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Chaturanga

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Tag Archives: John Kerry

Israel’s Day At The Ballot Box

18 Wed Mar 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Israel, Middle East

≈ Comments Off on Israel’s Day At The Ballot Box

Tags

Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu, European Union, Gaza, HaBayit HaYehudi, Iran, Isaac Herzog, Israel, John Boehner, John Kerry, Knesset, Kulanu, Likud, Meretz, Mitch McConnell, Moshe Kahlon, nuclear, Palestine, Reuven Rivlin, Samantha Power, Saudi Arabia, settlements, Susan Rice, United List, United States, UTJ, West Bank, Yahadut HaTora HaMeuhedet, Yesh Atid, Yisrael Beiteinu, Zionist Union

March 17 is an important day for many reasons, but it is known primarily for being the death anniversary of Patrick, one of the patron saints of Ireland. On this day in 180, Marcus Aurelius died, very unwisely, leaving the Empire to Commodus; in 1861, the Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, perhaps equally unwisely; and in 2015, Israel went to the polls and elected Binyamin Netanyahu…how wisely, is yet to be seen. These elections have evinced interest from important capitals in the West and the region, for Israel’s policies could influence a very volatile region at a crucial juncture.

Netanyahu’s reelection is a big blow to the Democrats in the United States. The difficult relationship between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu is no secret; Jerusalem and Washington have differences on the Palestinian question but Iran has made the relationship even more acrimonious. While the White House has sought to engage diplomatically with Tehran and come to a negotiated settlement, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office has insisted on a harsher interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran’s obligations under it as a signatory. In September 2012, Netanyahu made a speech in the United Nations that urged the United States to draw clear red lines on Iranian nuclear development beyond which to consider a military solution to the issue. Israel has stuck to this stance despite several public statements from Israel’s own former intelligence chiefs that downplayed the Iranian nuclear threat to Israel.

In January of this year, the Netanyahu-Obama relationship became even more acrid when the Israeli prime minister accepted an invitation from John Boehner, the leader of the US House of Representatives, and Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, to address a joint session of the US Congress. The Republicans, who were critical of Obama’s nuclear negotiations with Tehran, were incensed at the US president’s threat to veto any bill that proposed passing new sanctions on Iran and broke diplomatic protocol by inviting a foreign head of state to Congress without the knowledge of the White House. This saga unfolded in the wake of ugly allegations that the US State Department had funded a tax-exempt organisation to undermine Netanyahu’s bid for reelection. In February 2015, senior US officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, publically criticised Netanyahu and some even took to the social media platform Twitter to attack him.

Israeli elections 2015It is important to understand this background for it informs the outcome of the Israeli election. The most important issue that concerns Israel today, according to Netanyahu, is the nuclearisation of Iran. On this, he has shown willingness to damage Israel’s relations with its closest ally and even weaken the bipartisan support it has enjoyed in the US Congress. This brinkmanship and fearmongering on the international scene finds strong support domestically. Netanyahu’s victory confirms that many ordinary Israelis agree with his assessment even over the opinion of their military and intelligence chiefs. While opinion poll after opinion poll tells us that Israelis are concerned about the social issues such as the cost of living, housing, and employment, Netanyahu’s Likud surged ahead of Isaac Herzog and his Zionist Union upon promises that Netanyahu would never accept a Palestinian state and continue to expand settlements in the disputed territories. Moshe Kahlon and his Kulanu, who had actually run on an economic platform, managed only fifth place with 10 seats, behind the Likud, Zionist Union, (Arab) United List, and Yesh Atid. Similar behaviour was observed even in 2013, and with 72 per cent voter turnout in these elections, ideology and identity seem to mean far more to Israelis than socioeconomic well-being – not a surprising conclusion but one that militates against the logic of the rational actor. Perhaps because for Israelis, ideology and identity is synonymous with security – a higher order need than bread alone.

Netanyahu was also helped by the fact that many of those who voted for him did so only because they could not see any viable alternative. To the middle class, he has been a disappointment though most admit that he is their man on security. What might put a spanner in the works is President Reuven Rivlin had earlier indicated that he would seek a national unity government. Given the political landscape, it would be very difficult for Herzog to produce a winning combination: he would have to seduce the Yahadut HaTora HaMeuhedet away from the Likud with concessions to synagogues, unite Meretz, the United List, and Yesh Atid behind him, and hope that Kahlon does not return to his Likud roots. Instead, the size of Likud’s victory might just persuade Rivlin to invite the leader of the largest party to form the governing coalition rather than maintain his earlier desire.

Netanyahu has used two issues to rally his base – the fear of a nuclear Iran and the undesirability of Palestinian statehood. His victory now puts Israel on a collision course with both the European Union and the United States, the former over Palestine and settlements and the latter over Iran. Unfortunately, the Israeli prime minister has no solutions of his own to offer either. On Palestine, Israel has two choices – accept their statehood or incorporate them into a larger, multicultural, non-Jewish Israel. The only other option is to use military force to initiate a mass exodus of the people of Gaza and the West Bank, a thoroughly unpalatable course of action with dire consequences for Jerusalem.

To become prime minister, however, one needs 61 of the 120 seats in the Knesset and the Likud’s 30 means there will be a coalition yet again. A coalition of the religious parties and Likud alone will not suffice to give Netanyahu the majority he needs and so he will have to reach out to the centrists at least. All centrist and leftist parties support Palestinian statehood though each have their own caveats. Nonetheless, this means that there will be support for Palestinian statehood within the ruling coalition and that could restrict the prime minister’s hand during his term.

From Iran, Netanyahu expects total supplication. No country could accept such terms short of total conquest, especially not the proud Persians. To be fair, Israel’s concerns are not unfathomable, especially to Indians. Jerusalem fears the nuclear veto Tehran will possess on Israel’s range of options if Iran ever crosses the nuclear Rubicon, much the same way Pakistan holds India hostage today. Unfortunately for Israel, its options are constricted for war with Iran without the backing of the United States – even with the backing of the United States – will be a thoroughly taxing affair and not be limited to the deserts of the Middle East but spread to all Jewish assets across the globe. Furthermore, Israel’s greatest patron, Uncle Sam, is exhausted after over a decade of military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Even worse for Israel, sanctions alone have proven ineffective against Iran for several reasons.

Politics makes for strange bedfellows, and interestingly, Israel is not alone in its fear – paranoia? – about the possibility of an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Netanyahu has the silent backing of at least Saudi Arabia and the majority of the Persian Gulf states such as Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. For reasons of political optics, it is a safe bet that this will not materialise into public support of Israel by the Arab monarchies and Israel will be remain isolated.

It would be an interesting exercise to study where the Likud got its votes. Compared to the results of the 2013 elections, it appears that the largest share of Likud’s votes came from other right-wing parties: while Likud jumped from 19 to 30, HaBayit HaYehudi and Yisrael Beiteinu fell from 12 and 11 to 8 and 6. On the whole, the right-wing parties have gained only one seat, from 43 to 44. It would, therefore, be inaccurate to consider this a landslide victory for the Right.

For India, the Israeli elections mean nothing. Delhi’s relations with Jerusalem are not so close that the finer differences between Israel’s political actors matter much to Raisina Hill. India plays the role of the deaf-mute in the Middle East for lack of capability (and willingness?) and has little influence on any side of any conflict. India would like to boost trade with Iran but Delhi has so far followed the American line and reduced its oil imports from the Middle Eastern state. Similarly, Israel is hardly likely to strike an alliance with Pakistan’s non-state friends – terrorists – nor is it likely to develop a strategic relationship with either Pakistan or China in the near future. Any government in Israel will be willing to develop its military and civilian relationship with India.

In sum, Netanyahu has come to power by playing on two major concerns, it appears, of the Israeli people and yet he has no solution to either. In fact, his preferences would put Israel squarely at war or at loggerheads with its close allies. At this moment, it is difficult to see how this will actualise into a successful prime ministership. One possibility is that Netanyahu will hope for a Republican victory in the next US presidential election; he will bide his time until January 2017 when Obama finally leaves office and hope to repair some of the damage done these past few years. Europe will be a tougher but less valuable nut to crack. For now, a sombre mood hangs over the Tehran, Washington, and a few pockets of Israel.


This post first appeared on Swarajya on March 19, 2015.

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The Russians Are Coming!

01 Sat Mar 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Europe

≈ Comments Off on The Russians Are Coming!

Tags

Antonio Gramsci, Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, Crimea, EU, European Union, Eurozone, G-8, hegemony, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Jack Matlock, John Kerry, Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, nationalism, NATO, realism, Rodric Braithwaite, Russia, sanctions, Ukraine, United States, Viktor Yanukovych

Napoleon is supposed to have warned his generals never to ascribe to malice that which could be explained by incompetence. The general tone of reportage and analysis on the riots in Ukraine, however, challenges the Little Corporal’s advice. For weeks, Western coverage has focused on the unsettling situation in Ukraine and the unhealthy relations of its oligarchs and President Viktor Yanukovych with Russia. Many have urged the European Union and the United States to adopt a firmer posture with Kiev and Moscow to win Ukraine over to the “European side” without giving any thought to what the region means strategically to Russia and how such ventures might precipitate a sharp response from Moscow.

When the Russian parliament finally did respond by authorising the use of military force to protect Russian minorities in Crimea, there was much shock and horror (at least feigned) in Washington and the capitals of Europe. In an eerie encore of their surreal commentary before Russian military manoeuvres, analysts suggested that the crisis may have been thwarted had Ukraine been a member of NATO as the organisation had spread to the Baltic republics ten years ago. Lithuanian foreign minister Linas Linkevičius invoked NATO’s Article IV which calls for immediate consultations upon the violation of territorial integrity of a NATO member while others have pointed to the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO which promises (Art. V:14) that the latter will support the former’s “sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers.”

The absurdity of this boilerplate rhetoric becomes clear in the light of some history. Ukraine remains close to the Russian heart as the homeland of their ancestors. A large part of Ukraine came under Russian control after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 and the rest in the late 1700s. Several waves of Russification has left Ukraine without any strong identity and an uncertain sense of nationhood. Despite overwhelmingly voting to secede from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine remained in the Soviet – and then Russian – orbit out of necessity as well as in recognition of the fact that many Ukrainians still have close familial and cultural ties to Russia.

Since independence, Ukrainian politics has swung between leaning West and leaning towards Russia. Leonid Kravchuk’s desire to integrate his country into the EU did not sit well with Moscow but he allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain in Sevastopol. Similarly, his successor, Leonid Kuchma, entered into a special partnership with NATO as well as Russia. As long as Ukraine did not drift too close to the West, Russia protested and tried to win Kiev back through a crude combination of coercion and enticement. Russia’s red line, when it came to it neighbours, became clear in 2008 when it used military force to delay Georgia’s membership to NATO. Russia also fiercely opposed US ballistic missile defence installations in Poland and Ukraine, threatening to counter with the deployment of Iskander, a short-range ballistic missile, to Kaliningrad. In this light, a Russian military response in Crimea ought not come as a surprise.

Ironically, as former British and US ambassadors to Russia, Rodric Braithwaite and Jack Matlock, have both pointed out, most Ukrainians do not wish to join NATO and they lean towards the EU only as a symbol of the good governance their own country has been sorely lacking since independence.

The sudden reversal of the situation in Kiev stunned Moscow. On February 18, the riot control Berkut were deployed to quell the protests at the Euromaidan; on the 20th, orders emanated from unknown quarters for snipers to open fire and the death toll shot up from 25 to 80; the next day, Yanukovych reached an agreement – capitulation – with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland, but the protesters, enraged by the death of their comrades, demanded that he leave the country by February 22. Within four days, events had made a 180-degree turn.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, the speed and manner in which Ukraine had waltzed into the EU camp indicated that the radical nationalists had received covert assistance from the West. The new government was proceeding with the plan Yanukovych had rejected in November 2013 bringing Ukraine closer to the EU. With NATO’s interest in Ukraine no secret, there was every chance that Kiev might also repudiate its 2010 promise to remain non-aligned and instead seek membership of military organisation. The new government’s decision to remove Russian as an official language only served to underscore its political leanings for Moscow.

The Russian decision to use the military option in Crimea fits into an older pattern of the Kremlin creating buffer states between itself and its threats. In fact, Moscow’s security concerns could even be understood from Washington’s response to the discovery of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba 52 years ago. US and European concerns about the freedom of the Ukrainian people are risible given their own support of Islamists in Syria and several unsavoury leaders worldwide.

Tragically, empty and thoughtless Western rhetoric may have worsened the situation for Ukrainians in much the same way as Radio Free Europe did for Hungarians in 1956 – they aroused expectations that could never be fulfilled. During the negotiations between the European Union and Ukraine in November, Kiev and asked for loans and assistance to shore up its flagging economy amounting to $20 billion. Aware of the rampant corruption in Ukraine, the EU unsympathetically offered $827 million. As in Hungary, the gap between what the West said and what it was prepared to do was substantial. Russia, on the other hand, has agreed to provide gas to Ukraine at a steep discount of 33% in addition to $15 billion in loans. Were Ukraine to slip into the European fold, it is doubtful whether an anaemic Eurozone will be able to buttress the Ukrainian economy or if the International Monetary Fund would be willing to.

Western response to Russia’s intervention has been swift. US Secretary of State John Kerry, while ruling out any military countermeasures, has hinted that the G-8 would isolate Russia with visa bans, trade and investment penalties, asset freezes, and boycotts. This will certainly hurt Russia, but it remains to be seen how effectively the threat can be implemented. Japan, for example, might express reluctance as Tokyo seeks allies in the region to balance a belligerent China. Additionally, the West also needs Russian cooperation on Syria and Iran, and Europe depends on Russian energy more than it remembers in the heat of the moment.

Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci defined hegemony as the power accrued to a group when they are able to exercise a role of moral leadership in a system. In other words, it is the additional power a socially dominant group achieves when its claim to represent the general interest goes unchallenged. The hegemon is able to place all the issues around which conflict rages on a universal plane. By framing the Ukrainian crisis in terms of abstract ideas such as freedom, Washington is (clumsily) diverting attention from the very simple and realist dimensions of the conflict.

As for the Ukrainian people…whoever said geopolitics had anything to do with people?


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on March 03, 2014.

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First Principles

23 Sun Jun 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia, United States

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Afghanistan, China, India, John Kerry, nuclear, Pakistan, Taliban, terrorism, trade, United States

President Barack Obama’s second-term Secretary of State, John Kerry, is visiting India right now. In a speech at the India Habitat centre, New Delhi, Kerry touched upon several factors in the relationship between the two countries that have given substance to their strategic partnership, including defence, counter-terrorism, and high-tech and civil nuclear cooperation. The Secretary of State reiterated the high value the United States places upon its close ties to India, and even had a short video message for the Indian people via YouTube before his arrival in South Asia. However, the United States’ recent positioning on talks with the Taliban, as well as Kerry’s tone on Pakistan and his chiding on climate change and the Delhi rape victim ruffled many feathers in Delhi.

There has been much speculation in India whether Obama’s new man in the State Department is pro-Pakistan, if his trip is merely intended to renew the status quo until an era of bolder politicians, or if he actually intends to achieve anything. These are all legitimate concerns, albeit tainted by the euphoric high of the Indo-US nuclear deal during the George W Bush administration. In comparison, the US delegation’s visit this time promises more icing and less cake – both sides expect to seal large arms deals and wheels have been set in motion for India’s nuclear establishment study’s Westinghouse’s proposal to build up to six AP1000 reactors in Mithi Virdi, Gujarat, but discussion on more substantial issues is not likely to see much movement.

To be fair, these deals are not all chaff – not every meeting between states alters the shape of history or sets a ground-breaking precedent as the nuclear deal did. Firm and stable relationships are formed over time through ties between people, business, and government; it would simply be unrealistic to expect any US – or for that matter, Indian – official to wave a magic wand and propel Indo-US ties through to the next level. Nonetheless, India’s relations with the United States are likely to be cooler than either side would like in the near future until the fundamentals are addressed.

One of India’s fundamental concerns lies to its west – Pakistan. US plans to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014 has Delhi concerned, and the recent near-talks between the United States and the Taliban has made India furious. From Delhi’s perspective, American abandonment of Afghanistan to the Taliban bears an eerie parallel to 1989 when Washington did just that. In a strongly worded statement (by Indian standards), India’s external affairs ministry spokesman Syed Akbaruddin said that India remained committed to the government and people of Afghanistan.

Though India has come around to the US view more than many in South Block would like by altering its stand that the international community cannot make distinctions within the Taliban as good and bad, Delhi emphatically stated that the reconciliation process should not be taken to confer equivalence between the terrorist groups and Kabul. Rumours that the Obama administration might not even insist on the Taliban abandoning al Qa’ida or that the Pakistani intelligence backed Haqqani network may be a participant in the talks has disturbed Delhi too.

India has also remained fairly quiet, perhaps due to its own impotence in the matter, over US inaction over China’s nuclear relations with Pakistan and continued US military aid to the South Asian terror hub. Meanwhile, Pakistan has been caught red-handed hiding Osama bin Laden and other wanted top operatives of terrorist groups. The Inter Services Intelligence has nurtured terrorist bases against India and against Pakistan’s enemies in Afghanistan; behind the cover of its nuclear shield, the ISI continues to orchestrate terror plots against India and western interests in India. In return, Washington has quietly removed many certification requirements that placed conditions on US assistance to Islamabad, much to the chagrin of South Block.

It is unlikely that Foggy Bottom disagrees with Delhi on the Af-Pak question. However, as Washington sees it, India has enjoyed pecuniary benefits from the twelve-year-long conflict waging near its north-western border. Despite the US repeatedly urging India to take up a more active role in its own backyard, the South Asian giant has remained on the sidelines; it has steadfastly refused to put boots on the ground, even training Afghan forces on Indian soil.

Despite its military reticence, India is the fifth-largest investor in Afghanistan, spreading development aid primarily around infrastructure, food, and government administration. The lack of a bigger footprint in the mountainous central Asian country has also given India a smaller voice in the peace negotiations.

There are other unresolved matters between India and the United States – Iran, China, and economic reforms. Yet none of these are critical to the interests of either India or the United States. India continues to trade with Iran but the US/EU sanctions ensure that the volume of trade is small enough not to cause any concern. On China, India’s stubborn persistence in maintaining its old shibboleth about non-alignment hurts India more than it does the US; it is true that the South Asian state would be an invaluable partner in a US rebalance, but Washington can make do without Delhi. Finally, on economic reform, Indians are agreed that they must take place; the problem is the pace with which reforms are proceeding and the criminal welfarism and endemic corruption.

Kerry’s visit has been tagged as low-key and the Indian media did not even give it the usual coverage reserved for high-level visits from strategic partners; this is, however, largely the fault of India’s strategic indecisiveness. For Indo-US relations to move forward substantially, substantial problems have to be resolved. Bush took steps to mitigate the effects of one problem, the nuclear apartheid India faced for the last 40 years; the next big question is Pakistan and Islamic terrorism. If Washington is serious about better ties with India, it cannot turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s umpteen transgressions against America’s strategic partners.

India must do its part too. On the other issues, the ball is in India’s court. Delhi needs to stop running with the G-77 and hunting with the G-20; it needs to formulate more active policies and contribute to the global commons. Yet all these issues are negotiable – while India’s greater participation would be welcome, it is not critical; Delhi’s narcoleptic routine hurts India more than anyone else. However, on Pakistan, India has no room to negotiate.


This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on June 26, 2013.

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