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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: OBOR

Taming the Dragon

01 Sun Oct 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Book Review

≈ Comments Off on Taming the Dragon

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China, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, Dragon on Our Doorstep, George Tanham, Ghazala Wahab, India, Jawaharlal Nehru, Kargil, Line of Actual Control, Line of Control, LoAC, LoC, military, Nathu La, OBOR, One Belt, One Road, Operation Meghdoot, Operation Vijay, Pakistan, People's Liberation Army, PLA, Pravin Sawhney, Russia, Siachen, Sumdorung Chu, United States

Sawhney, Pravin and Ghazala Wahab. Dragon on our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power. New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2017. 488 pp.

Let alone China, India cannot even win a war against Pakistan. This is the provocative opening sentence of Dragon on our Doorstep: Managing China Through Military Power by Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab. While most Indians grudgingly admit to the vast disparity between their country and its giant northeastern neighbour, they are emotionally unprepared to accept that India might struggle to win a war with its Islamic twin to the west. Sawhney, a journalist with 13 years of service in the Indian Army, and Wahab, a career journalist covering security and terrorism, describe in their book the disturbing lack of strategic thought in India’s defence policy. While the material is nothing new for seasoned analysts, it brings to to the general public in a readable manner what the authors see as shortcomings in the country’s security and their proposed solutions.

The crux of the central point of Dragon on our Doorstep is made at the outset – Sawhney and Wahab begin with the argument that bean-counting the number of tanks, artillery pieces, fighter jets, and other hardware may make for colourful charts and captivating news coverage but says little about military strength. The authors differentiate between military power, which Pakistan has developed, and military force, in which India enjoys numerical superiority. The latter is merely the stockpiling of war materiel while the former is concerns the optimal utilisation of that force through well considered defence policy and political directive.

If the famous Prussian military theorist was right that war is the continuation of politics by other means, Sawhney and Wahab have put their finger on the fundamental weakness in Indian security that propagates to all other aspects and levels. The authors’ observation that India’s political will and institutional structure is ambivalent at best reinforces an observation made by an American analyst, George Tanham, in that has been received with some rancour in the Indian establishment. In a now famous 1992 essay for Rand titled, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, Tanham bemoans that India has always lacked in strategic thinking. This has only been to the advantage of Delhi’s enemies. As Sawhney and Wahab contend, “India’s political and military leaders, in cahoots with its diplomats, have sold falsehoods to their own people” about the country’s security.

Establishment weakness is partly due to incompetence: in its crusade to establish civilian primacy over the military, the government has effectively eliminated the armed forces from decision-making process and replaced them with generalist civil servants who are simply unaware of the implications of policies. Dragon on our Doorstep gives several examples of diplomatic errors that were caused by having little knowledge of precedence, history, and facts on the ground.

The lack of a coordinated security policy sometimes results in different government departments working at cross purposes with each other. The lines of authority are also inordinately ambiguous; for example, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs during peacetime but is seconded to the Ministry of Defence in wartime. Not only do such regulations denude cohesiveness and self-awareness among units at the border but they create multiple chains of command that report to different bureaucracies that do not always have the same goals.

Sawhney and Wahab contrast the Indian condition with a conference they attended in China. From the beginning to the end, all representatives of the Chinese media had only one message to impress upon their guests, from the political leaders and bureaucrats to military officials and the media. Such is Beijing’s coordinated strategy, aligning everything from the battlefield to the airwaves.

Not only are Chinese forces well-coordinated, they have, through arms exports and constant training, achieved a high degree of interoperability with the Pakistani Army. This means that India’s enemies retain the physical option to fight on two fronts against a common enemy, holding only the political decision in abeyance. Delhi, on the other hand, suffers from poor coordination between its units, its services, and with foreign powers. Blurred chains of command and the lack of a joint chief of staff has hurt military planning severely, and Raisina’s reticence to establish regular and comprehensive exercises with foreign militaries has left India completely unprepared even if foreign assistance were immediately forthcoming in the event of war.

Sawhney and Wahab take readers on a tour of India’s security blunders and make a convincing case that someone, somewhere, who should know what is going on in fact does not. As the authors explain, weakness at the top has percolated to all levels – from strategic to operational and tactical. The elimination of military inputs from foreign policy and even, to an extent, defence policy, has created a dangerous blind spot in the manner India views the world.

One of the concerns is that India does not seem to learn from its mistakes; perhaps the structure of the defence establishment is such that it does not retain an institutional history. For example, Operation Vijay (1999) was preceded by an Operation Meghdoot. Just as Indian soldiers returning to the mountain tops of Kargil in the summer of 1999 discovered that Pakistani soldiers had infiltrated into India during the winter and occupied the heights, Indian soldiers at Siachen had already had a similar experience in 1983. Sawhney and Wahab describe how Indian delegations were surprised to bump into their Pakistani counterparts in Europe shopping for the same winter accoutrements. The inability to learn from experience is a death knell for any organisation.

There is nothing particularly new by way of data or analysis in Dragon on our Doorstep for scholars or even seasoned observers of Indian foreign and security policy. However, the solutions offered are bound to raise hackles and ignite spirited debates. Ultimately, however, this is perhaps what Sawhney and Wahab seek – greater discussion of issues of vital importance among citizens and decision-makers alike.

For example, it is suggested that the path to India becoming a leading power is Pakistan because Delhi would not be able to focus on global issues or dedicate resources to them without a stable neighbourhood. This would indeed be ideal but the observation underestimates Pakistan’s hatred of India. The authors remind readers of how close both nations were to peace during the Agra summit in 2001 with Pakistani military dictator Pervez Musharraf but India was wary of trusting any offer from across the border so soon after the Kargil conflict.

On a related issue, Dragon on the Doorstep warns that Kashmir is potentially destabilising for India and goes on to criticise the highly controversial enactment of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in the state. Again, the ideal of diplomacy over bullets is proposed without taking into account relentless cross-border instigation. Sawhney and Wahab also work on the assumption that Kashmir is the root of India’s problems with Pakistan, something that has always been rejected by India and recently been dismissed by even Western scholars such as Christine Fair and Daniel Markey.

Provocatively, the authors write, “India needs to understand that the road to managing an assertive China runs through Pakistan.” This is not the first time this suggestion has been made. Bharat Karnad, a scholar at the Centre for Policy Research, has long advocated some emollience with Pakistan so that India may better focus on the real threat to its security from China. As Sawhney and Wahab see it, India has three options towards China. One, it can form a closer partnership with the United States to contain Chinese ambitions; however, India will always have a deficit of trust with a country that is as supportive of Pakistan as the United States has been.

Two, India can go it alone – build the requisite military and economic strength to become a true rival to the dragon; this is easier said than done and the umpteen structural weaknesses in the Indian state will make this a decades-long process, assuming there is no wavering of political will in the meantime. Three, India can bluff its way along without aggravating China too much; the authors leave the substance of this ambiguous but it possibly means maintaining the status quo and playing the unsatisfying balancing act between Beijing and Washington. The language leaves one suspecting that this would be the authors’ choice.

While the title may imply a hawkish position on China, some of the authors’ suggestions are surprising, some may even say naive. For example, Sawhney and Wahab recommend that India join Chinese infrastructural initiatives like One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and even the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) because it would give Delhi leverage to open negotiations on Tibet and facilitate a stable peace with Pakistan.

The same credulity is witnessed when Dragon on the Doorstep accept every positive claim about the Chinese and Pakistani armies while questioning the Indian army at every turn. The simple fact of the matter is that India managed to “win” its wars with Pakistan and hold its ground with China in later conflagrations such as at Nathu La in 1967, Sumdorung Chu in 1987, and Doka La in 2017. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has no doubt advanced leaps and bounds since the modernisation begun by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1970s – which Dragon on our Doorstep discusses at length – but despite its clear strategic vision, the PLA still suffers from lack of decent hardware, regular political indoctrination, insufficient training, a crisis of loyalty, and corruption much like the Pakistani Army.

It is important to understand the assumptions behind these evaluations, for they are not limited to the authors alone. In this world view, the United States is seen as untrustworthy, and India’s nuclear deal with it a failure. Russia is the model relationship, and China is a regrettable enemy. With these parameters, Dragon on our Doorstep makes a far more compelling argument than without. Sawhney and Wahab do not explore these assumptions beyond a superficial glance, unfortunately.

Otherwise, it might be countered that the United States remains the only country that has the economic and military wherewithal to catalyse India’s hesitant rise to an international power to reckon with. Furthermore, its relations with India and Pakistan over the decades have been coloured by Delhi’s (Jawaharlal Nehru’s) assumptions about the United States. Regarding Russia, there are more thorns in that relationship than are publicly discussed. The ballooning cost of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier was just one incident among several disagreements on transfers of technology, quality of equipment, and cost. Finally, on China, it is unfathomable that a rising superpower would ever tolerate a powerful country on its border. Regardless of how much both countries can achieve together, Beijing can never countenance Delhi’s power.

Dragon on our Doorstep has a questionable foreign policy analysis but that should not detract readers from its strength – the discussion of the nitty-gritty of military planning and preparation, from foot soldier to president. The expertise of both the authors is on display as they marshal facts and anecdotes to make their argument that security-wise, India is ill-prepared at all levels. Sawhney and Wahab present a comprehensive accounting of India’s weaknesses, from border logistics to Islamist and Maoist insurgencies that draw soldiers away from military operations to counter-terrorism, from an anaemic domestic defence manufacturing industry to over-confidence in India’s armed forces.

A more conscientious editor would have certainly helped Dragon on our Doorstep sharpen the argument and reining in the authors when they got carried away by their narrative. What should be obvious by now is that Sawhney and Wahab are primarily interested in revealing the inefficiencies and incompetence in the Indian security structure despite the ominous, admonitory title implying China. In this, the book certainly succeeds, and is a valuable addition to the security buff’s reading list .

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What Scope For India-Iran Ties?

15 Wed Jul 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Iran, Middle East, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on What Scope For India-Iran Ties?

Tags

Afghanistan, ASEAN, Association of South East Asian Nations, BRICS, Chabahar, Farzad B, gas, Gholamreza Ansari, Hassan Rouhani, India, INSTC, International North-South Trade Corridor, Iran, ISIS, Israel, narcotics, Narendra Modi, OBOR, oil, One Belt One Road, ONGC Videsh, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Sinopec, Taliban, the kingdom, United States, Wilayat Khorasan, Yadavaran

With a nuclear deal between Iran and the N5+1 (Britain, France, Russia, the United States, China, and Germany) finally concluded, Narendra Modi’s meeting with Hassan Rouhani on the eve of the BRICS and SCO summits a few days ago gains more significance than it might have earlier. Leaders, geopolitical analysts, and businessmen are all keen to see what hints may be gleaned from the early interactions between Rouhani and Modi about how relations between two aspiring regional powers will develop. The fact is, however, that there are some very difficult days ahead for both countries and it will require burning a fair amount of the proverbial midnight oil.

Despite the jet-setting Modi has been accused of, the Indian prime minister is yet to visit Iran. An invitation was extended to him in January at the Vibrant Gujarat Summit and has been accepted though the dates have not yet been decided. However, other Indian leaders and officials have made their way to Tehran in recent months. Most notably, the Minister for Roads and Transport, Nitin Gadkari, visited the Middle Eastern country in May of this year and came back promising that upgrades to the Iranian port of Chabahar will be completed by December 2016 – India had won the contract in 2003. Additionally, Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar visited Tehran in June and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj was scheduled to make a trip towards the end of July for a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement that has now been postponed by Venezuela until the first quarter of 2016. If Modi is to visit Iran this year, it will have to be between now and November when he is scheduled to visit Turkey for the G-20 meeting, Malaysia for the East Asia and ASEAN-India summits, and Israel and Singapore on state visits. Russia has been penciled in for December.

While the world expects a commercial bonanza from Iran in terms of lucrative contracts to modernise and develop the country’s industrial infrastructure and lower oil prices, India will most likely miss out on most of the party. However, its interest in Iran, now free from US pressure, is far deeper and lies in strategic initiatives more than commerce. In the post-sanctions era, Delhi hopes to see Tehran revive three or four projects of crucial bilateral importance that have languished in the doldrums for over a decade.

Security

Whenever Modi and Rouhani do meet, security will be high on their agenda. Ironically, India has had better relations with the Islamic Republic than with the Shah despite initial concern over the outcome of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Tehran has been critical of Islamabad’s attempts to use fora like the Organisation of Islamic States to pass resolutions condemning India and in the 1990s, the two countries cooperated with the Northern alliance to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. The latest situation in Afghanistan, however, does not bode well for either.

The fledgling appearance of ISIS in Afghanistan is of great concern to its neighbours. In the 1990s, Iran and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Pakistani-backed Taliban. However, Tehran sees the emergent ISIS as a far greater threat and may now be lukewarm to India’s concerns about their former enemy; India’s policy on the Middle Eastern terrorist syndicate is as yet unclear. In February 2015, ISIS killed a Taliban leader in Logar province and in April, claimed credit for a suicide bombing in Jalalabad that killed 35. US drone strikes have killed a few ISIS commanders in the country but the number of dissatisfied Taliban fighters heading over to the newcomers is steadily increasing though still small. The ultimate nightmare scenario for both India and Iran would be if ISIS spilled over into Pakistan’s toxic soup of terrorist safe havens. Both Tehran and Delhi need to develop a strategy that does not strengthen their old enemy, the Taliban, but also keeps ISIS out of the region. If US reports are to be believed, Iran has already made a few small shipments of arms and other supplies to the Taliban.

According to some analysts, ISIS has made an appearance in Afghanistan to stake a claim to a portion of the profits of the narcotics trade. US airstrikes against oil facilities in Iraq and Syria and the loss of important towns along the Turkish border have diminished their finances and ISIS hopes to find new economic pastures in Wilayat Khorasan – what they call their imaginary province in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. If so, it could prove the task of eliminating them much harder as poppy traders have always been.

Economics

On a less dire front, much has been made of the potential for trade between India and Iran. Before US sanctions and pressure brought trade between the two countries to a trickle, it stood at approximately $15 billion per annum. There is no doubt that hydrocarbons will boost commerce between India and Iran quickly back to this level – India is already back to importing 370,000 barrels of Iranian crude per day – but questions remain on the emergence of a broader trading portfolio. Iran’s most immediate needs are in the upgradation of its hydrocarbon infrastructure, its factories, and other high-tech goods that are available in Western rather than Indian markets.

Iran will also want to improve its transport, education, health, and cyber infrastructure but with the prospect of the sanctions lifting, Iranian negotiators have become tougher negotiators and told several Indian delegations that they could acquire their needs from other sources at lower cost. One deal to be hit by Tehran’s increasing confidence was a $233 million State Trading Corporation venture to supply Iran’s railways with tracks; India was able to hold on to the deal but after lowering its price by seven per cent and officials are still worried that further cuts may be demanded or the order split. Iran has also withdrawn its offer to India to develop the Farzad B gas field since it was made in 2013 and free shipping as well as discounts on oil purchases have been canceled. Part of the reason is that India is seen as low on delivery; in 2007, ONGC Videsh was bumped from Yadavaran oil and gas field in favour of China’s Sinopec despite a memorandum of understanding.

Tehran has also reduced its purchase of Indian rice after its frozen assets were released from Indian banks. Exports from India may still include iron, edible oils, meat, diesel, tractors, turbines, grains, computers, machinery, and medicines, but they will face stiffer competition from the international market than before.

Regional Infrastructure

While the stars do not seem too favourable towards booming India-Iran trade, the Islamic republic still sees India as a valuable partner. In a recent interview, Iran’s ambassador to India, Gholamreza Ansari, expressed his country’s interest in developing the International North-South Trade Corridor through his country. Indian goods would reach European, Central Asian, and Russian markets sooner and at lesser cost if this corridor were completed. As a country along the route, Iran would also piggyback its imports and exports on the same network; Chabahar will already have been upgraded from 2.5 million tonnes to handle 12.5 million tonnes per annum. Coincidentally, Modi mentioned a similar proposal that linked Bombay to St. Petersburg in his discussions in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan a couple of days ago. Such a project would be of immense economic as well as strategic value to India. it would bypass Pakistan and offer an alternative to China’s One Belt, One Road project; extending the INSTC from Bombay eastwards to Haiphong would alter trading patterns in the region.

Iran is still keen on building an undersea gas pipeline to India, another project hanging on from the previous decade. With improvements in technology and less US pressure, this might be a project India takes up with alacrity. This pipeline would diversify India’s hydrocarbon imports and certainly be more secure than the other project India has signed on to, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

India also has the opportunity to develop a stronger naval presence in the Sea of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Iran is just as concerned as India about the safety of sea lanes in the area, its two major ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar both lying in those waters or adjacent to them. An expansion of the Indian Navy’s role westwards would improve Delhi’s grasp over the Indian Ocean Region as well as dilute the effect of Chinese presence in Gwadar.

Foreign Policy

Will India’s ties with Iran not interfere in Delhi’s relations with many of Tehran’s foes such as Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia? Absolutely not. India’s links to Iran are almost entirely commercial and overlap with US and Israeli interests where they are not – Afghanistan. Despite some literary affinity in the north, India does not share, to employ an overused expression in international affairs, a “strategic/special relationship” with Iran. In all likelihood, American companies will have a greater presence in Tehran after the sanctions are lifted than will Indian companies.

For similar reasons, there is little reason for Saudi Arabia to be alarmed by India’s ties to Iran – they are largely economic. South Bloack’s long-held belief that friendly relations with Riyadh would temper Rawalpindi’s misbehaviour has been proven wrong over the decades and has therefore diminished the Arab capital’s importance to Delhi. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia still hosts almost two million Indian workers who make considerable remittances back to India. Yet greater economic interaction with Tehran hardly constitutes antagonism towards Riyadh and is no more than what the Gulf country has extended towards Pakistan.

Despite outward appearances, Israel has a somewhat intimate relationship with India that will take a lot to disrupt. India is a large country and has many needs both in volume and diversity; Israel is a useful partner in several arenas of its security framework and economy that India will not jeopardise. Renewed links to Iran do not change the fundamentals of India’s world view and should in no way concern Israel. Delhi’s influence in Tehran and jerusalem may be limited yet but a voice without geopolitical baggage in both capitals cannot hurt either side. Modi’s upcoming visit to Israel has caused some flutter as has India’s recent vote in the United Nations, abstaining from censuring Israel. This scaling down on rhetoric reflects a marginal course correction in Indian policy towards the region but ultimately, India has no skin in the game and is hardly a major player in the region to change the course of nations.

There is a lot on Modi’s plate whenever he visits Tehran. Though the scope for any rapid expansion in direct trade remains uncertain, the potential to transform trade routes in the region and with them local economies lies latent as does the hope that some stability if not peace will be brought to India’s mountainous northern borderlands. This is certainly too ambitious an agenda for one trip but perhaps the first steps may be taken.


This post appeared on FirstPost on July 16, 2015.

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