Tag Archives: MMRCA

Rafale Finally Comes Home

21 Wed Sep 2016

Posted by in India, Security, South Asia

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As news broke late Wednesday evening that India and France had finally agreed upon the terms and conditions for the purchase of 36 Rafale jets by the former from the latter, it was probably greeted with relief rather than joy. Dassault, the French aviation company that manufactures the Rafale, had won the tender in January 2012 but had been locked in negotiations with the Indian government over the technical details ever since. When Narendra Modi came to office, he tried to break the impasse and India initiated talks directly with the French government for an inter-government agreement but even that, until just a month ago, seemed to be going nowhere. The conclusion of the deal, to be signed on September 23, will be a relief to the Indian Air Force as well as Dassault. The first planes will begin to arrive 36 months hence and the entire order will be completed a further 30 months from then.

In fact, India’s search for a medium multi-role combat aircraft had begun almost a decade ago in August 2007 when finances finally allowed the IAF to begin replacing its aging fleet of MiGs. Four companies participated in the competition – Saab, Mikoyan, Lockheed, and of course, Dassault. The Rafale’s similarities to the Mirage 2000 that the IAF already operated, its lower life-cycle costs, and its naval and nuclear strike variants clinched the deal for Dassault.

Although the deal was originally envisaged to be for 126 aircraft with an option of 74 more, the final agreement has settled around 36 jets. Projected to cost $12 billion in 2012, that figure has also come down to $7.88 billion. However, India has managed to negotiate for several bells and whistles in the smaller deal and it is reported that the agreed upon price is around $750 million less than what the previous government was willing to pay

Dassault has agreed to make India-specific modifications to the planes, allowing the integration of Israeli helmet-mounted displays. Additionally, MBDA, the European missile manufacturer, will provide Meteor, an air-to-air missile with a beyond-visual-range over 100 kms, and Storm Shadow (known as Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée – Emploi Général or SCALP in the French military), an air-launched cruise missile with a range of over 560 kms, with the Rafales. Both these acquisitions will significantly improve the reach of the IAF, allowing them to shoot deep into enemy airspace or territory without crossing any international boundaries. Integration of the Brahmos-NG, a smaller version of the Brahmos supersonic missile, will make the Rafale a lethal platform by land or sea.

A complete transfer of technology, including for the Thales RBE2-AA radar and software source code, spare parts, maintenance, training, and a guarantee of 75 percent operational availability for the first five years takes the price of the package up from a base price of $3.8 billion for just the Rafales to the final number. A 50 percent offset agreement obligates Dassault to re-invest half the money from the deal in India again, creating hundreds of new jobs.

India’s decision to buy only 36 planes, barely two squadrons, seems puzzling at first. They will not fill the gap in the IAF’s numbers and nor will the Rafale’s nuclear capability add much to the Indian offensive toolkit. One can only assume that once the first set of jets are delivered, a further order will be placed to augment the existing numbers, including naval variants. This is even more likely if Dassault begins to manufacture in India – with the transfer of technology, it would be easy to domestically ramp up numbers as India has done with the Sukhoi. The Rafale’s primary role is to replace the IAF’s retiring fleet: while the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft is expected to step in at the low end, the Rafale will occupy the mid-level force structure with the expectation that an advanced indigenous descendant of the Tejas or the fifth generation fighter that India is jointly developing with Russia will form the top of the line component.

Immediately, the Rafale is expected to give India the dominant status in the air. Wedded to airborne control systems, the Rafale and its armaments can essentially hit enemy targets while staying out of range of their fighter jets. Though not the essential component of a future cross-border strike, the Rafale can provide the additional firepower if needed. As the IAF’s description of the tender suggests, the Rafale is a multi-role platform that can be deployed for air dominance, ground support, aerial reconnaissance, and nuclear delivery. The Rafale has already been used in all these capacities – except the last, of course – in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, and Iraq and maintained a high operational rate throughout.

Neither the Rafale nor any other weapons system will give the side possessing it the ultimate advantage in battle and such expectations are foolish. Nonetheless, the Rafale, when it arrives, will substantially augment the Indian Air Force’s capabilities in several mission profiles and put India’s hostile neighbours on notice. An additional acquisition of domestically manufactured Rafales post-2021 would buy the Indian defence establishment time to complete its advanced fighter aircraft for the IAF. For an enervated service, the arrival of the Rafales will be a breath of fresh air.

This post appeared on FirstPost on September 22, 2016.

India’s Tepid French Affair

26 Tue Jan 2016

Posted by in France, India, South Asia

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India’s Republic Day celebrations this year were unusually representative of its state of affairs. Last year, US president Barack Obama had been the chief guest and there had been fanfare about the resolution of the nuclear liability deadlock; 12 months on, there has been little to show for it on the ground. French president François Hollande’s visit – the guest of honour this year – has been relatively subdued by comparison. Despite 19 deals – including 13 memoranda of understanding – being signed between India and France in several sectors such as space cooperation, food safety, smart cities, renewable energy, and railways, the two big ticket items – the 126 Rafale Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft  contract (downgraded to 36 in 2014) and the six EPR reactors for Jaitapur – are still stuck in negotiations.

Hollande in India, R-Day 2016Much like the promised reforms under the Modi government, progress on the Rafale and Jaitapur deals has followed salami tactics – slice by slice – rather than whole hog. The Jaitapur project was approved in December 2010 and the Rafale deal announced in January 2012 – neither are close to conclusion, let alone fruition. After his meeting with Indian officials, Hollande announced that he hoped the nuclear sale would be concluded by the year’s end. By way of contrast, the Iranian nuclear negotiations started clandestinely in Muscat, Oman, in March 2013 and a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was concluded in July 2015. It is worth bearing in mind that the JCPOA was was conducted between six countries, some hostile to each other, on a matter of grave disagreement. By contrast, the Rafale and Jaitapur deals are between two friendly countries with strategic relations working towards similar goals.

It is true that foreign relations are not built on big ticket item deals alone. Strong and sustainable ties are built only through a greater enmeshing of economies, institutions, and people. However, it is the major deals that act as beacons of intent – sophisticated technologies, particularly in advanced weapons systems, are not traded on a purely pecuniary calculus or Western relations with China and the Gulf countries would have been very much different today. Similarly, the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal was a landmark more for what it heralded politically than its dollar value alone – which has not yet added up to much. India’s relations with Japan have blossomed but are still viewed as incomplete because the two states are yet to establish firm nuclear and defence relations. And had Australia refused to sell uranium to India until the latter signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, relations would have been much frostier.

The high symbolic value of certain sectors is sometimes pooh-poohed by some analysts. Particularly in nuclear cooperation, they say, it is this mindset that contributes to more proliferation. This is ridiculous, of course: the symbolism accrued to certain sectors like nuclear and defence does not come from a postmodern construction of values but from an implicit expression of trust between states. A clear example is the US position on potential nuclear proliferation by Iran and the alleged proliferation by Israel. Perhaps something that is genuinely pure symbolism is the Indian contingent marching in France’s Bastille Day celebrations in 2009 and French soldiers returning the honour in the Republic Day parade this year.

What ails the discussions between Paris and Delhi is not apparent either. India’s hypersensitivity to an informed public sphere means that only sanitised tidbits from bureaucrats of either side are available: basically, it is rumoured to boil down to cost. No matter, the Rafale and Jaitapur deals are important to India for reasons beyond mere symbolism. Indian Air Force readiness hangs precariously and country-wide energy shortages are apparent.

One can admonish the government, suggest steps required to remedy its hurdles, or point out the economic and other losses incurred by its lethargic pace but that has been of little use for the past four years. Delhi needs to realise that it is not just important that reforms and agreements move forward but it is crucial that they do so in a timely manner. In its own neighbourhood, China’s rapid rise while India dilly-dallied over core reforms should have been a lesson to Delhi that power is not absolute but relative; there is a cost to the slow and steady approach as the Bharatiya Janata Party gets its house in order…one citizens might not want to pay.

This post appeared on FirstPost on January 27, 2016.

Rafale à la carte…

10 Fri Apr 2015

Posted by in Europe, France, India, Security, South Asia

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Amidst rumours that there might be some movement on the Rafale deal during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to France, India unexpectedly announced that it would purchase 36 of Dassault’s Rafale aircraft off the shelf for expedited delivery. This purchase would be in addition to the 126 similar jets India has been negotiating to acquire since 2012 from the same company through a tender floated in April 2007 for Medium-range Multi-Role Combat Aircraft. The news comes as a surprise because the possibility of an extra-contractual emergency purchase was never imagined by defence analysts – attention had been focused on the technical issues that have kept India and France apart in the negotiations for so long and pessimists opined that the technical nature of the disagreements would preclude any breakthrough unlike the nuclear liability issue with the United States in January 2015 which was political in nature. In a town like Delhi, it is astounding that there was not even the slightest hint of a leak about the government’s decision. The 36 jets would equip two squadrons of the Indian Air Force.

Interestingly, neither the Indo-French joint statement nor any information released since makes any mention of the negotiations for the 126 jets that are ongoing. This has set tongues wagging in India as to the implications of such a purchase on a wide variety of issues such as the development of Indian manufacturing, the fate of India’s defence procurements processes, and, of course, the MMRCA contract itself. On the surface of it, there appears to be little impact intended – the acquisition was motivated purely by the “critical operational necessity” of the IAF and is a one-off special dispensation. As Air Chief Marshal Arup Saha said at Aero India in February, “It is important we have an MMRCA. I would not say Rafale, but we need to have it [MMRCA] in the quickest possible time.”

The need is clear – against a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons, the IAF is presently operating with barely 25 squadrons. Moreover, 14 of these squadrons are comprised of MiG-21s and MiG-27s which are scheduled for retirement between 2015 and 2024. With India’s Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft joint venture with Russia held in abeyance, it might be time for some constructive panic in Vayu Bhawan. The order for 272 Sukhoi-30MKIs from Russia – 230 in 2002 and 42 in 2012 – will provide 13 squadrons by then but that still leaves operation strength at 24 squadrons. Yet even these have recently been plagued with troubles and India grounded its entire Sukhoi fleet for a time. With seven to nine Rafale squadrons and 14 squadrons of the indigenous Tejas LCA – orders for the Tejas are yet to be placed – the IAF may finally be at full strength by 2030. Defence hawks will have to wait for while before India is in a position to further raise the number of sanctioned squadrons.

What impact will India’s rush purchase have on the MMRCA negotiations? One might argue that the possession of 36 Rafales by the IAF will strengthen Dassault’s bargaining position. If India does not dilute its position, Delhi may well be left with yet another plane in its air force that only compounds the logistics of spares and ammunition without any indigenisation. This is an extreme view – unless the Indian terms are outrageous, it would be financially as well as politically myopic of Dassault to walk away from a $20 billion order. There may be plenty of arguments against (and for) the Rafale aircraft itself but those have little bearing on the purchase of 36 additional jets and would pertain to the entire MMRCA venture.

Another concern is that the purchase of 36 Rafale aircraft in parallel yet isolation from the MMRCA negotiations might undermine the Cost Negotiation Committee. However, it is difficult to see how that might be the case. The primary factor in the ballooning of costs has been India’s insistence on indigenisation – Dassault argues that India does not have the prerequisite industrial infrastructure to manufacture jets like the Rafale and to allow Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to do so would require certain upgrades and expansion in capability. The development of this infrastructure will add to the cost of India’s MMRCA project. Yet this will have little bearing over jets manufactured entirely in France and delivered to the Indian Air Force. Furthermore, the terms India has asked for and been granted are “better than conveyed by Dassault Aviation as part of a separate process underway.”

There is a valid concern that such purchases would undermine Indian defence procurement procedures. Foreign companies will not take contract negotiations seriously if they feel that it is possible to circumvent Delhi’s stringent demands by dragging on discussions indefinitely. This may make sense in retrospect but is dangerous as a corporate policy. During the negotiations of the MMRCA contract, it has been suggested several times that the exercise be abandoned or that a rival aircraft manufacturer be courted. While it worked out well for Dassault this time, India could have just as easily abandoned talks and gone for a different aircraft. There are problems with India’s defence procurement process, no doubt, and they certainly cast grave doubts over the country’s bureaucracy and planning. These problems exist whether the 36 additional aircraft were purchased or not and to feign affront over the compromising of India’s acquisitions process now is disingenuous at best.

The parallel purchase of 36 Rafales may rub many people the wrong way. Nonetheless, it is important to contextualise the decision in light of the IAF’s urgent operational needs. Given the troubles with the Sukhoi-30MKI and the FGFA project, the fastest possible acquisition was the Rafales from France – any consideration of the Eurofighter or any other jet would have merely started another clock on familiarisation and negotiations between India and the new manufacturer. All in all, this one-time purchase gives the IAF some breathing room until its other acquisitions come in.

This post first appeared on Swarajya on April 11, 2015.