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Chaturanga

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Tag Archives: No First Use

Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

22 Wed Mar 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

Tags

Bharatiya Janata Party, BJP, Caroline rule, China, counter-force, counter-value, India, Manohar Parrikar, NFU, No First Use, NSG, nuclear, nuclear doctrine, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Pakistan, Shivshankar Menon

There have again been speculations recently about India’s nuclear doctrine and the value of its no first-use-posture. The reason for the kerfuffle this time are a couple of sentences in former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. Menon writes,

There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.

This has been interpreted to mean that India’s no-first-use posture is not credible, which would implicitly exonerate Delhi from the charge – if it is made – that it has quietly changed its nuclear doctrine. Instead, this understanding of Menon’s words suggests that the Indian no-first-use policy was a sham from the very beginning.

Menon also writes,

…proportional responses and deterrence were not the preferred posture in the initial stages of the weapons program, for it might tempt adversaries to test the space available below the threshold for full nuclear retaliation… Instead, the logical posture at first was counter-value targeting, or targeting the opponent’s assets, rather than counter-force targeting, which concentrates on the enemy’s military and command structures.

Here, the object of interrogation is the past tense (emphasis mine) that Menon uses; does he mean to indicate that India initially settled for a massive retaliation against an enemy’s cities but later may have surreptitiously modified its doctrine as its weapons systems became more sophisticated in terms of detection and destruction? However, the context of his objectionable grammar is the historical evolution of Indian nuclear thinking from the mid-1980s. Menon is talking about the inter-test years (1974-1998) when India had not publicly weaponised its peaceful nuclear explosion and therefore obviated the need for a nuclear doctrine.

However, the former NSA is not nuclear-shy once red lines have been crossed. As he explains the rationale,

There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.

Essentially, under India’s massive retaliation strategy, military as well as civilian targets would be considered. A purely counter-value massive retaliation by Delhi would leave Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal intact and capable of raining nuclear fire on Indian cities. The sudden realisation that the Indian military could potentially go after Pakistani nuclear assets as well as its infrastructure has caused a bit of a stir in some circles.

There are several problems with this sudden alarmist tone. The most obvious is that this is not a new observation. Aside from the fact that scholars have gleaned every nuance out of India’s nuclear policy already, the doctrine itself – what is publicly available – specifically states that its retaliation only policy is dynamic. In the words of the National Security Advisory Board,

India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.

India’s policy is clearly stated to be to only retaliatory, which is again emphasised in the next section: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Nonetheless, this position is dynamic in that it is conceivable that imminent use of nuclear weapons against India – fuelling of missiles, field deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, delegation of launch authority – especially from a state that has repeatedly declared a willingness, almost an eagerness, to strike first with nuclear weapons, will be treated as an attack and liable for Indian retaliation. As many Indian strategists have wondered, what is the morality of awaiting certain destruction just to satisfy a dictionary definition of no-first-use?

Such use – anticipatory self defence – may not be to the satisfaction of semanticists but is nonetheless considered just under international law if it fulfills the criteria of the Caroline rule: instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Thus, as Menon himself noted, more flexibility – ambiguity? – has been built into the Indian nuclear doctrine than is realised. As a side note, it is interesting that the same Caroline rule that bears out Indian views on nuclear strikes objects to the dilution of NFU by extending it to chemical or biological weapons as India and other nuclear states have done.

The composition of India’s nuclear arsenal and its status should belie any fears about preemptive counter-force targetting. Most nuclear observers agree that the Indian arsenal is still rudimentary compared to mature nuclear states such as the United States, France, or China. By the benchmarks of those in whose footsteps it follows, India has conducted far fewer (hot) tests to confirm design parameters that would affect miniaturisation, maximise yield, or assure successful detonation in unconventional circumstances to be capable of precise, proportionate strikes. Although the exact composition of the Indian arsenal is classified, the mainstay may be assumed to be improved versions of its 1974 prototype that was tested again in 1998, a ~15 kT Hiroshima-style device and hardly an ideal choice for a surgical counter-force strike. The sub-kiloton designs, ideal for mating with the Brahmos missile for tactical strikes, are not as reliable as their larger brother. The real concern, then, and a more familiar one for Indians, is that their bureaucrats and politicians might be promising more than their military can actually deliver.

It is also worth noting that in regions with population density as high as in the Indian subcontinent, it is very difficult to achieve a purely counter-value or counter-force strike. Military bases are almost always near population centres or important infrastructural nodes out of necessity. Even if Delhi’s policy of massive retaliation was purely counter-value, it would inevitably damage or destroy vital military assets. Despite such collateral damage, the doctrine can then hardly be called counter-force. Yet, as the former NSA points out, it would be ludicrous to leave the enemy’s nuclear arsenal intact for the sake of doctrinal purity.

The newly rediscovered ambiguity in the Indian nuclear doctrine may perhaps carry more salience because not only does it come from a former official who had a large role in shaping Delhi’s nuclear policy but in view of certain “personal” comments former defence minister Manohar Parrikar recently made. Speaking at a book launch in Delhi in November 2016, the then defence minister calmly eschewed India’s no-first-use policy although he immediately clarified that there had been no change in government policy. With two former senior officials casting doubt on India’s intentions, should the international community consider Delhi’s NFU to be diluted?

It needs to be stressed that Menon merely explained India’s long-existing doctrine and did not reformulate it. With regard Parrikar’s comments, seen in their entirety, there can be no doubt that Indian nuclear policy has not changed. At most, the former defence minister’s comments indicate that there may be discussions going on in South Block in very small circles on updating India’s nuclear doctrine. Surely, this cannot be a surprise when the Bharatiya Janata Party had even announced its intention to do so in its election manifesto in 2014. Indeed, the present government may change India’s nuclear policy but it is absurd to expect that policies are static and eternal – especially when even nuclear warheads are upgraded.

Some observers have wondered at the opportune timing – the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary is just around the corner in June – of a sudden panic attack on Indian nuclear no-first-use and counter-force posture. This is unlikely to have been a factor for several reasons: 1. the United States, India’s supporter in the forum with the most clout, does not seem willing to twist arms on India’s behalf as it did in 2008; 2. India has found it difficult to bring into its confidence the several smaller states on the moral high horse; 3. China would be relied upon to veto Indian membership in the consensus-seeking group unless Pakistan were simultaneously admitted. The strategic dimension of NSG membership in South Asia should not be underestimated.

So if not a shift in doctrine, has there been a change in strategy? With improving capabilities, it would be myopic not to expect refinements in strategy. However, none of it – the apprehension about anticipatory self-defence or counter-force targetting – adds up to a new phase in Indian nuclear posture. The nuclear doctrine has long offered these options and at best, India’s material realities might be quietly catching up with its lofty ambitions. No matter, this whole affair has been an exercise in making mountains out of molehills.


This post appeared on FirstPost on March 23, 2017.

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India’s Choices

21 Sat Jan 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Book Review

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

China, diplomacy, foreign policy, India, Inter Services Intelligence, ISI, MEA, Ministry of External Affairs, No First Use, nuclear, Pakistan, Shivshankar Menon, Sri Lanka, terrorism

choicesMenon, Shivshankar. Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Penguin Random House, 2016. 224 pp.

Memoirs by retired, senior Indian government officials are an occupational hazard for a historian. On the one hand, they may contain valuable insights or data and offer a peek behind the scenes into the world of policy-making, but on the other, remain the memories and interpretations of one person, usually years after the events. This is true of memoirs everywhere, but what makes them even more perilous in India is the lack of periodically declassified archives. For example, imagine understanding the United States’ role in international affairs through Henry Kissinger’s three-volume memoir.

Shivshankar Menon’s Choices, however, cannot truly be described as a memoir. The book discusses five important decisions India has had to make over the past 25 years, and in each of these, Menon was either intimately involved or at least a senior official in the process. However, the author’s tone is that of a professor than a practitioner. Each of the decisions is placed in its historical context and the rationale for the way things unfolded is broadly explained. Rarely does the reader get the sense that the author was one of the central dramatis personae in what he is reading!

This is not a weakness in itself, but Choices is, unfortunately, very short on the details in terms of the dynamics between the key actors and how the various variables influenced their thinking. How did the decision evolve? What were the hurdles? Whose minds were changed? What were the turf battles? The answers to these sorts of questions come through in government documents and paint a comprehensive picture for historians. Memoirs ought to reveal at least one side of the puzzle, but Menon is reticent on the matter. This could very well be due to India’s secrecy rules, but it still leaves the story incomplete.

The subject matter for Choices is the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement with China in 1993, civil nuclear cooperation with the United States in 2005, the Pakistani terrorist attack on Bombay in 2008, Delhi’s role in the end of the Sri Lankan civil war, and the rationale behind the nuclear no-first-use policy. Little of what Menon goes over is new to anyone who has followed these events in the newspapers, except to lend a particular line of thought an air of gravitas now that a former foreign secretary and national security advisor is also extending it.

Menon is no hawk on China and in fact thinks that India is entering an era of opportunities with China. As he argues, there are facets to the relationship other than the border. The reason for the delay in settling the border dispute, to Menon’s mind, is that both sides think that time is on their side. For the 1993 accord, the then joint secretary for the North East gives credit to Atal Behari Vajpayee for his many ideas and putting country above party. Regarding China’s present assertiveness, Menon does not believe that encircling China will help; in fact, it will only confirm their worst suspicions, Menon argues, and diminish trust. Similarly, India is too large for China to attempt to encircle.

During the nuclear negotiations with the United States, Menon was foreign secretary. He attributes the willingness of most countries to support India to commercial interests of varying intensity. However, the former foreign secretary has harsh words for the small states with big egos, or the mini-six – Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland. These states had no interest in nuclear commerce and had little stake in India anyway; the Nuclear Suppliers Group gave them some importance and that was they stage upon which they could pontificate.

Although Menon had argued for military reprisal in the aftermath of the Bombay attack in 2008, in retrospect, he defends India’s decision to abjure from the use of force and instead seek a diplomatic route. Menon argues that this has been more successful in that Pakistan has been isolated in the international community and India received cooperation from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar – all Pakistan’s traditional partners. By working through international fora, Delhi was able to bring the heat on Islamabad through Washington, the Europeans, and even its patron, Beijing.

The Israeli model, the former national security advisor opines, has been misquoted in India. It has not brought peace or deterrence to Israel and it will not do so to India. “Mowing the grass,” as the Israelis call it, seeks cumulative deterrence, not absolute deterrence. However, he misunderstands the purpose of Israeli anti-terror operations: they have not been, at least for the past 20 years, for deterrence but for attrition. India’s war against terror is a protracted one and it cannot be solved. Temporary silencing is the best Delhi can hope for, which, according to Menon, is much lower on the list of national priorities than the socioeconomic transformation of India.

Menon is under no illusion that Pakistan continues to be a hotbed of terrorism but he reminds the reader of the more complicated geopolitical web. For example, the United States has restricted India’s access to David Headley, one of the chief reconnoiters for Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence. Additionally, when Ahmed Shuja Pasha, then director general of the ISI, visited the United States, he was given diplomatic immunity to protect him from law suits brought against him by the families of Americans killed in Bombay.

Insisting that nuclear weapons are only political signifiers and not meant for war, Menon defends India’s nuclear NFU policy. His defence could interest only a lay reader, unfortunately, for it completely ignores the counter arguments to such a policy. In all fairness, Choices is not a exegesis of nuclear deterrence theory and a thorough explanation would skew the balance of the topics covered. Essentially, the two strands of Indian nuclear thinking, one represented best by General Krishnaswamy Sundarji and the other by nuclear scientist Raja Ramanna, either viewed the super weapons as necessary to redress a conventional imbalance or as an enabler of political goals. The second strand held sway in the discussions after the 1998 nuclear tests.

On the whole, Menon’s view is that Indian nuclear policy is sober and realistic even though it has been couched in moral terms. He is not particularly fond of the international non-proliferation regime either, for it has not addressed any of India’s concerns such as China’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to Pakistan or the danger of rogue nuclear actors within the Pakistani Army. However, there is no gain to India by flouting it and staying within earns diplomatic goodwill. This should not be construed to mean that India is a status quo power.

The most interesting part of the book is Menon’s brief airing of his views about India’s place in the world. Despite being taken to task by Bharat Karnad in his Why India Is Not A Great Power (Yet), Menon insists that he does believe that India is destined to become a great power and not by soft power alone. The former foreign secretary does believe that there is a particular Indian style to foreign policy, as Deep Datta-Ray argues, though it is difficult to put a finger on it. Nonetheless, Menon attempts to describe it:

If there is an Indian way in foreign policy, it is marked by a combination of boldness in conception and caution in implementation, by the dominant and determining role of the prime minister, by a didactic negotiating style, by a fundamentally realistic approach masked by normative rhetoric, by comfort in a plural and diverse world or multiverse, and, most consistently, by a consciousness of India’s destiny as a great power.

This caution, Menon allows, could be due to systemic failures – the Ministry of External Affairs is desperately understaffed and centralised foreign policy under the prime minister’s office has meant that no other player has the authority to contemplate on grand strategy or vision. In other words, Indian foreign policy (also) suffers from weak institutions. The structured and formal decison-making is always preceded by considerable informal consultations and discussions. In light of this, it makes sense why an MEA official asked Datta-Ray why he wanted to see their documents since they only indicated process and not thinking.

Interestingly, Menon believes in an Indian exceptionalism and his belief in India’s destiny to become a great power smacks of the same Nehruvian arrogance when contraposed with India’s shortcomings in health, infrastructure, education, society, law, governance, and military. Geography and demographics are necessary but not sufficient conditions of becoming a great power.

All things considered, Choices is a disappointing production given the senior positions in government that its author achieved and the knowledge and experience that must have come with them. Anyone expecting a fresh or insightful exposition of Indian foreign policy will instead find an elegant rehashing of what columnists have already said umpteen times. This is a wasted opportunity to reveal, to scholars and the public alike, how choices are made in the PMO and MEA. Its saving grace is that it reads well and is short.

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Thus Spake Parrikar…

12 Sat Nov 2016

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Thus Spake Parrikar…

Tags

deterrence, India, Manohar Parrikar, NFU, No First Use, nuclear

​Manohar Parrikar often finds himself in the news for the wrong reasons. A seemingly harmless book launch presented the latest opportunity for the Indian defence minister to enjoy some limelight yet again. However, at least this time, the brouhaha was entirely manufactured with little reason in sight.

In what appears to be a response to a question at the launch of The New Arthashastra: A Security Strategy for India, Parrikar expressed the view that the logic of a well-defined and written security doctrine eluded him. Why would one, he pondered out loud, not only restrict oneself to a set of responses but also open up the playbook to one’s enemy? Parrikar gave the example of nuclear policy – why would India tie itself down to a nuclear no-first -use position? In his view, India’s leaders should merely state that India is a responsible nuclear weapons state and any potential use would be after careful deliberation.

The defence minister was vehement in declaring these views to be his private thoughts and that the country’s nuclear policy had not changed. In fact, he went as far as predicting, half jokingly, that it would be splayed all across newspapers the next day that a change in doctrine had been made. He was not wrong – within minutes of his comments hitting Twitter, policy wonks were condemning his casual attitude towards nuclear deterrence and even the thought of straying from a nuclear NFU.

Parrikar’s most egregious sin appears to have simply been that his views were not popular among those who would don the hat of experts; nothing the defence minister said was actually either surprising or extraordinary. Given the situation, the criticism levelled against Parrikar comes off as petty  and motivated.

First, the accusation that the minister should not have aired his personal opinion on so sensitive a subject – it should be noted that even as he answered the question asked of him, Parrikar categorically stated that there was no doctrinal shift and he was only expressing his views as an individual. It was not a later clarification by his office to put the minister in the clear.

More to the point, is it surprising that not just the defence minister but even several other senior officials in the present regime may have private views that differ from stated government policy? After all, this administration saw it fit to include the country’s nuclear doctrine in its election manifesto – surely there would be a few who question the wisdom of the present strategy? And if so, what delicate balance has been upset if these doubts are expressed right alongside a disclaimer that no strategic shift has been envisaged in the short term?

Second, Parrikar has been skewered for doubting the value of a nuclear NFU and his preference for ambiguity has been derided as confusion. The nuclear NFU has become almost an article of faith among Western think tankers, though the United States has refused to adopt such a posture itself despite an overwhelming conventional superiority over most of its rivals. British and French nuclear postures are also more ambiguous on the matter than Chinese or Indian nuclear doctrines.

It is commonly acknowledged that India needs to revise its doctrine that has lain virtually unchanged since its formulation soon after the Pokhran II nuclear tests. The opposition, however, is to abandoning the NFU. Indian planners cannot take such objections seriously for the only posture that will satisfy some corners is unilateral and unconditional nuclear disarmament. Instead, Delhi must look to the peculiarities of its threat matrix and decide upon a strategy that suits the subcontinent best.

For example, Parrikar has a valid point when he says that an unequivocal NFU restricts his options in case of war; it would be like showing the enemy your playbook. Instead, a defensive-use-only posture might offer the desired flexibility and ambiguity while retaining some degree of responsibility. Some of these decisions will need to take into account other factors, such as the extent of Indian conventional superiority over its likely foes, its ability to manufacture reliable and accurate tactical nuclear weapons, and a clear understanding of its objectives in various scenarios.

Admittedly, these are conversations to be had in private but there is little stability to lose before a country that has on umpteen occasions nonchalantly expressed its willingness to use nuclear weapons as a first resort. The sort of stability international scholars advocate is laudable but can only be achieved with mature states. A nuclear NFU and a clearly articulated military doctrine are indeed excellent confidence building measures but they must be deserved, not exploited.

The real tragedy of this little non-incident is that it is a reminder of India’s inability to think and act strategically towards long-term objectives, the aversion of the state’s holy cows to expert scrutiny, and a bureaucratic opacity that would make Brussels proud. Though the Indian defence minister raised some pertinent questions on India’s nuclear doctrine, it is unlikely that much comes of it.


This post appeared on FirstPost on November 14, 2016.

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