Tag Archives: nuclear doctrine

Counter-force Mountains Out of NFU Molehills

22 Wed Mar 2017

Posted by in India, Nuclear, Opinion and Response, South Asia

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There have again been speculations recently about India’s nuclear doctrine and the value of its no first-use-posture. The reason for the kerfuffle this time are a couple of sentences in former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s book, Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy. Menon writes,

There is a potential grey area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first against another NWS (nuclear weapons state). Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first, for instance, against an NWS that had declared it would certainly use its weapons, and if India were certain that adversary’s launch was imminent.

This has been interpreted to mean that India’s no-first-use posture is not credible, which would implicitly exonerate Delhi from the charge – if it is made – that it has quietly changed its nuclear doctrine. Instead, this understanding of Menon’s words suggests that the Indian no-first-use policy was a sham from the very beginning.

Menon also writes,

…proportional responses and deterrence were not the preferred posture in the initial stages of the weapons program, for it might tempt adversaries to test the space available below the threshold for full nuclear retaliation… Instead, the logical posture at first was counter-value targeting, or targeting the opponent’s assets, rather than counter-force targeting, which concentrates on the enemy’s military and command structures.

Here, the object of interrogation is the past tense (emphasis mine) that Menon uses; does he mean to indicate that India initially settled for a massive retaliation against an enemy’s cities but later may have surreptitiously modified its doctrine as its weapons systems became more sophisticated in terms of detection and destruction? However, the context of his objectionable grammar is the historical evolution of Indian nuclear thinking from the mid-1980s. Menon is talking about the inter-test years (1974-1998) when India had not publicly weaponised its peaceful nuclear explosion and therefore obviated the need for a nuclear doctrine.

However, the former NSA is not nuclear-shy once red lines have been crossed. As he explains the rationale,

There would be little incentive, once Pakistan had taken hostilities to the nuclear level, for India to limit its response, since that would only invite further escalation by Pakistan. India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other worlds, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.

Essentially, under India’s massive retaliation strategy, military as well as civilian targets would be considered. A purely counter-value massive retaliation by Delhi would leave Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal intact and capable of raining nuclear fire on Indian cities. The sudden realisation that the Indian military could potentially go after Pakistani nuclear assets as well as its infrastructure has caused a bit of a stir in some circles.

There are several problems with this sudden alarmist tone. The most obvious is that this is not a new observation. Aside from the fact that scholars have gleaned every nuance out of India’s nuclear policy already, the doctrine itself – what is publicly available – specifically states that its retaliation only policy is dynamic. In the words of the National Security Advisory Board,

India shall pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence. In this policy of “retaliation only”, the survivability of our arsenal is critical. This is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size components, deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.

India’s policy is clearly stated to be to only retaliatory, which is again emphasised in the next section: “India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Nonetheless, this position is dynamic in that it is conceivable that imminent use of nuclear weapons against India – fuelling of missiles, field deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, delegation of launch authority – especially from a state that has repeatedly declared a willingness, almost an eagerness, to strike first with nuclear weapons, will be treated as an attack and liable for Indian retaliation. As many Indian strategists have wondered, what is the morality of awaiting certain destruction just to satisfy a dictionary definition of no-first-use?

Such use – anticipatory self defence – may not be to the satisfaction of semanticists but is nonetheless considered just under international law if it fulfills the criteria of the Caroline rule: instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Thus, as Menon himself noted, more flexibility – ambiguity? – has been built into the Indian nuclear doctrine than is realised. As a side note, it is interesting that the same Caroline rule that bears out Indian views on nuclear strikes objects to the dilution of NFU by extending it to chemical or biological weapons as India and other nuclear states have done.

The composition of India’s nuclear arsenal and its status should belie any fears about preemptive counter-force targetting. Most nuclear observers agree that the Indian arsenal is still rudimentary compared to mature nuclear states such as the United States, France, or China. By the benchmarks of those in whose footsteps it follows, India has conducted far fewer (hot) tests to confirm design parameters that would affect miniaturisation, maximise yield, or assure successful detonation in unconventional circumstances to be capable of precise, proportionate strikes. Although the exact composition of the Indian arsenal is classified, the mainstay may be assumed to be improved versions of its 1974 prototype that was tested again in 1998, a ~15 kT Hiroshima-style device and hardly an ideal choice for a surgical counter-force strike. The sub-kiloton designs, ideal for mating with the Brahmos missile for tactical strikes, are not as reliable as their larger brother. The real concern, then, and a more familiar one for Indians, is that their bureaucrats and politicians might be promising more than their military can actually deliver.

It is also worth noting that in regions with population density as high as in the Indian subcontinent, it is very difficult to achieve a purely counter-value or counter-force strike. Military bases are almost always near population centres or important infrastructural nodes out of necessity. Even if Delhi’s policy of massive retaliation was purely counter-value, it would inevitably damage or destroy vital military assets. Despite such collateral damage, the doctrine can then hardly be called counter-force. Yet, as the former NSA points out, it would be ludicrous to leave the enemy’s nuclear arsenal intact for the sake of doctrinal purity.

The newly rediscovered ambiguity in the Indian nuclear doctrine may perhaps carry more salience because not only does it come from a former official who had a large role in shaping Delhi’s nuclear policy but in view of certain “personal” comments former defence minister Manohar Parrikar recently made. Speaking at a book launch in Delhi in November 2016, the then defence minister calmly eschewed India’s no-first-use policy although he immediately clarified that there had been no change in government policy. With two former senior officials casting doubt on India’s intentions, should the international community consider Delhi’s NFU to be diluted?

It needs to be stressed that Menon merely explained India’s long-existing doctrine and did not reformulate it. With regard Parrikar’s comments, seen in their entirety, there can be no doubt that Indian nuclear policy has not changed. At most, the former defence minister’s comments indicate that there may be discussions going on in South Block in very small circles on updating India’s nuclear doctrine. Surely, this cannot be a surprise when the Bharatiya Janata Party had even announced its intention to do so in its election manifesto in 2014. Indeed, the present government may change India’s nuclear policy but it is absurd to expect that policies are static and eternal – especially when even nuclear warheads are upgraded.

Some observers have wondered at the opportune timing – the Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary is just around the corner in June – of a sudden panic attack on Indian nuclear no-first-use and counter-force posture. This is unlikely to have been a factor for several reasons: 1. the United States, India’s supporter in the forum with the most clout, does not seem willing to twist arms on India’s behalf as it did in 2008; 2. India has found it difficult to bring into its confidence the several smaller states on the moral high horse; 3. China would be relied upon to veto Indian membership in the consensus-seeking group unless Pakistan were simultaneously admitted. The strategic dimension of NSG membership in South Asia should not be underestimated.

So if not a shift in doctrine, has there been a change in strategy? With improving capabilities, it would be myopic not to expect refinements in strategy. However, none of it – the apprehension about anticipatory self-defence or counter-force targetting – adds up to a new phase in Indian nuclear posture. The nuclear doctrine has long offered these options and at best, India’s material realities might be quietly catching up with its lofty ambitions. No matter, this whole affair has been an exercise in making mountains out of molehills.

This post appeared on FirstPost on March 23, 2017.

India’s Nuclear Indecision

28 Mon Apr 2014

Posted by in India, Nuclear, Security, South Asia

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The recent brouhaha over the alleged reconsideration of India’s nuclear no first use policy by a potential Bharatiya Janata Party government was disappointing. One, it was unnerving to watch how paranoid politicians are of even a mischievous, unsubstantiated rumour. Two, it was distressing to realise that something as serious as a country’s nuclear posture could be so profoundly influenced – the prime ministerial candidate Narendra Modi himself denied the rumours and swept NFU off the table – by a handful of editorials from those not acquainted with the details of India’s nuclear capabilities and threat matrix. And three, the country’s stated policy remains woefully ill-conceived and inadequate to counter the stated nuclear postures of its neighbours.

Modi’s promise to retain the nuclear NFU policy was not, all things considered, a bad decision even if his ostensible reason was. Though abandoning NFU might have given India’s strategic planners greater operational flexibility, there was little advantage to be gained by doing so either. India’s conventional superiority in the west and the untraversable terrain in the east provide enough of a buffer for Delhi to eschew nuclear first strike. The only advantage of an NFU, which Modi inadvertently secured, was the diplomatic and public relations benefit of India being viewed as a mature and restrained nuclear power.

The BJP’s resolution to reconsider the country’s nuclear doctrine, however, could not be more welcome. It has been over a decade since India’s nuclear policy was formulated and a nuclear posture review that considers the technological and political developments since 1998 is much needed. Delhi’s present nuclear deterrence policy of massive retaliation is comical and desperately requires a rethink.

The core promise of massive retaliation is that the use of even the smallest nuclear device will result in an immediate response of the full fury of India’s nuclear arsenal. In most situations, this would be catastrophic overreaction. For example, would a tactical nuclear strike on an Indian armoured column 20 kilometres outside Lahore be grounds for turning Pakistan into a radioactive parking lot? Would a warning detonation in India’s uninhabited desert? Furthermore, what incentive does massive retaliation give an adversary to hold back from total nuclear war once its red lines are crossed?

A more flexible response would involve the development of tactical nuclear weapons. Analysts frequently note the failure of of these smaller battlefield weapons to increase stability during the Cold War. As Thomas Schelling warns, a small conflict may not remain so and there is always the fear of nuclear escalation. In a game of nuclear one-upmanship between two powers close to nuclear parity, escalation dominance is near impossible to achieve. However, the South Asian case is different – neither side is operating with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads nor is there the unpalatable potential of having to use nuclear weapons on allied soil.

Another way of looking at battlefield nuclear warheads is that the quantum of damage is significantly reduced from city busters and gives warring parties a small chance to escape the suicidal nuclear spiral. Furthermore, the explicit targeting of civilians only escalates conflict, makes de-escalation psychologically difficult, morally unjustifiable, and serves no military purpose.

The catch-22 of the nuclear debate is that strategic nuclear weapons are considered unusable in war and tactical nuclear weapons run the risk of escalation and yet one sees few nuclear powers rushing to disarm. An arsenal that is composed more of tactical weapons and few strategic weapons offers greater flexibility in battle, gives some chance to avoid an all or nothing nuclear exchange, and reduces the possibility of senseless targeting of non-combatants.

Developing an entirely tactical arsenal – nothing stops one from lobbing several sub-kiloton warheads at a megapolis in a crunch – does not mean that control of nuclear weapons will be released to field commanders the moment full-scale conventional war breaks out. A system can be implemented wherein release of each warhead is sanctioned by a central command that has the advantage of real-time satellite imagery and fuller knowledge of the entire theatre of war.

Giving the military weapons it cannot use sounds more like a bureaucratic boondoggle more than a defence strategy. The military must educate, train, and familiarise itself with nuclear weapons and the implications of their use; bureaucrats and generals must strategise together on the political, tactical, and other implications of nuclear weapons use in various scenarios. These reports – tactical as well as strategic and political – must inform civilian politicians as they decide on the country’s nuclear doctrine. As it stands, India’s posture appears to be influenced far too much by abstract theories from a conflict too removed from the subcontinent’s realities.

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on May 03, 2014.

India’s Nuclear Posturing

01 Wed May 2013

Posted by in India, Nuclear, Pakistan, Security, South Asia

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India’s former foreign secretary and chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, declared a few days ago that even the smallest of nuclear attacks by Pakistan on India would be met with a massive response. This statement is interesting for multiple reasons, not the least of which is from whom it came. Though it is refreshing to get even a murmur out of what is essentially an opaque nuclear regime, the profession of faith in an old Cold War strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction deserves closer scrutiny.

Essentially, MAD postulates the use of high-yield nuclear weapons to annihilate enemy targets, be they military, population, or industrial centres. This idea grew out of World War II era convictions about strategic bombing when nuclear weapons were seen merely as bigger bombs. It was only with the understanding of what the nuclear age really meant – magnification of force and compression of time – that the problems with MAD began to be noticed. Its insistence on massive retaliation draws a red line that reduces operational flexibility; furthermore, giving little to no incentive for the adversary to step back, MAD becomes a rapid downward spiral, a race to the bottom, allowing for no alternative but total annihilation for even the smallest of nuclear provocations. In that sense, MAD is more of a suicide pact than a military strategy. Most disconcertingly, the dyad-specific thresholds upon which MAD operates are not clear – is a nuclear strike against an advancing Indian armoured column on Pakistani soil an attack on India?; is a warning detonation on barren Indian soil grounds for launching total war? For that matter, would Islamabad be willing to rain tactical nuclear warheads on its own soil if the Indian Army pushed through and tried to cut across Pakistan? The potentially disproportionate response also reduces the credibility of MAD, not to mention that in the event of a failure of deterrence, there is no incentive for the enemy to hold back from an overwhelming first strike.

But if total annihilation does not deter, what does? Some theorists have argued that if deterrence by annihilation does not work, the pre-nuclear era concept of deterrence by denial (inability of adversary to win an exchange) would. This was the birth of the notion of limited nuclear warfare. As World War II era mass bombing was found to be ineffective in breaking the enemy’s morale, limited warfare enthusiasts argued for counterforce (military assets) rather than countervalue (cities and industrial centres) targeting and developing an assured second strike capability. With technological improvements in warheads and their delivery systems, such precision with smaller bombs was made possible. The intent was to stablise nuclear conflict, increase control over escalation, and manipulate threats more adroitly.

Seen closely, deterrence by denial begins where deterrence by punishment fails – if the fear of nuclear war does not give the enemy pause, the fact that it has no hopes of winning one might. Despite its arguable appeal over MAD, limited nuclear war theory creates problems of its own: the temptation to escalate for the weaker side, and an arms race resulting from the larger arsenals required to insure against a neutralising counterforce first strike.

The use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan must indeed be met with counter use; otherwise, the deterrent value of India’s nuclear arsenal will go down in future conflicts. Deterrence is not about one side’s will and capability to use nuclear weapons but the adversary’s perception of it; the better one is perceived as being prepared for using nuclear weapons, the more credible the deterrence effect. In this regard, some transparency in terms of a clearly and publicly articulated doctrine and approximate force composition would increase stability, as would clamping down on idle and jingoistic rhetoric. Saran’s invocation of MAD as a strategy is a response that has not been properly thought out, at least against Pakistan.

The three nuclear-era crises between India and Pakistan – the 1990 border standoff, Kargil in 1999, and the one in May 2002 after Pakistani-backed terrorists attacked the Indian parliament – all reveal Pakistan’s very low nuclear threshold. This is not only because of India’s conventional superiority but also largely because as a much smaller country than India, Pakistan lacks the strategic depth to allow a conventional war play out for too long. Islamabad’s last resort will very likely also be its first response.

As a revisionist state, it is evident that Pakistan would be more willing than India to take risks, spanning the entire spectrum from pinpricks to cannonballs. New Delhi must not only be able to respond well, but make it clear that India is prepared to fight and is able to win at every level of violence. Yet while meting out punishment, Raisina Hill must not forget its second goal of damage limitation.

The standard critique of any nuclear strategy is that it pins much hope on the rationality of all actors. In the case of Pakistan, a jihadist-infested state teetering on the verge of failure, this is a great concern. While one can hope that senior military officials and political leaders in Pakistan, through their interaction with the international community, understand the “rules of the game,” religious zealots and fanatics such as the ones plaguing and being supported by Pakistan are unpredictable.

Indian planners must not overstate the irrationality either – however hardline some of Pakistan’s senior military officials are, they are under no illusion that even India’s rudimentary nuclear capabilities are enough to mean the end of their beloved nation. The Inter Services Intelligence, for example, would rather prosecute the war with India on a low flame through a thousand terrorist pinpricks; Pakistan’s nuclear shield would act as a circuit breaker and mitigate the scope and intensity of India’s responses. To these hardened realists, India’s MAD doctrine will ring hollow because of the proximity of the two states – no government will risk the resultant fallout of total nuclear war for only a small infraction.

But what of the irreconcilable Islamists? Pakistan certainly has many of those too, but New Delhi cannot fashion a strategy predicated on the assumption of an intractable suicide mission by the other side. India can only exert pressure through international partners on Islamabad to keep the jihadists in check; one would hope that Pakistan would do so for its own sake as well.

What is interesting about Saran making the pronouncement is that he is high enough in the Indian hierarchy not to be ignored but does not hold any official senior position that he cannot be overridden if the situation warranted it.

Nonetheless, the message India should be sending Pakistan is that the second user faces no nuclear taboo as the initiator of a nuclear exchange might; nuclear weapons may be, as one scholar wrote, “weapons of last resort – for us, at least – but last resort should not be confused with no resort.” While India indeed separates survival-of-state threats from lesser ones, New Delhi sees no stigma attached to the use of nuclear weapons. This posture encourages the separation of the Pakistani nationalist generals who would be unwilling to risk the survival of their country from the suicidal Islamists. One hopes that the perception of a strong will, military capability, and a clear strategy from New Delhi is enough for Islamabad to hold the dogs of nuclear war on a tight leash.

This post appeared on Tehelka Blogs on May 07, 2013.