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Earning the Dragon’s Respect

16 Friday Mar 2018

Posted by in India, Opinion and Response, South Asia

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Pace protestations from Delhi to the contrary, India’s relations with its larger northeastern neighbour China have at best been fraught with tension that have boiled over to outright hostility at the worst of times. Given Beijing’s consistent efforts to undermine Indian security and standing on the world stage, it is beguiling to see a not inconsiderate number of Indians expressing the hope that the 21st century will belong to a partnership between the two countries that will reshape the international order to the benefit of rising powers; with greater contacts through education, tourism, and trade, the border issue would diminish in salience.

Such aspirations are unrequited from the other side: it is a striking difference that Chinese businessmen returning from India are rarely as optimistic as their Western counterparts. Whereas CEOs from the United States, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere are enthused about India’s growing middle class, the improving regulatory environment, and the massive opportunities it offers in infrastructure, services, defence, and other sectors, the Chinese corporate class is more likely to complain about regulatory red tape, poor quality of human resources as well as material, woefully lacking infrastructure, and the culture of middlemen and rampant corruption. This difference indicates more than just the other side of the coin – it reaffirms that the Chinese do not see India as belonging, with themselves, to the first circle among nations.

The fundamental, unrecognised road block to India’s improved relations with China is that Beijing does not see Delhi as an equal. Incomprehensible to South Block’s mandarins confident in their own greatness, India remains for China a lesser power that could yet derail their aspirations for a Pax Sinica. Beijing, therefore, has never considered India in its own respect but as an appendix to its policies with other states.
A defining element of India’s self-projection on the world stage is the belief that somehow, it is an important nation. This could be seen in its first prime minister’s gratuitous commentary on international events at a time when India did not have the means to play a practical role in global affairs. In an audacious attempt, Jawaharlal Nehru tried to lead most of the world’s nations away from the superpower rivalry in a non-aligned third bloc. Delhi’s confidence did not come from its abilities but from a deep-rooted hubris that India simply was great; by virtue of its ancient civilisation, rich in philosophy, literature, science, architecture, and engineering, India deserved respect today.

Perhaps motivated by curiosity more than anything else, the world did accord India some attention in the early years of the newly-independent republic. With the passing of Nehru, however, so too did those giddy days. A planned economy that stumbled at every step, the constant moralising, and little contribution to alleviating the problems of the word soon put India back in the ranks of the “fly over” nations. Going by historic trends, India’s geographic size, population, and strategic location would have normally destined the country for an important global role but India’s leadership believe(d) that this was already so.

It is easy to bask in the praise of allies as India has done in recent years with the United States, and to a lesser extent, France, Israel, and Japan. However, much to Delhi’s discomfiture, it has not received the same deference from its unacknowledged rival, China. In fact, Beijing has studiously avoided reference to India in its policies except as a curt, off-handed afterthought. This disregard is apparent in the way Chinese policies are always presented as having their focus elsewhere but whose objectives may coincidentally impinge on Indian interests. For example, Beijing’s increasingly heavy footprint in Tibet has been portrayed as the integration of the forcibly annexed state into the mainstream of Chinese national life; however, the infrastructure, demographic transfers, and military deployments coincidentally put pressure on the Line of Actual Control with India. Similarly, China’s sudden activity on nuclear non-proliferation is couched in the language of creating a non-discriminatory regime though its real aim to stymie India’s admission into the Nuclear Suppliers Group is transparent.

After the Pokhran nuclear tests of 1998, China was initially silent but later released a restrained statement expressing shock and urging India to disarm and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China’s official position on India’s nuclear ambitions is that it is unfortunate, wasteful, and that Delhi and Islamabad should sort out their differences peacefully; the China threat is a rumour of ulterior motives. Similarly, India’s missile tests have not merited a comment until the recent Agni V finally rattled China into seeking a hearing in the United Nations. Even then, Beijing’s greatest concern is Delhi’s cosying relationship with Washington – and perhaps Tokyo – more than anything it has been able to achieve itself. There is no acknowledgement of any consideration of India in China’s defence planning, perhaps studiously so. This has successfully de-linked the two Asian giants in most minds, though the yawning gap between the two states in terms of the size of the national economy, their militaries, and infrastructural development has also contributed in some measure.

It is natural  that a rising power like China has expansive interests. Yet Beijing’s quest for influence has always tried to block Delhi’s gains – such as the recent interest in Chabahar –  or undermine India – Pakistan is the most glaring example. Competition between powers is natural, and no one can deny China’s legitimate interests around Asia. Yet it is the tone in which they are pursued that ought to have clued Delhi in on its neighbour’s thinking.

Delhi may believe China’s indifference to be merely a psychological game but all indications suggest it is much more than that: Beijing does not see Delhi as its equal. This is why the response to overtures towards resolving the border dispute have been met with flippancy. In October 2013, as well as during Xi Jinping’s visit to India (September 2014) and Narendra Modi’s stop in Beijing (May 2015), the Chinese army intruded deep into Indian territory and remained for days.

Although the Line of Actual Control separating India and Tibet is quiet in comparison to the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, there has nonetheless been constant friction. There have been three serious incursions in as many years during which the Chinese army camped inside India for weeks before finally retreating back to their side of the line.

There is also the matter of continued support for Pakistan – not just in terms of conventional military supplies, nuclear weapons, and missile technology but also in the form of substantial economic investments that could fundamentally alter Pakistan’s economic geography as well as support for Islamabad’s terrorist forces in the United Nations. This is not out of any shared worldview or camaraderie but is purely utilitarian – Beijing’s belief is that a lesser power like India can easily be distracted from global geopolitics by significant irritation from an even smaller state such as Pakistan.

The growing disparity in economic and military werewithal between India and China lends some credence to the latter’s attitude towards the former. More importantly, Indian leaders and society remain too focused on their domestic bickering to present a strong and unwavering image to the rest of the world. If Delhi truly wishes to improve relations with the dragon, it must do so from a position of equality. This means a far narrower difference in power and a demonstrated ability to achieve strategic goals – be they defence manufacturing or aid projects in the neighbourhood – in a timely manner. India must earn the respect of its opponent before anything fruitful may be expected of border talks and other summits.

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Creating an Indian Lake

15 Thursday Mar 2018

Posted by in India, South Asia

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The small, out-of-mind archipelago of Seychelles has been in the Indian news cycle an inordinate amount. Part of this is due to a prospering Indian public starting to take greater interest in the geopolitics of their region. Another reason is the recent agreement signed between India and Seychelles for the construction of a military base on Assumption Island, one of the 115 islands of the African country. Originally signed in 2015 during a visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the country, work could not begin on the strategic asset as the deal was not ratified by the Seychelles parliament during the term of the previous president, James Michel.

Controversy was stirred recently when the present president of the South Indian Ocean country, Danny Faure, declared in 2017 that the agreement would have to be renegotiated as it did not serve the interests of the Seychellois. Then, a recent leak of the text of the newly-negotiated agreement also stoked the controversy in that it was alleged that Victoria has sold off Assumption Island to India; Faure’s administration rushed to clarify that this was not the case and stressed that India would not be developing infrastructure on Assumption for military purposes. Ostensibly, the facilities are meant to support patrolling against illegal fishing, piracy, and drug and human trafficking.

Under the agreement, India will renovate the airstrip on Assumption Island, renovate the jetty, and build living quarters for the Seychelles Coast Guard. The entire project is expected to take a quarter of the tiny island that measures barely 6.7 kms in length and 2.9 kms in width and cost approximately $550 million.

Several things were clarified and modified between the 2015 agreement and the 2018 revision. The deal was extended to 20 years from 10 years with an option to further extend the arrangement by another 10 years; it was clarified that the island was still under the sovereignty of Seychelles, meaning that Indians stationed on Assumption Island will face Seychellois justice if accused of a crime; the obligations of each party were explicitly spelled out as were technical details pertaining to the jetty and airstrip; conditions for the storage of arms have been made more stringent (military exercises, guarding the facilities, and self-defence in case of internal disturbances). As in the 2015 agreement, India has agreed not to use the base in times of war or allow vessels with nuclear weapons to use the facilities. Third parties may be allowed use of the facilities upon joint agreement by both governments.

Although Seychelles has been at pains to emphasise that the agreement with India is not military in nature, the terms indicate otherwise or at least hold open the strong potential for use for security purposes. Victoria, however, does not wish to invite Great Power rivalry – not just between India and China but potentially the United States and France as well – into its living room and has made a public relations decision to highlight the benefits it receives from the development of infrastructure on Assumption Island in the enforcement of domestic law and order.

The deal is seen as important for India because it enhances its surveillance capabilities over the Indian Ocean. In concert with a coastal surveillance radar station already operating in Seychelles, a naval base at Agalega in Mauritius, a coastal radar station in Madagascar, an array of radars in Maldives, and a strong presence in the littoral waters of Mozambique, Delhi’s acquisition of facilities on one of the 67 raised coral islands of the Aldabra group will create an impermeable surveillance net in the southwestern and central Indian Ocean. Assumption Island’s position dominating the Mozambique channel, a key sea lane for merchant ships, adds to India’s kitty a second potential choke point after the Strait of Malacca; the latter is dominated by India’s augmented presence in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands chain as well as with naval agreements with Vietnam and Singapore.

India’s strategic assets in its ocean, important as they are on their own, have an added multiplier effect: Delhi has recently signed a Logistics Support Agreement with the United States and France, allowing the navies of those countries to share naval facilities with the Indian Navy. This extends India’s reach even further from the French base at Reunion – perhaps even Paris’ services in Djibouti – and the US base at Diego Garcia. Together, it is possible for the three countries to establish a Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) line array to closely monitor the movement of all ships and submarines through the region. It is rumoured that India is seeking Japanese assistance in setting up a similar surveillance line from Indira Point to Sumatra, which will then connect with a similar existing US-Japanese network in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean Rim. Between these two arrays, Delhi’s knowledge of movement in the Indian Ocean will see a marked increase and make its naval deployments more efficient.

An agreement with Australia for access to its Indian Ocean Territories, Cocos Islands and Christmas, is tempting but the geography and size of the islands is not an insignificant obstacle to overcome.

There has been some opposition to India’s presence in the archipelago that range from geopolitical to economic and environmental. However, with approximately 10% of the population tracing its roots back to India, there is, so far, general good will towards India. Unlike its larger northeastern neighbour China, India has avoided giving hard loans or flooding client states with Indian labour and instead preferred joint development. India’s previous assistance to the archipelago also puts it in good standing with the Seychellois. In June and September 1986, India helped suppress two coups in the country, the first by deploying the INS Vindhyagiri (which, to be fair, was already on its way to the island on a routine visit) and the second by then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi loaning Air India One to Seychelles president France-Albert René. India has also helped Seychelles patrol its Exclusive Economic Zone and provided equipment such as Dornier Do 228s and Chetak helicopters to meet the security needs of the island chain. The Indian Navy has frequently assisted Seychelles in anti-piracy operations in the past decade. and Delhi has also helped train the Seychellois own armed forces.

At present, India is economically and militarily incapable of facing Chinese encroachment into the Indian Ocean. Beijing has been candid about its String of Pearls for over a decade and yet little was done to augment India’s ability to respond to the threat, either diplomatically or otherwise. Despite its jarring paeans to non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and other such dated misadventures, Delhi has recently made a sound move by agreeing to work in tandem with similarly-minded powers to protect the Indian Ocean. The acquisition of its own assets in the Indian Ocean Region is a bonus and will retain some autonomy for India.

Energy’s Holy Grail One Step Closer

27 Sunday Aug 2017

Posted by in Nuclear

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The recent announcement by scientists of a major breakthrough in fusion research has gone largely unnoticed or with jaded acknowledgement among energy analysts. A team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Plasma Science and Fusion Center obtained a ten-fold increase in energy output from the Alcator (ALto CAmpo TORo, High Field Torus) C-Mod tokamak in an experimental run last year. The results were so exciting that researchers at the Joint European Torus in Britain decided to replicate them. Success has raised hopes that the first commercial fusion reactors might be on the horizon by the 2030s.

Nuclear fusion is considered by many to be the holy grail of energy, promising limitless clean energy with little to no waste production. Unlike fission, which splits atoms and releases excess binding energy from the daughter products, fusion combines atoms and uses energy left over from a more efficient atomic configuration. However, it has substantial challenges and promises made from optimism than engineering grounding in the early days of the nuclear age – such as Lewis Strauss’ famous 1954 declaration that electricity will become too cheap to meter in the future – have not yet panned out, causing scepticism among lay observers.

One challenge is that it is not easy to induce atoms into undergoing fusion. Incredibly high temperatures – at least 100 million degrees Celsius – and pressures are required to achieve it and scientists have often described the process as igniting a small sun on earth. This is achieved most commonly in one of two ways – inertial (ICF) and magnetic (MCF) confinement fusion. In the former, a high energy laser targets a pellet the size of a pinhead to heat and compress the fuel; in the latter, radio-frequency heating is used and the fuel is contained in a torus-shaped device known as a tokamak. The famous International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) in Saint-Paul-lès-Durance, France, is an example of the latter.

Generating such temperatures is no easy feat but to contain it within the confines of a small reactor is even more challenging. The ICF design bypasses this need by focusing a very powerful laser onto a few atoms of fuel for ten billionths of a second; the high energy and short time frame means that the fuel pellet reacts before it can explode. MCF, however, confines the plasma in a tokamak with helical magnetic field geometry, usually achieved by using superconducting magnets to contain the fuel.

The most common fuel for fusion is protium and deuterium, two isotopes of hydrogen, or deuterium and another isotope of hydrogen, tritium. Scientists focus on the lower total density portion of the mixture that is usually 95 percent deuterium because it can heat up to much higher energies. The researchers at MIT, however, decided to create a three-ion mixture with trace amounts, less than one percent, of helium-3 in the fuel. The energy output, in the realm of mega electron volts, has allowed scientists to study how such high energy ions behave under fusion conditions and how they might best be contained.

Despite decades of experimentation, it is still difficult to maintain plasma at sufficient temperatures for long enough to achieve efficient energy output. However, the tri-fuel is an exciting step in that direction. The results will allow researchers to make predictions about other fuel ratios and combinations that might yield even better energy output at lower energies.

Nonetheless, nuclear fusion is a technology that has always been around the corner for decades and present optimism regarding commercial fusion reactors within the next two decades should also be considered with caution. The Alcator C-Mod, for example, was mothballed soon after the successful testing of the helium-doped fuel. Substantial financial commitments will need to be made and results are still a long way from commercially viable.

Second, as scientists begin to maintain plasma in a high energy stage for longer periods (the longest period so far is six and half minutes by the French Tore Supra tokamak), new demands might be made on technology to withstand such intense heat and pressure for commercially viable duration. It is important to note that even with the latest energy output breakthrough, no fusion reaction has yet produced more energy than was required to initiate a reaction – the Joint European Torus (JET) holds the record for this at 70 percent of input power. ITER hopes to push these boundaries of time and energy further.

Third, a regulatory framework will have to be created for safe operation. This will take time for a new technology and the cost of an insufficient safety environment could be high. Four, with so many unknowns about technology and regulations, it is as yet difficult to ascertain the economic viability of fusion reactors.

This is not to say that nuclear fusion is impractical or unviable. However, much like renewable energy and energy storage, it is a promise of times to come rather than an offer of immediate solutions to climate change and energy scarcity. That part of the nuclear spectrum remains the Gen III+ reactors and Gen IV designs such as molten salt reactors, thorium fuel, and small modular reactors that are awaiting only market confidence.

Fusion research is very promising and must be pursued with earnest. As one scientist explained it, fusion plasma performance has increased by a factor of 10,000 over 50 years; research is now less than a factor of 10 away from producing the core of a fusion power plant. However, it cannot be an excuse for inaction towards cleaner energy now. This is not a complicated concept – like in any other industry, current products must be optimised until new designs enter the market. The MIT experiment takes us that much closer to achieving limitless clean energy with virtually no toxic byproduct.