Tag Archives: non-proliferation

The Peacemakers

15 Wed Aug 2012

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Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called children of God (Matthew 5:9)

The Nuclear Iran saga has so far developed quite predictably. Both sides have dug their heels in on their red lines – the United States (and Israel) will not accept a nuclear Iran, while the Islamic Republic will not surrender its right to enrich uranium. The West, with no diplomatic options left, passed sanctions against Tehran in the hope that unrest among the people would destabilise the regime and initiate a rethink on the country’s nuclear policy (let’s not pretend that generic economic sanctions do anything more than hurt the population). Simultaneously, the United States and Israel seem to be playing good cop, bad cop – Washington seems to be the only restraint on a Benjamin Netanyahu raring to have a go at Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is interesting to note that ex-servicemen are advocating more patience while those active in Israel’s intelligence and armed services are pushing for a strike “before it is too late.”

Iran analysts are generally agreed, Matthew Kroenig being the notable exception, that military action against the intractable ayatollahs would be inconceivable. Many are also opposed to the economic sanctions against Iran, arguing that its effect on the Iranian people will be disproportionately greater than on the nuclear conclave and the clerics. Yet while abhorring military action and rejecting sanctions, the peacemakers have not articulated any new solutions. Diplomacy, they say. But the United States (and Israel) will accept nothing short of an immediate cessation of uranium enrichment by Iran, preferably followed by negotiations wherein Iran would renounce its rights to enrichment and reprocessing (ENR), and Iran is not about to give up what it sees as the only insurance against uninhibited US interference in its internal and regional affairs. The kind of far-reaching diplomacy that is being pushed is simply not possible in this climate; beyond the need to save face, Washington has spurned such offers in the past. Now, for either side to even consider the the other side’s proposal, there has to be an element of trust involved, a commodity in very short supply in the Middle East.

One also gets the sense that perhaps some peacemakers are questioning why Iran cannot legitimately pursue a nuclear power and/or propulsion programme. Such projects would certainly require enrichment technology, and it is unlikely that Iran would consent to importing enriched uranium in perpetuity due to the strategic dependency it would create. Yet if Iran acquired such technology or improved on it, it would put them within easy grasp of making nuclear weapons on short notice, known as breakout capability in the lingo. To truly institute a system whereby Iran (or any other country) can develop, posses, and enhance ENR would be a body blow to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as it stands today; to make such an exception for Iran would result in similar damage. While George W Bush could argue in India’s case that India did not have ties to terrorist networks and did not engage in nuclear commerce outside of IAEA stipulations, any leader would be hard-pressed indeed to make the same case for Tehran.

If changing the NPT is indeed the veiled implication of the peacemakers, then they deserve much praise – scrapping or significantly modifying the NPT is a gargantuan and utterly thankless task, not to mention deeply unpopular among large sections of government, academia, and the policy bubble. Yet the NPT’s drawbacks are neither few nor insignificant, and the trouble the US is having in concluding “gold standard” nuclear cooperation agreements (123) with other states is indicative of more troubles still to come. The non-proliferation lobby, however, has been strenuously pushing for even stricter standards in nuclear commerce and were implacable in their opposition to the Indian exception (2008).

The idea of a more pragmatic NPT was indeed floated during Bush 43’s presidency. There was a small clique of senior officials who felt that the NPT was a relic of the Cold War and had outlived its usefulness. While disagreeing with Kenneth Waltz’s 15 ≤ n ≤ 20 (where n is the number of nuclear weapons states) idea, the sentiment was, nonetheless, that there was room within the spirit of the NPT to renegotiate the terms into a more inclusive framework that enhanced commerce but remained firm on non-proliferation goals. Amending the NPT, however, was ultimately seen as too big a task, a bridge too far.

As a thought exercise, one must ask what a world without the NPT would be like. If the NPT were scrapped today and the nuclear trade infrastructure was composed only of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) protocols, the reduced framework would essentially be an end-user certificate. This is, in many ways, returning to the pre-NPT world of bilateral and multilateral agreements but with the added force of a community of nuclear materials suppliers. Such a system facilitates nuclear commerce and also maintains a check on nuclear facilities worldwide. Furthermore, it avoids the hypocrisy of nuclear apartheid that has been enshrined in the NPT (which, by the way, has done little to prevent Sino-Pakistani nuclear collusion). Most importantly, it recognises that as security concerns change, states become more or less willing to acquire nuclear weapons (Pakistan, South Africa). It would not be, as some like to portray, the end times, with every state a nuclear weapons state. States that do go down the weaponisation route will present diplomatic challenges (as they do now under the NPT regime) and will have to negotiated with on a case-by-case basis. However, such negotiations will not be under an odious and unequal law which allows some states to possess nuclear weapons and forbids others; it would not be a system that serves to reiterate that military strength is the ultimate gold standard.

Understandably, Iran is the case study du jour for the peacemakers. Yet if they do harbour some reservations about the NPT, they should not hesitate to voice them – at the very least, it will get more pragmatic minds thinking on the puzzle. So far, they have opposed bombing and economic sanctions, but they (or anyone else) have not noticed that there is no carrot in the diplomatic approach. Full-spectrum negotiations cannot be held in a hostile atmosphere, but if serious sweat was invested in a new treaty, an NPT 2.0, so to speak, it might signal that change was coming. Of course, if the peacemakers do not imply any of these and are simply relying upon hope that the crisis will defuse itself, they would do well to heed Thucydides’ lesson: You are convinced by experience that very few things are brought to a successful issue by impetuous desire, but most by calm and prudent forethought.

Non-Proliferation Theology

03 Fri Aug 2012

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Over the past four decades, there has been developing what can only be called a theology around nuclear weapons. A significant amount of proselytisation has been conducted around the idea that nuclear weapons are the greatest danger to mankind. In the broadest sense that weapons and war are not a productive way of investing resources, this can perhaps be accepted. However, non-proliferation theology goes much beyond that, and like many theologies, problematically so.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is one of the central credos of the high priests of the new theology. They argue that the NPT must be strictly adhered to and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) given unhindered access to all nuclear facilities, including, if necessary, 24-hour live feeds at some facilities. In addition, all nuclear commerce should be conducted within the purview of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The appeal of these core beliefs, these commandments if you will, is not hard to understand. Surely, something as dangerous as nuclear technology ought to be monitored closely for safety purposes, and given the international scope of any potential disaster, be supported through international mechanisms that channel trade, operations, and materiel through a secure and verifiable system. For most nuclear ventures, this is not objectionable. The wrinkle only appears where nuclear weapons or their proliferation is concerned.

Again, while it would be infinitely more preferable for there to be no weapons in the world, nuclear or conventional, and for us all to hold hands and sing Kumbaya around a nice campfire, the reality of the world system is a large number of nation-states in competition with each other, economically, militarily, and even culturally. Given the high cost of a nuclear weapons programme, not only in terms of material but also the physical and knowledge infrastructure needed to manufacture and maintain them safely, the nuclear club has remained a most exclusive club of Great Powers and a couple of recent gatecrashers. As the lesser Great Powers (Pakistan, N. Korea) have learned, nuclear weapons is only a means to securing what Isaiah Berlin would call a negative freedom rather than gaining any additional clout in the international community. It is worth asking why these lesser Powers would invest so much energy into acquiring weapons they will, hopefully, never use.

A large part of the answer lies in the fact that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had little to do with arms control initially and entirely to do with national security. Historical documents clearly indicate that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) that produced the NPT was a forum for horse-trading rather than for the discussion of genuine approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There were at least five scripts being acted out at the ENDC negotiations:

  • the United States wished to keep China from the bomb
  • the United States, understanding the pressure a German bomb would put upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), wished to keep Bonn from the bomb
  • the British and French wished to ensure that Washington did not bargain away their arsenals to strike a deal with Moscow
  • the Indians, Italians, and W. Germans wanted to protect their rights to nuclear technology and science
  • the USSR wanted to ensure that neither Germany ever got the bomb – in this, they had wide European support, particularly from France and Italy

Furthermore, some key aspects of NATO nuclear strategy were withheld by the United States until six months after the NPT signing ceremony – for example, the ENDC was not aware of the nuclear sharing arrangements between Britain, France, and the United States. This is not to say that the ENDC did not support nuclear non-proliferation – most did, but the Powers had their own caveats. The main motive, however, was to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Germanies and China, not nuclear disarmament. Interestingly, the early 1960s had seen a memo from the US Department of Defence suggesting that India be provided with a  few nuclear bombs and delivery systems to spike the propaganda boost China would receive if it tested first. However, the 1965 Gilpatric Report changed the US tune as it began to subscribe to the nth country problem. The report highlighted the threat to US national security if more countries, even allies, were to possess nuclear weapons – the more NWSs, the greater the instability and unpredictability in a crisis, as US “diplomatic and military influence would wane.” The aim of the NPT was thus far less altruistic than has been read into it post facto. It was and is a treaty that furthered national security of a few, not the aims of global nuclear disarmament, except perhaps incidentally.

Though the high priests of non-proliferation theology would reject it, non-proliferation was and still is an extension of US national security. The difference in which Iran and Pakistan have been handled is ample proof of that. While the latter acquired nuclear weapons as the United States looked away, Iran has been under close watch since the fall of the Shah. Despite the exposure of the AQ Khan nuclear black market and alleged high-level Pakistani government complicity, there is little that has been done in terms of sanctions or arrests, while Iran has lived under the threat of invasion for over a year. They are both Islamic countries, they are both known to have links to terrorist groups, and they have both been less than upfront about their nuclear programme (though Iran has at least signed the NPT). The one difference between the two is that Pakistan’s nuclear programme was not seen as a threat to US allies or assets, while Iran’s programme is.

Another mantra of the new theology is that the spread of nuclear weapons creates an unstable international system. At the micro level, the United States has not been able to sell the idea to even its own citizens that fewer guns are safer, and at the macro level, this mantra entirely ignores the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and how the Cold War remained cold. Some argue that some states are less stable than others and are therefore riskier than others. Though his makes perfect sense, what is the yardstick of stability? On the one hand, totalitarian dictatorships with little regard for human life have not engaged in any overtly unsafe behaviour. On the other, democratic states with regular elections and fairly transparent systems have engaged in wars all around the globe – the UK in the Suez is one example, and the United States has interfered militarily in more places in the last forty years, some of them in the immediate vicinity of its superpower rivals, than one can easily recount. So the question remains, what is safe behaviour, and to whom is it safe?

It is also necessary to question the basis upon which the whole edifice of non-proliferation is built. One source is perhaps the report that warned US President John Kennedy that there could well be over 20 nuclear powers by the 1980s. Such claims belong in the same dustbin that contains claims like electricity being too cheap to meter (Lewis Strauss in 1954, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission). Making nuclear weapons has significant costs, not just political but economic too, and requires a complex infrastructure. Despite provocations by China and N. Korea, Japan and S. Korea have resisted the temptation of the nuclear genie; despite Israel’s open nuclear secret, the Middle East has, by and large, refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons; South Africa gave up its weapons, and Australia and South America have declared their regions of the globe as nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZ). Even without an NPT, it is highly unlikely that Lesotho, Monaco, Papua New Guinea, or even Sweden would consider possessing a nuclear arsenal. In fact, very few states would consider a nuclear programme, and it is unlikely that the NPT would restrain them if the perceived need were sufficiently strong. As scientists have told us many times before, knowledge cannot be concealed indefinitely.

It is possible that the non-proliferation lobby is speaking from a moral point of view. After all, killing tens of thousands of people, if not more, surely cannot be a moral enterprise. That is a thorny issue, but assuming for the moment that nuclear weapons are indeed immoral, the question arises why the non-proliferationists do not advocate that the United States or the United Kingdom set a schedule for complete, unilateral, disarmament. After all, I would not want to be complicit in an immoral act just because you are. There is no such call (at least, not seriously), because everyone, even the non-proliferation theologians, understand that national security and strategy are involved.

The foundation of the present non-proliferation regime, the NPT, was based on considerations of national security; the notion of stable and unstable states is, though not incorrect, heavily skewed towards protecting the interests of the five recognised nuclear powers, the N-5; the fear that any weakness in the NPT or associated protocols of nuclear commodities transfer will dramatically raise the number of nuclear weapons states (NWS) is fallacious; and despite the implied morality of nuclear non-proliferation, it is clearly a differentiated value that is willing to be subservient to the nuclear balance of power between the N-5. Given the overwhelming deceit that the non-proliferation system is built on, leaders in national capitals world over would do well to consider whose security or morality is enhanced by their decision to challenge or accept the newfangled non-proliferation theology.

Nuclear Jenga

24 Thu May 2012

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The 21st century has not been kind to the nuclear non-proliferation lobby. In the first decade itself, North Korea tested a nuclear device, India overcame four decades of ostracism and reached an accommodation with the international community over civilian nuclear trade, and Iran continues to shuffle its feet on the threshold of a nuclear test. As Western policy alternatives on Tehran’s thumbing its nose at the non-proliferation regime seem to oscillate between two equally unpalatable solutions – a nuclear Iran or a military strike – the one question few people are asking is, why is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) repeatedly failing us?

The NPT, ten years in the making, was opened for signature in 1968 and has by now been ratified or acceded to by 190 entities (Taiwan is not a recognised state). Four states remain outside the purview of the NPT – India, Israel, and Pakistan who have never signed the treaty, and North Korea, who withdrew from it in 2003. To summarise the provisions of the eleven articles, the NPT

  • prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons technology or material from nuclear weapons states (NWS) to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS)
  • allows nuclear research and commerce in “equipment, materials and scientific and technological information” for peaceful purposes subject to an agreement with the IAEA on safeguards
  • declares that only countries that have detonated a nuclear device on or before January 01, 1967, shall be considered as nuclear weapons states.
  • encourages the accepted nuclear powers to commit to a process of nuclear disarmament

Despite the general acceptance of the treaty’s terms and conditions, there has been some dissatisfaction with the NPT, even among member states. The most oft-cited complaints have accused the treaty of creating a system of nuclear apartheid, allowing vertical proliferation despite banning horizontal proliferation, noted that the “good faith” in which the nuclear powers (P5) were supposed to pursue nuclear disarmament has been found wanting, discounting the strategic realities (or subordinating them to Great Power politics at least) of some of the countries, condemned the flagrant violation of the treaty by the P5 when it served their strategic needs, and expressed disappointment that the treaty was used merely as a legislative weapon by the P5 against states they were not favorably disposed towards. All these critiques over the past four decades have sympathetic ears in Tehran, no doubt. But a more central issue, especially given the little sway the treaty has had over states determined to acquire nuclear weapons, is the spirit in which the treaty was drafted.

It would be naive (and wrong) to think that the primary motivation of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) that produced the NPT genuinely was nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. At the ENDC, there were four agenda, at some cross-purposes with each other, in play: 1. the United States wished to keep China from the bomb, 2. the British and French wished to ensure that Washington did not bargain away their arsenals to strike a deal with Moscow, 3. the Indians, Italians, and W. Germans wanted to protect their rights to nuclear technology, and 4. the USSR wanted to ensure that neither Germany ever got the bomb – in this, they had wide European support. Not in the spirit of non-proliferation, some aspects of NATO nuclear strategy were withheld by the United States – for example, the ENDC was not aware of the nuclear sharing arrangements between Britain, France, and the United States.

This is not to say that the ENDC countries did not support nuclear non-proliferation – they did, each with their own caveats. However, the intent of the main actors was to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Germanies and China – deemed an unacceptable security risk. At one point, the US Department of Defence had even debated whether India should be provided with a bomb to deflate Chinese communist propaganda. Ultimately, the United States was not able to prevent Beijing from acquiring nuclear weapons, and US non-proliferation policy in the aftermath of the Gilpatric Report began to subscribe to the nth country problem. The report highlighted the threat to US national security if more countries, even allies, were to possess nuclear weapons – the more NWSs, the greater the instability and unpredictability in a crisis, as US “diplomatic and military influence would wane.” The aim of the NPT was thus far less altruistic than has been read into it post facto. It was and is a treaty that furthered national security of a few, not the aims of global nuclear disarmament, except perhaps incidentally. Thinking about national security is not wrong, but in this case, it has led policymakers to be more dogmatic and rigid on non-proliferation.

The number of gate-crashers the NPT has faced suggests that a reorientation of policy is in order. History shows us that collective security can provide stability and is safer than nuclear deterrence. One of the best examples of shared security in modern times remains the Concert of Europe. After the defeat of Napoleon, rather than punish France for two decades of war, Metternich integrated the defeated state into a continental system of collective security in a manner that gave Europe a century of relative peace. In the long run, the only real solution to the Iranian standoff is engagement and integration into the regional system, especially when experts warn that even a successful military strike would slow Iran’s nuclear programme by merely 3-5 years; doing so would give Tehran a stake in maintaining stability, whereas it has little to lose now – the Middle Eastern country finds itself increasingly isolated in world affairs, has watched with alarm as the United States invaded two states bordering Iran and tried to set up friendly regimes, has spent sleepless nights over Israel’s opaque nuclear deterrent, and is worried about US weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, NATO member Turkey. Western leaders focus on Iran’s support of Hezbollah, its human rights record, and the outrageous statements the Islamic Republic’s leaders delight in making, all serious problems indeed, but do not consider the sources of Iran’s discontent with the West. Imperialism, the Mossadegh coup, support of the Shah and SAVAK, sanctions, military aid to Iran’s enemies, ignoring Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on Iran, and double standards on terrorism and non-proliferation have bred little goodwill in Tehran towards the US and its allies.

Iran fears being isolated on the international stage, particularly in the Middle East. A prickly self-esteem that seems attendant to most ancient civilisations, the country sees itself as the rightful regional power in West Asia. While the international community need not pander to this worldview, it can certainly acknowledge that size and resources make Iran a natural contender for the job. Opening full negotiations with Iran, bringing it into the discussion on the Middle East and Central Asia, and maintaining or at least not disturbing the balance of military power in the region will go some way in calming a skittish leadership. By giving Iran a seat at the table, there is a likely chance that like South Africa, Brazil, or Argentina, Iran too will gradually turn away from nuclear weapons. The South Asian example needs to be underscored for Tehran’s benefit – India was accepted, albeit de facto,  into the nuclear club because it did not have ties to groups with dubious repute or attempt to sell its technology on the black market, while Pakistan teeters on the brink of failure because of its questionable associations and activities.

The Iranian leadership has left a face-saving door open with their fatwa banning weapons of mass destruction and have expressed willingness ‘to play ball’ on full spectrum negotiations for the past two decades (but were snubbed by Washington). There has even been small signs signalling an intent for rapprochement, for example the no-longer-secret assistance Tehran extended the Bush White House early in their hunt for the Taliban, the offer to assist in rebuilding Afghanistan, and the recent Iranian rescue of an American vessel from pirates. These small gestures should be capitalised on; otherwise, the deteriorating security situation will urge Tehran towards the bomb. As Roger Sessions said, “communication is two-sided – vital and profound communication makes demands also on those who are to receive it…demands in the sense of concentration, of genuine effort to receive what is being communicated.”

Fundamentally, technology denial regimes (such as the NPT) are bound to fail because they institutionalise inequality; there is hope that economic inequalities can be overcome, geographic inequalities conquered, but legal inequalities are bound to sting. The standoff with Iran is only superficially about non-proliferation but really about decades of Iranian resentment at being mistreated by the West. By making it about the NPT, the P5+1 are unwittingly raising the stakes to a point where the result can only be instability or war. It is essential that the scope of negotiations with Iran be broadened and nuclear non-proliferation not be the only locus around which the West engages Iran.