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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: NFU

Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

22 Wed Mar 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

Tags

Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, Caroline rule, China, counter-force, counter-value, India, Manohar Parrikar, NFU, No First Use, NSG, nuclear, nuclear doctrine, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, Shivshankar Menon

There have again been speculations recently about India’s nuclear doctrine and the value of its no first-use-posture. The reason for the kerfuffle this time are a couple of sentences in former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. Menon writes,

There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.

This has been interpreted to mean that India’s no-first-use posture is not credible, which would implicitly exonerate Delhi from the charge – if it is made – that it has quietly changed its nuclear doctrine. Instead, this understanding of Menon’s words suggests that the Indian no-first-use policy was a sham from the very beginning.

Menon also writes,

…proportional responses and deterrence were not the preferred posture in the initial stages of the weapons program, for it might tempt adversaries to test the space available below the threshold for full nuclear retaliation… Instead, the logical posture at first was counter-value targeting, or targeting the opponent’s assets, rather than counter-force targeting, which concentrates on the enemy’s military and command structures.

Here, the object of interrogation is the past tense (emphasis mine) that Menon uses; does he mean to indicate that India initially settled for a massive retaliation against an enemy’s cities but later may have surreptitiously modified its doctrine as its weapons systems became more sophisticated in terms of detection and destruction? However, the context of his objectionable grammar is the historical evolution of Indian nuclear thinking from the mid-1980s. Menon is talking about the inter-test years (1974-1998) when India had not publicly weaponised its peaceful nuclear explosion and therefore obviated the need for a nuclear doctrine.

However, the former NSA is not nuclear-shy once red lines have been crossed. As he explains the rationale,

There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.

Essentially, under India’s massive retaliation strategy, military as well as civilian targets would be considered. A purely counter-value massive retaliation by Delhi would leave Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal intact and capable of raining nuclear fire on Indian cities. The sudden realisation that the Indian military could potentially go after Pakistani nuclear assets as well as its infrastructure has caused a bit of a stir in some circles.

There are several problems with this sudden alarmist tone. The most obvious is that this is not a new observation. Aside from the fact that scholars have gleaned every nuance out of India’s nuclear policy already, the doctrine itself – what is publicly available – specifically states that its retaliation only policy is dynamic. In the words of the National Security Advisory Board,

India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.

India’s policy is clearly stated to be to only retaliatory, which is again emphasised in the next section: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Nonetheless, this position is dynamic in that it is conceivable that imminent use of nuclear weapons against India – fuelling of missiles, field deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, delegation of launch authority – especially from a state that has repeatedly declared a willingness, almost an eagerness, to strike first with nuclear weapons, will be treated as an attack and liable for Indian retaliation. As many Indian strategists have wondered, what is the morality of awaiting certain destruction just to satisfy a dictionary definition of no-first-use?

Such use – anticipatory self defence – may not be to the satisfaction of semanticists but is nonetheless considered just under international law if it fulfills the criteria of the Caroline rule: instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Thus, as Menon himself noted, more flexibility – ambiguity? – has been built into the Indian nuclear doctrine than is realised. As a side note, it is interesting that the same Caroline rule that bears out Indian views on nuclear strikes objects to the dilution of NFU by extending it to chemical or biological weapons as India and other nuclear states have done.

The composition of India’s nuclear arsenal and its status should belie any fears about preemptive counter-force targetting. Most nuclear observers agree that the Indian arsenal is still rudimentary compared to mature nuclear states such as the United States, France, or China. By the benchmarks of those in whose footsteps it follows, India has conducted far fewer (hot) tests to confirm design parameters that would affect miniaturisation, maximise yield, or assure successful detonation in unconventional circumstances to be capable of precise, proportionate strikes. Although the exact composition of the Indian arsenal is classified, the mainstay may be assumed to be improved versions of its 1974 prototype that was tested again in 1998, a ~15 kT Hiroshima-style device and hardly an ideal choice for a surgical counter-force strike. The sub-kiloton designs, ideal for mating with the Brahmos missile for tactical strikes, are not as reliable as their larger brother. The real concern, then, and a more familiar one for Indians, is that their bureaucrats and politicians might be promising more than their military can actually deliver.

It is also worth noting that in regions with population density as high as in the Indian subcontinent, it is very difficult to achieve a purely counter-value or counter-force strike. Military bases are almost always near population centres or important infrastructural nodes out of necessity. Even if Delhi’s policy of massive retaliation was purely counter-value, it would inevitably damage or destroy vital military assets. Despite such collateral damage, the doctrine can then hardly be called counter-force. Yet, as the former NSA points out, it would be ludicrous to leave the enemy’s nuclear arsenal intact for the sake of doctrinal purity.

The newly rediscovered ambiguity in the Indian nuclear doctrine may perhaps carry more salience because not only does it come from a former official who had a large role in shaping Delhi’s nuclear policy but in view of certain “personal” comments former defence minister Manohar Parrikar recently made. Speaking at a book launch in Delhi in November 2016, the then defence minister calmly eschewed India’s no-first-use policy although he immediately clarified that there had been no change in government policy. With two former senior officials casting doubt on India’s intentions, should the international community consider Delhi’s NFU to be diluted?

It needs to be stressed that Menon merely explained India’s long-existing doctrine and did not reformulate it. With regard Parrikar’s comments, seen in their entirety, there can be no doubt that Indian nuclear policy has not changed. At most, the former defence minister’s comments indicate that there may be discussions going on in South Block in very small circles on updating India’s nuclear doctrine. Surely, this cannot be a surprise when the Bharatiya Janata Party had even announced its intention to do so in its election manifesto in 2014. Indeed, the present government may change India’s nuclear policy but it is absurd to expect that policies are static and eternal – especially when even nuclear warheads are upgraded.

Some observers have wondered at the opportune timing – the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary is just around the corner in June – of a sudden panic attack on Indian nuclear no-first-use and counter-force posture. This is unlikely to have been a factor for several reasons: 1. the United States, India’s supporter in the forum with the most clout, does not seem willing to twist arms on India’s behalf as it did in 2008; 2. India has found it difficult to bring into its confidence the several smaller states on the moral high horse; 3. China would be relied upon to veto Indian membership in the consensus-seeking group unless Pakistan were simultaneously admitted. The strategic dimension of NSG membership in South Asia should not be underestimated.

So if not a shift in doctrine, has there been a change in strategy? With improving capabilities, it would be myopic not to expect refinements in strategy. However, none of it – the apprehension about anticipatory self-defence or counter-force targetting – adds up to a new phase in Indian nuclear posture. The nuclear doctrine has long offered these options and at best, India’s material realities might be quietly catching up with its lofty ambitions. No matter, this whole affair has been an exercise in making mountains out of molehills.


This post appeared on FirstPost on March 23, 2017.

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Thus Spake Parrikar…

12 Sat Nov 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Thus Spake Parrikar…

Tags

deterrence, India, Manohar Parrikar, NFU, No First Use, nuclear

​Manohar Parrikar often finds himself in the news for the wrong reasons. A seemingly harmless book launch presented the latest opportunity for the Indian defence minister to enjoy some limelight yet again. However, at least this time, the brouhaha was entirely manufactured with little reason in sight.

In what appears to be a response to a question at the launch of The New Arthashastra: A Security Strategy for India, Parrikar expressed the view that the logic of a well-defined and written security doctrine eluded him. Why would one, he pondered out loud, not only restrict oneself to a set of responses but also open up the playbook to one’s enemy? Parrikar gave the example of nuclear policy – why would India tie itself down to a nuclear no-first -use position? In his view, India’s leaders should merely state that India is a responsible nuclear weapons state and any potential use would be after careful deliberation.

The defence minister was vehement in declaring these views to be his private thoughts and that the country’s nuclear policy had not changed. In fact, he went as far as predicting, half jokingly, that it would be splayed all across newspapers the next day that a change in doctrine had been made. He was not wrong – within minutes of his comments hitting Twitter, policy wonks were condemning his casual attitude towards nuclear deterrence and even the thought of straying from a nuclear NFU.

Parrikar’s most egregious sin appears to have simply been that his views were not popular among those who would don the hat of experts; nothing the defence minister said was actually either surprising or extraordinary. Given the situation, the criticism levelled against Parrikar comes off as petty  and motivated.

First, the accusation that the minister should not have aired his personal opinion on so sensitive a subject – it should be noted that even as he answered the question asked of him, Parrikar categorically stated that there was no doctrinal shift and he was only expressing his views as an individual. It was not a later clarification by his office to put the minister in the clear.

More to the point, is it surprising that not just the defence minister but even several other senior officials in the present regime may have private views that differ from stated government policy? After all, this administration saw it fit to include the country’s nuclear doctrine in its election manifesto – surely there would be a few who question the wisdom of the present strategy? And if so, what delicate balance has been upset if these doubts are expressed right alongside a disclaimer that no strategic shift has been envisaged in the short term?

Second, Parrikar has been skewered for doubting the value of a nuclear NFU and his preference for ambiguity has been derided as confusion. The nuclear NFU has become almost an article of faith among Western think tankers, though the United States has refused to adopt such a posture itself despite an overwhelming conventional superiority over most of its rivals. British and French nuclear postures are also more ambiguous on the matter than Chinese or Indian nuclear doctrines.

It is commonly acknowledged that India needs to revise its doctrine that has lain virtually unchanged since its formulation soon after the Pokhran II nuclear tests. The opposition, however, is to abandoning the NFU. Indian planners cannot take such objections seriously for the only posture that will satisfy some corners is unilateral and unconditional nuclear disarmament. Instead, Delhi must look to the peculiarities of its threat matrix and decide upon a strategy that suits the subcontinent best.

For example, Parrikar has a valid point when he says that an unequivocal NFU restricts his options in case of war; it would be like showing the enemy your playbook. Instead, a defensive-use-only posture might offer the desired flexibility and ambiguity while retaining some degree of responsibility. Some of these decisions will need to take into account other factors, such as the extent of Indian conventional superiority over its likely foes, its ability to manufacture reliable and accurate tactical nuclear weapons, and a clear understanding of its objectives in various scenarios.

Admittedly, these are conversations to be had in private but there is little stability to lose before a country that has on umpteen occasions nonchalantly expressed its willingness to use nuclear weapons as a first resort. The sort of stability international scholars advocate is laudable but can only be achieved with mature states. A nuclear NFU and a clearly articulated military doctrine are indeed excellent confidence building measures but they must be deserved, not exploited.

The real tragedy of this little non-incident is that it is a reminder of India’s inability to think and act strategically towards long-term objectives, the aversion of the state’s holy cows to expert scrutiny, and a bureaucratic opacity that would make Brussels proud. Though the Indian defence minister raised some pertinent questions on India’s nuclear doctrine, it is unlikely that much comes of it.


This post appeared on FirstPost on November 14, 2016.

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China’s Latest War Manual

27 Wed May 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Security

≈ Comments Off on China’s Latest War Manual

Tags

anti-access/area denial, China, Communist Party of China, CPC, cyber, Defence White Paper, Indian Ocean, Japan, Line of Actual Control, LoAC, military, NFU, No First Use, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, nuclear, nuclear weapons state, NWS, People's Liberation Army, People's Liberation Army Air Force, People's Liberation Army Navy, People's Liberation Army Second Artillery Force, PLA, PLAAF, PLAN, PLASAF, Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA, sea lines of communication, Senkaku Islands, SLOC, South China Sea, space, Taiwan, Tibet, Uighur, United States, Xinjiang

On May 26 this year, China released its latest Defence White Paper in which it outlined the direction and scope of its military modernisation efforts. As with the release of every such document, the immediate question is, ‘What’s new?’ The honest answer is, ‘Not much.’ The White Paper has never been the vehicle through which Beijing announces its policy changes; usually, these documents, about nine of them since 1998, reiterate already announced policies and tweak old policies a little to factor in the Communist Party of China’s latest threat perception. This means that the White Papers are fairly useless to strategists or Sinologists but may be of some use to political leaders who tend to have diverse demands on their attention.

China Defence White Paper 2015The 2015 White Paper starts typically with a brief assessment of the security situation China faces and the changes it expects in the proximate future. It repeats the standard rhetoric from Beijing of seeking only cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Beijing perceives the international environment to be fairly peaceful and stable with little risk of a major war in the foreseeable future. However, the CPC is concerned about threats arising from hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism which may encourage terrorist activities, ethnic, border, and territorial disputes; local wars, therefore, remain a threat.

Not surprisingly, China’s political and military confidence of recent years comes from its conviction that the world’s economic centre of gravity is shifting rapidly back to Asia. Its primary concern is the US in the western Pacific but Japan’s even gradual militarisation has alarmed Beijing. In perhaps a veiled reference to India, the White Paper also mentions foreign countries interfering in South China Sea affairs. Vietnam and the Philippines get a similar mention for the Senkakus and China rounds off its list of potential threats with a mention of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Interestingly, the last two did not merit a mention in the previous white paper two years ago. Several incidents by Uighurs in recent months makes the addition of Xinjiang an understandable addition but Tibet is a little surprising. The paper mentions the United States and Japan by name less number of times than earlier years, indicating that China has become more confident of its anti-access/area denial tactics.

The CPC has not altered its views on the role of the military – defending Chinese interests, participating in relief operations, international security cooperation, and preserving the stability of the state. Beijing’s paranoia about outside powers trying to foment a revolution, though much reduced since the days of Mao Zedong, has still not gone away completely.

China soldiersBut what can we expect to see in China’s defence spending and its areas of interests? Unlike the 2013 white paper, there are no mentions of units, military districts, or strength of the various branches of the Chinese military. However, the general outlook appears similar – the Revolution in Military Affairs has an inherent and irresistible push, according to Beijing, towards the development of long-range weapons systems, stealth, unmanned platforms, precision weapons, and the use of cyber and outer space. The focus on cyber and space-based assets for communications, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and surveillance, is clear from the mention – fear? – of the modern “informationized” battlefield 22 times in a short, 5,500-word document.

Operationally, the People’s Liberation Army will reorient its mission from merely theatre defence to trans-theatre mobility. This sounds a little like India’s much-vaunted Cold Start doctrine but something the Chinese might actually be able to pull off given their superior infrastructure. The PLA intends to develop specially-skilled units for different terrains and tasks and train them for closely coordinated operations. The multi-functional, modular units allows the PLA greater operational flexibility for small-scale operations in localised conflicts of the kind the CPC perceives China to be occupied with in the foreseeable future. The smaller, more mobile units would be perfect for “warning exercises” opposite the Japanese or Taiwanese coast or for adventures along the Line of Actual Control.

China navyThe PLA Navy’s role has been expanded from offshore waters defence to include open seas protection. This likely means the defence of new Chinese maritime claims and the assets Beijing might place in disputed waters. To this end, Beijing’s interest in acquiring additional aircraft carriers makes perfect sense – the envelope around a carrier group will be able to create little mobile pockets of Chinese sovereignty. This expanded role is of great concern not just for China’s immediate neighbours but also Indonesia and Australia. Fielding a blue-water navy has long been a Chinese ambition but open seas protection moves beyond that to some serious force projection.

Until now, China has relied on the international system to keep its sea lines of communication safe; henceforth, the PLAN will take a direct interest in ensuring their security. A legitimate security concern, defending its SLOCs gives the PLAN an excuse to sail more regularly and in greater strength into the Indian Ocean, a move sure to alarm Delhi.

The PLA Air Force will maintain its current role of early warning, air defence and offence, and force projection while modernising itself. A small but crucial addition to its role from 2013 will be “information countermeasures.” In essence, China’s military strategists have observed over the past quarter century how the United States fights its wars – the reliance upon aerial assets for positioning, reconnaissance, communications, targeting, and electronic countermeasures is a huge force multiplier for ground forces and is something the Chinese are interested in replicating. To this end, the PLAAF’s jurisdiction will extend into space as well.

China’s use of space must worry India greatly. The successful demonstration of an anti-satellite missile in 2007 and the development of other weapons systems for “soft kills” in space puts India’s own communications with its nuclear submarines and other military units in jeopardy. As the Chinese race after the United States to achieve parity in C5ISR, sooner or later, India will be inadvertently dragged in its wake. Sooner would be better.

Of particular concern to India is the profile of the PLA Second Artillery Force, the units in charge of China’s nuclear arsenal. Beijing has always adhered to a no first use nuclear policy ever since its first nuclear test in October 1964 but in 2013, the manner in which this assurance was worded became ambiguous. That ambiguity remains in this latest edition of Beijing’s white paper too – the document reads, “China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy…. China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states…” Again, it is not clear if Beijing’s NFU posture applies to nuclear weapons states or not.

One might argue that Beijing does not view India as a nuclear weapons state as per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore the NFU policy applies to India. Yet China has shown the ability to be surprisingly pragmatic when it serves them and the possession of nuclear weapons might confer NWS status for military purposes. Beijing’s no first use declaration, which critics, with some justification, have always considered empty words, in all likelihood does not apply to India. Delhi must take this into consideration when it next updates its own nuclear posture.

Besides this significant reorientation, the PLASAF will modernise its delivery systems and warheads and work on technologies to improve its deterrence, early warning, survivability, and counterattack capabilities as well as medium and long-range precision strikes.

The rest of the document lays out the PLA’s goals to streamline its and modernise logistics, augment its war reserves, improve rules and standards, and innovate modes of support. Officers will be given more opportunities to study military strategy and operations so that they may be able to introduce more effective principles and methods in their units. Troops will be given more “realistic” combat training and will strive for a high degree of combat readiness and alertness. The reserve force will be expanded and given better training to integrate them better with the regular military.

The PLA has stepped back from participating in the construction of civilian infrastructure but retains a focus on better integration of civilian and military infrastructure, education, manufacturing, and logistics. These personnel goals are less glamorous than the development of space-based military assets or a reorientation of operational strategy but remain nonetheless vital to the PLA’s well-being. As several US analysts have observed over the years, the PLA lacks the support of a professional non-commissioned officer corps or recent combat experience. The latter has led to China participating in UN peacekeeping missions but these human and experiential factors hamper the process of modernisation.

It would be an interesting exercise for those with Mandarin language skills to compare the English and Mandarin versions of China’s Defence White Paper. In any case, the white paper does not explain how the laundry list of goals will be achieved or make any assessments of the utility of developing certain capabilities; nor does it get into evaluations of present capabilities as a point of reference. This should be of no surprise as the primary goal of the document is to deter its foreign audience rather than provide an academic study of Chinese military thought.

On a concluding note, it is worrisome for countries vested in the Pax Americana to see how anti-status quo states like Russia and China are rapidly catching up with the United States in force-on-force warfare in terms of material as well as technology. All the while, the United States has been occupied with learning to fight a different kind of war in the Middle East and Central Asia and has had little time to dedicate to the strategic shifts in the western Pacific, space, and other theatres. India has only a secondary role to play in this imminent clash between powers but how Delhi plays its part in this game over the next twenty years will be very interesting to watch.


This post appeared on FirstPost on June 05, 2015.

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