Tag Archives: Indian Navy

Creating an Indian Lake

15 Thu Mar 2018

Posted by in India, South Asia

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The small, out-of-mind archipelago of Seychelles has been in the Indian news cycle an inordinate amount. Part of this is due to a prospering Indian public starting to take greater interest in the geopolitics of their region. Another reason is the recent agreement signed between India and Seychelles for the construction of a military base on Assumption Island, one of the 115 islands of the African country. Originally signed in 2015 during a visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the country, work could not begin on the strategic asset as the deal was not ratified by the Seychelles parliament during the term of the previous president, James Michel.

Controversy was stirred recently when the present president of the South Indian Ocean country, Danny Faure, declared in 2017 that the agreement would have to be renegotiated as it did not serve the interests of the Seychellois. Then, a recent leak of the text of the newly-negotiated agreement also stoked the controversy in that it was alleged that Victoria has sold off Assumption Island to India; Faure’s administration rushed to clarify that this was not the case and stressed that India would not be developing infrastructure on Assumption for military purposes. Ostensibly, the facilities are meant to support patrolling against illegal fishing, piracy, and drug and human trafficking.

Under the agreement, India will renovate the airstrip on Assumption Island, renovate the jetty, and build living quarters for the Seychelles Coast Guard. The entire project is expected to take a quarter of the tiny island that measures barely 6.7 kms in length and 2.9 kms in width and cost approximately $550 million.

Several things were clarified and modified between the 2015 agreement and the 2018 revision. The deal was extended to 20 years from 10 years with an option to further extend the arrangement by another 10 years; it was clarified that the island was still under the sovereignty of Seychelles, meaning that Indians stationed on Assumption Island will face Seychellois justice if accused of a crime; the obligations of each party were explicitly spelled out as were technical details pertaining to the jetty and airstrip; conditions for the storage of arms have been made more stringent (military exercises, guarding the facilities, and self-defence in case of internal disturbances). As in the 2015 agreement, India has agreed not to use the base in times of war or allow vessels with nuclear weapons to use the facilities. Third parties may be allowed use of the facilities upon joint agreement by both governments.

Although Seychelles has been at pains to emphasise that the agreement with India is not military in nature, the terms indicate otherwise or at least hold open the strong potential for use for security purposes. Victoria, however, does not wish to invite Great Power rivalry – not just between India and China but potentially the United States and France as well – into its living room and has made a public relations decision to highlight the benefits it receives from the development of infrastructure on Assumption Island in the enforcement of domestic law and order.

The deal is seen as important for India because it enhances its surveillance capabilities over the Indian Ocean. In concert with a coastal surveillance radar station already operating in Seychelles, a naval base at Agalega in Mauritius, a coastal radar station in Madagascar, an array of radars in Maldives, and a strong presence in the littoral waters of Mozambique, Delhi’s acquisition of facilities on one of the 67 raised coral islands of the Aldabra group will create an impermeable surveillance net in the southwestern and central Indian Ocean. Assumption Island’s position dominating the Mozambique channel, a key sea lane for merchant ships, adds to India’s kitty a second potential choke point after the Strait of Malacca; the latter is dominated by India’s augmented presence in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands chain as well as with naval agreements with Vietnam and Singapore.

India’s strategic assets in its ocean, important as they are on their own, have an added multiplier effect: Delhi has recently signed a Logistics Support Agreement with the United States and France, allowing the navies of those countries to share naval facilities with the Indian Navy. This extends India’s reach even further from the French base at Reunion – perhaps even Paris’ services in Djibouti – and the US base at Diego Garcia. Together, it is possible for the three countries to establish a Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) line array to closely monitor the movement of all ships and submarines through the region. It is rumoured that India is seeking Japanese assistance in setting up a similar surveillance line from Indira Point to Sumatra, which will then connect with a similar existing US-Japanese network in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Rim. Between these two arrays, Delhi’s knowledge of movement in the Indian Ocean will see a marked increase and make its naval deployments more efficient.

An agreement with Australia for access to its Indian Ocean Territories, Cocos Islands and Christmas, is tempting but the geography and size of the islands is not an insignificant obstacle to overcome.

There has been some opposition to India’s presence in the archipelago that range from geopolitical to economic and environmental. However, with approximately 10% of the population tracing its roots back to India, there is, so far, general good will towards India. Unlike its larger northeastern neighbour China, India has avoided giving hard loans or flooding client states with Indian labour and instead preferred joint development. India’s previous assistance to the archipelago also puts it in good standing with the Seychellois. In June and September 1986, India helped suppress two coups in the country, the first by deploying the INS Vindhyagiri (which, to be fair, was already on its way to the island on a routine visit) and the second by then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi loaning Air India One to Seychelles president France-Albert René. India has also helped Seychelles patrol its Exclusive Economic Zone and provided equipment such as Dornier Do 228s and Chetak helicopters to meet the security needs of the island chain. The Indian Navy has frequently assisted Seychelles in anti-piracy operations in the past decade. and Delhi has also helped train the Seychellois own armed forces.

At present, India is economically and militarily incapable of facing Chinese encroachment into the Indian Ocean. Beijing has been candid about its String of Pearls for over a decade and yet little was done to augment India’s ability to respond to the threat, either diplomatically or otherwise. Despite its jarring paeans to non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and other such dated misadventures, Delhi has recently made a sound move by agreeing to work in tandem with similarly-minded powers to protect the Indian Ocean. The acquisition of its own assets in the Indian Ocean Region is a bonus and will retain some autonomy for India.

In the Dragon’s Shadow

01 Fri Feb 2013

Posted by in India, Security

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The notion of a string of pearls (SOP) – strategic assets cultivated by China around India’s peripheries – was first put forward by a team of Booz Allen consultants to the Pentagon in 2003. One has come to expect any strategic vision about South Asia, accurate or otherwise, to emanate from the West for New Delhi has been notoriously inept at doing so itself. The SOP theory has its adherents and those who lampoon it too. Sadly, both sides are prone to exaggeration in the defence of their views.

It is easy to understand why hawks in India exaggerate – they have to get their message through to an indolent government and a sluggish bureaucracy that is the epitome of inertia. India’s nuclear project, its missile programme, its nuclear submarine enterprise, and its adventures in designing a Light Combat Aircraft, the Tejas, to name but a few ventures, show a lag rate that would make the planners of the Almudena seem industrious by comparison! Critics of SOP argue, and rightly so, that Chinese interest in Marao, the Coco Islands, Hambantota, and Gwadar is economic and has not yet taken on a military dimension. However, threat perceptions are not just about present capabilities but also trajectories, previous record, and potential.

Why do many Asians see China as a threat? What makes any state a threat? There is no denying that proximity to a rising power can be uncomfortable, as Mexico and the Europeans can vouch for. As the Austrians, Danes, and French felt the first slaps of the coming Second Reich, and Mexico of America’s Manifest Destiny, Asian states on the Chinese periphery wonder what is in store for them. Neither Beijing’s words nor actions have given them any reason to be sanguine; while Washington can afford to preach restraint, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Tokyo, Manila, Delhi, and Hanoi to do the same.

Another reason China’s rise is not trusted is the opacity of the state. Little is known with any surety about China’s military capabilities, ambitions, and scope, and even the country’s economic data is not quite reliable. Travel, for foreigners, is relatively free but some areas remain restricted or even forbidden. Interestingly, one of the features countries the United States has usually seen as unfriendly or hostile – China (pre-rapprochement), North Korea, Soviet Union – all share this characteristic.

China’s growing military budget – at least that which they admit to – is yet another concern for its neighbours. Larger neighbours such as Russia have less to worry about as the remnants of its arsenal assembled during the Cold War against the United States is sufficient to balance China. However, other states, particularly Japan and India, worry when a nuclear neighbour spends a greater portion of its Gross Domestic Product on the military, over $100 billion last year. In comparison, the US budget is seven times greater, but Japan spends less than $60 billion and India less than $50 billion on their militaries. The US has less to fear from a rising China for a little longer than the latter’s less fortunate neighbours.

Lest one dismiss a rapidly modernising and increasingly capable military, and if one is comfortable with not knowing what the world’s largest military is up to on one’s borders, Chinese rhetoric does not allow peaceful sleep. China’s leaders have been urging their armed forces to be ready to fight and win a war, while its navy has been considering acquiring bases in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere. China’s recent “re-understanding” of the maritime boundaries around the Senkakus and its economic prerogatives in the South China Sea show that Beijing’s rhetoric is not mere hot air. In light of Chinese behaviour on the seas, China’s territorial claims against India in Arunachal Pradesh should cause some concern in Delhi. On a parallel note, it is interesting to see reactions on the other end of the spectrum to Iranian rhetoric on Israel and the Jewish community.

Aggressive Chinese behaviour may be a new discovery to Western strategists, but is not new at all to its neighbours. Just in living memory, the Chinese have invaded Vietnam (1979), clashed with the Soviets (1968), attacked India (1962), and annexed Tibet (1950). In fact, since 1949, China has had 23 territorial disputes, of which seven (including Tibet) remain unresolved. A 2010 report by the Pentagon noted that in 2008, “the Indian military had recorded 270 border violations and nearly 2,300 cases of ‘aggressive border patrolling’ by Chinese soldiers.” On the seas, China’s infamous nine-dashed line has expanded against China’s neighbours, and as US Navy Captain James Fanell, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Information Operations for US Pacific Fleet, recently observed, “China is knowingly, operationally and incrementally seizing maritime rights of its neighbours under the rubric of a maritime history” that is strongly contested. One wonders if Russia would receive the same understanding if it started to aggressively patrol around Georgia or the Gulf of Narva.

There is, of course, the psychology of the Chinese state. Not only does Beijing see itself as the centre of the universe, but this Sinocentric conceptual imperialism, as China expert Christopher Ford calls it, seeks to control how others see China too. The Party reserves for itself “proprietary interest not only in how the rest of the world acts toward China, but also in how it depicts and understands China.” This totalitarian view of international politics, one that is deeply ingrained, usually makes democracies uncomfortable.

Do all these observations indicate an imminent invasion, brutal occupation, and annexation of India? Of course not. Yet even if the possibility of all-out war is minuscule, China has shown an adroitness when it comes to “salami tactics,” that is, incremental and small escalations which seem inconsequential on their own. It would be foolish to dismiss the Chinese threat or not view Chinese action in one’s backyard without due suspicion. Threats are measured not by intentions but by potential capabilities – it takes little time to change the former, while the latter takes years to develop. So the real question is, how long would it take for China to turn an ostensibly economic string of pearls into a military garotte around India? How quickly can India deploy counter measures? Is it possible that China’s “pearls” are being used as signals intelligence posts or bases for hydrographic research for its submarines?

While China’s intentions are admittedly not clear, what is clear is the incredibly slow Indian response time to threats. Rear Admiral (retd.) James Goldrick of the US Navy had an interesting observation about China’s maritime assets and plans: “China’s naval expansion is substantial and extensive, and it is not going to stop…China is using its civil maritime security forces increasingly effectively… The civil units of the various rapidly expanding agencies are now ‘white fleets’ which allow China to manage situations in a way that puts the onus – and the blame – on any opponent if the latter should resort to military force.”

China’s string of pearls, therefore, may not yet be a threat but Chinese acquisitions – be they material or diplomatic influence – certainly constitute the framework of a future problem. Beijing is certainly not making it easier for its neighbours to get over centuries of mistrust and mistreatment, and India should be wary of any attempt to downplay the danger.

This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on February 08, 2013.