Tag Archives: NSG

A Bridge Too Far?

28 Wednesday Jun 2017

Posted by in India, Israel, Middle East, Nuclear, South Asia

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Perhaps the most substantial show of friendship India can make towards Israel is to offer cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. Some might argue that a complete disavowal of the Palestinian cause and close diplomatic alignment with Israel would be a greater commitment, especially given Jerusalem’s craving for international recognition and normalisation, but an alliance with a middle power who does not have veto power in the United Nations has too many limitations to be worth much. Nuclear cooperation, however, holds far more allure for two critical reasons: one, it has an immediately utilitarian dimension, and two, pace what some academics have argued about prestige, nuclear commerce is tightly controlled by an international cabal who have deemed Israel ineligible to receive nuclear material.

Yet what will nuclear cooperation with Israel look like? Is Israel even interested in nuclear energy? Can India conduct nuclear commerce with a country that is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or have any sort of tacit acceptance such as the waiver India received from the Nuclear Suppliers Group? Will it invoke sanctions? What would be the ramifications for India? Is India capable of becoming a nuclear vendor? There are several questions that deserve careful thought before either country embarks upon such a venture.

Is Israel interested in nuclear energy?

Israel’s present installed electricity generating capacity is close to 17 GW, putting it in the same league as other OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. If the country maintains an economic growth of five percent, energy requirements will rise to approximately 45 GW by 2050.

Israel’s policy of amimut – a Hebrew word meaning opacity – regarding its nuclear weapons programme has meant that it has shied away about discussing anything nuclear in public. However, calls for the country to invest in nuclear energy began in 1976 and continued throughout the 1980s. A site in the Negev desert at Shivta was reserved for a nuclear power plant with a generating capacity of 3,000 MW in 1980. Early in the new millennium, the became more frequent early in the new millennium. In February 2007, Uri Bin-Nun, an official at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, said that Director General Gideon Frank had told him that Israel was actively considering building a nuclear power plant in the Negev. Barely six months later, infrastructure minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer declared that building a nuclear power plant is a national priority and the proposal had the support of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

The tsunami at Fukushima also threw water on enthusiasm for nuclear energy in Israel. In an interview with CNN, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu admitted that he was having second thoughts about nuclear power after Fukushima. However, Israel’s precarious energy situation meant that calls for nuclear energy would soon resurface. In 2015, the Ministry of Infrastructure raised the test balloon in a report that called for private sector participation in a nuclear energy programme. In an energy plan that forecast the doubling of Israel’s energy needs by 2030, the Ministry of Infrastructure suggested that at least 15 percent of Israel’s energy come from nuclear power by 2050.

Israel’s energy needs are not merely a matter of fuelling the economy – Jerusalem is very conscious of its energy security as well as the environment. After its diversification from coal to natural gas in the late 1990s, Israel discovered what would become the Mari-B gas field off the coast by Ashdod. Within a decade, natural gas became the country’s primary source of energy. Demand became so high that gas had to be imported from Egypt. However, the agreement had to be cancelled after seven years (2005-2012) due to political turmoil and terrorism and this experience underscored Israel’s vulnerability to Jerusalem. The discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields in 2009 and 2010 has given Israel a new lease of life, at least for the next 50 years, and plans are afoot to even begin exports to Europe; since January 2017, Israel began to quietly export gas to Jordan.

Israel also has no hydroelectric power to speak of, so it must rely entirely on fossil fuels, renewable energy, and nuclear power. Its move away from coal was partly due to environmental factors but also due to rising cost of imports; however, reliance on natural gas is still not quite environmentally friendly if Israel is to meet European emissions standards. More importantly, natural gas can serve as a reliable and valuable source of revenue if other energy sources can be found. Israel has invested in renewable energy and despite several remarkable startups in the sector, the government is not particularly enthusiastic about renewables due to its several shortcomings such as low efficiency, storage issues, water demands, land requirements, and grid stability. That leaves Israel with only nuclear energy.

Can India become a nuclear vendor to Israel?

At first glance, India seems a most unlikely nuclear partner for Israel. After all, how can a country which cannot sustain its own nuclear programme be of use to anyone else? It is true that the Indian Department of Atomic Energy has countless weaknesses but with a little political prodding, the DAE might just be able to assist Israel and in doing so revive its own domestic agenda. Despite its shortcomings, India does have the second-largest fleet of pressurised heavy water reactors in the world and decades of experience in building, operating, and maintaining them.

Globally, PHWRs are not the common choice for power generation; light water reactors have been preferred by the non-proliferation-minded governments of nuclear vendors. Yet with appropriate safeguards, this should not matter much to the international community which has experience in monitoring Canada’s 19 CANDU reactors of a technology similar to that which inspired Indian derivatives.

India’s reactors have the added benefit of being cheaper and smaller than the standard production models offered by Areva, General Electric, Rosatom, or Westinghouse. While these firms offer reactors with capacities between 1,000 and 1,650 MW, Indian models come at 220 MW, 540 MW, and 700 MW. The smaller size may suit Israeli needs better by allowing it to distribute reactors between three or four sites around the country. Admittedly, Israel may indeed prefer small modular reactors to even the diminutive Indian PHWRs but those models are yet to have a single working model even if Israel were eligible to purchase them.

It is not advisable to compare reactor costs across sites and technologies due to the dozens of variables that could change. However, as a rough illustration showcasing the viability of Indian nuclear exports, the two Russian 1,000 MW VVERs at Kudankulam III & IV cost India just short of ₹40,000 crores; by comparison, India’s 700 MW PHWRs at RAPS VII & VIII cost ₹12,300 crores and ₹11,500 crores at Kakrapar III & IV.

The biggest obstacle to India’s domestic nuclear manufacturing has been that no industrial house is willing to invest in the nuclear sector due to the paucity of orders. If India aggressively pursued nuclear energy for itself as well as for export purposes, it is a reasonable bet that there would be greater interest. India’s recent decision to approve ten more PHWRs for itself is a shot in the arm and if an order for 20 Israeli reactors over the next 30 years were to trickle in, it could reshape the industry.

There is also the issue of quality control. Indian manufacturers have had trouble producing nuclear grade turbines, instrumentation panels, and other equipment to an international standard. Cooperation with Israel need not be a one-way street – if Israeli know-how could augment Indian experience, these minor irritations might well disappear. This does require working with a level of openness the Indian establishment is not used to but it is a good measure to build character!

The biggest challenge to an Indian nuclear partnership will be its inability to provide full spectrum service. Delhi may be able to supply the reactors, manufacture fuel rods, train Israel to operate and maintain them, even buy back the used fuel to assuage proliferation concerns but it cannot guarantee a supply of uranium ore or yellow cake. India’s domestic production is shrouded in unwarranted secrecy but it relies on imports from Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The only way for India to emerge as a full spectrum nuclear vendor is by acquiring uranium mines abroad. This would help with domestic use as well as export and is a sound option that Delhi has anyway been considering, regardless of whether India cooperates with Israel in the nuclear field.

What are the geopolitics of Indo-Israeli nuclear cooperation?

This is the real question the proposal for Indo-Israeli nuclear cooperation boils down to. How will the international community react to the news? What will be their counter-moves? Can India and Israel bear the costs, if any? Are the benefits worth the price?

Legally, India stands in a unique space to offer Israel nuclear cooperation if it so desires. It is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty nor is it a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the primary cartel that restricts trade in nuclear technology, components, and fuel. Technically, Delhi breaks no laws by extending nuclear cooperation to Israel. Itself a non-signatory to the discriminatory NPT, India is perfectly placed to accept Israel’s refusal to accede to the treaty – albeit the reasons are somewhat different.

The primary concern for the international community, in principle, should be the diversion of civilian cooperation to military applications. To reassure the world, and because it is a better business practice, India can ask Israel to accede to safeguards under the International Atomic Energy Agency to those specific facilities India will be a partner in or offer a bilateral safeguards mechanism that follows the same protocols. The primary principle of non-proliferation reassured, the international community is but left with a sore nose at this circumvention of their net.

Used nuclear fuel is usually a concern for non-proliferation. India can buy back the used reactor fuel from Israel for use in its eventually coming fast breeder reactor programme. If the FBR programme shows promise, Israel might even be interested in recycling its used fuel with help from India. In a worst case situation, the fuel can be stored in an onsite facility until a suitable geological depository is found as is the case with all current nuclear power plants.

Will cooperation with Israel hurt India’s chances of furthering its own goals, such as getting into the NSG? Theoretically, perhaps. However, with China waiting to veto any mention of India and membership in the same breath, this really need not concern Delhi at all; its chances of getting into the nuclear cartel are as close to zero as one can get. The only way India might squeeze into the NSG is if Delhi is willing to let Pakistan off the hook and give it a clean chit for past transgressions. This is what “principles-based membership criteria” means and it is too high a price to even consider.

It is folly to even think that India is now a partial member of the nuclear community. Barring a handful of countries keen to do deals with it, the hurdles other countries place before Indian aspirations indicates that Delhi is resentfully seen as an interloper with powerful friends. India can expect further outrage from the non-proliferation community through at least these NSG members. Yet legally, India and Israel will have all their bases covered.

It may be tempting to compare Indo-Israeli nuclear cooperation to the Indo-US nuclear deal but it s not – neither India nor Israel are part of the non-proliferation architecture built around the NPT and NSG, freeing to engage in contracts of mutual benefit without restrictions. Regardless, the 2008 deal does establish a precedent and provide a structure for acceptable nuclear commerce outside the strict ambit of the non-proliferation regime. As with India, the non-proliferation community might decide that it is safer to have Israel’s reactors within the fold than without.

Much will depend on how the United States reacts, and as a close ally of Israel, Washington might be amenable to reason. India and Israel may also count on some assistance in lubricating the wheels of power in Washington through the influence of the famed Jewish diaspora. The deal, not a matter of identity or ideology, should not get caught in the internecine conflict in the American Jewish community. Israel has also been cultivating China, mainly for economic interests, who will have to choose between its relationship with Israel and its rivalry with India. The main opposition will likely come from the non-proliferation lobby, or nuclear ayatollahs, as Indian scholar Bharat Karnad has aptly named them.

Conclusion

Nuclear energy is not merely about a diversification of energy sources for Israel. World over, nuclear power plants have proven to have a multiplier effect on the local economy. The Shivta site, for example, would fit perfectly into Jerusalem’s other goal of developing the Negev. Additionally, nuclear power allows cheap desalination of large quantities of water from the waste heat generated by the reactors. A 15 percent share of total national energy creates a need for a fair number of reactors that can ease the pressure off Israel’s water supply. Tamil Nadu has operated desalination plants for over a decade from the waste heat of nuclear power stations in the state. Finally, a booming nuclear industry will also mean high-skilled employment opportunities for the population.

For India, nuclear cooperation will cement relations with an important strategic partner. It will also promote trade and strengthen the nuclear manufacturing sector by providing greater volume to make it lucrative for more players. A nuclear relationship with Israel would in effect set up a parallel nuclear commerce system to the NSG: if they wish to influence Indian policy, they must do so by letting India into the club.

Of course, all of this may be too soon for a country that has itself come in from the nuclear cold barely a decade ago. India, to paraphrase the immortal line of Lt. General Frederick Browning in the 1977 World War II classic, A Bridge Too Far, may be trying to go a bridge too far. People probably said the same thing about the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005.

Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

22 Wednesday Mar 2017

Posted by in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

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There have again been speculations recently about India’s nuclear doctrine and the value of its no first-use-posture. The reason for the kerfuffle this time are a couple of sentences in former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. Menon writes,

There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.

This has been interpreted to mean that India’s no-first-use posture is not credible, which would implicitly exonerate Delhi from the charge – if it is made – that it has quietly changed its nuclear doctrine. Instead, this understanding of Menon’s words suggests that the Indian no-first-use policy was a sham from the very beginning.

Menon also writes,

…proportional responses and deterrence were not the preferred posture in the initial stages of the weapons program, for it might tempt adversaries to test the space available below the threshold for full nuclear retaliation… Instead, the logical posture at first was counter-value targeting, or targeting the opponent’s assets, rather than counter-force targeting, which concentrates on the enemy’s military and command structures.

Here, the object of interrogation is the past tense (emphasis mine) that Menon uses; does he mean to indicate that India initially settled for a massive retaliation against an enemy’s cities but later may have surreptitiously modified its doctrine as its weapons systems became more sophisticated in terms of detection and destruction? However, the context of his objectionable grammar is the historical evolution of Indian nuclear thinking from the mid-1980s. Menon is talking about the inter-test years (1974-1998) when India had not publicly weaponised its peaceful nuclear explosion and therefore obviated the need for a nuclear doctrine.

However, the former NSA is not nuclear-shy once red lines have been crossed. As he explains the rationale,

There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.

Essentially, under India’s massive retaliation strategy, military as well as civilian targets would be considered. A purely counter-value massive retaliation by Delhi would leave Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal intact and capable of raining nuclear fire on Indian cities. The sudden realisation that the Indian military could potentially go after Pakistani nuclear assets as well as its infrastructure has caused a bit of a stir in some circles.

There are several problems with this sudden alarmist tone. The most obvious is that this is not a new observation. Aside from the fact that scholars have gleaned every nuance out of India’s nuclear policy already, the doctrine itself – what is publicly available – specifically states that its retaliation only policy is dynamic. In the words of the National Security Advisory Board,

India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.

India’s policy is clearly stated to be to only retaliatory, which is again emphasised in the next section: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Nonetheless, this position is dynamic in that it is conceivable that imminent use of nuclear weapons against India – fuelling of missiles, field deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, delegation of launch authority – especially from a state that has repeatedly declared a willingness, almost an eagerness, to strike first with nuclear weapons, will be treated as an attack and liable for Indian retaliation. As many Indian strategists have wondered, what is the morality of awaiting certain destruction just to satisfy a dictionary definition of no-first-use?

Such use – anticipatory self defence – may not be to the satisfaction of semanticists but is nonetheless considered just under international law if it fulfills the criteria of the Caroline rule: instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Thus, as Menon himself noted, more flexibility – ambiguity? – has been built into the Indian nuclear doctrine than is realised. As a side note, it is interesting that the same Caroline rule that bears out Indian views on nuclear strikes objects to the dilution of NFU by extending it to chemical or biological weapons as India and other nuclear states have done.

The composition of India’s nuclear arsenal and its status should belie any fears about preemptive counter-force targetting. Most nuclear observers agree that the Indian arsenal is still rudimentary compared to mature nuclear states such as the United States, France, or China. By the benchmarks of those in whose footsteps it follows, India has conducted far fewer (hot) tests to confirm design parameters that would affect miniaturisation, maximise yield, or assure successful detonation in unconventional circumstances to be capable of precise, proportionate strikes. Although the exact composition of the Indian arsenal is classified, the mainstay may be assumed to be improved versions of its 1974 prototype that was tested again in 1998, a ~15 kT Hiroshima-style device and hardly an ideal choice for a surgical counter-force strike. The sub-kiloton designs, ideal for mating with the Brahmos missile for tactical strikes, are not as reliable as their larger brother. The real concern, then, and a more familiar one for Indians, is that their bureaucrats and politicians might be promising more than their military can actually deliver.

It is also worth noting that in regions with population density as high as in the Indian subcontinent, it is very difficult to achieve a purely counter-value or counter-force strike. Military bases are almost always near population centres or important infrastructural nodes out of necessity. Even if Delhi’s policy of massive retaliation was purely counter-value, it would inevitably damage or destroy vital military assets. Despite such collateral damage, the doctrine can then hardly be called counter-force. Yet, as the former NSA points out, it would be ludicrous to leave the enemy’s nuclear arsenal intact for the sake of doctrinal purity.

The newly rediscovered ambiguity in the Indian nuclear doctrine may perhaps carry more salience because not only does it come from a former official who had a large role in shaping Delhi’s nuclear policy but in view of certain “personal” comments former defence minister Manohar Parrikar recently made. Speaking at a book launch in Delhi in November 2016, the then defence minister calmly eschewed India’s no-first-use policy although he immediately clarified that there had been no change in government policy. With two former senior officials casting doubt on India’s intentions, should the international community consider Delhi’s NFU to be diluted?

It needs to be stressed that Menon merely explained India’s long-existing doctrine and did not reformulate it. With regard Parrikar’s comments, seen in their entirety, there can be no doubt that Indian nuclear policy has not changed. At most, the former defence minister’s comments indicate that there may be discussions going on in South Block in very small circles on updating India’s nuclear doctrine. Surely, this cannot be a surprise when the Bharatiya Janata Party had even announced its intention to do so in its election manifesto in 2014. Indeed, the present government may change India’s nuclear policy but it is absurd to expect that policies are static and eternal – especially when even nuclear warheads are upgraded.

Some observers have wondered at the opportune timing – the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary is just around the corner in June – of a sudden panic attack on Indian nuclear no-first-use and counter-force posture. This is unlikely to have been a factor for several reasons: 1. the United States, India’s supporter in the forum with the most clout, does not seem willing to twist arms on India’s behalf as it did in 2008; 2. India has found it difficult to bring into its confidence the several smaller states on the moral high horse; 3. China would be relied upon to veto Indian membership in the consensus-seeking group unless Pakistan were simultaneously admitted. The strategic dimension of NSG membership in South Asia should not be underestimated.

So if not a shift in doctrine, has there been a change in strategy? With improving capabilities, it would be myopic not to expect refinements in strategy. However, none of it – the apprehension about anticipatory self-defence or counter-force targetting – adds up to a new phase in Indian nuclear posture. The nuclear doctrine has long offered these options and at best, India’s material realities might be quietly catching up with its lofty ambitions. No matter, this whole affair has been an exercise in making mountains out of molehills.

This post appeared on FirstPost on March 23, 2017.

What Next with the NSG?

24 Friday Jun 2016

Posted by in India, Nuclear, South Asia

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Early on Friday morning, Indian time, the verdict from Seoul was announced: India would not be allowed entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. For many, this had been a foregone conclusion but the strenuous efforts of the Indian government raised hope that things would ultimately come out in India’s favour as they did in 2008. They were wrong.

At Seoul, Beijing played spoil sport. Stubbornly insisting on creating an admissions process for countries not signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it refused to consider the specifics of India’s case. For China, it was a purely geopolitical calculation – Indian admission to the nuclear high table would bring the South Asian country on par with itself. Additionally, it would put India in a position of advantage over China’s client, Pakistan. Obfuscating these realities behind the rhetoric of non-proliferation, China, one of the worst proliferators in recent years, gained the support of other NSG participating governments for its “principled” stand.

Although India insists that its application was foiled by one obstinate country, other reports suggest that Austria, Brazil, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Turkey all supported a process-based entry. Turkey may have been keeping an eye on Israel while China is the largest trading partner for Brazil and New Zealand. According to diplomats, accession to the NPT was the recurring theme during the negotiations.

Technically, the NSG is a consensus-based body and it does not have rules, at least not legally binding ones. Furthermore, as Indian diplomats have repeatedly pointed out, France joined the NSG while not a member of the NPT. Nonetheless, if the sense of the group has now changed to requiring NPT membership, there is little India can do about it. However, given the support for India’s candidacy, that does not seem to be the sense. Were China to acquiesce to Indian membership, or even abstain from making a decision, it remains a question whether the others would still hold firm to their “principles.” Admittedly, there have been complaints about pressure to vote in favour of India but such behaviour is certainly the norm for any important decision in any forum.

India will not – and should not – sign the NPT as is, and an amendment to the treaty that would recognise India as the sixth nuclear weapons state would be tougher to achieve than a NSG membership. Even the George W Bush administration, which was rather sanguine about India’s nuclear programme, did not attempt to modify the NPT during the 2008 Indo-US nuclear deal for that was too high a mountain. After nearly half a century of having its arbitrariness and hypocrisy enshrined, no state would want to be reminded of the fundamental flaw in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear weapons states, at least one of them, would not want another competitor, and non-nuclear weapons states would feel the fool for accepting discriminatory laws all this time while a country that rejected the system for so long is admitted to its highest echelon.

How did India manage to get a waiver in 2008 and not in 2016? Several things have changed in these eight years. US president Barack Obama is not George W Bush, nor is Xi Jinping his predecessor. in 2008, the Bush administration is rumoured to have twisted arms to get India the NSG waiver; the Obama administration, though supportive of India, was probably not willing to go so far. Additionally, Sino-American relations were calmer: it was not unthinkable for Bush to personally call his counterpart, Hu Jintao, in Beijing on India’s behalf. Xi Jinping is different, intent on refashioning a Chinese empire during his time at the helm. The troubles in the South China Sea have also changed the tone of the relationship. Additionally, the 2008 waiver for India helped China in some ways: it gave them an excuse to openly sell more reactors to Pakistan against the NSG’s wishes and with no such waiver coming for Pakistan, it made Islamabad entirely dependent on Beijing for nuclear assistance. The 2016 waiver holds no such benefits for China.

The most important question now is, what next? There are several options on a broader diplomatic canvas but it is not clear whether Delhi has the courage to do so. Even Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who campaigned like a hawk in the general elections two years ago, has turned into a meek businessman since he moved to Raisina. To be fair to him, however, India cannot bite off more than it can chew – economically as well as militarily and diplomatically, India is much inferior to China and repercussions must be carefully considered.

Yet within the narrow arena of nuclear affairs, India is restricted to developing its own technology for the complete nuclear supply chain. This is easier said than done: industry will not be interested in partnering with government if there is no demand for their wares. An overt commitment to large-scale domestic growth of nuclear power with Make-in-India components will create the incentive for the private sector to develop nuclear-grade components. Furthermore, India has plenty of expertise in designing, building, and operating small to medium reactors. These also cost less than the larger Western models and may be more suitable for developing countries just embracing nuclear energy. Given India’s lower cost of labour, it may even be able to become part of nuclear supply chains of Western vendors.

Were India to commit to emerging as a nuclear manufacturing hub within the next ten years, its clout at the negotiating table would be significant. At that point, the NSG would run the risk of fuelling a parallel nuclear market were it to continue to ignore India. The value of NSG membership, for Delhi, at least since 2011, has not been the acquisition of technology but the prevention of the adoption of discriminatory guidelines in the future. It is also unrealistic to expect countries to sell their latest technology to India even if an NSG membership had been in the stars. For now, the failure to become an NSG member does not create additional burdens to the development of Indian manufacturing; that should be the point of focus.

A nuclear renaissance would need a considerable boost in India’s budget for the Atomic Energy Commission. It would also require greater private participation in the sector, perhaps even in operations. This has been a taboo subject so far for no good reason. Public-Private partnerships will catalyse capacity growth and have a ripple effect on several sectors such as labour, the environment, and, of course, the economy.

India can also speed up its languishing Fast Breeder Reactor programme. These reactors irk the non-proliferation lobby because of their excellent capacity to breed plutonium. With several of these reactors operating, India can offer to put most of them under safeguards in exchange for a seat at the nuclear high table. The investment in FBRs will not be wasted for India’s primary purpose is to use them to fuel the third stage of its civilian three-stage nuclear energy strategy.

Yet for any of this to occur, nuclear issues need to receive generous political attention that they have lacked since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru. Reforms bringing greater transparency and a focus on outcomes must be introduced to shake up what is until now a sluggish governmental behemoth. If India cannot join the NSG, it must be made largely irrelevant to India.

This post appeared on FirstPost on June 25, 2016.