Tag Archives: Right

The Other Jews

22 Sat Apr 2017

Posted by in Book Review

≈ Comments Off on The Other Jews

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Trouble in the TribeWaxman, Dov. Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016. 322 pp.

What drives criticism of Israel? Its supporters would probably argue that it is latent anti-Semitism. While there is certainly an element of that, it cannot explain all censure of the Jewish state. The question gets more complicated when some of those voices raised against Israel are Jewish. In his new book, Trouble in the Tribe: The American Jewish Conflict over Israel, Dov Waxman tries to explain this schism in the Jewish diaspora over Israel. Since the overwhelming majority of Jews outside of Israel – 40 percent of world Jewry and 70 percent of the diaspora – reside in the United States, Waxman focuses on the reaction of American Jewry to Israeli policies.

Among the diaspora, the importance of American Jews to Israel cannot be understated. Jewish organisations in the United States give over a billion dollars to Israel in various forms annually, and several members of the Jewish community have the ear of important congressmen and senators. It was a proto- “Jewish lobby” that influenced Woodrow Wilson to support Britain’s Balfour Declaration in 1917 and it was again the American Jewish community that influenced Harry Truman to support the creation of Israel in the United Nations in 1948. As David Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, had observed, “Israel’s only absolutely reliable ally is world Jewry.” Naturally, as the largest, richest, and most powerful diaspora Jewish community in the world, American Jewry carries much weight in Jerusalem.

Contrary to popular perception outside the fold, the American Jewish community is not united and unstintingly behind Israel. In fact, from a historical perspective, as Waxman argues, the pro-Israel consensus that did once exist is an aberration rather than the norm. It was only during a short span of about a decade and a half from the Six-Day War in 1967 to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 that Jewish Americans supported Israel wholeheartedly and unquestioningly. Even then, Waxman argues, polls show that this support was usually based either on ignorance or a rosy, idealised view of the Middle Eastern democracy rather than reality. Greater awareness among American Jews since the 1980s has actually increased criticism of Israel.

Trouble in the Tribe briefly delves into the history of American Zionism and the response of the American Jewish community to Zionism in Europe. In doing so, Waxman reveals the subtle differences between the two and how it informed American Jewish attitudes towards Israel. Waxman suggests that initial sympathy and beneficence among American Jews towards Israel was largely to assuage their guilt for their inability to help their European brethren during the Holocaust. American Jewish support for Israel has always been more emotional than ideological.

Waxman presents a fine dissection of American Jewish beliefs between liberal and conservative, secular and religious, non-Orthodox and Orthodox. Despite these cleavages, interestingly, American Jews of all political shades believe that they are acting out of genuine concern for Israel and in the state’s best interests, even if those happen to be against the Knesset’s policies at times! The divisions are also reflected in the issues each side prioritises, even if there is an inevitable overlap: while the Left is more concerned about Israel’s human rights record and civil liberties, the Right is more concerned about security and identity.

Public Jewish criticism of Israel – especially regarding foreign and security policy – is seen by the Right as, at best, misguided and naive if not downright disloyal. Such venting, they believe, only lends voices to the anti-Israel choir with no reciprocity from the other side. As a result, Jewish critics of Israel have often found themselves blacklisted at Jewish venues and events whose donors and/or board members are, at least, less vocal in their displeasure with Israeli policies. This is true for individuals as well as organisations.

The basic tenor of the argument against public criticism of Israel by the diaspora is that because they do not live in Israel, serve in the Israeli military, or are in constant danger of terrorist attacks, the diaspora has no business preaching to Israeli Jews about their security. Critics retort that since Israel claims to speak for all Jews worldwide, the diaspora have as much right to criticise its government’s policies as citizens do. Furthermore, Israeli policies may very well have an adverse impact of Jews around the world and the disapora is therefore entitled to have their opinions heard.

This raises an interesting question that goes back to the very founding and ideology of the Jewish state: does Israel truly wish to be a Jewish state, speaking for Jews worldwide, or is it willing to circumscribe its ambit to citizens alone with a permanent right to safe haven for international Jewry?

The common perception that the divide in international Jewry may be a function of geography, Waxman argues that it has, in fact, more to do with politics. “Secular, left-wing Israeli Jews are likely to have much more in common, at least politically, with secular, liberal American Jews than with other Israeli Jews.” It is not American and Israeli Jews who inhabit different universes and realities, then, but secular and Orthodox.

Waxman observes that there is a double standard in the acceptance or vilification of public Jewish criticism of Israel. Although left-wing groups are frequently attacked for their disloyalty, right-wing criticism of any willingness by the Israeli government to compromise with Palestinians is seen as kosher. In essence, the taboo on public criticism of Israel only applies one way – against more liberal policies towards its Muslim neighbours and not against urging more hardline policies.

Although the contours of Waxman’s arguments are broadly visible to anyone who has even peripherally followed US-Israel relations, the strength of Trouble in the Tribe is the detailed narration of the evolution of these positions that gives coherence to cursorily noticed trends. What is even more interesting is where Waxman sees these fissures in the American Jewish community heading. As he sees it, a change in generations has given the community’s politics a leftward tilt. Younger American Jews think differently from their parents on a host of political and social issues, are more likely than their parents or grandparents to have Palestinian or Arab friends, acquaintances, and colleagues, are further removed from the trauma of the Holocaust and the uncertainty of Israeli existence, and are more likely to be the offspring of intermarried couples. This is balanced by a rightward pushback in the simple fact that Orthodox Jews have a higher birthrate than liberal Jews; with the Orthodox population growing and the non-Orthodox population struggling to attain even replacability, demographics, which Waxman insists is not destiny, seems to be on the side of the Right. Despite the increasing assertiveness – and shrillness? – of secular, liberal American Jews, the mainstream narrative may still be held firmly by the Orthodox and conservative members of the tribe.

The fate that has befallen America’s Jews is not dissimilar to a culture war – differences in political perspectives, moral attitudes, and even psychology between secular liberals and religious conservatives are at the heart of the debates.

Waxman’s even-handedness on a topic that is extremely volatile to say the least is commendable. The author’s historical perspective is also a great method that puts contemporary disputes in context and adds depth to the positions held. Trouble in the Tribe desists from making value judgements and gives fair weightage to both perspectives. One drawback some readers may feel is the repetitiveness in Waxman’s narrative style. The same point is often made over and over again with slightly different data points that do not add to the richness of the argument.

[What makes these debates noteworthy to an Indian audience is the lessons it has for India’s relations with its diaspora – other than of course, the value of the American Jewish community in India’s relations with Israel. In the United States, the Indian community is becoming increasingly prosperous and vocal while the generous remittances from the Persian Gulf are indispensable. How will geography and “peer pressure” on these diaspora affect India? Which India will they support, the subject of their idealisation or the other, real India? What are the potential points of fissure in the diaspora, internally as well as with India? As India steps up to the world stage, these questions will gain additional significance.]

India’s Missing Right-Wing Intellectuals

14 Sat Mar 2015

Posted by in India, Opinion and Response, Society, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on India’s Missing Right-Wing Intellectuals

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , ,

In a recent article in Caravan Magazine, Indian historian Ramachandra Guha bemoans the absence of intellectuals on the right side of India’s political spectrum. He draws a distinction between ideologues, who are more interested in promoting their own beliefs, and intellectuals, who contribute to the growth of knowledge. While Guha does not define ‘intellectual,’ he gives several examples of those whom he considers as intellectuals in the fields of history, political science, and economics. For him, methodological integrity plays a large role in separating ideologues from intellectuals. Another difference between intellectual and ideologue is audience – the former is more concerned about the reception of research among scholars while the latter is keener on swaying the public.

At first glance, it is not difficult to have some sympathy for Guha’s point of view. A closer analysis, however, reveals a set of assumptions that may not be fully justified. First, Guha’s framework of the intellectual does not leave much room for the public intellectual – if the primary aim of scholarship is to talk to a small and academic community, then what role is there for them in the shaping of policy? If scholarship is to meant to, among other things, provide fertile material for ideologues, then would it not be wiser to look past the talking heads put up by the Right? Additionally, Guha limits the conversation to the humanities, that too a very thin slice of it – does this imply that the sciences do not produce intellectuals? In a world where it is becoming difficult to find spaces where technology and public policy do not intersect, this would be a bold assertion. If Guha’s point is merely that intelligence and intellectualism are two different qualities, then it is a rather obvious and boring observation.

Second, Guha does not specifically explain what it means to be an intellectual but takes the definition to be endoxa, that is, common wisdom based on observation over a period of time. This cleverly avoids a definitional quagmire but in exchange expects the reader to be receptive to Guha’s conception of the intellectual and the role of such figures in the public sphere. This might be too much to ask in India, a country that, even 70 years after independence, is still struggling with modernity and nationhood.

Guha’s intellectual is a product of the institution. This is not an entirely unreasonable position to take; after all, universities have become the epicentres of academic research in recent years, particularly in the humanities. Unfortunately, this view is also woefully incomplete – not only does it not acknowledge intellectuals by praxis, it also ignores scholars who are not in the academic circuit. Where does Kannada author SL Bhyrappa, for example, fit in Guha’s schema? Does the polyglot poet R Ganesh have a place? There is no doubt that these thinkers and authors have influenced millions of Indians, albeit largely in vernacular languages rather than the preferred institutional language, English.

Bhyrappa, by the way, is institutionally credentialed – he holds a doctorate in philosophy from the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, and R Ganesh is a Doctor of Letters from Hampi University. Yet degrees hardly make an intellectual, though admittedly, it is not a bad rule of thumb. Nonetheless, it should also be kept in mind that such a narrow vision would exclude people like Yevgeny Yevtushenko or Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. Moreover, it would be foolish to cling to intellectuals-by-degree in an era where more and more scholars are complaining about the flawed peer review system or a mutual citation society.

It is interesting that Guha mentions only the disciplines of history, political science, and economics. There is nothing particularly intellectual about these three than, say, philosophy, classics, and law. Presumably, Guha wants to whittle down the scope of discussion to how data or evidence is treated – in all the fields Guha mentions, there are archives, datasets, and databases upon which arguments must be based. It is here that Guha finds right-wing scholarship lacking. Yet Guha fails to mention Lokesh Chandra, the current president of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and just as visible and allegedly controversial as Yellapragada Sudershan Rao or Dinanath Batra. Awarded a doctorate by Utrecht, Chandra has hundreds of works to his credit in the institutional setting Guha prefers.

An ideologue might retort that Guha is stacking the deck, that historical data has been tainted by layers upon layers of Christian, racial, imperial, and Marxian interpretation. For the Right to work out of such a framework would be akin to expecting a Christian theologian to make an argument for his God using the works of Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens.  To this, one can easily demand that the Right develop their own primary-source-based scholarship than complain about research they do not agree with or like. However, the lack of a strong, institutional Right narrative in India is in part due to the hostile environment in which it would have had to develop. With near-dictatorial control and presence of the government in education, media, and broadcasting, there was little opportunity for right-wing institutions or intellectuals to develop. What we see today, be it the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the rebirth of a journal like Swarajya, or the slowly growing fan base for free market economics, is but a nascent movement. We are yet to see what they make of themselves.

The tradition of education, or what education was like a thousand years ago, in India is not pertinent today. Suffice it to say that several scholars – of law, Sanskrit, history, religion, philosophy, music, and art – exist amongst the teeming millions. They usually have day jobs and pursue their other interests in their spare time. Some of the more gifted ones have been able to abandon traditional 9-5 employment and embrace tutoring in their favourite subject. For those interested, it is not difficult to find such intellectuals but they are dispersed and not under institutional umbrellas. Which side of the political spectrum these scholars lean towards is difficult to declare for labels like Left or Right do not readily apply to the Indian political scene. However, several do maintain an admiration for the Hindu way of life and vote for the BJP.

An interesting example can be found in Guha’s hero, Kota Shivarama Karanth. Where would Guha place him on the Left-Right spectrum? Karanth is a most respected Kannada litterateur who has spoken out strongly in favour of Dalit rights (in Chomana Dudi, for example) and has opposed several infrastructural projects such as nuclear power at Kaiga and hydroelectric power at Bedti on environmental grounds. This ought to place him on the Left. However, Karanth has also opposed proselytisation and in fact aligned with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad on the issue of the Ram Mandir at Ayodhya. This would place him firmly on the Right. It is easier to find on the Right those who support Dalit rights and environmental causes than it is to find supporters of the Ram Mandir on the Left. Is Karanth not an intellectual or is the choice of Left/Right biased?

Despite the questionable assumptions of Guha’s article, any honest conservative will accept one frustration Guha has with the Right – institutions carry forward legacies and it is imperative for the Right to articulate its narrative clearly and intelligently. Whatever the past glories of India, her science, her education system, her values, or anything else, there is no turning back the clock and India’s Right must broadly conform to the modern state and its creeping bureaucratism. It is not that the Indian Right has no intellectuals but rather that it is time they stepped up to a different challenge and way of functioning.

This post appeared on FirstPost on March 17, 2015.

Searching for Left and Right in Indian Politics

08 Sun Mar 2015

Posted by in India, Society, South Asia

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Frequently – nay, always – does one read and hear discussions about right-wing politics and left-wing ideology in India, each being pit as the antithesis of the other. Countless hairs have been pulled in the quest to define the Indian Right, Hindutva, or whatever incarnation seems to be trending that day. Comparison to right-wing movements and leaders in foreign countries add an exotic flavour to this cacophony of generalisations. All the noise, however, is embarrassingly misguided for there is neither a Left nor a Right, as understood in the West, in India.

Coined to describe the accidental sitting arrangement in the French legislature after the Revolution, the Western political nomenclature of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ does not strictly apply to the Indian political landscape. Not only does the country have a different historical experience and political evolution but it is also at variance with Europe in its developmental trajectory. As a result, Left and Right are often highly misleading descriptors that find greater use as pejoratives than as meaningful categories. Closely examined, the division in Indian politics is perhaps better understood as between traditionalism and a modernity imported from the West. It goes without saying that there is a spectrum of thought within each of these groups.

So what are the politics of traditionalism and imported modernity? One site of conflict is culture. Traditionalists believe that India is a Hindu country with an undeniably Hindu past and one should not shy away from this fact. Acknowledging this does not make, ipso facto, India a majoritarian state. Modernists, however, wish to emphasise the plurality of Indian history and argue that a country as diverse as India can stay together only as a secular state. Traditionalists argue that secularism does not provide a level playing field between different belief systems as it does in the West. In fact, non-exclusive and non-proselytising systems such as Hinduism, Jainism, or Sikhism need to be protected against the predatory practices of faiths that are not so. The petty point that receives the most attention at the cost of missing this larger issue is whether the Congress Party, which has ruled India for over three quarters of the time the country has been independent, is genuinely secular or is a conniving player of vote bank politics. Many on the “Right” accept the modernist narrative of secularism as equality but accuse the Congress of minoritarianism, whereas traditionalists beg the question itself and prefer a localised modernity with an Indic soul.

A starker example of the failure of the Right/Left dichotomy in India can be found in economics. Conventional wisdom portrays the Left as socialistic or welfarist and populist while the Right remain the champions of capitalism, open markets and business. In India, the “right-wing” Bharatiya Janata Party has market-friendly economic thinkers like Arun Shourie and Subramanian Swamy and yet it also has Swaminathan Gurumurthy who is suspicious of the entire American financial model. In fact, some of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s views on community and economics mirrors Israeli kibbutzim of the early years far more than it does Wall Street. In between stands Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is not allergic to capitalism or the free market but is also reluctant to abandon the country’s public sector units. Interestingly, the BJP, in its earlier avatar as the Jana Sangh, had stronger positions against state interventions than in its current incarnation.

The same might be said of the “left-wing” Indian National Congress, that some of its younger members might have much more in common with Arun Shourie than their own leaders of yesteryear who advocated control over the commanding heights of the national economy. The Congress party has itself now advocated a mixed economy, building a middle path between state and private capitalism.

The other parties, such as they are, contribute just as generously to the confusion: Babasaheb Ambedkar was a strong votary of capitalism and free markets, but most of the parties which now worship Ambedkar would be reckoned to be broadly to the left of the political universe.

The marriage of the Right with welfarist economics, though rare, is not a new phenomenon. In Europe, Germany’s Bismarckian socialism and the Vatican’s Rerum novarum (and its three sequels), an encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, are Western examples of a politics of tradition, nationalism, and welfare that are not identical but fairly similar to India today.

Another interesting variation on the international Left/Right political framework is the environment. It is difficult to pin down the BJP’s exact environmental policy as it has had very little time at the helm – it is easy to make speeches without accountability while sitting in Opposition. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has recently uttered repeatedly a concern for the environment. Some may indeed argue that the BJP’s actions do not match with Modi’s words but the net result remains to be seen. In terms of clean energy, both the Congress and the BJP are inclined favourably towards nuclear power; with the possible exception of France, worldwide, the Left has generally had its reservations on the matter. Similarly, the BJP is gung-ho on solar and wind energy which traditionally saw less support from the international Right – until recently.

It would be erroneous to conflate the traditionalist/imported modernity binary to regressive/progressive labels too. For example, it was India’s “progressive” first prime minister who introduced curbs on free speech and a “regressive” thinker like Vinayak Savarkar argued against untouchability and the caste system. Of course, these are singular examples but this mishmash of views is not uncommon and illustrates the care with which Indian politics much be approached.

None of this is to argue that India cannot learn from the West – it can and should without any shame or hesitation. However, it would not hurt to think through the political scene a little more carefully to make sure we are describing the reality of India and not the Republicans or the Labour Party. Perhaps then, India might start to make an iota more sense to observers.

This post appeared on FirstPost on March 23, 2015.