patton was implicated in the massacre of 73 Italians at Biscari, and the same callous approach to prisoners of war was shown at Normandy on D-Day. Similarly, over 10,000 German prisoners died at Rheinwiesenlager, the Allied POW camp, from starvation, dehydration, and exposure. There is also the case of the massacre of the Dachau prison guards by American soldiers who flew into a rage at the sight of the camp’s inmates. While one crime does not excuse another, these incidents illustrate the nature of war.

Ariel Sharon remains one of Israel’s most popular sons, and for all the differences they may have had with him, Israelis will miss him. May G-d comfort him among the other mourners of Zion and Jerusalem.

המקום ינחם אותך בתוך שאר אבלי ציון וירושלים


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on January 11, 2014.

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