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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: LWR

Will China Export The Next Chernobyl?

22 Mon Sep 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Will China Export The Next Chernobyl?

Tags

AP1000, Areva, Autorite de Surete Nucleaire, CGN, China, China General Nuclear Corporation, China National Nuclear Corporation, China Power Investment Corporation, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, CLNDA, CNNC, CPIC, CPR-1000, EPR, Fukushima, General Electric, Hitachi, IAEA, India, INES, International Nuclear Event Scale, LWR, National Nuclear Safety Administration, NNSA, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, NSG, nuclear, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Operational Safety Review Team, OSART, Rosatom, SCRO, State Council Research Office, Toshiba, WANO, Westinghouse, World Association of Nuclear Operators

During his recently concluded visit to India, Xi Jinping expressed China’s interest in participating in India’s nuclear energy market. The sector is expected to be worth at least $150 billion and India’s small domestic nuclear energy capacity cannot handle the rapid ramp up the country’s energy crisis demands. Foreign vendors have been in discussions with Delhi since the India-US nuclear agreement but have so far been vexed by India’s unconventional nuclear liability law. Presently, India is looking to source 40 light water reactors from Rosatom, Westinghouse, General Electric, and Areva; Beijing hopes that its three nuclear developers – China General Nuclear Corporation, China National Nuclear Corporation, and China Power Investment Corporation will receive a piece of India’s nuclear pie in the next round.

While China’s nuclear dream is very impressive and tempting, there are several considerations India must keep in mind. The foremost among these is the vendor’s nuclear safety and regulatory history. At a quick glance, China’s nuclear industry appears just as competent and competitive as any other in the world. China has not had a single nuclear accident scored above 2 on the International Nuclear Events Scale and the country has been constantly improving its standards since its first civilian nuclear reactor went online. After the earthquake-tsunami at Fukushima, the Beijing ordered a full review of its safety precautions to ensure – and reassure – that its reactors were not similarly vulnerable.

However, China’s nuclear establishment is not known for its transparency and concerns have been voiced at regular intervals. Presently, China has 20 nuclear power plants operating and another 28 are being constructed. Of these, most will have the CPR-1000 reactor, the Chinese version of the French 900 MW M310 unit. These reactors have had some problems which the Chinese have been reticent to admit: in 1998, for example, one of the reactors at Qinshan suffered a critical failure and had to be rebuilt because of defects in the welding of the steel vessel that contained the reactor. Worse, these reactors will be operating on technology a century old by the time they are decommissioned.

There is great concern over the process by which China buys or builds its reactors. As one US embassy cable complained, “all reactor purchases to date have been largely the result of internal high level political decisions absent any open process.” To be fair, the United States might be exaggerating the seriousness of the matter to promote its own reactors instead but such concern has also been voiced within China. He Zuoxiu, a Chinese scientist involved in developing the country’s first nuclear device, has warned against the rapid expansion of nuclear facilities without the congruent expansion of intellectual infrastructure to license, construct, and operate the additional reactors. Fan Bi, a senior official at China’s State Council Research Office, agrees. In an article that appeared only a few months before the Fukushima accident, Fan wrote, “If the current momentum of development continues, if too many nuclear power projects are started too quickly, it could jeopardize the healthy, long-term development of nuclear power… Safety is the lifeline of the nuclear power industry.” Others would add transparency of safety and regulatory mechanisms to that list.

Areva, who is involved in constructing two of its latest 1,650 MW EPRs at Taishan, has expressed its concerns over the project. “It’s not always easy to know what is happening at the Taishan site,” said one official. The collaboration was not at a level that the French firm desired, admitted another official, explaining, “One of the explanations for the difficulties in our relations is that the Chinese safety authorities lack means. They are overwhelmed.” Autorite de Surete Nucleaire, the French nuclear regulatory authority, has given few details about its worries in China. However, the body has published hundreds of documents and closely monitored the work at Olkiluoto, Finland, with whom they have better relations.

Yet another concern is the quality of indigenously manufactured reactor components. One former vice president of CNNC confessed that though Beijing puts great emphasis on nuclear safety, “companies executing projects do not seem to have the same level of understanding.” This is encouraged by the cosy relationship between China’s state-owned nuclear regulators and state-owned operators, as well as by a revolving door that allows employees to move easily between government and industry. The formulation of cogent policy is even more challenging due to divided responsibility for the country’s nuclear governance between multiple government departments and bureaucracies. China’s quest for rapid growth only exacerbates these problems of weak regulation, poor implementation, and faulty manufacturing. Given India’s own questionable policies on nuclear transparency and accountability, it would be natural for Chinese firms to replicate their behaviour at home in India as well.

To be fair to China’s nuclear industry, it has also shown remarkable eagerness to achieve the world’s highest standards in safety. It has voluntarily been through a dozen of the IAEA’s OSART (Operational Safety Review Team) missions and subjects all its civilian nuclear facilities to annual inspections by the World Association of Nuclear Operators. Though the details of the reports are private, they confirm that the reactors are operated in conformance with international protocols and standards.

Nonetheless, these accolades are for reactor operation, not construction. China’s suitability as a nuclear partner is in doubt when its export potential is stretched to the limit by its domestic expansion plans – China hopes to add 250 GW of nuclear power between now and 2040, bringing ten reactors online every year. China’s three nuclear enterprises will be hard-pressed to construct and provide post-completion support to their international clients.

For domestic nuclear enthusiasts, one hope is that between international inspections, peer reviews, and collaboration with international entities with a good safety culture, India’s nuclear enclave will also develop greater transparency and accountability. India has never had a nuclear accident rated above 3 on the INES and though an IAEA inspection gave Rajasthan’s nuclear power units a good evaluation, fears abound due to ignorance of the general populace and poor communication by the authorities. The lack of independence of India’s nuclear regulatory authority is also of some concern. Given China’s record on transparency, these values will hardly be inculcated in the Indian establishment via a nuclear partnership with Beijing.

China is a below-par partner on another level too: technology transfer. India has always made the transfer of technology a key component of its high-tech purchases, hoping these would compensate for its own inadequacies in research & development. However, Beijing has little new technology to offer; nuclear energy took off in China only in the late 1980s and Beijing also bases its nuclear decisions on the degree of technology transfers vendors are willing to provide. Like India, China also intends to leapfrog stages of nuclear development via reverse engineering and emerge, initially under license, as a major exporter of nuclear products and services. India would be better served by dealing directly with more mature vendors in France, Canada, Russia, and the United States.

Unlike other sectors, nuclear partnerships are long-term relationships. The life of an average reactor nowadays is 40-60 years and during that time, the vendor is always in the picture. Many reactor contracts nowadays come with a lifetime guarantee of nuclear fuel and support as well and it is not easy to change suppliers as Ukraine recently discovered. Is India willing to enter into a 60-year marriage with a country that denies Indian firms fair market access, props up a neighbouring state with nuclear weapons and missiles against India, has claims on Indian territory, and with whom regular skirmishes along the border are not unusual?

China’s interest in India’s nuclear programme is, to put it politely, curious. Beijing has consistently vetoed Delhi’s application to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and yet it wishes to enter India’s nuclear market. China may have calculated its policy based on India’s nuclear liability law – as it exists, the law inhibits private foreign vendors such as Westinghouse or GE from competing in the Indian market by imposing new and large insurance premia. The state-owned enterprises of Russia and China, however, will find it easier to provide for the necessary guarantees. If India sticks to its present nuclear liability law, the smaller number of vendors in India’s nuclear bazaar is to China’s advantage. A normative nuclear liability law, however, negates that advantage and leaves China with little to offer.

India must insist on any nuclear cooperation with China to be contingent upon Beijing’s unconditional support to India’s membership to the NSG; China is presently trying to finagle a place for its ally Pakistan along with India in the body and such hyphenation runs contrary to Delhi’s long-stated position. An uncompromising attitude on the NSG costs India little for China has no nuclear unique selling point. The policy of barring India’s entry into the NSG while hoping to enter its nuclear market run contrary to each other.

India’s nuclear establishment has borne the price of four decades in the non-proliferation wilderness. Consequently, it remains in a diminished capacity and sorely needs an infusion of capital and talent. However, China is an unsuitable partner for India in a venture as complex and as strategic as nuclear energy for technical as well as geopolitical reasons. As with telecommunications, it would not be judicious for India to allow China into its nuclear energy market.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on September 23, 2014.

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Aspects of India’s Nuclear Renaissance

22 Fri Aug 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Aspects of India’s Nuclear Renaissance

Tags

ACR-1000, BARC, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited, Bhavini, Canada, CANDU, EC6, EPR, India, Kudankulam, LWR, MOX fuel, NPCIL, nuclear power, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, PHWR, PWR, Russia, Tarapur, thorium, United States

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi is famous for his commitment to solar power. In the past month, however, Modi has praised nuclear energy and declared that it will form a vital part of India’s energy mix. In July 2014, the prime minister visited the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, praising the country’s scientists and challenging them to strive for even greater achievements. Within ten days of Modi’s BARC visit, it was announced that India would be setting up 22 nuclear power projects with Russian assistance. In addition to the six nuclear reactors planned for Chhaya Mithi Virdhi from Westinghouse, another six reactors for Kovvada from General Electric, and six more from Areva for Jaitapur, India is in talks to import 40 reactors – almost 200% of its present number and over 700% of its installed nuclear capacity.

However, it must be remembered that the time for celebration in India is post delivery, not post announcement; bureaucracy can frustratingly distort timelines and projections. There is reason for nuclear power enthusiasts to be cautiously elated with the development but beyond India’s labyrinthine bureaucracy, there are some issues arising from India’s massive nuclear expansion that require some careful thought.

The first concern is that the 40 reactors India is looking at are all light water reactors (LWRs) with which India has little experience. Barring the original two reactors at Tarapur, India’s nuclear fraternity operates a fleet of pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs). After the initial purchase of a 220 MW CANDU reactor from Canada for Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS) I (a second purchase was interrupted by the post-Pokhran sanctions), Indian scientists modified and improved the technology to produce CANDU-derivatives known as INDU. The two boiling water reactors (BWRs) at Tarapur were purchased to prove to a sceptical Lok Sabha that Indians could indeed operate nuclear power plants safely on their own and the sector receive full support.

Kudankulam is India’s first LWR, and as such, Indian knowledge about operating the reactor is only bookish. To master the technology and be able to come up with improvements and indigenous designs will require time, training, and large transfers of technology. One of the benefits of the tens of billions of dollars of nuclear imports ought to be that India learn to at least replicate if not design the reactors indigenously. Training engineers to operate the LWRs is fairly easy and quick but with 40 more reactors added to the mix, the autonomous Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) will be busy with plant management to do additional research and experimentation on LWR designs. As it is, some 90% of NPCIL’s budget goes towards operations and management, leaving only crumbs for research & development and nothing for expansion.

Corporations and governments do not engage in technology transfer without extracting a steep price. However, even if India were able to secure a painless technology transfer from its nuclear vendors, to whom would the transfer be made? Due to the clause in the Indo-US nuclear deal that stipulates the separation of India’s nuclear facilities, only those designated for exclusive civilian use can be the beneficiaries of such transfers. Otherwise, the military facility receiving the transfer will lose its status and come under international safeguards. With BARC disqualified and NPCIL incapable, only the fledgling BHAVINI is left whose main purpose is the development and operation of fast breeder reactors. In effect, there is presently no agency in India capable of conducting in-depth studies of other reactor designs or doing extensive research on new and promising reactor designs such as the molten salt reactor; even India’s thorium reactor programme is proceeding at a snail’s pace.

However, why is India suddenly interested in LWRs? The primary reason India chose HWRs over LWRs and BWRs in the 1950s was that the former did not require the large investment in the development of enrichment technology. Furthermore, the technology to make the heavy water needed for PHWRs was easily available and only had to be mass-produced. A further advantage of HWRs is its ability to achieve criticality at lower concentrations of fissile isotopes than in LWRs. This makes it ideal for the use of thorium or MOX fuel without much redesigning, something India has been interested in for a long time due to the paucity of domestic uranium.

It is puzzling why India has not reached out to Canada to help with its nuclear renaissance. Delhi has a history with Ottawa, albeit complicated, and Indian scientists are familiar with the basic CANDU design. Since 1974, when Canada imposed sanctions on India, Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL) has significantly enhanced its designs to the CANDU-6, the Enhanced Candu 6 (EC6), the Advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR), and others. These reactors retain the advantages of tolerance to multiple kinds of fuel – including thorium – and have better safety mechanisms installed, a perfect fit for India’s nuclear needs.

In the long run, India should think about emerging as a nuclear vendor, from reactors and components to services. This can hardly be done with a research establishment trapped in the civil-military divide; the role of NPCIL and/or Bhavini must be expanded while simultaneously encouraging private players to participate in the nuclear market. This can be hastened only with more training, experience, and research, for which the choice of India’s partners will be important. Contrary to public perception, the United States and Canada were far more forthcoming with Tarapur and RAPS I & II than the Russians are with Kudankulam.

Decades of neglect has brought the Indian nuclear power sector to a point where it is forced to make sub-optimal choices for the near-term. Forty years of sanctions forced indigenous development, which has been a success story with mixed results. However, the country’s power crisis is so acute that like Tarapur in 1962, a few LWRs are needed to provide momentum to a moribund industry. Thankfully, India is a large country with a growing population, medium industrialisation, and a massive power deficit. These disadvantages can work in India’s favour now over the purchase of LWRs – if the government can sustain growth, by 2050, India may well need up to 200 new reactors and 40 or even 80 LWRs with a 40-year lifespan will appear a notable but not subversive trend in Indian nuclear development. However, the government should be aware of the history of India’s nuclear development and the trajectory it has plotted for itself before making any major purchases or decisions.

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The Price of Failure

27 Wed Mar 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Pakistan, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on The Price of Failure

Tags

BARC, CANDU, Chashma, China, FBR, HTGR, India, LFTR, LWR, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, NSG, nuclear, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, plutonium, PWR, thorium, uranium

Early this week, news broke that China would provide Pakistan with Chashma-5, a 1000-MW Pressurised Water Reactor. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei, not surprisingly, rejected the notion that Beijing stood in violation of several Nuclear Suppliers Group and International Atomic Energy Agency norms, claiming that Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation was only for peaceful purposes. The Chashma Nuclear Power Complex in Pakistani Punjab already contains two 300 MW reactors (online in 2000 and 2011) built by China and has two more 340 MW reactors under construction (expected criticality 2016 and 2017). Experts are not sure whether the fifth reactor is an upgrade to the third one or a new reactor altogether.

China joined the NSG in 2004, and that should have been the end of clandestine Chinese nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. However, Beijing insisted that the third and fourth reactors at Chashma were part of the original deal struck before China joined the international nuclear controls body (2000) and grandfathered them in. The fifth reactor, however, or further upgrades to the existing reactors, is not part of any known clause in the Sino-Pakistani nuclear agreement on Chashma.

Interestingly, Beijing may not have violated any international commitment in their nuclear trade with Pakistan – while strong evidence suggests that the China National Nuclear Corporation assisted Pakistan in manufacturing weapons in the late 1980s, China had not acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until 1992; the NPT only makes it incumbent upon non-nuclear states party to the treaty to submit to IAEA inspections and is quiet on the matter of verification of such inspections by nuclear states. China’s membership of the NSG came in 2004, and though the group’s guidelines clearly prohibit the transfer of a whole array of nuclear material, they are neither law nor are they backed up by enforcement provisions beyond international opprobrium.

China has continually peddled the view that its 1985 nuclear agreement with Pakistan allows it to grandfather in the sale of nuclear reactors and other related material. The United States has always rejected this interpretation but mutedly, for lack of the power to enforce and its own geostrategic calculus. Furthermore, China argues that the NSG’s guidelines are biased: Russia was allowed to go through with selling India nuclear fuel in 2001 when 32 of 34 members of the NSG opposed the sale. NSG rules state that members should report any approach for nuclear trade so that the group can act uniformly, and states are expected to refrain from making exports denied by other members. Ultimately, the regime’s voluntary nature means that members may violate guidelines for their own political gains. China is also unhappy with the waiver India received from the group in 2008.

China’s position is obviously strategically motivated – it would require some impressive intellectual gymnastics to equate Pakistan’s nuclear black marketeering with India’s behaviour on nuclear exports. The international community’s silence on China’s repeated transgressions in spirit if not law ought to underscore for India what it should already know – hard power is a persuasive diplomat.

Nonetheless, India need not worry too much about the latest Chinese transgression; the Chashma-5 reactor is likely to be far safer than its predecessors (a real concern with Chashma-1), and being a PWR (a kind of Light Water Reactor), far less suitable for military appropriation than a Heavy Water Reactor. However, the principle of nuclear cooperation, licit or otherwise, between India’s two rivals ought to concern India. It is a pity that India’s government is content with mere protests and statements of concern while India’s strategic analysts only rail about the nuclear control regime’s double standards – the convenient memory lapse for incidents favouring India is perhaps because the general impression in the country is that India has been a more responsible nuclear power and has been the beneficiary of far less largesse than its neighbour.

India must consider the situation it finds itself in as punishment for its unwarranted moralising about nuclear weapons and romanticism regarding international affairs, not just under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru but to this day. Barring a few exceptions that prove the rule, Raisina Hill has been unable to think strategically or decisively over a myriad of issues, not the least of which relate to defence, foreign policy, or science & technology.

India has failed to realise its nuclear dream – not only is the country decades away from commercial deployment of thorium reactors, India is yet to start its Fast Breeder Reactor programme; furthermore, India’s stocks of fissile material is unbelievably low, and though it has modified the Canadian CANDU reactor for domestic use, it has been unable to create and export any completely Indian IPR product. Unfortunately, Indian manufacturing lacks the capability to make some of the components of nuclear reactors to satisfactorily high quality. India’s underdeveloped uranium mining and even worse uranium prospecting has forced it to seek the assistance of an international nuclear deal, the whole need for which was to be obviated by Homi Bhabha’s three-stage nuclear programme.

The nuclear establishment cannot blame its failure on the civilian front on an aggressive effort on the military front – India has conducted only six tests until date, a number most experts consider too small for Indian scientists to be able to do any simulations. In addition, there are rumours that most of the tests generated lower yields than expected and that the thermonuclear device in the 1998 tests failed to achieve fusion. As a result, India’s nuclear arsenal remains small, unreliable, and bulky.

Rather than bemoan its state, New Delhi must work to negate the stranglehold the nuclear exports control regime has on it. India needs to focus on its thorium reactor research and initiate its stage-II FBRs with priority. It would behoove India’s nuclear establishment to inquire about other nuclear reactor designs such as the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor or the High Temperature Graphite Reactor – while not commercially active, both have been tested, are proliferation-resistant, and use thorium (something India has plenty of) as fuel. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre must be tasked with improving and creating new and better reactor designs with 100% Indian IPR content; Indian industry must be able to manufacture and export nuclear material, from fuel, reactors and components, to heavy water. In essence, India should be able to run a parallel NSG if it so wishes.

Clearly, all this will be a 20-year programme at the very least. Yet India did not find itself at this juncture because of one policy decision; undoing over six decades of lackadaisical planning by bloviating officials in a third the time is no mean feat. The impotence India feels now simply the wages of sins past. Ironically, India would do well to take a page from former Chinese Premier, Deng Xiaoping’s book, namely: (1) lengjing guancha — observe and analyze [developments] calmly; (2) chenzhuo yingfu — deal [with changes] patiently and confidently; (3) wenzhu zhenjiao — secure [our own] position; (4) taoguang yanghui — conceal [our] capabilities and avoid the limelight; (5) shanyu shouzhuo — be good at keeping a low profile; (6) juebu dangtou — never become a leader; (7) yousuo zuowei — strive to make achievements.

Wise words from a man and a people who know how to quietly build their capabilities and await their turn at global leadership.


This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on March 28, 2013.

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