• Home
  • About
  • Reading Lists
    • Egypt
    • Great Books
    • Iran
    • Islam
    • Israel
    • Liberalism
    • Napoleon
    • Nationalism
    • The Nuclear Age
    • Science
    • Russia
    • Turkey
  • Digital Footprint
    • Facebook
    • Instagram
    • Pocket
    • SoundCloud
    • Twitter
    • Tumblr
    • YouTube
  • Contact
    • Email

Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Inter Services Intelligence

India’s Choices

21 Sat Jan 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Book Review

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

China, diplomacy, foreign policy, India, Inter Services Intelligence, ISI, MEA, Ministry of External Affairs, No First Use, nuclear, Pakistan, Shivshankar Menon, Sri Lanka, terrorism

choicesMenon, Shivshankar. Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Penguin Random House, 2016. 224 pp.

Memoirs by retired, senior Indian government officials are an occupational hazard for a historian. On the one hand, they may contain valuable insights or data and offer a peek behind the scenes into the world of policy-making, but on the other, remain the memories and interpretations of one person, usually years after the events. This is true of memoirs everywhere, but what makes them even more perilous in India is the lack of periodically declassified archives. For example, imagine understanding the United States’ role in international affairs through Henry Kissinger’s three-volume memoir.

Shivshankar Menon’s Choices, however, cannot truly be described as a memoir. The book discusses five important decisions India has had to make over the past 25 years, and in each of these, Menon was either intimately involved or at least a senior official in the process. However, the author’s tone is that of a professor than a practitioner. Each of the decisions is placed in its historical context and the rationale for the way things unfolded is broadly explained. Rarely does the reader get the sense that the author was one of the central dramatis personae in what he is reading!

This is not a weakness in itself, but Choices is, unfortunately, very short on the details in terms of the dynamics between the key actors and how the various variables influenced their thinking. How did the decision evolve? What were the hurdles? Whose minds were changed? What were the turf battles? The answers to these sorts of questions come through in government documents and paint a comprehensive picture for historians. Memoirs ought to reveal at least one side of the puzzle, but Menon is reticent on the matter. This could very well be due to India’s secrecy rules, but it still leaves the story incomplete.

The subject matter for Choices is the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China in 1993, civil nuclear cooperation with the United States in 2005, the Pakistani terrorist attack on Bombay in 2008, Delhi’s role in the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, and the rationale behind the nuclear no-first-use policy. Little of what Menon goes over is new to anyone who has followed these events in the newspapers, except to lend a particular line of thought an air of gravitas now that a former foreign secretary and national security advisor is also extending it.

Menon is no hawk on China and in fact thinks that India is entering an era of opportunities with China. As he argues, there are facets to the relationship other than the border. The reason for the delay in settling the border dispute, to Menon’s mind, is that both sides think that time is on their side. For the 1993 accord, the then joint secretary for the North East gives credit to Atal Behari Vajpayee for his many ideas and putting country above party. Regarding China’s present assertiveness, Menon does not believe that encircling China will help; in fact, it will only confirm their worst suspicions, Menon argues, and diminish trust. Similarly, India is too large for China to attempt to encircle.

During the nuclear negotiations with the United States, Menon was foreign secretary. He attributes the willingness of most countries to support India to commercial interests of varying intensity. However, the former foreign secretary has harsh words for the small states with big egos, or the mini-six – Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland. These states had no interest in nuclear commerce and had little stake in India anyway; the Nuclear Suppliers Group gave them some importance and that was they stage upon which they could pontificate.

Although Menon had argued for military reprisal in the aftermath of the Bombay attack in 2008, in retrospect, he defends India’s decision to abjure from the use of force and instead seek a diplomatic route. Menon argues that this has been more successful in that Pakistan has been isolated in the international community and India received cooperation from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar – all Pakistan’s traditional partners. By working through international fora, Delhi was able to bring the heat on Islamabad through Washington, the Europeans, and even its patron, Beijing.

The Israeli model, the former national security advisor opines, has been misquoted in India. It has not brought peace or deterrence to Israel and it will not do so to India. “Mowing the grass,” as the Israelis call it, seeks cumulative deterrence, not absolute deterrence. However, he misunderstands the purpose of Israeli anti-terror operations: they have not been, at least for the past 20 years, for deterrence but for attrition. India’s war against terror is a protracted one and it cannot be solved. Temporary silencing is the best Delhi can hope for, which, according to Menon, is much lower on the list of national priorities than the socioeconomic transformation of India.

Menon is under no illusion that Pakistan continues to be a hotbed of terrorism but he reminds the reader of the more complicated geopolitical web. For example, the United States has restricted India’s access to David Headley, one of the chief reconnoiters for Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence. Additionally, when Ahmed Shuja Pasha, then director general of the ISI, visited the United States, he was given diplomatic immunity to protect him from law suits brought against him by the families of Americans killed in Bombay.

Insisting that nuclear weapons are only political signifiers and not meant for war, Menon defends India’s nuclear NFU policy. His defence could interest only a lay reader, unfortunately, for it completely ignores the counter arguments to such a policy. In all fairness, Choices is not a exegesis of nuclear deterrence theory and a thorough explanation would skew the balance of the topics covered. Essentially, the two strands of Indian nuclear thinking, one represented best by General Krishnaswamy Sundarji and the other by nuclear scientist Raja Ramanna, either viewed the super weapons as necessary to redress a conventional imbalance or as an enabler of political goals. The second strand held sway in the discussions after the 1998 nuclear tests.

On the whole, Menon’s view is that Indian nuclear policy is sober and realistic even though it has been couched in moral terms. He is not particularly fond of the international non-proliferation regime either, for it has not addressed any of India’s concerns such as China’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to Pakistan or the danger of rogue nuclear actors within the Pakistani Army. However, there is no gain to India by flouting it and staying within earns diplomatic goodwill. This should not be construed to mean that India is a status quo power.

The most interesting part of the book is Menon’s brief airing of his views about India’s place in the world. Despite being taken to task by Bharat Karnad in his Why India Is Not A Great Power (Yet), Menon insists that he does believe that India is destined to become a great power and not by soft power alone. The former foreign secretary does believe that there is a particular Indian style to foreign policy, as Deep Datta-Ray argues, though it is difficult to put a finger on it. Nonetheless, Menon attempts to describe it:

If there is an Indian way in foreign policy, it is marked by a combination of boldness in conception and caution in implementation, by the dominant and determining role of the prime minister, by a didactic negotiating style, by a fundamentally realistic approach masked by normative rhetoric, by comfort in a plural and diverse world or multiverse, and, most consistently, by a consciousness of India’s destiny as a great power.

This caution, Menon allows, could be due to systemic failures – the Ministry of External Affairs is desperately understaffed and centralised foreign policy under the prime minister’s office has meant that no other player has the authority to contemplate on grand strategy or vision. In other words, Indian foreign policy (also) suffers from weak institutions. The structured and formal decison-making is always preceded by considerable informal consultations and discussions. In light of this, it makes sense why an MEA official asked Datta-Ray why he wanted to see their documents since they only indicated process and not thinking.

Interestingly, Menon believes in an Indian exceptionalism and his belief in India’s destiny to become a great power smacks of the same Nehruvian arrogance when contraposed with India’s shortcomings in health, infrastructure, education, society, law, governance, and military. Geography and demographics are necessary but not sufficient conditions of becoming a great power.

All things considered, Choices is a disappointing production given the senior positions in government that its author achieved and the knowledge and experience that must have come with them. Anyone expecting a fresh or insightful exposition of Indian foreign policy will instead find an elegant rehashing of what columnists have already said umpteen times. This is a wasted opportunity to reveal, to scholars and the public alike, how choices are made in the PMO and MEA. Its saving grace is that it reads well and is short.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

How India Lost Afghanistan

26 Wed Nov 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on How India Lost Afghanistan

Tags

Afghan National Security Force, Afghanistan, Ajit Doval, ANSF, Arya Guesthouse, Ashfaq Kayani, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, Bilateral Security Agreement, BSA, Chabahar, China, Delaram, Hajigak, Hamid Karzai, Herat, India, Inter Services Intelligence, Iran, ISI, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kyun Ki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi, Mazar-e Sharif, Narendra Modi, Pakistan, Russia, SAARC, SAIL, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Steel Authority of India Limited, Taliban, United States, Uralvagonzavod, Zaranj

There used to be a time, not long ago, when Afghanistan could not get enough of India. Just in 2013, in addition to the usual delegations on business, health, security, and other sectors, then Afghan president Hamid Karzai paid three visits to India. Then suddenly, a coolness developed in India-Afghanistan relations as Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai took over as president after the Afghan elections of April 2014. Just like that, the hot romance had cooled down to a casual acquaintance.

However, things were hardly that sudden. In fact, the Indian government squandered Afghanistan’s goodwill over years of vacillating and incoherent policy towards the country. Where decisions were taken, they went unhonoured as many times as not and Delhi almost appeared disinterested in the future of the central Asian state. Most critically, India repeatedly deflected requests to play a greater role in the security of the nascent Afghan democracy.

India’s historical ties to Afghanistan are well known; every Indian and Afghan leader likes to reflect upon them in front of the camera and analysts usually make at least a cursory reference to them. Yet India’s crisis in the mountainous country has little to do with either Mauryan conquests or Mughal control of the country. More importantly, the policy paralysis India has exhibited in Afghanistan is symptomatic of deeper flaws in the Indian foreign policy apparatus that will have repercussions not just in the country but in the entire region.

In October 2001, less than a month after the September 11 attacks, the United States and its allies launched the invasion of Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. The United States was quick to ask India to contribute towards its Global War on Terror. India showed a willingness to cooperate in terms of intelligence and logistics but firmly refused to play a military role in Afghanistan. Washington appealed to Delhi several times over the tenure of the India-friendly president George W. Bush – even for Indian boots on the ground since 2006 – but Raisina Hill did not budge. Perhaps some felt that the United States owed India for creating a grand mess in the region in the 1980s in the first place.

Riding on the coattails of US military power comes easy to the world, especially when things are going well. However, by 2009, Americans were growing tired of of a war on the other side of the planet that supposedly degraded terrorist networks but did not yield any visible prize. In May 2011, the terrorist queen bee Osama bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan, barely a stone’s throw away from a military facility of an American ally. Domestic public pressure to leave became more now that the mission seemed truly accomplished – the Afghan government had been established in 2004 and it was their responsibility to safeguard their own well being.

Strategists warned, however, that the Taliban was not yet dead and would come back the moment NATO left Afghanistan; the Afghan National Security Force was as yet too weak to resist the Taliban on its own. The United States was desperate for allies in the region to hold on to the gains they had made. Already, as US plans to retreat became more pronounced, the Taliban began a small surge against local and foreign forces.

India’s reticence to become involved in Afghanistan’s security has come at a high price. Even as talk of downsizing the American commitment to Afghanistan appeared in the US presidential election campaign in May 2008, the Indian embassy in Kabul was the target of a terrorist attack that left 58 people dead and 141 wounded; it was targeted again in October 2009, killing at least 17 more. In February 2010, terrorists levelled the Arya Guesthouse, killing nine Indian doctors. In August 2013, the Indian consulate in Jalalabad suffered a suicide bomber with 10 casualties, and the Indian consulate in Herat was attacked in May 2014, thankfully with no injuries. Indians have also been victims of kidnappings and executions in the central Asian version of the Wild, Wild West.

Many of these attacks have been traced back to India’s arch stalker, Pakistan, and its notorious intelligence service, the ISI. The US retreat had not only encouraged the Taliban to launch their own Spring Offensive but also emboldened their patrons in Islamabad to try and dislodge Delhi’s foothold in their backyard. In fact, Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff from 2007 to 2013, had publicly called for minimising India’s role in Afghanistan in exchange for stability in Afghanistan.

India’s inaction in the face of these provocations is curious. On the diplomatic front too, Delhi’s actions can at best be described as tepid except when it has come time to criticise the United States. However, India has helped neither itself nor the region with any proposal of its own. For example, from Delhi’s perspective, Iran holds the key to Afghanistan’s reintegration into South Asia. Yet India has done little to persuade the United States to make an exception to its sanctions on Iran so that India could continue the highway from Delaram to Zaranj through Milak to Chabahar. This route would not only open Afghanistan up to trade but also the rest of Central Asia.

At the same time, Chinese companies trade routinely with Iran in arms, auto parts, electronics, mining, oil, power generation, textiles, toys, transportation, and more. China’s trade with Iran has increased dramatically since 2007 when it replaced the European Union as Iran’s largest trading partner and is set to hit $44 billion this year. India has largely complied with the spirit of the US sanctions by reducing its oil dependency and disconnecting its financial links with Iran.

So timid has Indian diplomacy been that Delhi was excluded from the International Conference on Afghanistan, held in Istanbul in January 2010, largely due to Pakistani pressure. Last year, Delhi’s outcry at the preposterous attempt by Washington to distinguish between a “good Taliban” and a “bad Taliban” was also ignored. Despite vociferously denouncing the withdrawal of US troops, Delhi remained predictably yet frustratingly quiet during the negotiations between Afghanistan and the United States over the Bilateral Security Agreement in 2013 and early 2014. If anything, India’s policy towards Afghanistan since US invasion can be best described as masterly inactivity.

To be fair, Raisina has not been entirely inert: India has extended over $2 billion in aid to Afghanistan, the most it has ever extended to any country. India is the fifth largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, after the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany, though Islamabad remains Kabul’s largest trading partner. Besides the much-publicised Delaram-Zaranj highway, India has also built power lines from Uzbekistan to Kabul, constructed the Salma Dam for hydropower in Herat province, invested in the mining sector at Hajigak (although work has progressed so slowly that Kabul has threatened to take the contract away from the Steel Authority of India), and provided support in education, health, and telecommunications. India opened up four consulates in Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, and in 2007, India also pushed for Afghanistan’s entry into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to better integrate it into the region’s economic networks.

Howbeit, India would do well to look to its own history – if it ever opened it archives – to understand that developmental aid would never mean the same as military assistance. The United States and Japan were the largest sources of developmental aid to India since independence and yet it was the Soviet Union who won the affection of the Indians with their MiG fighter jets and Uralvagonzavod tanks.

India’s military aid to Afghanistan is not quite nil: Delhi trained 576 Afghan troops in 2012 and that number was increased to 1,000 in 2013; over 650 officers and special forces commandos have also received training in India. According to Indian officials, there are also some 500 Indian paramilitary forces deployed in Afghanistan to guard Indian assets as they develop Afghan infrastructure. Finally, in May 2014, India worked out a deal with Russia whereby Delhi would pay Moscow to manufacture and deliver the weapons to Kabul. Though the specifics of this deal are unknown, brand new weapons would cost more and cut into the volume of armaments Afghanistan was looking for. India would also pay to repair old equipment the Soviets had left behind in 1989.

This is not enough for Kabul, which has been blunt about what they expect from India: second-hand weapons such as MiG-21 fighter jets, T-72 tanks, Bofors howitzers, An-32 transport aircraft, Mi-17 helicopters, trucks, bridge-laying equipment, radios, radars, other equipment critical to command & control, and significantly more military trainers. India’s excuses so far have been baffling, from claiming that India does not have surplus weapons and Pakistani refusal to grant overflight permission to requiring Russian permission to manufacture weapons for export under license. Admittedly with the benefit of hindsight, it is nonetheless unclear why Delhi could not anticipate Kabul’s requests and work towards resolving these logjams once it received the first requests from Washington and Kabul in 2006.

Seeing India’s hesitation, Afghanistan has reached out to other regional powers such as China and Russia and has been less prickly towards Pakistan, from whom it had once rejected any military aid, even training. For Kabul, Delhi was the ideal partner as it provided aid with no strings attached given the considerable overlap of interests between the two countries.

India itself invited China, Iran and Japan to find ways of providing for Afghanistan’s security. As most realists would point out, this was a grave mistake by the Indian government – one never offers other governments an opportunity to enter one’s own backyard, especially when one of them harbours hostile intentions and has been known to support a rival neighbour.

The real reasons for India’s vacillating Afghanistan policy are twofold. The first is that Delhi continued to subscribe to the foolish policy of placating Islamabad at all costs lest the latter escalate the situation in Kashmir and elsewhere. Over the last decade, India has approached Pakistan with a soft touch because of domestic votebank politics and/or a mental paralysis that prioritises looking noble and restrained over achieving results. While there was no lessening of support for terrorist activity against India from Islamabad, Delhi genuflected to the half-baked logic of brotherhood and Pakistan as a co-victim of terror. As one analyst argued, India already deploys almost 10,000 troops abroad under the UN flag; it really would not be that difficult or alien an experience for India to put boots on the ground in Afghanistan if it so decided.

The second reason for India’s inertia is that its ruling political party was too inward-looking and occupied with domestic rivalries to formulate an effective national policy. Foreign policy was federalised, with Sri Lanka being the purview of Tamil Nadu, Bangladesh falling to West Bengal, and Pakistan coming under the jurisdiction of Kashmir and its chapter in Delhi. There was no foreign policy community in the country that could grill the government as citizens became withdrawn from governance as scam after scam rocked the country and institutions crumbled one after the other.

In April and May 2014, both India and Afghanistan went to the polls. In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party won in a landslide, the first time any party captured more than 50 % of the seats in the Lok Sabha in 30 years. Even before Narendra Modi took his oath of office, he received two calls from Karzai. The appointment of Ajit Doval as National Security Advisor gave hope to the outgoing Afghan president that India may at last step up to its regional responsibilities.

In Kabul, Ghani took office; unlike his challenger in the polls, Abdullah Abdullah, Ghani had no ties to India. He had not fought alongside Ahmad Shah Masood against the Taliban. Ghani is an academic and a technocrat, educated at the American University of Beirut and Columbia University before teaching at Berkeley and Johns Hopkins and joining the World Bank. While Karzai’s relations with Pakistan were as toxic as his relations with India were good, Ghani comes to the table with a blank slate and is willing to work with Islamabad to reduce terrorism in his country. Now, India fears that this may increase Pakistan’s influence in Kabul yet again.

Ghani is by no means anti-India. However, having watched the South Asian giant vacillate for years, he is following the prudent path by dealing with those ready to do so. Delhi fears that Ghani might overcompensate for his predecessor’s brusqueness with Pakistan and cooperate with them to reduce India’s footprint in Afghanistan in exchange for reducing support to the Taliban.

The pity of it all is that Delhi remained aloof while it had Afghanistan trying to woo it and is now realising its folly, albeit under a different government, when Kabul has turned away to other partners. In many ways, Afghanistan is a litmus test for Delhi’s ascendance as a regional power. One of the many lessons a regional power must understand is that soft power, while useful, is meaningless without hard power.

For a decade, Delhi proudly recalled that the most popular TV serial in Afghanistan was an Indian soap opera, Kyun Ki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi, as proof of the superiority of its soft power over US military force. Yet Kabul burned, and as they used to say back home, dum Romae consulitur, Saguntum expugnatur – while Rome deliberated, Saguntum was captured.


This post first appeared on Swarajya on December 08, 2014.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

India’s War in Afghanistan?

04 Sun Aug 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Pakistan, Security, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, Haqqani network, Herat, India, Inter Services Intelligence, ISI, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif, Pakistan, terrorism

The Indian mission in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was attacked this Saturday. According to reports from the ground, three terrorists drove up to the consulate in a car before detonating their explosives. The target had obviously been the Indian consulate, but the attackers failed to get into the building, detonating their explosives in the street. The incident has left at least 12 dead and 23 injured. Though the Taliban has denied a hand in the attack, suspicions linger primarily on the Pakistani ISI-backed Haqqani network. It has been learned, however, that security threats were received from several smaller terrorist outfits based in Pakistan too. This is not the first attack on Indian assets in Afghanistan – the same station was attacked in 2007, and the Indian embassy was attacked twice, in 2008 and 2009. India maintains three other consulates in the Central Asian country, in Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Kandahar.

Repeated attacks on Indian interests in Afghanistan ought to be worrying in their own regard. To compound Delhi’s worries, al Qa’ida has executed a series of successful jailbreaks in Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan, releasing hundreds of jihadists. Most of these would most likely return to their own wars in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, but many will find their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s troubled frontiers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and perhaps even Pakistani-occupied Kashmir.

In case the prospect of hundreds of returning jihadists did not cause Indian security officials to lose sleep, the US pullout from Afghanistan will leave a tidy cache of weapons for Pakistan. That the abandonment of surplus weaponry too expensive to take back home is standard US practice will be of little consolation to Delhi; furthermore, it is understood that the US is considering resuming military aid to Pakistan through friendly third parties via the Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Fund (PCF) and the Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Capability Fund (PCCF).

The United States is expected to complete its withdrawal by the end of 2014. Many analysts worry that this would cause a surge in Taliban activity in Afghanistan and may sorely test the stability of Hamid Karzai’s government; already, intelligence intercepts indicate that the ISI has placed a bounty on the head of the Indian ambassador to Kabul. Given the trajectory of events in the past ten days, India’s presence in Afghanistan is likely to come under serious attack soon, and definitely post-2014.

India has several options at its disposal. The first is to turn down Indian presence in Afghanistan. By reducing diplomatic and economic ties, India reduces its exposure to the Taliban. Primarily preoccupied with regaining power at home, it is unlikely that the Afghan part of the Taliban would bother to chase Indians across the border…for now. This option buys time (though for what is unclear), and reduces the intensity of attacks India will probably experience otherwise in the immediate future.

A second option is to further fortify Indian consulates and the embassy, as well as lean on the Afghan government to provide extra security in areas Indians live and work. After all, Delhi has already invested approximately $2 billion in infrastructural loans in the country and will probably increase its role in that sector. However, this option will only increase the illusion of security without necessarily providing significant increase in safety. Indians outside the heavily fortified compounds of their companies and government will remain vulnerable to attacks and kidnappings; embassy security can be breached by a dedicated team of well-armed terrorists, which the present situation has certainly created. In addition, it will always remain a difficult task to do business in a country from behind high walls, to say nothing of the hit India’s soft power will take. The message from Delhi will appear to read, “Your problems are yours alone, we are here only for the economics.”

Delhi’s third option is to increase dramatically the range and quantity of weapons Afghanistan wants to buy from it. The Karzai government has already presented India with such a wishlist in May, but the UPA government refused to consider the request. Manmohan Singh may have to reconsider this decision now, given the increasing threats to Indian interests, Pakistan’s boldness, and the US retreat. It may certainly sound like an imperial policy, but realpolitik dictates that India must be willing to defend Afghanistan at least until the last drop of Afghan blood.

A strong Indian backing of Afghanistan is not merely about Pakistan; India also has interests in developing its access to Central Asia’s rich energy resources as well as seek out trade opportunities in those countries as an insurance policy against other regional states of concern. Especially if India stops dragging its feet on the development of Chabahar, Afghanistan may develop into a vital conduit of Central Asian energy for India.

India’s most heavy-handed option is to deploy its military overseas. There is no indication that Kabul would welcome this, and more importantly, the cost of such an adventure could be astronomical in terms of money as well as blood. This is assuming, of course, that India can work out the logistics and even has the capability for such an operation. India also suffers from its version of the Vietnam Syndrome, the IPKF Syndrome, and any such foreign deployment will be fraught with political ambiguity, social second-guessing, and military danger.

For now, the prudent course of action seems to be to follow a combination of these options – give the Afghan Army a blank cheque regarding weapons it wants from India, train their soldiers and special forces, and send the inaugural contingent of a “Diplomatic Assets Protection Force” to Afghanistan. The purpose of this newly-formed force to be drawn from elite Indian units would be solely to guard Indian facilities in hotspots around the world. In his recent meeting with Pakistan’s new prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the United States will, after all, be maintaining a residual force in Afghanistan post-2014; India needs to explore any synergies that exist between the US’ new mission as evinced by this force and its own security. Russia might be another logistical partner South Block can tap – after all, Moscow ought to be almost as concerned as Delhi about a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan spreading its ideology into the former Soviet –stans. Delhi can then cross its fingers and pray – this will not be over any time soon.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on August 05, 2013.

Share this:

  • Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Tumblr (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pinterest (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Pocket (Opens in new window)
  • Click to email this to a friend (Opens in new window)
  • Click to print (Opens in new window)
  • More
  • Click to share on LinkedIn (Opens in new window)
  • Click to share on Reddit (Opens in new window)

Like this:

Like Loading...

Chirps

  • French nuclear slump comes at a wrong geopolitical time: bloom.bg/3wR9MLA | Build more reactors, maintain ex… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 7 hours ago
  • Japan to enable fighter jet and missile exports to 12 nations: s.nikkei.com/3MWyIXL | India, Australia, Vietnam,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 7 hours ago
  • Scientists can now grow wood in a lab without cutting a single tree: bit.ly/3LWV89Y | How long to scale it? 7 hours ago
  • Samoa signs bilateral pact with China: bit.ly/3MYBTOq | You'd think they had learned from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, etc 11 hours ago
  • RT @elderofziyon: Here is a summary of what @bellingcat and @CNN got wrong with Shireen Abu Akleh's death: The only way they have any clue… 11 hours ago
Follow @orsoraggiante

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 225 other followers

Follow through RSS

  • RSS - Posts

Categories

Archives

Recent Posts

  • The Mysterious Case of India’s Jews
  • Polarised Electorates
  • The Election Season
  • Does Narendra Modi Have A Foreign Policy?
  • India and the Bomb
  • Nationalism Restored
  • Jews and Israel, Nation and State
  • The Asian in Europe
  • Modern Political Shibboleths
  • The Death of Civilisation
  • Hope on the Korean Peninsula
  • Diminishing the Heathens
  • The Writing on the Minority Wall
  • Mischief in Gaza
  • Politics of Spite
  • Thoughts on Nationalism
  • Never Again (As Long As It Is Convenient)
  • Earning the Dragon’s Respect
  • Creating an Indian Lake
  • Does India Have An Israel Policy?
  • Reclaiming David’s Kingdom
  • Not a Mahatma, Just Mohandas
  • How To Read
  • India’s Jerusalem Misstep
  • A Rebirth of American Power

Management

  • Register
  • Log in
  • Entries feed
  • Comments feed
  • WordPress.com
Considerate la vostra semenza: fatti non foste a viver come bruti, ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza.

Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.

  • Follow Following
    • Chaturanga
    • Join 225 other followers
    • Already have a WordPress.com account? Log in now.
    • Chaturanga
    • Customise
    • Follow Following
    • Sign up
    • Log in
    • Report this content
    • View site in Reader
    • Manage subscriptions
    • Collapse this bar
 

Loading Comments...
 

    loading Cancel
    Post was not sent - check your email addresses!
    Email check failed, please try again
    Sorry, your blog cannot share posts by email.
    %d bloggers like this: