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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

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Tag Archives: Manohar Parrikar

Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

22 Wed Mar 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

Tags

Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, Caroline rule, China, counter-force, counter-value, India, Manohar Parrikar, NFU, No First Use, NSG, nuclear, nuclear doctrine, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, Shivshankar Menon

There have again been speculations recently about India’s nuclear doctrine and the value of its no first-use-posture. The reason for the kerfuffle this time are a couple of sentences in former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. Menon writes,

There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.

This has been interpreted to mean that India’s no-first-use posture is not credible, which would implicitly exonerate Delhi from the charge – if it is made – that it has quietly changed its nuclear doctrine. Instead, this understanding of Menon’s words suggests that the Indian no-first-use policy was a sham from the very beginning.

Menon also writes,

…proportional responses and deterrence were not the preferred posture in the initial stages of the weapons program, for it might tempt adversaries to test the space available below the threshold for full nuclear retaliation… Instead, the logical posture at first was counter-value targeting, or targeting the opponent’s assets, rather than counter-force targeting, which concentrates on the enemy’s military and command structures.

Here, the object of interrogation is the past tense (emphasis mine) that Menon uses; does he mean to indicate that India initially settled for a massive retaliation against an enemy’s cities but later may have surreptitiously modified its doctrine as its weapons systems became more sophisticated in terms of detection and destruction? However, the context of his objectionable grammar is the historical evolution of Indian nuclear thinking from the mid-1980s. Menon is talking about the inter-test years (1974-1998) when India had not publicly weaponised its peaceful nuclear explosion and therefore obviated the need for a nuclear doctrine.

However, the former NSA is not nuclear-shy once red lines have been crossed. As he explains the rationale,

There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.

Essentially, under India’s massive retaliation strategy, military as well as civilian targets would be considered. A purely counter-value massive retaliation by Delhi would leave Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal intact and capable of raining nuclear fire on Indian cities. The sudden realisation that the Indian military could potentially go after Pakistani nuclear assets as well as its infrastructure has caused a bit of a stir in some circles.

There are several problems with this sudden alarmist tone. The most obvious is that this is not a new observation. Aside from the fact that scholars have gleaned every nuance out of India’s nuclear policy already, the doctrine itself – what is publicly available – specifically states that its retaliation only policy is dynamic. In the words of the National Security Advisory Board,

India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.

India’s policy is clearly stated to be to only retaliatory, which is again emphasised in the next section: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Nonetheless, this position is dynamic in that it is conceivable that imminent use of nuclear weapons against India – fuelling of missiles, field deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, delegation of launch authority – especially from a state that has repeatedly declared a willingness, almost an eagerness, to strike first with nuclear weapons, will be treated as an attack and liable for Indian retaliation. As many Indian strategists have wondered, what is the morality of awaiting certain destruction just to satisfy a dictionary definition of no-first-use?

Such use – anticipatory self defence – may not be to the satisfaction of semanticists but is nonetheless considered just under international law if it fulfills the criteria of the Caroline rule: instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Thus, as Menon himself noted, more flexibility – ambiguity? – has been built into the Indian nuclear doctrine than is realised. As a side note, it is interesting that the same Caroline rule that bears out Indian views on nuclear strikes objects to the dilution of NFU by extending it to chemical or biological weapons as India and other nuclear states have done.

The composition of India’s nuclear arsenal and its status should belie any fears about preemptive counter-force targetting. Most nuclear observers agree that the Indian arsenal is still rudimentary compared to mature nuclear states such as the United States, France, or China. By the benchmarks of those in whose footsteps it follows, India has conducted far fewer (hot) tests to confirm design parameters that would affect miniaturisation, maximise yield, or assure successful detonation in unconventional circumstances to be capable of precise, proportionate strikes. Although the exact composition of the Indian arsenal is classified, the mainstay may be assumed to be improved versions of its 1974 prototype that was tested again in 1998, a ~15 kT Hiroshima-style device and hardly an ideal choice for a surgical counter-force strike. The sub-kiloton designs, ideal for mating with the Brahmos missile for tactical strikes, are not as reliable as their larger brother. The real concern, then, and a more familiar one for Indians, is that their bureaucrats and politicians might be promising more than their military can actually deliver.

It is also worth noting that in regions with population density as high as in the Indian subcontinent, it is very difficult to achieve a purely counter-value or counter-force strike. Military bases are almost always near population centres or important infrastructural nodes out of necessity. Even if Delhi’s policy of massive retaliation was purely counter-value, it would inevitably damage or destroy vital military assets. Despite such collateral damage, the doctrine can then hardly be called counter-force. Yet, as the former NSA points out, it would be ludicrous to leave the enemy’s nuclear arsenal intact for the sake of doctrinal purity.

The newly rediscovered ambiguity in the Indian nuclear doctrine may perhaps carry more salience because not only does it come from a former official who had a large role in shaping Delhi’s nuclear policy but in view of certain “personal” comments former defence minister Manohar Parrikar recently made. Speaking at a book launch in Delhi in November 2016, the then defence minister calmly eschewed India’s no-first-use policy although he immediately clarified that there had been no change in government policy. With two former senior officials casting doubt on India’s intentions, should the international community consider Delhi’s NFU to be diluted?

It needs to be stressed that Menon merely explained India’s long-existing doctrine and did not reformulate it. With regard Parrikar’s comments, seen in their entirety, there can be no doubt that Indian nuclear policy has not changed. At most, the former defence minister’s comments indicate that there may be discussions going on in South Block in very small circles on updating India’s nuclear doctrine. Surely, this cannot be a surprise when the Bharatiya Janata Party had even announced its intention to do so in its election manifesto in 2014. Indeed, the present government may change India’s nuclear policy but it is absurd to expect that policies are static and eternal – especially when even nuclear warheads are upgraded.

Some observers have wondered at the opportune timing – the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary is just around the corner in June – of a sudden panic attack on Indian nuclear no-first-use and counter-force posture. This is unlikely to have been a factor for several reasons: 1. the United States, India’s supporter in the forum with the most clout, does not seem willing to twist arms on India’s behalf as it did in 2008; 2. India has found it difficult to bring into its confidence the several smaller states on the moral high horse; 3. China would be relied upon to veto Indian membership in the consensus-seeking group unless Pakistan were simultaneously admitted. The strategic dimension of NSG membership in South Asia should not be underestimated.

So if not a shift in doctrine, has there been a change in strategy? With improving capabilities, it would be myopic not to expect refinements in strategy. However, none of it – the apprehension about anticipatory self-defence or counter-force targetting – adds up to a new phase in Indian nuclear posture. The nuclear doctrine has long offered these options and at best, India’s material realities might be quietly catching up with its lofty ambitions. No matter, this whole affair has been an exercise in making mountains out of molehills.


This post appeared on FirstPost on March 23, 2017.

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Thus Spake Parrikar…

12 Sat Nov 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Thus Spake Parrikar…

Tags

deterrence, India, Manohar Parrikar, NFU, No First Use, nuclear

​Manohar Parrikar often finds himself in the news for the wrong reasons. A seemingly harmless book launch presented the latest opportunity for the Indian defence minister to enjoy some limelight yet again. However, at least this time, the brouhaha was entirely manufactured with little reason in sight.

In what appears to be a response to a question at the launch of The New Arthashastra: A Security Strategy for India, Parrikar expressed the view that the logic of a well-defined and written security doctrine eluded him. Why would one, he pondered out loud, not only restrict oneself to a set of responses but also open up the playbook to one’s enemy? Parrikar gave the example of nuclear policy – why would India tie itself down to a nuclear no-first -use position? In his view, India’s leaders should merely state that India is a responsible nuclear weapons state and any potential use would be after careful deliberation.

The defence minister was vehement in declaring these views to be his private thoughts and that the country’s nuclear policy had not changed. In fact, he went as far as predicting, half jokingly, that it would be splayed all across newspapers the next day that a change in doctrine had been made. He was not wrong – within minutes of his comments hitting Twitter, policy wonks were condemning his casual attitude towards nuclear deterrence and even the thought of straying from a nuclear NFU.

Parrikar’s most egregious sin appears to have simply been that his views were not popular among those who would don the hat of experts; nothing the defence minister said was actually either surprising or extraordinary. Given the situation, the criticism levelled against Parrikar comes off as petty  and motivated.

First, the accusation that the minister should not have aired his personal opinion on so sensitive a subject – it should be noted that even as he answered the question asked of him, Parrikar categorically stated that there was no doctrinal shift and he was only expressing his views as an individual. It was not a later clarification by his office to put the minister in the clear.

More to the point, is it surprising that not just the defence minister but even several other senior officials in the present regime may have private views that differ from stated government policy? After all, this administration saw it fit to include the country’s nuclear doctrine in its election manifesto – surely there would be a few who question the wisdom of the present strategy? And if so, what delicate balance has been upset if these doubts are expressed right alongside a disclaimer that no strategic shift has been envisaged in the short term?

Second, Parrikar has been skewered for doubting the value of a nuclear NFU and his preference for ambiguity has been derided as confusion. The nuclear NFU has become almost an article of faith among Western think tankers, though the United States has refused to adopt such a posture itself despite an overwhelming conventional superiority over most of its rivals. British and French nuclear postures are also more ambiguous on the matter than Chinese or Indian nuclear doctrines.

It is commonly acknowledged that India needs to revise its doctrine that has lain virtually unchanged since its formulation soon after the Pokhran II nuclear tests. The opposition, however, is to abandoning the NFU. Indian planners cannot take such objections seriously for the only posture that will satisfy some corners is unilateral and unconditional nuclear disarmament. Instead, Delhi must look to the peculiarities of its threat matrix and decide upon a strategy that suits the subcontinent best.

For example, Parrikar has a valid point when he says that an unequivocal NFU restricts his options in case of war; it would be like showing the enemy your playbook. Instead, a defensive-use-only posture might offer the desired flexibility and ambiguity while retaining some degree of responsibility. Some of these decisions will need to take into account other factors, such as the extent of Indian conventional superiority over its likely foes, its ability to manufacture reliable and accurate tactical nuclear weapons, and a clear understanding of its objectives in various scenarios.

Admittedly, these are conversations to be had in private but there is little stability to lose before a country that has on umpteen occasions nonchalantly expressed its willingness to use nuclear weapons as a first resort. The sort of stability international scholars advocate is laudable but can only be achieved with mature states. A nuclear NFU and a clearly articulated military doctrine are indeed excellent confidence building measures but they must be deserved, not exploited.

The real tragedy of this little non-incident is that it is a reminder of India’s inability to think and act strategically towards long-term objectives, the aversion of the state’s holy cows to expert scrutiny, and a bureaucratic opacity that would make Brussels proud. Though the Indian defence minister raised some pertinent questions on India’s nuclear doctrine, it is unlikely that much comes of it.


This post appeared on FirstPost on November 14, 2016.

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An Unofficial Alliance

15 Tue Dec 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Security, South Asia, United States

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, ACSA, Ashton Carter, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation, BECA, CISMOA, Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, Cooperative Security Location, CSL, IED, Improvised Explosive Device, India, Logistics Sharing Agreement, LSA, Manohar Parrikar, Michelle Flournoy, spectrum management, United States, US, Wikileaks

The outcome of Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar’s recent visit to the United States to meet with his counterpart Ashton Carter has met with approval from all corners. Even critics of the Narendra Modi government were somewhat muted for once, as several columns reported that the agenda for the visit indicated a shift in Indian foreign policy from style to substance. Two projects critical to Indian defence modernisation, the development of jet engines and aircraft carrier technology, have received greater impetus under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). Calling the US-India relationship an anchor of global security, Carter expressed satisfaction with the new pace defence cooperation between the two states has taken. “We’ve done so much more in the last year, probably than we’ve done in the 10 years before that,” Carter said. “And I’m guessing that in the next 10 months, we will do yet again more than we’ve done in the last year.”

The United States’ approach to India underwent a sea change during the presidency of George W Bush. Although the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would end up absorbing much of the administration’s energy, Bush and his team had come to office with the aim of curbing the rise of China. The Bush White House moved from the previous regime’s view of China as a strategic partner to one where the Asian giant was a strategic competitor. The neoconservative world view, as David Frum, speechwriter for Bush, explained it later, sought close ties with India and a pragmatic relationship with China that combined economic engagement with military containment. Part of the US strategy was to make India a part of the international system and midwife its rise asa counterbalance to China. The Indo-US nuclear deal was part of that plan, as was the DTTI. As Philip Zelikow, a counselor for the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, had said, the goal was “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century.”

From the US point of view, however, defence relations could have developed much faster had India accepted what the Pentagon calls “foundational agreements.” These pacts, typical military alphabet soups like the LSA (Logistics Sharing Agreement), CISMOA (Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement), and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation), facilitate military-to-military cooperation primarily at a tactical level though they can be developed further into strategic cooperation.

The LSA, for example, allows the navies and air forces of each country to share each other’s facilities for berthing and refueling without making payments each time; instead, accounts would be settled periodically. The LSA also negotiates several practices that are presently decided upon on a case-by-case basis such as the pre-positioning of military materiel in each other’s countries (Cooperative Security Location – CSL), playing host during exercises, and permitting operations of the other in-country. The LSA is similar to the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that the United States has with over 75 countries, including its NATO partners and Sri Lanka in India’s own neighbourhood.

Similarly, the CISMOA allows interoperability of Indian and US equipment. For example, if Indian troops wish to call in a US airstrike at a certain location, or if US Special Forces are “lighting up” a target for a precision munitions strike by an Indian bomber, their hardware, which is normally encrypted, must be able to communicate with each other to relay information accurately and quickly. In a crowded theatre of operations that nowadays involves non-state actors, drones, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), coalition militaries, and electronic warfare, spectrum management is crucial.

Admittedly, the Indian Navy has been able to operate the Boeing P-8I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft without the advanced communications equipment it would have come with had India signed the CISMOA. The gaps were filled with indigenous electronic equipment that did not diminish the aircrafts’ capabilities. However, in a multi-nation environment, be it during a humanitarian relief mission or anti-piracy operations, these gaps would have been felt acutely.

The purpose of BECA is to facilitate the exchange of geospatial information between governments for military as well as civilian use. It includes maps, charts, satellite imagery, geodetic, geophysical, geomagnetic, and gravity data. One practical application of this for the military is that aircraft such as the C-17 Globemaster III and the C-130 Hercules can fly very close to the ground and evade enemy radar; another is improved accuracy of munitions. India cannot rely on foreign global positioning system in times of war and has therefore developed its own Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System. However, the coverage of this system is yet limited and geospatial data from the United States can improve its performance. The civilian application of geospatial data can contribute to infrastructural and other requirements as well.

The United States’ eagerness for closer ties with India is plain. The Bush White House made that very clear, as did Wikileaks in a collection of cables that expressed Washington’s priorities in the Indo-Pacific region and suggestions on how to achieve them. As the US embassy in New Delhi wrote to the Under Secretary for Defence, Michelle Flournoy, in October 2009, the way forward lies in “nudging India to expand their commitments by signing the foundational agreements and by moving forward with military sales [which] will provide opportunities for a sustained relationship far more robust than exercises and exchanges. If we can continue our trend of major military sales, we will cement a relationship for the next several decades with the most stable country in South Asia.” India is not doing the United States a favour by signing the foundational documents and nor is the case vice versa.

What none of these agreements do is compel India to side with the United States in any conflict, allow Washington to permanently station troops on Indian soil yet under the jurisdiction of American courts (that would be the Status of Forces Agreement – SOFA), or permit hostile military action against other countries from bases in India. These agreements are also reciprocal, giving the Indian military access to American facilities around the world. This could come in particularly handy at Diego Garcia or Guam, for example, in anti-piracy or regional collective security operations. The sharing of supplies has not only a strategic argument but an economic one as well: Indian forces can resupply at any US facility and pay back in kind when American forces travel through the Indian Ocean, an especially useful arrangement during extended war games.

It is unlikely that the Indian side has not seen the material benefits of these agreements. Certainly, the Indian military can operate without subscribing to an American framework but doing so will drastically expand its capabilities until such a time as when Delhi develops its own defence network. When the subject of India signing on to the foundational agreements was first broached, several senior Indian military officials played down their importance, saying that the pacts make no difference to the Indian operational scope. Such opinions might be dismissed as being bound by political views of the time – non-alignment, and an intellectual inertia that was sold as pacifism. However, with a new and more ambitious government in Delhi, the time might be ripe to conclude these agreements.

India’s equivocal response to the Pentagon’s protocols does have a legitimate basis – a deep-rooted suspicion of the United States. For earlier generations, this was ideological: India eschewed the free market, embraced state socialism, and was in closer orbit to the Soviet Union diplomatically and militarily than it was to the West. For the younger generation, mistrust of Washington stems from what appears from Delhi as unwavering support of a hostile neighbour, Pakistan. Despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, Foggy Bottom sees Islamabad as a close non-NATO ally and supplies it with advanced military equipment that includes nuclear-capable F-16 fighter jets. The United States has also earned a reputation as an unreliable patron, ironically from both India and Pakistan. Foggy Bottom cut off arms supplies in 1965 as well as in 1971 when war broke out between India and Pakistan; in 1974 and in 1998, after India’s nuclear tests, it became the subject of US sanctions. Delhi worries that if it relies too much on an American defence framework, it might find its options in a conflict circumscribed by US interests and worldview. More recently, Washington’s ridiculous good Taliban/bad Taliban routine got no chuckles in Delhi.

Delhi’s greater concern is that forging closer military-to-military relations with the United States may appear to other important powers, particularly Russia and China, as an Indo-American alliance. Given the proximity of these powers to India and an overt US desire to contain their power, Indian action might speak louder than Indian intentions and antagonise them into a firmer response. Indian accession to the treaties will certainly stir otherwise friendly waters with Russia and likely precipitate a reaction from China that India is not ready for yet. Russia is already flirting with the idea of weapons sales to Pakistan and seeing US warships in Vishakapatnam might tilt the scales unfavourably to India. These treacherous diplomatic waters must be navigated by the Indian Foreign Service, convincing India’s partners that logistical cooperation with the United States would not hurt their interests. It might even be worth considering expanding logistical support to Russian, Australian, or Japanese naval vessels at Indian bases. In the meantime, India might also consider the spate of weapons deals and joint military exercises it as had with the United States – there is no need of deals to divine which way the geopolitical winds are blowing.

In January this year, it was reported that Modi gave his officials a non-paper on the Pentagon’s foundational agreements. It is a new India now, and the ambitions of the Modi government are substantially more than the timid considerations of the Congress regime. Delhi is striving to forge strong bonds around the Indian Ocean rim as well as with Japan and contribute to regional security and stability. Its aims of taking a no-nonsense approach to its borders in the northeast as well as the west demand better infrastructure, logistics, and hardware. While there might have been no need for India to consider the Pentagon’s pacts earlier, an India aspiring to fill the role of a regional power certainly does. Modi’s muscular foreign policy needs a defence doctrine to match, and loose coalitions are a healthy way to test the waters. As the subhashita advises,

न अभिशेको न संस्कार: सिम्हस्य क्रियते वने |
विक्रमार्जिता सत्वस्य स्वयमेव मृगेन्द्रता ||

There is no official coronation ceremony held to declare lion king of jungle He becomes king by his own attributes and heroic actions.


This post appeared on FirstPost on December 22, 2015.

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