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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: sanctions

We Have A Framework!

03 Fri Apr 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Iran, Middle East, Nuclear, United States

≈ Comments Off on We Have A Framework!

Tags

Additional Protocol, Arak, centrifuge, Code 3.1, E3+3, enrichment, Ernest Moniz, Federica Moghierini, Gérard Araud, heavy water, Heavy Water Reactor, HWR, IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, IR-40, Iran, Javad Zarif, JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Lausanne, Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, nuclear, plutonium, PMD, possible military dimensions, reprocessing, safeguard, sanctions, United States, uranium

Late in the night, Indian Standard Time, news emerged from Lausanne that a framework for a nuclear agreement between Iran and the E3+3 (France, Germany Britain + Russia, United States, China) had been agreed upon. Lausanne, the small and picturesque Swiss town on the shores of Lac Léman, has been the latest host to dozens of diplomats, lawyers, and nuclear scientists involved in the long and difficult negotiations over the state of Iran’s nuclear obligations. A short joint press conference by Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, and Federica Moghierini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced to the world that a significant milestone had been reached and that an agreement would be drafted by June 30. More than elation, tiredness marked the faces of the two diplomats. This last phase of discussions had gone late into the night for the previous two days and even these were only the tip of an 18-month long conversation between Iran and the E3+3.

The outcome of the negotiations has been hailed in the expected corners as well as condemned by the usual suspects. If this framework holds and a final agreement is inked by June 30, this will be one of the few times in recent memory that diplomacy has held sway over force. Barring the Cuban Missile Crisis, few major international squabbles in the past century have been solved through negotiations. So much so that we might have even forgotten what compromise looks or feels like – either side is satisfied but not content. The same is the case with the Iran talks. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Republicans might prefer total supplication and abject surrender from Iran but there is as much chance of achieving that – even through war – as there is of the West giving Iran a clean chit on its nuclear activities.

The framework is far more elastic than it appears at first sight. Though the United States has released a fact sheet and the US Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, made a statement, these are just US interpretations of what has been agreed upon and Iran has not signed off on them yet. Iran’s only public commitment is stated in the joint statement made by Zarif and Moghierini. Troubling to some, the framework has been portrayed in a different light by Iranian leaders in Persian to their domestic audience than Western negotiators have to their citizens. This was also seen in November 2013 when the Joint Plan of Action was first agreed to and is nothing to be alarmed about. It would hardly be healthy for the life of the framework if Iranian President Hasan Rouhani portrayed the JCPOA to the clerics and common Iranians as an American victory or an Iranian submission any more than for US President Barack Obama to tell the US Congress that Iran outwitted the United States and the Europeans in the negotiations. Such diplomatic license must be allowed in reading the behaviour of politicians.

Nonetheless, that statement still gives several reasons for optimism. The parameters of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, at the very least, assures the world that Iran’s Heavy Water Reactor at Arak will not be used to make weapons-grade plutonium, that its enrichment capacity, level, and stockpile will be limited for a specified duration, and that there will be no enrichment facility other than at Natanz. Reprocessing is forbidden Iran and spent fuel will be exported. Tehran will also accept the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements of the International Atomic Energy Agency and nuclear-related sanctions will be removed upon IAEA verification of Iran’s safeguards.

The Devil, as they say, is in the details and these will not be known until the final agreement is drafted. Iran hawks warn that the JCPOA does not go far enough but several experts seem to have confidence that the agreement will lead to something more substantial by the end of June. Many are in fact surprised that Iran conceded so much at all though they will hold the champagne until the deal is signed and implemented. To get into specifics, first, Iran will retain the right to enrich uranium. Yet it has agreed to limit this to 3.67 percent for at least 15 years and not build any new enrichment facilities for at least as long. Tehran is allowed only 6,104 centrifuges under the agreement, a far cry from the 19,000 operational presently. The excess centrifuges will be stored under IAEA supervision and will be accessed only as replacement for operating centrifuges. In addition, all operational centrifuges will be IR-1, that is, Iran’s more inefficient first generation equipment. It has also been agreed that Iran will not maintain a stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent greater than 300 kgs; presently, the country has 10,000 kgs of low-enriched uranium. It is not clear whether the excess will be downblended or exported but either way, it will not go into the Iranian nuclear programme in its present state. In conjunction, it is estimated that were Iran to try and make a nuclear device – it will certainly not be a bomb – the breakout time would be at least a year as opposed to the three months at present.

Second, Fordow – the secret site that was revealed by the United States, France, and Britain in 2009 – will be converted into a research centre. It may work on nuclear related matters but not enrichment research for at least 15 years. The facility will neither enrich nor store uranium for the same period. Almost two-thirds of the nuclear infrastructure at Fordow will be removed; it will have 1,044 centrifuges remaining but these will not be used to enrich uranium and will be placed under IAEA safeguards. This means that the only facility at which Iran can enrich uranium is Natanz, where 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges will be allowed to operate. The thousand IR-2M centrifuges will be removed and placed in safeguarded storage for 10 years. Iran’s other more advanced centrifuges are similarly prohibited for ten years. Research related to the development of advanced centrifuges will be limited for ten years and after that, subject to IAEA supervision.

Third, the IAEA will have regular and even continuous access in some cases to Iran’s entire nuclear fuel cycle. Its uranium mines will be under continuous surveillance for 25 years and its centrifuge manufacturing facilities for 20 years.Natanz and Fordow will, of course, come under safeguards and all of Iran’s technological and material procurements will be channeled through the IAEA. The JCPOA suggests that Iran will implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements with the IAEA; this requires it to give early notification to the IAEA when it constructs new nuclear facilities. The statement released by the United States says that Iran will accept the IAEA’s Additional Protocol but the joint press release suggests that this acceptance will be provisional and temporary. One can guess that Iran’s provisions refer to other promises made by the E3+3 but what it means by temporary acceptance is yet unclear. Though the US statement says that the IAEA will have the authority to investigate suspicious activities, Iran will likely question the definition of “suspicious activities.” The US seems to be sure that Iran will confess to its past work on the possible military dimensions of nuclear research but this is unlikely. This is also, thankfully, the least bothersome of the clauses and may be honoured more in the breach than the observed if the other clauses are satisfactorily implemented.

Fourth, Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild the HWR at Arak. The core of the IR-40 will in fact be removed and destroyed, making it impossible to produce weapons-grade plutonium in the reactor. Iran has agreed not to reprocess fuel and will export its spent fuel out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime. Tehran has agreed to abjure from building any more HWRs for the next 15 years and it will not accumulate heavy water in quantities greater than is needed for the operation of the research reactor at Arak.

These are substantial compromises from Iran. In exchange, the nuclear-related sanctions against it will be removed upon verification by the IAEA that Iran has livedup to its safeguards and transparency commitments. UN Security Council resolutions shall be lifted under similar conditions. Interestingly, the greatest hurdle in the rapid re-imposition of sanctions upon an Iranian breach of faith would come not from Iran but Russia, a member of the E3+3. Moscow has long stated that snap-back sanctions bypass the veto in the UNSC and it is not willing to give up that right. From Russia’s point of view, it may no longer be interested in maintaining sanctions on Iran or it might want to leverage it against the United States if the geopolitics has shifted significantly at a later date. How the United States and its European allies convince the Russians to agree to a snap-back remains to be seen.

The details in the JCPOA has surprised many observers as have Iran’s substantial compromises. A two-thirds reduction in the number of centrifuges, the restriction on enrichment, a small stockpile, and the unprecedented access promised to the IAEA were beyond what anyone had expected. This has led many to wonder if there are any major discrepancies between the Iranian understanding of the framework and the US interpretation. However, when asked on Twitter, Gérard Araud, the French ambassador to the United States, said that the Iranians had agreed to the detailed parameters of the US interpretation. The discussions over the final draft will address how much sanctions relief and when is appropriate for how much safeguards. If even three quarters of this framework is implemented, it will still be an excellent outcome.

To those who remain unconvinced, it might be useful to reflect on the idea that no guarantee is absolute and no agreement is perpetual. Iran may well manage to develop a nuclear device on the sly despite all these safeguards. Geopolitical alignments may change and it may become convenient to look the other way as was the case with Israel and Pakistan. No country will ever adhere to an agreement that runs contrary to its national interests. That is a reality one must come to terms with.

Finally, the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is not about its sovereign right to engage in such endeavours. These long negotiations are about Iran’s failure to keep its word once it signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. One wonders what would have happened in a world where the Shah of Iran was not persuaded by Richard Nixon to accede to the NPT. As for the hypocrisy of the “recognised” nuclear powers in their disarmament and proliferation obligations, power is the ultimate arbitrator.


This post appeared on FirstPost on April 04, 2015.

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The Russians Are Coming!

01 Sat Mar 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Europe

≈ Comments Off on The Russians Are Coming!

Tags

Antonio Gramsci, Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, Crimea, EU, European Union, Eurozone, G-8, hegemony, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Jack Matlock, John Kerry, Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, nationalism, NATO, realism, Rodric Braithwaite, Russia, sanctions, Ukraine, United States, Viktor Yanukovych

Napoleon is supposed to have warned his generals never to ascribe to malice that which could be explained by incompetence. The general tone of reportage and analysis on the riots in Ukraine, however, challenges the Little Corporal’s advice. For weeks, Western coverage has focused on the unsettling situation in Ukraine and the unhealthy relations of its oligarchs and President Viktor Yanukovych with Russia. Many have urged the European Union and the United States to adopt a firmer posture with Kiev and Moscow to win Ukraine over to the “European side” without giving any thought to what the region means strategically to Russia and how such ventures might precipitate a sharp response from Moscow.

When the Russian parliament finally did respond by authorising the use of military force to protect Russian minorities in Crimea, there was much shock and horror (at least feigned) in Washington and the capitals of Europe. In an eerie encore of their surreal commentary before Russian military manoeuvres, analysts suggested that the crisis may have been thwarted had Ukraine been a member of NATO as the organisation had spread to the Baltic republics ten years ago. Lithuanian foreign minister Linas Linkevičius invoked NATO’s Article IV which calls for immediate consultations upon the violation of territorial integrity of a NATO member while others have pointed to the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO which promises (Art. V:14) that the latter will support the former’s “sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapon state, and the principle of inviolability of frontiers.”

The absurdity of this boilerplate rhetoric becomes clear in the light of some history. Ukraine remains close to the Russian heart as the homeland of their ancestors. A large part of Ukraine came under Russian control after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 and the rest in the late 1700s. Several waves of Russification has left Ukraine without any strong identity and an uncertain sense of nationhood. Despite overwhelmingly voting to secede from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine remained in the Soviet – and then Russian – orbit out of necessity as well as in recognition of the fact that many Ukrainians still have close familial and cultural ties to Russia.

Since independence, Ukrainian politics has swung between leaning West and leaning towards Russia. Leonid Kravchuk’s desire to integrate his country into the EU did not sit well with Moscow but he allowed the Russian Black Sea Fleet to remain in Sevastopol. Similarly, his successor, Leonid Kuchma, entered into a special partnership with NATO as well as Russia. As long as Ukraine did not drift too close to the West, Russia protested and tried to win Kiev back through a crude combination of coercion and enticement. Russia’s red line, when it came to it neighbours, became clear in 2008 when it used military force to delay Georgia’s membership to NATO. Russia also fiercely opposed US ballistic missile defence installations in Poland and Ukraine, threatening to counter with the deployment of Iskander, a short-range ballistic missile, to Kaliningrad. In this light, a Russian military response in Crimea ought not come as a surprise.

Ironically, as former British and US ambassadors to Russia, Rodric Braithwaite and Jack Matlock, have both pointed out, most Ukrainians do not wish to join NATO and they lean towards the EU only as a symbol of the good governance their own country has been sorely lacking since independence.

The sudden reversal of the situation in Kiev stunned Moscow. On February 18, the riot control Berkut were deployed to quell the protests at the Euromaidan; on the 20th, orders emanated from unknown quarters for snipers to open fire and the death toll shot up from 25 to 80; the next day, Yanukovych reached an agreement – capitulation – with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Poland, but the protesters, enraged by the death of their comrades, demanded that he leave the country by February 22. Within four days, events had made a 180-degree turn.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, the speed and manner in which Ukraine had waltzed into the EU camp indicated that the radical nationalists had received covert assistance from the West. The new government was proceeding with the plan Yanukovych had rejected in November 2013 bringing Ukraine closer to the EU. With NATO’s interest in Ukraine no secret, there was every chance that Kiev might also repudiate its 2010 promise to remain non-aligned and instead seek membership of military organisation. The new government’s decision to remove Russian as an official language only served to underscore its political leanings for Moscow.

The Russian decision to use the military option in Crimea fits into an older pattern of the Kremlin creating buffer states between itself and its threats. In fact, Moscow’s security concerns could even be understood from Washington’s response to the discovery of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba 52 years ago. US and European concerns about the freedom of the Ukrainian people are risible given their own support of Islamists in Syria and several unsavoury leaders worldwide.

Tragically, empty and thoughtless Western rhetoric may have worsened the situation for Ukrainians in much the same way as Radio Free Europe did for Hungarians in 1956 – they aroused expectations that could never be fulfilled. During the negotiations between the European Union and Ukraine in November, Kiev and asked for loans and assistance to shore up its flagging economy amounting to $20 billion. Aware of the rampant corruption in Ukraine, the EU unsympathetically offered $827 million. As in Hungary, the gap between what the West said and what it was prepared to do was substantial. Russia, on the other hand, has agreed to provide gas to Ukraine at a steep discount of 33% in addition to $15 billion in loans. Were Ukraine to slip into the European fold, it is doubtful whether an anaemic Eurozone will be able to buttress the Ukrainian economy or if the International Monetary Fund would be willing to.

Western response to Russia’s intervention has been swift. US Secretary of State John Kerry, while ruling out any military countermeasures, has hinted that the G-8 would isolate Russia with visa bans, trade and investment penalties, asset freezes, and boycotts. This will certainly hurt Russia, but it remains to be seen how effectively the threat can be implemented. Japan, for example, might express reluctance as Tokyo seeks allies in the region to balance a belligerent China. Additionally, the West also needs Russian cooperation on Syria and Iran, and Europe depends on Russian energy more than it remembers in the heat of the moment.

Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci defined hegemony as the power accrued to a group when they are able to exercise a role of moral leadership in a system. In other words, it is the additional power a socially dominant group achieves when its claim to represent the general interest goes unchallenged. The hegemon is able to place all the issues around which conflict rages on a universal plane. By framing the Ukrainian crisis in terms of abstract ideas such as freedom, Washington is (clumsily) diverting attention from the very simple and realist dimensions of the conflict.

As for the Ukrainian people…whoever said geopolitics had anything to do with people?


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on March 03, 2014.

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