Tag Archives: JCPOA

Politics of Spite

09 Wednesday May 2018

Posted by in Iran, Middle East

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As predicted, US president Donald Trump has led the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The agreement, which was supposed to increase international (Western) oversight into Tehran’s nuclear programme and hopefully rein in its nuclear ambitions, was one of the few unambiguously positive legacies of Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama, but ran into opposition even during the delicate negotiations. Critics tried to add riders involving their pet projects – usually human rights or missile development – to the deal in an attempt to derail process. Consistent with his pre-election criticism for once, Trump had called the JCPOA a bad deal and promised to repudiate it if elected.

America’s European partners – Britain, France, Germany, and Russia – have parted ways with Washington and declared their intent to continue adherence to the JCPOA; China has so far been mute but already threatened with a trade war with the United States, it is highly likely that it, too, will follow the Europeans in holding on to the Iranian nuclear deal.

It is not yet clear what the fallout of the American departure from the JCPOA will be. Although the rhetoric of the exit has been focused on how the agreement did not go far enough in preventing Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons, the fact that Trump administration officials have stated that sanctions will be “snapped back” indicates that they believe Iran to be in breach of its obligations under the JCPOA – although most technical experts disagree with this evaluation.

Given that the other members of the E3 + 3 – particularly Britain, France, and Germany – will not be following the US example, the interesting question is if Washington intends to sanction their businesses and banks under the recently passed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) as India fears its defence dealings with Russia might. This would cause an enormous rupture in in the US and world economy as China is the United States’ single largest trading partner and Britain, France, and Germany are together the fourth largest ahead of Japan. Yet if Trump does use his presidential discretion to waive sanctions and exempt these four countries, it would be too blatant an act of political hypocrisy if the same treatment was not extended to others over Russia and North Korea as well as over Iran.

In February 2018, Patrick Pouyanné, the CEO of the French oil & gas giant Total, openly called for the implementation of the 1996 European Union Blocking Regulation, a law that prohibited European firms from cooperating with foreign demands that are in violation of international law or hurt European sovereign interests. Denis Chaibi, a senior diplomat in the European External Action Service, commented that the EU was looking at a variety of options and the blocking regulations would not be difficult to implement.

Ultimately, these are political instruments and businesses would be hurt either by European penalties for obeying US sanctions or the denial of access to American markets due to US sanctions. Obviously, firms would prefer having access to the far larger American markets than pin their hopes on soaring Euro-Iranian trade and the threat of blocking regulations is empty. States are supposed to exercise restrain and caution and a tit-for-tat exchange between the United States and its three primary European allies will hurt everyone. More to the point, the multinational supply chains of most large industrial houses today means that there would be few European firms that are not exposed to the United States and are free to do business with Iran.

Internationally, many countries would be pulled into the US wake for similar reasons; most countries are fairly integrated into the US economy and their national economies are not robust enough to withstand the loss of the American market. Additionally, others may have political reasons to reluctantly support Washington. India, for example, has been trying to purchase high-end American weapons systems and seeks Washington’s cooperation on several crucial issues such as defence technology and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific. It is most likely that India will have to bear the damage done to its own ambitions in Chabahar and the International North-South Trade Corridor (INSTC). Delhi will have even more to lose if Tehran responds to Delhi’s distancing by handing the responsibility for the Shahid Beheshti port over to Beijing.

If India can persuade the United States for a partial waiver on trade as it had done last time, its importance to Tehran would rise again only to the extent that other countries stop or reduce links with the Islamic republic.

Saudi Arabia, considered to be one of the beneficiaries of the American abnegation of the JCPOA, will enjoy in the short-term the spike in oil prices that is bound to follow Trump’s decision. However, this entire episode will have reiterated to Iran that the only way to be truly safe from American interference, as an Indian general is supposed to have observed after the First Gulf War in 1991, is to acquire nuclear weapons. Tehran seems to have been acutely aware of this note – Iran’s ambitions, as revealed by Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent document dump, were to posses just five nuclear warheads than an entire arsenal.

Riyadh has only managed to stoke Tehran’s determination and not douse it. The JCPOA was designed to give the international community breathing space to consider how best to dampen Iran’s love of the Bomb – it was never meant to provide a permanent solution as there are none. As non-proliferation experience has illustrated, the determined country will acquire nuclear weapons regardless of the financial and political costs to it and the willingness to pay such a high price will attract unscrupulous suppliers. The classic example of this is Pakistan, whose nuclear journey would have taken far longer had it not been for the generous acts of commission by China and of omission by the United States.

Perhaps the greatest beneficiary of the American walkout is Israel. On the one hand, the reintroduction and expansion of sanctions hurts the Iranian economy and removes funds that might have otherwise gone to fund the Hezbollah and its adventures in Syria but on the other, the European and Iranian decision to continue observing the JCPOA keeps the checks on the Iranian nuclear programme in place for at least the next decade. If the archives reveal 30 years down the line that this was a game of good-cop-bad-cop, this would be a strategic masterstroke by Benjamin Netanyahu.

The one certainty at this moment is that Iran is not as isolated as it was prior to 2015. Even if Europe falls in line with America’s wishes, Russia and China are both unlikely to go along with the West this time. Both countries have been antagonised by Trump’s sanctions and threats of a trade war to be receptive to cooperation. This opens the door for greater Russian and Chinese influence in the Middle East. Russia also gains by the rift that has been created between Europe and the United States over the Iranian nuclear programme.

In some ways, Trump has just given Iran’s hardline clerics a lease of life. There have been several signs that Iranians citizens are frustrated with their government and the poor economy. Some analysts were even hopeful of organic reforms that would gradually move the country from its extreme Islamic views. Trump’s abandonment of the JCPOA underscores everything hardliners warned against – that the United States is not a trustworthy partner and it ultimately seeks the total subjugation of Iran.

If Washington expects Tehran to come back to the negotiating table, it may have a long wait. Rather than re-engage with a party that has shown bad faith, Iranian president Hassan Rouhani may simply choose to wait out his American counterpart in the hopes that Trump’s successor would be more amenable to the Obamian status quo.

It is not clear what the Trump administration sought to achieve by leaving the JCPOA. If anything, it draws attention to the Iranian bogey in American minds and the ghosts of 1979 that such policies would have any support in the houses of legislature or with the citizens. Pace the political acrobatics that are about to ensue over the coming days, the ultimate prize is the withering of the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. It is not clear if anyone in the White House had kept that in mind while thinking about abruptly walking out of an international treaty.

This post appeared on FirstPost on May 10, 2018.

Nuclear Security and Nuclear Convenience

24 Thursday Mar 2016

Posted by in Nuclear, Security, United States

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With an important nuclear conference – the last Nuclear Security Summit – about to start in a week, this is usually the time when articles criticising aspects of non-Western nuclear programmes coincidentally begin to appear. India has been a favoured subject recently, inspiring thoughtful prose before the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, biennial meetings of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation, and annual Nuclear Suppliers Group plenaries. It is a lot of ink that only serves to reiterate what VC Trivedi, India’s ambassador to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in the mid-1960s, called nuclear apartheid.

The NSS has addressed issues that have not received sufficient attention in existing fora. Juicier topics such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive related technology have their own fora in the NPT and NSG communities as well as the United Nations and other regional and bilateral frameworks. By contrast, the safety of nuclear materials seems like plain police work and has largely been left to individual states and industry to handle. Agreements such as the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are rare and safety regime so far inadequate. Nonetheless, participants at the NSS have taken a creative approach to nuclear safety and security, raising the possibility of even stepping away entirely from the use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It is in this expanded and comprehensive view of safety and security that we should also consider policy and not just the technicalities of nuclear weapons, energy, and commerce.

First, it is clear that the United States needs reminding that it presently possesses a stockpile of around 7,000 nuclear weapons. This, if you can believe it, is actually the result of years of disarmament from an all-time high level of almost 30,000 nuclear weapons. Since the nuclear ayatollahs have always told us that more weapons mean more danger, it seems obvious that significantly reducing that stockpile is the place to start.

Russia and the United States each have about the same number of nuclear weapons, estimated to be some 25 times (!) that of the next nuclear power, France. By contrast, India is estimated to have 120 nuclear weapons. Even granting Russia and the United States a temporary 10:1 advantage, they would still need to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpile by half before they enter the realm of reason.

Second, the nuclear modernisation drive that all the treaty nuclear powers are on does not augur well for the reputation of the non-proliferation regime. Were a cynical attitude to develop among member states, international cooperation would be made even more difficult; the difficulty in having a common sensical amendment to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is clear indication that faith in the global nuclear framework is eroding. During the long negotiations with Iran that recently culminated in a favourable agreement, a fear that repeatedly arose was the lack of faith in international institutions as neutral arbiters of law. India’s objection to intrusive inspections that allow fuel tracking through its nuclear complex is also along similar lines of security and questionable impartiality.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran was a truly commendable diplomatic effort. The Islamic republic had taken creative license with its Article IV right under the NPT to enrich uranium and the international community persuaded Tehran of its obligations to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities for verification. It would be even more commendable were a similar effort put behind reminding the N5 – the five nuclear powers recognised by the NPT – of their long-pending Article VI obligation towards nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. Until now, there seems to be no sign that the N5 have even recognised this promise. Such double standards weaken the nuclear regime that will find a challenger in every Iran and North Korea when their geopolitical situation demands it.

Such hypocrisy is not new – even before NPT opened for signing, the United States kept it quiet that its interpretation of Articles I and II of the treaty allowed for nuclear sharing between NATO countries; US nuclear weapons could thus be deployed to non-nuclear states such as Italy, Turkey, and West Germany. The US role in the Israeli and Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons, of omission or commission, certainly marks it as one of the most irresponsible nuclear powers in the world. China’s overt assistance to the Pakistani nuclear programme puts it in the same company. If the world community is to accept that nuclear weapons present an unbearable risk and their proliferation must be prevented,  Washington’s reckless behaviour from the 1960s to the 1980s does little to convince the sceptics.

A different kind of recklessness is revealed in Eric Schlosser’s Command and Control, a terrifying book about the several close calls the United States had in handling nuclear weapons. To be sure, it is praiseworthy that the United States is an open society where such research was possible – other nuclear weapons states are far more hesitant to allow such information to be made public. Nonetheless, when Washington finds research in Trombay or Kalpakkam risky, it has little ground to stand on. The recent scandals involving the United States’ missile men shows that this plague of poor maintenance and readiness is not yet over.

Even if the attendees at the NSS were willing to let history remain in the past, there remain some serious questions regarding present US nuclear policy. Washington believes, for example, that reprocessing, even under safeguards, is an unacceptable proliferation risk and the nuclear fuel cycle must remain open. In effect, the United States believes that it is safer to bury radioactive nuclear waste for some 29,000 years than to recycle it until the most dangerous radioactive elements are burned up and store a fraction of the waste for 300 years or less. Such faith in our engineering capabilities will require some proselytism, especially when the other option promises energy security and expands fuel availability by several thousand years.

Perhaps a genuine drive for nuclear safety would include the mainstreaming of thorium reactors for energy. There is plenty of intelligent speculation among nuclear energy enthusiasts that the Molten Salt Reactor programme was abandoned in the 1960s because it was not fissile material-friendly. MSRs do not remove all risk – nothing does – but they substantially reduce the security and safety implications present in light water reactors. Admittedly, nuclear research in the United States is more and more in private hands but a CCC-like (Conference on Climate Change) effort to mobilise international will and resources would address multiple concerns simultaneously. The NSS would not be the appropriate forum for such a venture but issues as grave as nuclear safety and security can know no boundaries.

There is plenty to be said about the United States and N5 behaviour regarding nuclear weapons and energy, a lot of it not laudatory. This would be nice to remember the next time a column raises alarm about some allegedly new development in India. It would put the alarm in context, and chances are, the world will still be here tomorrow.

This post appeared on FirstPost on March 26, 2016.

Iran’s Nuclear Deal

14 Tuesday Jul 2015

Posted by in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear

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Historically, negotiations have rarely resulted in the complete capitulation of one side to the other side’s demands. Even military force, for that matter, has provided only uncertain results – Carthage paid off the war indemnity levied by Rome after the Second Punic War ahead of schedule but Berlin proved a far more tightfisted customer after World War I. The Japanese, even after losing two cities to nuclear bombing, refused to surrender unconditionally to the United States in World War II. With that background in mind, the nuclear deal agreed upon by Iran and the E3+3 (Britain, France, Germany + United States, Russia, China) is the praiseworthy outcome of 23 months of hard bargaining between the two sides. Politics demands playing to the home crowd and that each side emphasise the gains it made in the talks but the agreement is remarkably fair and a model for future non-proliferation risk scenarios.

Iran nuclear mapThe nuclear deal, however, thankfully depends upon the exact terms and conditions laid out in the agreement and not the rhetorical interpretation of either side. To that end, the terms are a logical extension of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed upon in July this year. The final JCPOA, running to 159 pages, consists of the terms and conditions between Iran and the E3+3 as well as a detailed timeline of implementation and dispute arbitration mechanisms. The deal achieves balance also in that it is progressively implemented in a staggered manner, allowing each side to gain confidence in the other’s intentions. The agreement reflects Iran’s practical needs and research ambitions aside the international community’s desire for circumscription, transparency, and verification. A Joint Commission (JC) reporting to the United Nations Security Council and comprised of a representative from each of the negotiating parties as well as one from the European Union, will oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal and serve as a forum for dispute arbitration.

As US President Barack Obama said in his speech, the JCPOA is not based on trust but on verification. As such, it has two aims: to extend Iran’s breakout time – the time required for Iran to acquire a nuclear device after it expels international observers from its facilities – as much as possible and give the international community time to respond, and to make sneakout – a clandestine parallel programme designed to provide Iran with a nuclear weapon – virtually impossible. Towards this end, Iran will accept limitations on its uranium enrichment and research & development for the first eight years after which it will be gradually allowed to begin enrichment activities and research. Tehran is restricted to using its first generation centrifuges, the IR-1, for 10 years; enrichment will not be allowed beyond 3.67 per cent and all such activity will be restricted to just one facility – Natanz – for 15 years, where 5060 IR-1s will be installed and the rest kept in storage under continuous IAEA monitoring. Failed or damaged centrifuge machines may be replaced from storage.

However, Iran is allowed to conduct research in future generations of centrifuges, the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8, at a small scale in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium and isotope separation will be limited. Work on IR-4 is restricted to a cascade of 10 machines and one machine for the IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8. After 8.5 years, the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades may be expanded to 30 machines. The manufacture of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors will be allowed then in consultation with the JC. At no point is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium in any form to exceed 300 kilogrammes. Any excess quantities must be sold on the international market or downblended to natural uranium level. These combined restriction on stockpile, enrichment, and rate of production serve as technical barriers to an Iranian breakout bomb.

Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology centre where an additional 1044 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed in six cascades. Two of these will be used for isotope production for medical, industrial, and research purposes and the other four will remain idle. Iran’s heavy water reactor at Arak will be redesigned to use lightly enriched uranium (LEU), minimise plutonium production, and operate at 7 MW instead of the 40 MW it was originally designed for. No more heavy water reactors will be constructed in the country for 15 years and surplus heavy water will be exported.

What is a remarkable achievement for the West is that Tehran has agreed to not only ship out all spent fuel from Arak but also from all of its other research and power reactors. Furthermore, Iran will not engage in spent fuel reprocessing, construct a facility capable of reprocessing, or conduct any research in the area except for isotope production. Iran has also acquiesced to not acquiring fissile metals or conduct research on their machining, casting, and metallurgy for 15 years. This effectively shuts down a second, plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. What may be of concern to Iran, however, is that this limits its options in any future interest in fast reactors.

Javad ZarifThe JCPOA also makes it incumbent upon Iran to apply the Additional Protocol (AP) to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement within a timeframe. Another remarkable feature of the JCPOA is that Iran will resolve all its issues regarding past and present activities with the IAEA within the next six months. These, along with other stipulations agreed upon by both parties, will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the various non-proliferation measures. The IAEA will have a long-term presence in Iran, monitor its uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years, maintain surveillance on enrichment machinery such as bellows and centrifuge rotors for 20 years, and install monitoring equipment in Iran’s nuclear facilities that will provide a measure of transparency for 15 years. This surveillance will make an Iranian dash for the bomb more difficult even as its more advanced centrifuges start to come online after 10 years.

The nuclear agreement draws out a timeline stretching at least ten years for complete sanctions relief. Staggered between Finalisation Day (conclusion of negotiations), Adoption Day (endorsement of the JCPOA by the UNSC), Implementation Day (IAEA verification of Iranian implementation of nuclear-related measures), Transition Day (eight years from Adoption Day when the IAEA should have reached a Broader Conclusion regarding Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions and Iran seeks ratification of the AP), and Termination Day (ten years from Adoption Day when the UNSC closes its Iran file based upon interim progress), nuclear-related sanctions against Iran by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States will be repealed contingent upon Iran meeting its end of the bargain.

During the implementation of the JCPOA, ff there is any suspicion of Iran possessing illicit nuclear material, a complaint may be filed with the JC. Iran must respond quickly and if its answer is not satisfactory, an on-site visit by the IAEA can be ordered. However, Iran has the option of suggesting other methods by which its compliance can be reassured. This entire exchange must occur within 14 days, allowing the monitoring agency timely access to Iran’s nuclear facilities. Given the short timeframe in which this process is to occur, it gives little time for Iran to conceal evidence of potential wrongdoing and is as close to anytime access as can be reasonably expected of Iran.

Until the last few days, the E3+3 were divided amongst themselves on the automatic reapplication of sanctions in case of Iranian non-compliance. Russia and China viewed automatic sanctions as a violation of their veto rights in the UNSC while the United States worried that it may not be possible to hold the international community and the permanent members of the UNSC together on the subject. This difficulty has been ingeniously resolved in the final agreement. Once a complaint has been filed, the JC has 35 days to resolve the matter satisfactorily. If it fails to do so, the matter may be brought up before the UNSC again. To prevent sanctions from returning, the Security Council would have to pass a resolution declaring that sanctions should not be reapplied. If this resolution does not pass within 30 days, sanctions snap back on Iran. Given the negative wording of the resolution, a veto would not be able to block reapplication of sanctions within 65 days of the initial notification.

In exchange for Iran returning to a nuclear stature it committed to in the NPT, the E3+3 will cooperate with Iran in matters of civil nuclear technology and ensure that the country meets international standards in nuclear safety and security. Iran will also receive assistance in attaining global guidelines in the export of nuclear materials. Initially, these cooperative ventures are meant to hasten Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA’s terms but they also signal Iran’s return to good standing that makes it eligible for such cooperation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal tried to add missile proliferation and even human rights concerns to the agenda but that would have in all likelihood scuttled the deal. Strictly speaking, neither of those issues bear a strong relationship to Iran’s nuclear programme; Iran’s ballistic missile programme has incurred sanctions of its own apart from the nuclear restrictions. To critics, it is unsatisfying that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions altogether; it is also unrealistic.

Iran nuclear deal leadersWhatever else the JCPOA may be, it is not a victory for non-proliferation efforts. Vienna, Lausanne, and Geneva were merely different battlegrounds for the geopolitical struggle between Iran and the United States. Washington has tried to interpret the NPT to its convenience and deny Iran its enrichment rights under the treaty but this is a farcical attempt. Besides the NPT being fundamentally unequal, even a quick glance at the debates in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) that led to the NPT would reveal that non-proliferation was only a tangential goal. Furthermore, when convenient, Washington has not found it difficult to look the other way when its allies are busy acquiring nuclear arsenals. Yet a nuclear Iran threatens Western interests and also their security as Tehran’s missiles reach farther and farther.

The successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement with Iran does not mean that the West has a new ally in the Middle East. On the contrary, Washington and other Western capitals will be busy trying to reassure their friends in the region that the deal is not an indication of a new geopolitical alignment or in any way threatening to them. The fear in Arab capitals will be that an Iran free from crippling sanctions is bound to alter the balance of power between itself and its Arab neighbours. Already, events in Iraq have seen Tehran’s influence grow and its grip on Syria does not seem to be loosening despite four years of civil war. The United States and the European Union will continue to struggle against Iranian ambitions in Syria, Iraq, and perhaps Afghanistan. While Washington still remembers the Tehran Embassy hostage crisis vividly, Iran has yet to come to terms with the US-sponsored coup in 1953, the tacit US approval of two nuclear programmes in Israel and Pakistan, and the arming of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons in the 1980s which he used with impunity on Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War.

Despite these recriminations, both sides were able to reach an amicable settlement that prevented yet another war in the Middle East. If implemented according to plan, the JCPOA is a very good deal for both sides. Iran has given up one path to nuclear weapons, its breakout time has been extended to at least a year, and continuous IAEA presence has made sneakout very difficult. For all its alleged flaws, it would be no surprise if the negotiators of the JCPOA were to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in the near future. As for the nuclear apartheid codified in the NPT, Iran signed and ratified the treaty – perhaps next time, it should think before making a commitment of such gravity. The sanctions and the limitations on its nuclear programme are the price Tehran now has to pay.

This post first appeared on Swarajya on July 15, 2015.