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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Shinkansen

Namaskar, Abe-san!

11 Fri Dec 2015

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Namaskar, Abe-san!

Tags

bullet train, CEPA, Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, defence, economy, India, infrastructure, Japan, Narendra Modi, nuclear, Shinkansen, Shinzo Abe, US-2 ShinMaywa

Japan’s Shinzo Abe is in India for his third prime ministerial visit and it has the feeling of a meeting between friends rather than between the leaders of two major states. On the morning of his arrival, the Times of India ran an article by the Japanese prime minister in which he briefly outlined the history of India-Japan relations. Calling India a key international player and a natural partner who shared Japan’s values, Abe stated his belief that the two countries held the greatest potential of any bilateral relationship in the 21st century and declared his intention of “dramatically developing” the bonds between India and Japan. Not to be outdone in a show of warmth, the Indian prime minister tweeted, “India is all set to welcome its great friend & a phenomenal leader, PM @AbeShinzo. His visit will further deepen India-Japan relations.”

The rise of Abe in Japan and of Narendra Modi in India tells an interesting tale. Both men are nationalists leading nations that had retreated from the international spotlight during the Cold War, Japan via its pacifism and India through its non-alignment. Both nations have seen a generation pass and the younger crowd does not share the sentimentality of the old, though vast numbers yet remain unsure whether the risks of a more dominant global role are worth taking. Both leaders seek to remake their countries but face substantial opposition at home.

Relations between the two prime ministers go back to Modi’s chief ministerial days. This is the fifth meeting between the two men, the initial one being in 2007 when Abe was in his first term as prime minister. Modi and Abe connected well, or at least understood that they needed each other as the post-Cold War honeymoon drew to a close. Their personal chemistry has certainly helped Modi domestically: at a time when the West was trying to isolate him over the 2002 Godhra riots, Japanese firms made major investments in Gujarat’s infrastructure and industry. It is partly the successful outcome of these projects that propelled Modi to the top position in the country in May 2014.

Abe is in India for three days to attend the ninth annual India-Japan Summit talks. These talks broadly encompass three shared strategic interests: Indian infrastructural and economic development, civil nuclear cooperation, and defence ties. Expectations of the summit are big this year, something to top Japan’s promise in August 2014 to invest $34 billion in the Indian economy over five years. And Abe might deliver – it has been reported that the summit will likely see India and Japan seal an agreement for the latter to provide the former $15 billion at 0.5 per cent interest over 50 years to construct India’s first high speed rail line connecting Bombay to Amdavad. India is expected to adopt Japan’s Shinkansen technology and invest at least 30 per cent of the soft loan back into the Japanese economy. Construction is expected to start in 2017 and service by 2024; it has even been suggested that the line might, at a later date, be extended to Delhi as part of India’s Diamond Quadrilateral scheme to link its four metropoles with 10,000 kms of track. Besides this big ticket item, Japan has taken a role in developing the Amdavad and Madras metro projects and is negotiating its involvement in several highway undertakings, airport construction, industrial townships in Tumkur, Ghilot, Mandal, and Supa, and other infrastructural ventures.

An issue that has received less attention in the press is the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the two nations. For several reasons, the full potential of this agreement has not been realised and the Indian and Japanese delegations would do well to ponder this. India is eager to enter the services sector in Japan, not just in information technology; meanwhile, it wishes Japan to give Indian Small and Medium Enterprises a closer look. The individual transactions may not be as headline worthy as nuclear cooperation or bullet trains but the impact over the entire economy will be greater. As India continues to grow and develop into a manufacturing hub as well, its markets promise to revitalise a flagging Japanese economic story.

While there are few hurdles on the economic front, civil nuclear cooperation is much more complicated. The Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008 readmitted India to international nuclear trade circles after four decades of nuclear apartheid and the South Asian country has since concluded several agreements for supplies of uranium for its small fleet of nuclear reactors. It had been hoped that Japan would also promptly begin to engage in nuclear commerce with India but that has not been the case. Tokyo has strict policies governing nuclear commerce, and one of them prohibits any such relations with a country that is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Delhi will not sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and allowing it to join as a nuclear weapons state will in all likelihood mean the collapse of the international non-proliferation regime. Over the years, India has worked to persuade Japan of its trustworthiness and it is rumoured that Abe is closer to accepting the Indian view.

Truth be told, the value of a nuclear agreement between the two countries has been blown out of proportion. This is entirely because of the symbolic significance India has placed on international recognition of its nuclear credentials as a safe and reliable state. However, even if Abe and Modi were to be able to come to an agreement on this issue, it is unlikely that India will gain anything owing to its unique interpretation of nuclear liability. Japan has become an important manufacturing node in the international nuclear supply chain with major nuclear vendors in France and the United States depending upon vital components from the island. Yet the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) has brought India’s nuclear renaissance to a screeching halt and GE has refused to enter the country’s nuclear sector. Westinghouse has been silent too and Areva has slowed down its activities in Jaitapur, awaiting clarification on some of the problematic clauses of the CLNDA. If Modi successfully closes a nuclear deal with Abe, the only possible benefit to India in the near future is access to the high quality forging of reactor pressure vessels by Japan Steel Works. This will not bring back the foreign vendors but will at least indigenous nuclear industry the option to accelerate its expansion.

The third leg of the India-Japan relations triad is defence ties. This is a difficult subject for Japan: since World War II, the country has been avowedly pacifist – albeit under a US nuclear umbrella – and has abjured from any military activity outside Japan’s boundaries. Tokyo also forbade itself from selling defence equipment to other countries, even allies. It is only recently that there has been a thaw in this position: in 2011, Abe managed to pass several amendments to Japanese law that now allow him to engage in defence trade. This allowed Japan’s ShinMaywa to respond to Delhi’s Request For Information for nine amphibious aircraft capable of search and rescue operations, radar surveillance, and transportation of cargo. India and Japan set up a Joint Working Group in 2013 to explore the possibility of manufacturing the US-2 ShinMaywa together. Though a new era has begun for the Japanese defence industry, it is still early days and Abe faces strong domestic opposition to his reforms. Even an agreement on joint manufacture of the US-2 will not herald a rapid expansion of Indo-Japanese defence trade in the near future. However, such a deal is to be welcomed as a step in the right direction.

It cannot be ignored that the urgency motivating closer relations between two of Asia’s largest economies is the mutual perception of the threat of a more powerful and assertive China. Both Delhi and Tokyo have looked on with concern as Beijing strengthened its military on the back of a booming economy over the last two decades. China’s show of muscle in the South China Sea, its noxious relations with Pakistan, the quest for assets around the Indian Ocean, and the rapid modernisation and expansion of its military have not only pushed the nations of Southeast Asia together but also raised warning flags for the United States. However, neither Delhi nor Tokyo wish to antagonise Beijing too much just yet for both have substantial economic relations with their troublesome neighbour. An open and aggressive alliance is to neither country’s benefit, at least just yet, and both India and Japan hold out hope that their blossoming security relations will dampen the Middle Kingdom’s impetus for expansionism.

The silent partner in Indo-Japanese security relations is the United States. Washington indicated its willingness to pivot to Asia in 2011 but found little local support for it for no South, East, or Southeast Asian mouse wanted to bell the Chinese cat. Robust ties between Delhi and Tokyo offer the most viable foundation for a quiet US pivot to Asia and the several recent naval exercises between these three nations indicates the substance of this invisible partnership. Australia has been another quiet comrade, making the troika into a quartet. Before the guns start roaring, however, Modi and Abe have astutely chosen to strengthen economic and military ties, coordinate policies, and support regional security architecture as a hint to Beijing to desist from its threatening behaviour.

The outcome of this summit appears positive on the economic front, cautiously optimistic in the security arena, and uncertain in the nuclear field. Yet what still makes it pleasing for Modi to engage with Abe is the shared values and intellectual framework between Indians and Japanese. As the inheritors of a similar set of ancient Asian cultural values, the two countries make ready partners in an Asian century. Mutual security concerns and economic complementarities only further highlight the logic of a close relationship between India and Japan, even if this summit does not deliver all that observers expect of it. There may be no permanent friends in international affairs, but Shnizo Abe and Japan are probably as close to it as India can get in the short and medium term.

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Considering High-Speed Rail in India

24 Mon Nov 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on Considering High-Speed Rail in India

Tags

Alta Velocidad Española, AVE, bullet train, high-speed rail, India, railway, Shinkansen, TGV, train, Train à Grande Vitesse, Transrapid

Of all the exciting new ventures Prime Minister Narendra Modi has announced, there seems to be the least optimism for high-speed rail (HSR), colloquially referred to as bullet trains. This is quite puzzling, for given India’s size, population, and ramshackle transportation networks, one would have expected relief from at least the urban and semi-urban middle class.

Critics of HSR in India have raised objections primarily over cost and traffic. Bullet trains will need entirely new infrastructure and tickets will not be cheap; unlike Japan or France, the average Indian may not be affluent enough to afford travel on this white elephant. These are both valid points yet show a greater pessimism for the overall context of HSR in India than is warranted.

Presently, the fastest train in India clocks in at barely 88 kmph. Given the “people-friendly” circuitous routes Indian Railways lays out, a simple cross-peninsular journey from, say, Madras to Mangalore takes just short of 18 hours to cover the 700 kms. Similar such less-than-optimal routes abound and even considering that trains, like public buses, are not point-to-point modes of transport, three quarters of a day seems excessive to travel across the Indian peninsula. Though the circuitous route designed to cater to more people is not difficult to excuse, the extra distance must be compensated for with higher speed.

It is argued that air travel is available for those who place a premium on time. For the vast majority who travel by road and rail, the longer duration of the journey is not bothersome and factored into their schedules. However, if the only choices are between a quick hour’s flight and a painfully long 16-hour bus ride or an 18-hour schlepp on a train, there is a huge excluded middle of journey times; people are forced to choose only between two extremes of cost and time with no intermediate options.

Of course, the cost of an HSR project does not vary in relation to its position between airfares and other modes of land transportation. Estimates put the price per kilometre at anywhere between ₹100 – ₹150 crores for tracks supporting speeds of 350 kmph. This high price must be balanced with the advantages beyond just ticket sales. Europe, for example, is considering a continent-wide HSR freight network to alleviate airport congestion, the rising price of fuel, and environmental concerns. Initially, each train would be able to carry the load of seven Boeing 737 planes. Japan has also made its HSR services more efficient by introducing double-decker carriages and carrying freight. Computerised controls of train switches and speeds has allowed Japan to maximise the number of trains running at any given time on a track, thereby also lowering costs.

While convenience to commuters is first thought, HSR in India can make a difference in freight transportation. Be it courier mail services, perishables, or other items, any fast alternative to overloaded lorries should be welcome for businesses as well as private consumers. Profits from freight can be used to extend limited subsidies for commuters.

Of course, for HSR to live up to its full potential, bullet trains cannot share the already existing and crowded railway network; they would only be slowed down by regular trains and tight schedules. This requirement implies that the development of HSR be prioritised on high freight and passenger routes and be expanded gradually. Even at its fullest development, it would only serve as a skeletal system around which regular trains would serve the less densely populated settlements.

There is also this to consider – infrastructure is always expensive, be it roads, airports, dams, or schools. HSR has shown operational profitability in several countries but after government investment in the supporting infrastructure. Roads also do not generate money and its beneficiaries are too numerous and diffuse to count. Similarly, the impact of HSR over its environs can be significant: towns as far away as Aurangabad, Solapur, and Kholapaur can be brought within the orbit of Bombay, or Bellary and Davangere within Bangalore’s sphere of influence. A business trip from Thiruvananthapuram to Salem that would have previously taken at least two days can now be completed in the same day, reducing business costs. Employment, services, and salaries would be spread over a greater area, bringing prosperity to the hinterland and bringing the price of real estate in India’s overcrowded cities to saner levels.

There is no doubt that rail transportation is more efficient than roads in terms of people it carries per unit space as well as a better safety record. India’s roads present a challenge to all forms of road transportation in terms of time, safety, as well as connectivity during the monsoons. Nor are roads necessarily cheaper – the tolls between Bangalore and Madras amount to ₹355 one-way – over 70% of a bus ticket! Faster and more reliable rail transportation would not only save on hydrocarbon costs but also provide a safer alternative to roads.

One cannot forget the many airports that are not served well or the mid-sized towns without an airport due to the prohibitive price of airline connectivity. HSR would be a life link to these towns and revitalise their economy. The higher density of the Indian population compared to Europe or the United States makes HSR more viable than examples frequently cited. Even in the United States, trains in the population-dense northeast or the bay area serve far more profitable than they would in the great hinterland states like Montana, the Dakotas, or Kansas.

For the jet setters, HSR may make more sense for journeys up to 1,200 kms. The time it takes to travel to the airport, get processed, and at the other end, travel from the airport to work or home is a significant portion of the total time taken over short journeys. A three-and-half-hour train journey from Majestic, Bangalore, to Churchgate, Bombay, would be immensely preferable to the ordeal of driving out to Kempegowda International Airport and driving in from Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport. On the matter of convenience, air travel since September 11 is just not what it used to be – security checks, baggage screening, baggage handling fees, and cost cutting on everything from in-flight peanuts to legroom has made air travel a necessary evil we all have to bear.

No one claims HSR to be India’s silver bullet for developmental woes. However, history has shown that generous and proper investment in infrastructure has always resulted in economic growth in the future. Presently, India’s infrastructure is dilapidated or non-existent, denying India the luxury of cheaper upgrades. Were an HSR network not to be laid out, the same funds – if not more – would have had to be dedicated to more tracks, small-to-medium airports, expansion of present airports, and widening of roads. Some of this will have to happen anyway, but HSR takes the pressure off highways, airports. and regular rail. The question is not if India can afford high-speed rail, but if it can further afford not to develop it.


This post appeared on FirstPost on November 26, 2014.

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