Tag Archives: sharia

An Islamic Reformation?

06 Sat May 2017

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Salafi-JihadismMaher, Shiraz. Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2016. 292 pp.

The most pressing problem occupying world leaders today is the threat of Islamic terrorism and domestic radicalisation. The realm of analyses, however, has become a toxic and vitriolic cacophony of voices that say more about the source than the subject. Amidst the deluge of Islamophobic drivel, politically correct inanities, and unconscionable apologiae for regressive, barbaric acts, Shiraz Maher’s Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea comes as a breath of fresh air. Rather than attempt to explain the entire panoply of beliefs and customs under Islam, Maher restricts his analysis to the singular idea that has caused the most disruption in the international community – Salafi-Jihadism.

Maher’s work is the result of his research at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College, London, and it certainly benefits from his rare qualification – among researchers – of having been a member of a pan-Islamic organisation, Hizb ut-Tahrir, that supports the strict implementation of sharia law and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. His familiarity with the sources, debates, rhetoric, and volksgeist is, therefore, as an analyst as well as a former practitioner.

Islamic schools of thought are described with a delicacy that has not been a common feature of public discussions. The author, for example, separates Salafis from the larger body of Muslims and proceeds to distinguish between a quietist strand and a violent faction. Salafi, by the way, is derived from the Arabic salaf, which means ancestor and refers to the first three generations of Muslims; Salafism wishes to recreate society in the image of those early days of Islam. In essence, while all Muslims are not necessarily terrorists, all Salafis are, by definition, regressive. Regardless, it is possible to be a Salafist and non-violent as much of the Saudi Arabian clergy has been, particularly the Al–Sahwa al-Islamiyya Movement. This group advocates for the implementation of its world view through engagement with state institutions and, sometimes, even democratic practices.

It is the violent Salafists that have held the world’s attention and are the subjects of Maher’s study. Five key concepts define salafi-jihadists from other Muslims: jihad, takfir, al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, tawhid and hakimiyya. Some of these, like tawhid (unity of God) are common across Islam but Salafist interpretation ties it to manhaj (method by which Truth is reached). According to one of the icons of Salafism, the 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya, the first obligation of a Muslim, after iman, is the repulsion of the enemy aggressor. Thus, jihad becomes an inseparable companion to tawhid.

Maher demolishes the argument that jihad only means an inner struggle by demonstrating the externally aggressive interpretations of the term throughout history, starting from Mohammad himself. The breadth of his arguments also put to rest any attempts to dissociate Islam from the actions of those who commit terrorism in its name. The justification for the acts of terrorism are repeatedly given with the support of scripture and Islamic jurisprudence. As a result, it becomes that much more difficult for apologists to cling to the view that the violent chaos in the Middle East and Central Asia has nothing to do with Islam. Wisely, the author does not wrangle with whether a certain view is “correct” – he leaves that to the theologians and philosophers, instead sticking simply to precedent and historical, juridical, ideological, and political connections between tawhid and jihad.

The violence of jihadists against fellow Muslims is explained by takfir, the process by which a fellow Muslim is declared outside the fold of Islam. For Salafi-Jihadists, enormous sections of civilian society are takfiris – secularists, democrats, nationalists, Ba’athists, and communists. The Shia especially are eternal enemies of Islam who are linked via the Safavids to Ali. Takfir, as Maher observes,  homogenises the faith by shutting down all debate.

Yet what makes some of the Salafist-Jihadists so exceptionally brutal? Why did they, for example, burn a Jordanian pilot when the Qur’an is clear that the use of fire for punishment should only be left to God? Maher states that the answer can be found in the Salafist interpretation of qisas, the law of equal retaliation. He explains how the West, in toto, is seen as the enemy for their role in supporting tyrannical or insufficiently Islamic governments in power over Muslims. Additionally, since Western governments are democracies, their policies imply the consent of their people and thus, their civilians are also legitimate targets in the struggle for an Islamic world order.

In conjunction with al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, Salafi-Jihadists become a sect incapable of compromise. The Arabic term, loyalty and disavowal, allows for a clear separation between Muslims and the ‘Other.’ Since any understanding or coexistence with the ‘Other’ opens one up to accusations of takfiri, Salafi-Jihadists are able to maintain the purity of their faith.

Finally, hakimiyya demands the securing of political sovereignty for God. Effectively, this pits Salafi-Jihadists forever in battle against the kuffar for it is inconceivable to universalist faiths that there be a limit to the domain of their deen – religion – and coexistence with others, even if they are only ahl al-kitab – people of the book, namely Christians and Jews. It is no coincidence that the negative experiences of colonialism, an imposition of modernity, and Cold War alliances fuelled resentment against the West.

The real test of theory is when it meets reality, and Maher is the first to admit that many of the Salafist doctrines are evolving due to changing conditions on the battlefield. There appears to be a divide, however, more between theorists and practitioners rather than between the various terrorist factions. The irony of this situation is, as the author points out, that bida’, or innovation, is anathema to religious purists.

Reading Salafi-Jihadism, it is difficult not to get the deeply uneasy feeling that Salafi-Jihadism is perhaps what an Islamic Reformation may look like. The furious debate between the Islamic scholars that Maher extensively cites are reminiscent of John Calvin’s Geneva, and one remembers only too vividly what followed over the next hundred years. This is a sad note for those who hope to see liberalising reforms come from within the Islamic fold.

Perhaps one aspect that might have preemptively answered a question readers are bound to wonder upon reading this book is the point at which quietism transitions into violent jihad. Furthermore, what are the implications – in terms of stability and security – to the international community of living with a radicalised yet quietist Salafist state? A clash between the universalist and interventionist impulses of the Left and such a state seems inevitable, especially given the recent fads in international relations such as the Right to Protect (R2P) .

Salafi-Jihadism balances scholarship with an ease of access that will endear it to both, the lay reader as well as specialists. The author’s harsh yet honest appraisal of the role of Islam, albeit one specific strand, in inspiring the unending brutality and violence is a must-read for anyone seeking to be better informed about the crisis of our times.

A Sudden Churning

12 Thu Jun 2014

Posted by in Middle East

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On June 11, Middle East observers were stunned at the sudden breakthrough of militants belonging to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) against Iraqi forces opposing them in Anbar and Nineveh. ISIS stormed through Mosul, Tikrit, and Baiji as the Iraqi army melted away so quickly that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki termed it a conspiracy. A report by the International Organization for Migration says an estimated 500,000 people, including 99% of its Christian population, have fled Mosul since hostilities began Saturday morning. The militants seized huge stores of American-supplied arms, ammunition and vehicles, including six Black Hawk helicopters and approximately $420 million in cash.

ISIS surgeAdmittedly, Mosul is not ISIS’ first scalp – they have captured and held Falluja since January 2014, put pressure on Ramadi and Samarra, and regularly target the Iraqi capital Baghdad with bombs. However, Mosul is Iraq’s third-largest city and an important hub of commercial activity; by way of comparison, Bangalore is India’s third-largest city. As such, its capture is symbolic and a huge morale boost for ISIS. It demonstrates a strong command and control and a high degree of internal coordination and cohesion within ISIS to be able to capture a city. Run by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has a doctorate in education from the University of Baghdad, ISIS is estimated to command some 6,000 fighters in Iraq and another 3,000 in Syria; the United States has placed a $10 million bounty on al-Baghdadi, surpassed only, so far, by the $25 million reward for al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Equally worrisome is the disintegration of the Iraqi army. In many areas, soldiers doffed their uniforms and disappeared into the civilian population; in others, they were willing to lay down their arms without offering any resistance if they were guaranteed safe passage. Immediate blame may fall upon the failure of the United States to supply Iraq with weaponry in a timely manner or raise doubts about its training of Iraqi troops but the problem goes deeper than that – al-Maliki’ and his government was not able to build a state to which the average Iraqi felt much loyalty.

ISIS started out as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), a militant group that opposed the US occupation of Iraq. The group was decimated but not completely eliminated by the US during the 2007 surge. However, the incompetence of the Iraqi government and the civil war in Syria led to its resurrection in 2012. For example, al-Maliki purged Sunni Muslims from government posts; he also went back on his promise to integrate Sunni militias known as Sahwa into the regular army. It was these brigades that the US had used to fight and defeat AQI earlier. The release of al-Qa’ida prisoners by the United States also provided what Michael Knights, the Lafer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, calls “an unprecedented infusion of skilled, networked terrorist manpower” into the region. The series of massive prison breaks across Iraq in 2013 also contributed to the swelling of ISIS ranks. Disturbingly, ISIS was expelled from the al-Qa’ida fraternity in February 2014 for unnecessarily killing civilians and being too vicious!

The collapse of the Iraq-Syria border will aid ISIS in its fight in Iraq as well as against Bashar al-Assad. They can take refuge from one side in the territory of the other and enjoy internal lines of communication. The civil war in Syria has improved the fighting capability of ISIS and as many US military observers are saying, this is no longer a terrorist threat but a small army on the move. ISIS is moving south against Baghdad, and the Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf may very well be next for the Sunni extremists. The group’s twitter account said it had taken Mosul as part of a plan “to conquer the entire state and cleanse it from the apostates.” The organisation’s goal, as it has often stated, is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate from the Mediterranean to the Zagros under sharia law.

There have been reports that ISIS may extend its domain beyond Iraq and Syria into Jordan, but in all likelihood, the focus will be on consolidating the gains in Iraq and protecting the rear by gaining the upper hand against arch-rival Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Al-Nusra has pushed ISIS out of Aleppo and Idlib as well as the northern provinces in Syria and offered strong resistance in Deir Ezzor. Furthermore, Syrian forces are starting to attack ISIS strongholds in Raqqa and Hassakah.

In response to the ISIS surge, the Iraqi government has requested that the United States conduct air strikes against key militant positions across northern Iraq. Ironically, Washington sees the use of drones against ISIS as a step too far and has refused to act so far. In some ways, the United States is torn between supporting or standing idly by as ISIS fights Assad and acting against it in defence of its Iraqi client while incidentally helping the Syrian regime. However, events seem to have overtaken Washington and it will be forced to act. Ground troops are not an option for the US, but the fear of Iran increasing its footprint in Iraq will propel Washington to conduct airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq if not Syria.

The only group that is currently capable of fighting ISIS in the region is the Kurdish Regional Government and its brethren in Rojava. The peshmerga and the Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG) are also battle-hardened and fairly well-equipped after decades of fighting Iranians, Arabs, and Turks for Kurdish autonomy. Nonetheless, there is no love lost between Hewler and Baghdad. Kurdish forces have so far taken Kirkuk but made no move against ISIS yet. It remains to be seen whether they remain neutral or join the fight on the side of their nemesis, Baghdad. There is temptation in Hewler to sit on the sidelines but ISIS is unlikely to view Kurdistan favorably once it establishes its caliphate; the KRG would be making a grave mistake if it allowed ISIS to consolidate its power, or on the contrary, the militant threat is defeated and Hewler is seen as opportunistically neutral.

The march on Shia shrines and the brutal massacres of Shia in ISIS-held territory has evinced a response from Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. The cleric has said that he is willing to raise the Mahdi Army he had disbanded in 2008 to provide for the security of Shia and Christians in Iraq. The obvious Shia power that has remained quiet so far is Iran. Though most officials have been silenced by a gag order from the top, Iran’s police chief Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam revealed that the Supreme National Security Council intervene in Iraq if Shia were explicitly targeted.

Iran has been troubled by rising Sunni extremism in its neighbourhood; in August 1998, the Taliban stormed Mazar-e Sharif and massacred Shia pilgrims in neighbouring Afghanistan. According to the memoirs of former diplomat Hossein Mousavian, it was only the veto of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that stopped Iran from going to war. Iran is already involved in the Syrian conflagration in favour of Assad and this new ISIS threat in Iraq could be catastrophic. Said Ghassem Suleimani, leader of the Quds Force, Iran’s rage at the destruction of religious sites it holds dear would be enormous and all options would be on the table – “battles, attacks, raids, massacre.” The Quds Force, however, is thought to have been operating in Iraq in an unofficial capacity for a while now. At the time of writing, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has just announced that he would deploy the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to Iraq to fight the terrorists.

ISIS’ rapid success has made many enemies. Turkey had so far opposed the Assad regime and had turned a lazy eye towards foreign fighters streaming into Syria to fight the Syrian regime. Recent geopolitics, however, has made Ankara change its mind on Syria and the rebels. The storming of the Turkish consulate in Mosul and the taking some 80 Turkish citizens as hostages comes at an awkward time, domestically speaking, for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Reconnaissance flights over Mosul out of Diyarbakir have already been conducted in consultation with Baghdad and Ankara has issued a stern warning to ISIS over any harm befalling the Turkish hostages. Turkey is unlikely to conduct military operations against ISIS just yet unless ISIS kills the hostages, a very unlikely event. Ankara, however, will maintain its new policy of keeping its borders closed and make it more difficult for foreign fighters to drift in as before.

It is unlikely that ISIS will take on so many foes at once. However, if the group settles into a holding pattern, it may lose support of the people in the territory it controls. The massive exodus from Mosul is an indication that people have little faith in organisation’s governance abilities. ISIS has already made a powerful negative image for itself by persecuting minorities and brutally crushing even the slightest dissent in lands it has held. If ISIS slows down now, or if a loose and reluctant coalition of Turks, Iranians, Kurds, and US-supplied Iraqis manages to slow them down, they may be the reason of their own unravelling.

The phrase, “May you live in interesting times” is usually taken to be an ancient Chinese blessing. It is, in fact, neither ancient nor Chinese nor a blessing. It appears in the opening remarks of Frederic Coudert at the Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in 1939…and was meant as a curse. These are interesting times indeed.

Incidentally, Iraq is – was – India’s second-largest oil supplier.

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on June 13, 2014.

Islamic Banking – Where’s The Beef?

18 Sun Aug 2013

Posted by in India, Society, South Asia

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Whatever benefits Islamic banking may or may not have in its favour, public relations is not one of them. The Reserve Bank of India’s recent nod to sharia-based non-banking financial houses met with resistance from the usual suspects. Objections to Islamic banking in India range from regulatory inertia and concern about the unknown to Islamophobia. This is made worse by the existence of few rigorous analyses of Islamic finance.

The first Islamic bank in the world was founded in Egypt in 1963, and since than, the phenomenon has grown slowly but steadily. Conceptually, an Islamic bank has an equity-based capital structure, composed of shareholders’ equity and investment deposits based on profit and loss sharing. Just as supervisory issues such as capital adequacy ratios in conventional banking are regulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Islamic banks follow the standards prescribed by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).

The most known factoid about Islamic banking is that it prohibits earning of interest, or riba. Muslims believe that profit should be based on effort; moneylenders expend little effort, their earnings accruing while they sit idle. Islamic banking also prohibits investment in activities considered haram, or sinful, according to sharia. Thus, projects involving alcohol, tobacco, pork products, weapons & defence, and pornography are all forbidden. The system also proscribes gambling and speculative activities. It should be mentioned that Islamic banks keep their doors open to all, including non-Muslims.

It should be noted, however, that while riba is prohibited, equity-based returns on investment are not. Islamic finance covers several types of financial contracts that vary in equity and profit-loss sharing (PLS). For the simplest accounts, Islamic banks perform a fiduciary role by primarily protecting the principle and sharing the surplus if any; for savvier depositors, the bank serves as an agency and provides administrative support. Modes of financing such as mudaraba (one partner provides the money and the other contributes expertise) and mushakara (investment, labour, expertise, risk is shared among all parties) may be seen as strictly profit-loss sharing, while murabaha (sale of goods in which profit margin is decided upon by both buyer and seller), ijara (leasing), and bai-us-salam (advance payment on future delivery of goods) are not. There also exist hybrid of these two types.

To enlarge the field of operations of Islamic banking, the requisite infrastructure has been slowly put in place. In 1995, the Dow Jones Islamic Markets Index (DJIMI), a listing of sharia-compliant portfolios, was launched. A special Sharia Supervisory Board oversaw the process, and the stocks are widely traded. In general, Islamic banks have performed as efficiently as conventional banks despite their self-imposed restrictions.

There is nothing inherently problematic about this system; investors are free to choose between conventional and Islamic finance, and the pitfalls of conventional investments such as investor knowledge, information asymmetry, and agency problems also apply to Islamic banking. Regulatory mechanisms such as financial cushions and prudent asset-liabilities structures will enhance the banks’ fiduciary role. Like conventional banking, Islamic banking also will require periodic audits and stringent rules on transparency.

India’s present laws obstruct the establishment of Islamic banking – the Banking Regulation Act (1949) prohibits the operation of banks on a profit-loss basis (5b), forbids murabaha, or, the buying, selling, or barter of goods (8), impedes ijara, or, bars the holding of immovable property for a period greater than seven years (9), and requires the payment of interest (21). However, there is no reason for these regulations not to be amended. The purpose of regulations is to ensure smooth and standardised operations, not vet business models; the market will be the best judge of the efficiency and pitfalls of Islamic banking.

Undoubtedly, beyond the infrastructural issues, Islamic banking faces many difficulties – given the partnership dimension of business, Islamic banks may have to maintain a closer watch on their investors than a typical bank would. Furthermore, Egypt’s al-Azhar disagrees with the Pakistani Supreme Court’s 1973 interpretation of riba – while the former restricts the meaning to usury, the latter accused the country’s banks of engaging in “conventional banking sprinkled with holy water” and interpreted it as all forms of interest. Again, these are questions best left to the investor, the bank, and bodies such as the AAOIFI and DJIMI; the regulatory authority’s mandate is only to create and maintain a system with maximum transparency and accountability.

Experts argue that Islamic banking will mobilise enormous capital held by devout Muslims who sparingly participate in the conventional market. The Raghuram Rajan Committee on Financial Sector Reform (2008) also considered interest-free banking, and by 2013, the global market for sharia-compliant assets has risen to $1.6 trillion. Specifically for India, this means institutional money from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as well as private wealth held by Indian Muslims in and out of the country. Given the number of Indian expatriates in these regions, Islamic banking holds an enticing opportunity for fuller market capitalisation. Sharia-compliant schemes have already shown promise in India – Tata Core Sector Equity Fund, launched in 1996, was tailored to assuage Muslim inhibitions on riba. Furthermore, it would be an added bonus if Islamic banking reduces dead-end investments in gold and jewelry.

No matter, Islamic banking is a political and not financial argument in India. In an environment of minority vote-banking and cynical political manipulation, any idea tagged with a religious prefix is doomed. It should be remembered, however, that Islamic banking is not a mandatory methodology imposed on all financial operations in the country, even in Saudi Arabia. It is an additional choice for the investor, and nothing prohibits one from using different systems for different transactions. While Islamic banking is based on a package of ethical values, ethical investments are not a uniquely Islamic phenomenon – we make daily choices about fair trade coffee, blood diamonds, and other products. Consumers may choose not to patronise a store if the company supports a cause they disagree with, something we have seen with the attempted academic boycott of Israel.

Finally, there is the canard of terrorism. This is utter nonsense; there is no evidence to show that Islamic banking makes terrorist funding easier than any other financial activity. As long as transparency is maintained and regular audits performed under RBI guidelines, the system will remain viable. Islamic banks have appeared in several countries from the United Kingdom to Japan and Singapore without causing any disruption in either the financial system or in security.

The debate over Islamic banking is motivated by sectarianism in the guise of technical arguments over regulatory concerns, security, or secular society; none of these arguments survive scrutiny. Indians need to decide which idea they want to talk about – development or sectarianism. Whatever their choice, another economic term they might want to keep in mind is “opportunity cost.”

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on August 20, 2013.