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Chaturanga

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Tag Archives: MTCR

The Elephant and the Eagle at Sweet 16

05 Sun Jun 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia, United States

≈ Comments Off on The Elephant and the Eagle at Sweet 16

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Ajmer, Allahabad, ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations, Australia Group, Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation, BECA, China, CISMOA, Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, DTTI, European Union, free trade, India, intellectual property rights, Logistics Support Agreement, LSA, Make in India, Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, NSG, nuclear, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, PSLV, smart cities, TPP, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP, United Nations Security Council, United States, UNSC, Vishakapatnam, Wassenaar Arrangement, World Trade Organisation, WTO

It has been 16 years since George W Bush fundamentally altered the way the United States looked at India. As the old Cold War with the Soviet Union receded into memory and a new one with China appeared imminent, at least to the Bush White House, India emerged as an important potential ally in the new world order. India’s economy had recently started down the road to liberalisation too, making the South Asian country attractive to US industry as well as the government.

Despite frequent kerfuffles in the media – and there have been plenty – India-US relations have moved from strength to strength over the past 16 years. From the Strategic Quartet – high technology trade, space cooperation, nuclear energy, and missile defence – through the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership to the historic Indo-US nuclear deal and the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, Washington and Delhi appear poised on the brink of a century-defining partnership. If state visits are any indication of warmth, prime minister Narendra Modi is visiting the United States at this moment for the fourth time in just two years – something his predecessor required nine years to necessitate.

Defence ties are usually the most prominent measure of relations between nations for obvious reasons: not only do they declare how much skin each state has in the other’s security, but they are also a statement of how much states trust each other with their prized technology. No wonder, then, that India’s defence purchases from the United States have attracted so much attention. Between CH-47 Chinooks, AH-64 Apaches, C-17 Globemasters, and C-130J Super Hercules, India’s aggregate defence acquisitions from the United States has crossed $13 billion. The loss of India’s Multirole Medium Range Combat Aircraft contract disappointed Washington but under Modi’s Make in India programme, US defence firms are considering moving the production of the F-16 and F-18 to India.

The United States has moved beyond the role of being a mere supplier of weapons to India: officials have been engaged in talks that, if successful, would result in the co-production of systems. Under the DTTI, the next generation of Raven unmanned aerial vehicle will be jointly developed and produced. Other projects include intelligence gathering and reconnaissance pods for the C-130J, mobile electric hybrid power sources, helmet-mounted digital displays for aircraft and helicopter pilots, high energy lasers, and chemical and biological warfare protection gear for soldiers.

Washington has also been keen to assist India with core defence technologies such as the development of jet engines and the catapult launching system on board US aircraft carriers. India’s Kaveri programme has been a miserable failure and with Delhi’s increasing focus on maritime security, the US offer could provide a healthy boost to Indian capabilities.

India’s change of mind on what the Pentagon calls the foundational treaties – LSA, BECA, and CISMOA – has been a welcome surprise. These agreements formalise the sharing of logistical facilities and align communication protocols between the US military and their partners, greatly enhancing the range and capabilities of both forces in joint humanitarian or security missions. Although the agreements will remain unsigned during Modi’s visit this June, it is reported that they are close to conclusion.

The United States’ support for Indian admission to the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and technology export control groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Group gives some weight to Philip Zelikow’s statement in 2005 that the United States intends to help India become a major power.

Although both India and the United States have come a long way in defence cooperation, one cannot shake the feeling that both sides are still hedging from a complete commitment. India has lost no opportunity to stress that the signing of the foundational agreements with the United States will in no way erode its sovereignty, that it is happy to conduct numerous maritime joint exercises but will not be persuaded to conduct joint patrols, and that India sees itself as a friend and partner of the United States but not quite an ally. On the American side, senators questioned the wisdom of a bill that proposed elevating India to the status of a NATO ally in all but name given that the South Asian country did not see itself in that role. The US bill would have amended the Arms Export Control Act and made defence transfers to India quicker and smoother.

One hurdle in closer ties is Pakistan: India is displeased with the continued sale of US weapons to the Islamic republic despite ample evidence pointing to terrorist ties and an unhelpful disposition towards US goals in South and Central Asia. However, the dynamics of these ties have remained relatively unchanged since the 1950s: Pakistan provides services in the region that the United States cannot get elsewhere in return for White House forbearance on matters Islamabad sees as vital to its interests. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was basing privileges for US reconnaissance aircraft conducting missions over China and the Soviet Union; in the 1970s, Islamabad served as the channel to Beijing and a rapprochement with China; in the 1980s, it was the shipment of arms to the mujaheddin in Afghanistan. In the 2010s, Islamabad has become the conduit to the Taliban, with whom Washington hopes to negotiate a “decent interval.” Even now, though the United States has been urging India to play a greater role in Afghanistan, Delhi has declined, choosing to involve itself more in important but not critical facets of Afghanistan’s development.

India’s reluctance to play a more significant role in its own interests may frustrate observers but this has, understandably, in large part to do with the country’s capabilities. Couched in the rhetoric of multipolarity and morality, India’s inaction misleads the casual observer. The ignored pachyderm in the room is that Delhi lacks the financial and industrial wherewithal to flex its military muscle in Central Asia or the South China Sea, and any attempt to persuade it to do so will fail. The remedy to this is economic growth, technological development, and strategic coalitions.

On the surface of it, economic relations seem to have grown substantially between India and the United States. Both countries are investing more in each other’s economies and trade between the two stands hovers around $70 billion. More and more US companies are setting up shop in India as Indian companies are expanding their business beyond the Atlantic. Washington is the lead partner for developing Allahabad, Ajmer, and Vishakapatnam as smart cities. There is still plenty of room to grow and Modi has ambitiously suggested aiming for $500 billion in trade in a few years. However, there are several issues that will plague relations. The first is subsidies: Washington recently won a case against India at the World Trade Organisation that prohibited the Indian government from giving preferential treatment to domestic solar panel manufacturers. US firms are also pushing Washington to act against subsidies the Indian Space Research Organisation gets from the government for its Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle programme.

A second hurdle is intellectual property. In several sectors, India has brought its laws into alignment with US and international norms yet there remain significant differences in philosophy. Pharmaceuticals is one such field, where Indian courts have been hostile to the US practice of evergreening patents, instead seeing a social dimension to the industry. India has also had disagreements with the United States on its agricultural subsidies and food security programme.

A sector-specific yet politically potent point of friction is nuclear energy. Although the Indo-US nuclear deal was announced in 2005 and came into force in 2008, there has been little movement on that front since. India’s nuclear liability laws were found to be at odds with international norms and it was only in 2015 when US president Barack Obama visited India during the Republic Day celebrations that some headway was made in easing the logjam. The Indian side came up with a convoluted mechanism to bypass its own law without losing face and satisfied Washington but private companies are still uncomfortable with the provisions. As a result, a number of nuclear energy projects have stalled across the country; GE has flatly refused to participate in the Indian nuclear energy market as long as the present law stands and Westinghouse has delayed the submission of its project proposals. The sins committed by the BJP while in Opposition have been visited upon the BJP while in power.

A probable future cause for concern is the US creation of large trading spheres via the Trans Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. India is not party to either of these blocs and its efforts to forge free trade agreements with important partners such as the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has proceeded at a snail’s pace. There is a danger that the implementation of the TPP and TPIP will take trade away from Indian shores to within the bloc, dampening much-needed Indian economic growth.

Many of these frictions arise from the fact that the US and Indian economies are at different points: certain Indian policies may not optimize on economic efficiency but are geared towards lifting more of its population out of poverty or establishing its own industries firmly in the international arena. Delhi and Washington have much work to do to negotiate through the clashing policies that will certainly arise in the future and early recognition and amelioration will insulate relations from harsh market realities.

After 16 years, India-US relations are on a firm footing. Much has been accomplished though a lot more remains to be done. It was feared that the warmth between the two would dissipate after the exit of Bush and the election of Obama but despite the lull due to an international economic slowdown and a paralysed UPA government, ties have started to blossom again in the past two years since Modi took office. India enjoys bipartisan support in the US and Washington a hesitant embrace in Delhi. Can relations be derailed? There will always be swings and roundabouts but it seems to have dawned on both countries that the geopolitics of this century are best navigated as friends than estranged democracies.


This post appeared on FirstPost on June 06, 2016.

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A Foreign Policy for Mr. Modi

14 Fri Feb 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Anglosphere, Australia, Brazil, China, energy, European Union, foreign policy, France, India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, Narendra Modi, non-proliferation, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, nuclear, oil, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United States

Foreign policy seldom occupies an important position in political agenda during electoral campaigns, and 2014 in India is hardly any different. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s prime ministerial candidate has, however, evoked a little more interest from various sections. One reason for this abnormal curiosity is that anything Narendra Modi does attracts attention. Another reason is that the refusal by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to grant Modi a diplomatic visa because of his alleged role in the 2002 Gujarat riots makes him an even more interesting prime ministerial candidate, especially given his apparent popularity with large swathes of the Indian people. Conversely, the Gujarat chief minister has enjoyed much success in his foreign visits to China, Japan, and Singapore.

Modi himself has said little about the shape his foreign policy would take but his actions as Chief Minister belie a strong emphasis on trade, particularly with Asia and the countries of the Indian Ocean rim. Yet commercial links alone do not dictate foreign relations and in this era of the global village, Modi must think on several interconnected factors that will affect the security and esteem of India.

Structural issues

The making and study of foreign policy is beset with difficulties at several levels. First, there are structural issues – despite scores of its own languages, India is predominantly an English-speaking state and moves in Anglophone circles. The dominant views in this system are set by the United States and to a lesser extent, Britain. This is largely because of the presence of hundreds of well-staffed and well-funded think tanks who see the world through Anglophone eyes. Issues such as non-proliferation, global warming, and terrorism and defined, unchallenged, by American interests. Multilingual historians are often surprised by the diversity of debate in other languages even when there is broad national consensus.

The Anglophone discourse is a result not of some master conspiracy but of a failure to empathise with rationalities other than one’s own. India’s best response to the present situation would be to open its own national archives to scholarly scrutiny and encourage its universities to produce policy experts in the plethora of fields governments usually interfere in. A narrative informed by the history of Indian policy-making is the first step in generating superior inputs to current policy makers.

A second challenge India faces in its international relations is infrastructure – the lack of energy, transportation, public safety, health, and a sound legal system make the country not immediately attractive to foreign investment. It is telling that an Egypt still recovering from the turmoil of the Arab Spring saw more tourists in 2013 than India did. Though infrastructure does not strictly fall in the realm of external affairs, it makes an enormous difference in attracting valuable partners and forming strong ties with them.

A third question Modi must ponder on is the structure of India’s military, the stick or hard power of foreign policy. What sort of force structure is required for the nature of tomorrow’s conflicts? With the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia, it is unlikely that India’s neighbours will engage in 20th century style conflicts over land with India; rather, they’ll rely on asymmetric warfare and/or well-trained fast and mobile units with heavy firepower, good lines of communication, and a high degree of stealth. India will need to be able to deploy force in a variety of theatres – maritime anti-piracy operations, mountainous border engagements, thrusts across the desert, and others.

Remedying these fundamental deficiencies will give India a stronger hand, despite its understaffed Foreign Service, with which to project its views and defend its interests in the international community.

Central & South Asia

A state’s immediate neighbours are always of the greatest concern; India has seen its influence slip considerably in recent years, or at least, has had its impotence exposed. With smaller states who can pose no military threat on their own like the Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, India must be generous in its development aid and facilitate closer ties via education, cultural exchanges, and easier travel regulations. However, India must be careful to avoid the tail wagging the dog – preferential treatment must be reciprocated by good faith. Modi must see to it that Indian officials do not come off as overbearing and condescending to the neighbourhood as they have been accused of in the past and walk that fine line between arrogant regional power and regional locus of power.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan will shift some of the burden of keeping the Central Asian country free from Taliban rule onto India. It is more logical for Afghans to fight the Taliban for their own country than for India to follow in the erroneous footsteps of imperial Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. India must act in concert with other regional powers with similar interests – Russia and Iran – to help Afghanistan repel the Taliban and rebuild its society and economy. Any less of a commitment would irredeemably jeopardise Indian economic and security interests. The challenge would be to strangle the Taliban’s flow of aid from Pakistan. Modi must keep international attention and condemnation on Pakistan’s aid to the Islamists in Afghanistan while cobbling together a coalition to provide military and financial aid to the non-theocratic forces in Kabul.

Iran can be another important regional partner for India. Both countries have somewhat similar interests in Afghanistan, and Iran is also the last stop on the proposed International North-South Trade Corridor that would connect the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea and serve Turkey, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Iran would be a vital partner in this project as well as in providing security to Afghanistan against the Taliban. Although Iran does not look to India as a major economic partner, there are, nonetheless, several projects of bilateral interest India must push to develop quickly. Among these are the much talked about development of Chabahar port, its attendant road, rail, and pipeline infrastructure, and oil & gas pipelines between the two countries. Modi must put Iran towards the top of his foreign policy agenda not only to capture a new, post-sanctions Iranian market but for the ripple effect the INSTC can have for trade in the region.

Over the years, Pakistan has elevated itself from a nuisance to a threat with its support of terrorism from behind its nuclear shield. Endless summits have failed to silence the guns in Kashmir, let alone bring peace to the region. In fact, all evidence still points to support of terrorist cells by various arms of the Pakistani government, and men like Malik Ishaq and Hafiz Saeed roam free. At this low juncture, one option left to Modi is to suspend talks and downgrade diplomatic relations to the consular level. In the past, India has shown itself to be too willing to talk regardless of provocations and dishonoured commitments by the other side. A concerted effort to highlight internationally Pakistan’s links to terrorism must be mounted. India must try to throttle international aid to Pakistan or affix conditions that demand aid be sanitised from contact with terrorism via sub-contractors, finance, labour, etc. Any talks that do take place between the two states must be only via a third party. Modi must be bold – but not reckless – and explore other strategies to put pressure on Islamabad, be it via Afghanistan, Balochistan, or along the LoC.

The Great Powers

China has always been India’s bête noire since the Communists seized power in 1949 and annexed Tibet in 1950. India’s nuclear and rocket programmes took on a military dimension solely to deter China’s ambitions south of the Himalayas and Delhi’s quest for the nuclear triad was to assure Beijing that it had second strike capability. The irony will not be missed when one notes that China is also India’s largest trading partner today. This should not lead to an underestimation of the threat China poses to India – it has helped Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, surrounds India with its string of pearls, blocked India from gaining membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, prevented India from being raised to a permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, supports insurgencies against India, claims Indian territory to this day, maintains military pressure along the LAC, and has been a negative influence on any international aid flowing towards the development of India’s North East.

A muscular policy against China is not possible at India’s present capability levels. Furthermore, attacking trade between the two countries would only make the Indian consumer suffer by having to pay more for goods. Modi must strengthen trade with India’s northeastern neighbour as he has repeatedly suggested whilst keeping an eye on the balance of trade. China must be banned from core sectors of the economy such as telecom and infrastructure in sensitive areas. If India wants to make its position on Tibet ambiguous again and invite the Dalai Lama to Race Course Road or express sympathy for the plight of the Uighurs, it would only reflect China’s position on Kashmir. Simultaneously, India must strengthen ties with Southeast Asia via universities, road, rail and air links, and trade; this, however, will not be easy as Chinese aid far surpasses anything India can muster due to its superior economy. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia has for long sought an Indian alternative to Chinese hegemony and will welcome it if provided. In essence, Modi must deliver on India’s much-hyped but insubstantive Look East Policy.

Outside India’s immediate mandala, India’s relationship with Russia and the United States are of great importance to it. Despite recent purchases of big-ticket items from France and the United States, over 70% of Indian military hardware is still sourced from Russia and the situation is unlikely to change in the near future. Moscow has concerns regarding US intentions in what has traditionally been the Russian sphere of influence; NATO expansion eastwards (Georgia) and US ballistic missile defence stations in Poland and the Ukraine have forced Russia to tolerate rising Chinese power on its borders and in its eastern peripheries. Modi must assure Russia that India’s apparent drift towards the United States is not directed at it but other regional aspirants for hegemony. India must stress common concerns such as Chinese belligerence, a volatile Afghanistan, rising costs of defence research and development, and US intervention in areas of mutual concern. Modi must also push for greater access to Russian markets for Indian companies.

India’s ties with the United States have been in the doldrums since the end of the George W Bush administration. Even then, arguably, the optimism was felt more in Washington than in Delhi which did little to reciprocate. India’s difficult process in ratifying the Indo-US nuclear deal, the nuclear civil liability law [link] it enacted, and the Non-Alignment 2.0 document sources close to the government produced gave the United States pause in its embrace of India. Similarly, the United States’ continued assistance to Pakistan, its policy in Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, and its ambiguous position on China give India little reason to rush into the US’ embrace. The recent distraction over the mistreatment by the United States of Indian Acting Consul in New York, Devyani Khobragade, may have soured public opinion but left common interests unchanged.

Despite the many disagreements the estranged democracies have, Modi must remember that India is not “looking for a groom for its daughter.” India must realise that the United States will not commit to Asia without a reliable partner; furthermore, US concerns about the end use or theft of its technology are as valid as Indian concerns over end-users of the Brahmos missile (if they are ever exported). Modi must promote trade but also push for more transfer of technology, explore joint development and production of defence items, yet ensure that US interpretation of intellectual property law does not put India at a perennial disadvantage. Intelligence sharing, joint training and exercises, energy, advanced materials, nuclear research, space exploration, and environmental protection are just some of the areas where Indian and US interests converge. A significantly more substantial relationship is possible and of greater value to India if it could modify its nuclear civil liabilities law and jettison flawed doctrines such as non-alignment. A lesson India can emulate from its northeastern neighbour is that the more valuable a partner India becomes to the United States, the more influence it will have on US policies in Asia. Modi cannot allow himself to be distracted by public relations snafus and trivia and push forward to forge what may well be India’s most important relation of the first half of the 21st century.

Partners

Less powerful than Russia or the United States but no less valuable to India as partners are France, Israel, and Japan. The lack of a large power disparity may even psychologically pave the way for more stable partnerships. France is one of the few countries that has rarely been critical of India, even in the aftermath of the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998. In fact, the Indo-US nuclear deal was the culmination of a French idea to bring India into the nuclear fold. Despite the struggling negotiations over India’s purchase of the Dassault Rafale, the two countries are mutually compatible in several areas such as nuclear energy, infrastructure, chemicals, and telecommunications. Most importantly, both France and India seek a larger role in global affairs today – the former seeks to regain its earlier grandeur and the latter to acquire it anew. Modi must capitalise on this psychological dynamic to forge not just a partnership with France but also a new multipolar world order.

Japan can be India’s most reliable ally in Asia to balance China. Modi is already known for the importance he gives relations with Japan and this must be expanded even more. Given Japan’s reluctance to enter into the arms market or enter into civilian nuclear cooperation with India just yet, Modi must engage with Japanese parliamentarians across the political spectrum to gain their confidence. The mutual benefits of close ties, if achieved, are already clear to all and business and cultural exchange will foster greater trust at more levels between the two peoples. Modi’s task here is less diplomatic and more social and cultural – perhaps cold balance of power calculations would be better received if couched in the language of shared values, threats, and goals.

For decades, relations between Israel and India were clandestine at best because of Delhi’s belief that the Arab World would prove a moderating influence on its Islamic brothers in South Asia. However, the evolving political realities of the Arab-Israeli struggle allowed India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel by 1992. The two countries have little in common but exchanges today include military hardware, intelligence sharing, and agricultural know-how. Despite differences in their views on Iran and China, the threat of international Islamic terror brings Jerusalem and Delhi closer to each other. Modi can use this as a springboard to encourage greater joint development of military systems; in a cost-sensitive world, indigenous hardware with export potential should interest both parties. After the loss of Iran, Israel may look to India in a revival of its periphery doctrine.

If there is any psychological value in being one of the few countries in the world where Jews have never been persecuted, Modi can leverage that to develop tourism, agriculture, medical research, and educational ties. Most people know the tiny Levantine country for terrorism and wars but Israel has a strong knowledge economy with many gifted scientists, doctors, and engineers who work on projects that can be of great interest to India such as electric cars and desalination. Modi must see Israel other than through a narrow security prism and build relations at a societal level.

Reaching Out To The Rest

India obviously wants stellar relations with all countries in the world and would like to engage in commerce with as many as possible. Australia is fast emerging as a major supplier of energy to India and may be a partner in security for the Indian Ocean Region. Africa presents a massive opportunity for Indian business houses in raw materials, agriculture, education, and infrastructure. However, South America has received little attention in Indian thinking despite the presence of another BRICS member. Modi must explore opportunities in this far-flung land and make India’s reach global. An Indian alternative to Chinese aid and investments in international markets will prevent the balance of power from becoming too skewed in China’s favour while opening more and more countries to Indian products, services, and ideas.

*        *        *

Foreign policy has never been so important in independent India’s history except perhaps during the early days of the Cold War. India needs the international community for security, trade, and aid. The rise of China has brought a Cold War upon India’s doorstep – already India is competing with China in Africa and Southeast Asia for resources and influence – and meaningful ties with similarly minded countries will be of mutual benefit. India has been able to plod along at a lethargic pace until now because it was not at the forefront of international developments. Now, as one of the largest economies and a country directly threatened by the rise of a hostile neighbour, India can no longer afford such nonchalance. Modi’s foreign policy must measure up to his domestic vision and captivate a new generation of Indians; it must be ambitious in its goals, wide in its scope, measured in its formulation, and assertive in its implementation. As the Good Book tells us, where there is no vision, the people perish (Míshlê 29:18).


This post appeared on Gateway House on February 26, 2014.

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Nuclear Monopolies

15 Sat Jun 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Austria, Britain, China, Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, ENDC, ENR, enrichment, France, India, Ireland, Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, Netherlands, New Zealand, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Norway, NPT, NSG, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, reprocessing, Russia, Switzerland, United Nations Security Council, United States, UNSC, Wassenaar Arrangement, Zangger Committee

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 2013 plenary meeting in Prague last week. Little of what transpired at the meet has trickled out, but it is known that Britain lobbied strongly for India’s membership into the exclusive nuclear club. After the meetings, a brief statement was issued that said that “only the NSG’s relationship with India was discussed.” An earlier meeting in March this year revealed that though four of the five Non-Proliferation Treaty sanctioned nuclear powers – France, Russia, Britain, and the United States – supported India’s membership, the proposal was opposed by China and a few other countries (most likely Austria, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and New Zealand).

The NSG was established in the immediate aftermath of India’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion” at Pokhran. From an initial seven members in 1975, the group today has 47 members that are all part of the nuclear cycle, be it ore, technology, or even important shipping hubs. The secretive body works on consensus, and its rulings are not legally binding but serve as guidelines to coordinate and regulate nuclear commerce between states.

Despite the Pokhran impetus behind the creation of the NSG, the Indo-US nuclear deal supported strongly by George W Bush brought about a thaw in civilian nuclear relations with India. The United States was able to arm-twist the few hesitant Participating Governments (PG) of the NSG into giving India a waiver for its non-NPT status. Yet this was only a quick fix – in the long-run, US pressure upon the NSG regarding India brought to the fore related tensions within the group over enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) and China.

India has publicly downplayed its interest in joining the NSG and other technology denying regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Zangger Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Nonetheless, its apparent nonchalance should not be misread: if anything, Delhi is extremely eager to have a seat at the “Big Boys’ Table.” Some analysts perceive this, quite narrow-mindedly, as a matter of prestige. However, these memberships are important to India as they provide a better platform from which to voice India’s views on nuclear commerce and non-proliferation and thereby protect its own nuclear establishment.

The NSG’s India Quandary

India critics are quite right in their warning that India does not see eye-to-eye with the NSG and the body’s opening its doors to the South Asian country will dilute its mission. Had anyone paid attention, this would have been obvious from the mid-1960s at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) negotiations over the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and at every opportunity to discuss nuclear issues since. The PGs must decide whether the nuclear status quo serves the world’s best interests (and risk being made irrelevant) or allow changes to reflect the realities which they had been in a position to ignore 40 years ago.

By allowing India into the NSG, the group also risks looking hypocritical, at least on paper, and losing credibility with trouble spots like Pakistan, Iran, and a slew of countries newly interested in nuclear power (29 according to the International Atomic Energy Agency). China has already not-so-obliquely hinted, however debatably, at the double standards exhibited by the group regarding India and Pakistan, and used the Indo-US nuclear deal as an excuse to make further sales to Pakistan under the, again debatable, pretext of ‘grandfathering’ its sales into a previous bilateral treaty between the two states.

However, by not letting in India, the NSG might be hastening its own demise – as India’s economy grows so will its nuclear energy sector. Increased confidence in designing, building, and running nuclear reactors will inevitably lead to India eventually becoming a nuclear exporter – it is already among the leading countries in fast breeder and thorium reactor research. At this point, Delhi will have little to hold it back from establishing its own criteria for safe nuclear commerce outside the scope of the NSG. Every country pursuing nuclear power has its own strategic equation, and if an Indian-led export regime is perceived as less intrusive and insulting to national sovereignty while offering similar benefits, the NSG may have few bargaining chips to use with India.

The View From Delhi

India’s dealings with the NSG have revealed two anti-India blocs – a small group of nations whose opposition is on ideological grounds, and China. The first group’s idealism prohibits it from accepting the sort of exceptions the NSG would have to make to allow India to become a member. This group also opposed the India-specific waiver in 2008 and would have voted against it had it not been for “tremendous pressure” exerted upon them by the White House.

India can, and has in the past, use persuasive diplomacy with the group of European states (and New Zealand) to convince them of the merit of India’s case. India can also count on the countries that have the most to gain from India’s unrestricted entry into the nuclear market to also speak on its behalf to these states. Though not easy, Delhi can probably persuade these states not to block its membership if not support it.

The bigger hindrance for Delhi is Beijing. Not only has China flouted NSG guidelines in its dealings with Pakistan, but it is also the main obstacle to India in several international fora including the NSG and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Strategists in Delhi must rue the day Jawaharlal Nehru refused a permanent seat on the UNSC (the US offered to support India’s bid in 1952 and again in 1955) in favour of China. If India expects its northeastern neighbour’s behaviour to change, it will have to wait long. These memberships amplify India’s voice on the world stage; they are diplomatic force multipliers that once given, cannot be taken back or negated. Beijing might be willing to make small and temporary concessions on the border and on its support to anti-India forces in the region but it will never accede to a place at the table for Delhi.

There is little doubt that China is using its clout to squeeze benefits out of the group for its protégé and several PGs accept the logic equating an unstable and nuclear black-marketeering Pakistan to India. Not only has Chashma 3 and 4 been grandfathered in soon after the announcement of the Indo-US nuclear deal, a new deal for two more reactors has been struck between China and Pakistan. Worse, the NSG has been unwilling (and unable) to take Beijing to task for its violations.

India’s Way Forward

There is little hope for India with regard to the NSG (or UNSC) while it faces what is practically a veto from China; the organisational structures of these groups do not allow for much room to manoeuvre. However, India can lobby the other members of the NSG hard and enter into bilateral deals with them as it tries to block Pakistan’s way up that same path. India’s booming economy and energy needs are an enticing carrot if deployed well, and few countries would be able to resist such an offer in an era of global economic slowdown.

India also needs to develop good relations with states not in the NSG that have significant nuclear activities, particularly Namibia, Niger, and Morocco, who are all major suppliers of uranium ore concentrates. The IAEA lists 72 countries with significant nuclear activity of which 47 are members of the NSG. The remaining 25 represent a market India can create, nurture, and develop outside the ambit of NSG restrictions. This is not to say that India should not insist upon IAEA safeguards; on the contrary, it should. However, India can write its own rules beyond IAEA protocols.

In all honesty, this is too bold a step for India’s nuclear establishment that struggles even to construct a reactor on time without finding substandard parts or accusations of incompetence. In addition, India’s political masters have never exhibited the mettle or vision required to work around such a diplomatic impasse. The threat of the evolution of an alternate nuclear control regime is the surest way to force members of the NSG to consider India’s views and membership, but the real question is if Delhi has the stomach for a long drawn out and demanding game of nuclear chess. My guess is no.

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