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Tag Archives: Tajikistan

A View From Central Asia

14 Wed May 2014

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Central Asia, India, South Asia

≈ Comments Off on A View From Central Asia

Tags

Afghanistan, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Central Asia, Chabahar, China, Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO, Dushanbe, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, India, INSTC, International North-South Trade Corridor, Iran, Karshi-Khanabad, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Manas, New Silk Road, Russia, SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Tajikistan, Tashkent, Turkmenistan, Uighur, United States, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang

After month-long elections in nine phases, the Bharatiya Janata Party is returning to power in India after a decade in Opposition. Led to its highest ever Lok Sabha tally by Narendra Modi, it is the first time since 1984 that the BJP or any party has secured a majority on its own. This will, observers hope, bring a new decisiveness to the Prime Minister’s Office that has been lacking for the past ten years.

In his election campaign, Modi talked about India’s relations with its neighbours in terms of trade and security. Departing from India’s traditional emphasis on ties with the superpowers, Modi focussed on India’s immediate neighbours in Asia, particularly the members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Japan. Though Central Asia did not feature prominently in the Prime Minister Elect’s speeches, it would be unwise to read too much into this – no matter its place amidst campaign promises, the region has geographic proximity and remains vital to Indian trade and security interests.

Until now, both sides have been subdued over the potential for better relations. The Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan – used to see India from the perspective of the Soviet Union, a friendly state which received aid and preferential economic treatment from Moscow. However, since India’s economic liberalisation began to bear fruit by the end of the previous millennium, the country has switched roles to having the capability of being a donor state to the Central Asian republics (CAR). Despite this switch, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Tashkent have been disappointed to see India defer to Russia in taking an active role in the region.

Central Asian capitals have a generally positive view of India; some of the old hands from the Soviet era still populate the bureaucracy and remember the country fondly. More importantly, India has not used its image as the world’s largest democracy to push for liberalism and democracy in the region, preferring instead to instruct by example. India’s tiny footprint in Central Asia is not seen as threatening whereas China’s economic involvement in the region is viewed with suspicion. Russia is not much liked either due to dissatisfaction over its geopolitical domination over the five -stans. The United States is also suspect because its commitment to the region, combined with its constant harangues about human rights, is not trusted.

Other smaller players like Iran and Turkey have had limited success due to their finite means to provide solutions to the region’s problems. India’s military weakness compared to the other major actors – it still depends on Russia and other foreign suppliers for an overwhelming portion of its military equipment – in Central Asia and its growing economy makes it an ideal partner for prosperity and to balance Great Power designs.

Some of Central Asia’s positive view of India is also due to the several common goals they share. All parties are worried about the threat of Islamism which may boil over from Afghanistan and Pakistan; there is eagerness to develop energy infrastructure that can deliver oil and gas to India’s growing economy; interest also exists in expanding cooperation beyond mere energy and security. In no area is there a direct conflict of interest between India and the CARs.

Despite the goodwill and potential for a rewarding relationship, the CARs remain uncertain about Indian policy towards them. How will Delhi’s alignment with the United States and the European Union on the one hand and Russia and China on the other affect them? India is proud of its non-alignment but what would that mean for the region? What is India willing to offer that others cannot? How does India see Central Asia? These questions need clarification from Delhi.

Frustration also mounts from the lethargic pace of Indian business. The perception in Central Asia is that not only are Indian investments paltry compared to Chinese projects, but India is extremely slow in its delivery mechanism. India’s political dillydallying and sluggish bureaucracy has put in doubt the country’s seriousness and ability to be a reliable partner. While several memoranda of understanding have been signed between India and the CARs, the former is not even in the top ten countries exploring the region for oil and gas. Trade between the two regions at the end of 2012 remained at a paltry $700 million while that between China and the CARs topped $46 billion. South Block’s ambitious Connect Central Asia initiative and the International North-South Trade Corridor connecting South Asia to Europe by road, ship, rail, and pipeline via Central Asia and the Caucasus has not materialised yet.

China, on the other hand, has invested tens of billions of dollars in road, rail, and pipeline projects, all linking Central Asia to China. In 2000, China launched the Great Western Development Plan, which has made Xinjiang a vital trade and energy corridor along the New Silk Road. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as bilateral agreements, China has invested over $30 billion in Kazakhstan to purchase MangistauMunaiGas and in its Kashagan oil field, the world’s largest discovery of oil in the last 30 years. Beijing has signed a $15 billion deal with neighbouring Uzbekistan for oil, gas, and uranium, and it has started production at Galkynysh in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gasfield. In addition, Beijing has lent Ashgabat $4 billion to develop the gasfield at South Yolotan and extended $10 billion to the whole region during the international economic recession through the SCO. Furthermore, China is working on its New Silk Road to connect the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Once completed, it will lower cost of transport, bring Central Asia transit fees, and bypass India in the economic development of the region.

Interestingly, despite the enormous flow of investments from Beijing, there is very little trust of its motives among the Central Asian republics. The Chinese practice of using its own labour force, for example, has not eased tensions with local communities who are themselves migrant labourers in Russia due to unemployment back home. In addition, many think it is only a matter of time before Chinese immigrant workers settle in the Central Asian republics and take away more jobs. China’s brutal repression of the Uighur in Xinjiang has not gone unnoticed; despite its Soviet past, Central Asia remains a tribal society and old loyalties run deep. It is also unlikely that Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, or Kyrgyzstan will soon forget that they ceded land to China to maintain the peace, particularly when the ensuing protests removed the Kyrgyz president from office. A couple of years ago, Kanat Ibragimov, a Kazakh performance artist, symbolically decapitated a toy panda to protest against Chinese expansionism into his country.

It is in this light that the partnership with India has proven disappointing. Its failure to reap a bonanza so far has pushed Central Asia closer to the Chinese economy and kept their energy exports vulnerable to Russian transit policies by denying them access to the southern seas via Afghanistan and Iran. However, in India’s defence, one must also consider the fractious nature of the region. Rivalry, corruption, social polarisation, poverty, crime, narco-trafficking, and the lack of stable institutions has made central Asian states politically unstable and daunting to business.

Although India and China are both concerned by Islamism in the region, China would like to curtail Indian influence in Central Asia as it would eventually undermine Beijing’s goals vis-a-vis Pakistan. Similarly, though Russia might prefer India as a partner in Central Asia to balance China, it is loathe to share its backyard with anyone. The current Ukraine crisis has made China more useful to Russia while India’s diversification of its weapons suppliers in recent years has irked Moscow. As a result, India can expect little cooperation from either power in the joint development of energy and transportation infrastructure in Central Asia. Similarly, the United States and India cannot see eye-to-eye in Central Asia because of the former’s antipathy towards Iran and its ambiguous position towards Pakistan and its Islamist networks. India’s own military hesitation mean that Central Asia will continue to depend on the CSTO and the SCO for its security in the immediate future.

With a new prime minister, India has fresh impetus to pursue its mutual interests with Central Asia. A new government with a clear mandate from the people and no baggage is ideally positioned to forge stronger ties with Central Asia. First, India must recognise that it needs individual policies for each of Central Asia’s five states – each have their own priorities, problems, and the rivalries between them must be kept in mind. Second, India has so far played up its historical ties to the region and that is good soft power. However, soft power alone does not build partnerships. If it did, Turkey and Iran would be the dominant powers in Central Asia and not Russia and China. India must acknowledge that Central Asian leaders are pragmatic about security and trade bottom lines in their dealings.

Third, India needs to shift focus from the mega-projects to smaller, localised projects that will build trade relations across a spectrum of fields. India can lend its expertise in chemical equipment, electronics, telecommunications, mining, IT, services, tourism, environmental technology, education, healthcare, construction, and agriculture. Cooperation in archaeology, space, and the nuclear field is also possible. This is for two reasons: 1. it will be difficult to break into oil & gas exploration and development at this late date without even having a clear idea of how the pipelines from Central Asia will run to India, and 2. rivalries between the CARs, such as that between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan over hydropower and water, will also delay hydrocarbon transit; early successes are important to boost confidence and inspire greater engagement.

The single most important long-term project India can undertake in Central Asia is the INSTC. This trade corridor is not dependent on just hydrocarbons for its profitability but also minerals, produce, and manufactured goods. India’s PM-Elect has campaigned aggressively on infrastructural development within India. India undoubtedly has the skills required to build the INSTC but has been lacking the political will to do so. With Iran becoming less of an international pariah, Modi only needs the political will to expand his infrastructural vision to India’s near abroad for the benefit of all concerned.

PM Elect Modi has suggested that India’s foreign policy will be intertwined with trade and focus more on the immediate neighbourhood such as SAARC, ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea under him. He has prioritised infrastructural development within India as well as with important trading partners such as Burma. Central Asia also fits comfortably within Modi’s rubric of a co-prosperity sphere for the region and will enhance the stability and security in Central and South Asia. All that is required now is for Modi to “Look North.”


This post appeared in the June 2014 issue of the Diplomatist.

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The Loss of India’s Near Abroad

07 Sat Dec 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Central Asia, India, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Afghanistan, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Central Asia, Chabahar, China, Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO, Dushanbe, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, India, INSTC, International North-South Trade Corridor, Iran, Karshi-Khanabad, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Manas, New Silk Road, Russia, SCO, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Tajikistan, Tashkent, Turkmenistan, Uighur, United States, Uzbekistan, Xinjiang

Central Asia does not feature in the news much, and indeed, why would it when surrounded by far more happening regions? To its south lies the war in Afghanistan, the flames of Islamism in Pakistan, and a nuclear hot zone; a little to the west is Iran and its nuclear programme; of late, even the Caucasus has been in the limelight, torn as it is between Russia and the European Union; to the north is Russia, still attempting to stem the bleed-out of its power from its days as the Soviet Union; and to its east is China, flexing its military muscle everywhere from the East China Sea to Aksai Chin.

Central Asia and the CaucasusCentral Asia, once called the Eurasian Balkans by Zbigniew Brzezinski, is at once unstable, corrupt, dangerous, unfathomably rich in mineral wealth, strategically located, a grand prize in the new Great Game, and most importantly for Delhi, in its near abroad and slipping away. Like many others, India has enjoyed free-riding on a global security commons founded initially upon the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States and later, as the Cold War ended, upon a US strength of arms. However, that strength was hardly felt in Central Asia and whatever little of it existed is on its way out by the middle of next year.

As the United States prepares to pull out of Afghanistan, Tajikistan is worried about the potential overflow of terrorism from across its southern border. Due to ethnic kinship and the highly profitable narcotics trade, Afghanistan’s problems have always drawn in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan’s northern neighbour, Kyrgyzstan, has already been through two revolutions in 2005 and 2010, and is worried of jihadists freed from fighting in Afghanistan or returning from Syria to foment trouble at home. Terrorists from groups such as the Hizb-ul-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have been arrested on several occasions in the past few years and are known to have received special training from secret al-Qa’ida camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given the fractious nature of inter-clan relations, any Central Asian republic is vulnerable to instability and sudden waves of domestic terrorism as Kazakhstan experienced in 2011.

Poor relations between the five countries makes matters worse; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan vie with each other to be primus inter pares in Central Asia, all the while forgetting the Russian bear; Uzbekistan also contests territory with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the Fergana Valley, and while the latter upper riparian states are considering hydroelectric power projects (Kambarata and Rogun) which would starve the former of water, Uzbekistan has a habit of switching off gas supplies and closing borders with its eastern neighbours.

Russia’s influence over Central Asia is undeniable, not just historically but also economically. Some 29% of Kyrgyz and 47% of Tajik gross domestic product comes from remittances of their migrant labourers from Russia, and an easy way for Moscow to cajole Bishkek or Dushanbe to seeing its point of view is to float the idea of requiring visas for Central Asians. In fact, Russia has even persuaded Kyrgyzstan to join a customs union which carries little benefits for the Central Asian country given that China accounts for about 50% of its trade and Russia only 17%.

In addition, Moscow’s military aid and training to the region persuades the Central Asian capitals to stay away from entanglements with foreign powers. Not only has the US lease of Manas not been renewed, it was asked to leave Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan after it criticised a massacre of civilians in Andijan in 2005. In the meantime, Moscow has signed a treaty with Dushanbe that will see Russian troops on Tajik soil until 2042.

Until recently, China was content with taking a back seat in the Central Asian Great Game. However, China’s insatiable hunger for energy and resources has made it take note of its western neighbours. Furthermore, unrest in its own Xinjiang province necessitates Beijing’s interest in maintaining a calm Central Asia. The major difference between China and the other powers, however, is that Chinese entry is backed by billions of dollars in aid. Hillary Clinton voiced the idea of a New Silk Road in a speech in Madras in 2011, an “international web and network of economic and transit connections” that would link South and Central Asia to the West via Afghanistan, but little has come of it. China, on the other hand, has invested tens of billions of dollars in road, rail, and pipeline projects, all linking Central Asia to China. Given the economic crunch, stingy Russian aid, and Central Asia slipping down the United States’ priority list, Beijing’s no-strings-attached cash transfusion is very welcome.

In 2000, China launched the Great Western Development Plan in 2000, which has made Xinjiang a vital trade and energy corridor along the New Silk Road. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as bilateral agreements, China has already invested over $30 billion in Kazakhstan, including its Kashagan oil field, the world’s largest discovery of oil in the last 30 years, and the purchase of MangistauMunaiGas. Beijing has also signed a $15 billion deal with Uzbekistan for oil, gas, and uranium, and it has started production at Galkynysh in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gasfield. Beijing has also lent Ashgabat $4 billion to develop the gasfield at South Yolotan and extended $10 billion to the whole region during the international economic recession through the SCO. In 2012, China’s annual trade with Central Asia stood at $46 billion.

China’s growing clout in Central Asia comes at Russia’s expense, but Moscow and Beijing need each other too – the Kremlin wishes to entice some of China’s wealth into the Russian economy while Beijing realises Russia’s value on the international stage. After all, a reverse Russo-American rapprochement 40 years after Richard Nixon came to China would not do. Beijing views Central Asia as very much within its sphere of influence, its zhoubian, though it allows the perception of Russian control. China and Russia also have common problems – their wariness of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, and Islamic extremism in the region. China is particularly worried of Uighur separatists in Xinjiang and their  over half a million ethnic brethren across the border. For these reasons, the two giants have managed to tango together well in Central Asia.

Interestingly, despite the enormous flow of investments from Beijing, there is very little trust of its motives among the Central Asian republics. The Chinese practice of using its own labour force, for example, has not eased tensions with local communities who have family working in Russia. In addition, many think it is only a matter of time before Chinese immigrant workers settle in the Central Asian republics and take away more jobs. China’s brutal repression of the Uighur in Xinjiang has not gone unnoticed, nor has its behaviour along its borders with other states; it is unlikely that Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, or Kyrgyzstan will soon forget that they ceded land to China to maintain the peace, particularly when the ensuing protests removed the Kyrgyz president from office. Last year, Kanat Ibragimov, a Kazakh performance artist, symbolically decapitated a toy panda to protest against Chinese expansionism into his country. Despite Russia’s militarily dominant position via the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, fears of Chinese expansionism pervade the region.

In this climate, India’s entry into Central Asia appears almost welcome. Not only is the economic and strategic significance of Central Asia to India difficult to overestimate, the region is Delhi’s near abroad too – a flight from India to the farthest point in Central Asia takes no more than three hours. Yet the South Asian country has barely made a mark, its annual trade of $700 million with the five republics vastly overshadowed by its northeastern rival. In the last couple of years alone, Russia has blocked India from obtaining a military base in Kyrgyzstan and renewing the lease on Ayni in Tajikistan, while China has pipped India in the competition for the Kashagan oilfield in Kazakhstan and the Dauletabad gasfield in Turkmenistan.

Like Clinton’s speech, Delhi has been tall on words but short on action. South Block’s Connect Central Asia initiative envisions engagement across a wide spectrum, from education, medicine, tourism, energy, and agriculture, to archaeology, security, transportation, construction, and e-networks. Yet there has been little focus on short-term projects that would start yielding results immediately. India had hoped to establish an International North-South Trade Corridor connecting South Asia to Europe by road, ship, rail, and pipeline via Central Asia and the Caucasus, but nothing has materialised yet. In fact, it looks like China has supplanted India yet again, its New Silk Road already connecting the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea.

The perception in Central Asia is that not only are Indian investments paltry compared to Chinese projects, but India is extremely slow in its delivery mechanism. India’s political dillydallying and sluggish bureaucracy has put in doubt the country’s seriousness and ability to be a reliable partner in Asia and elsewhere. However, one reason India has not been able to engage fully with Central Asia is lack of access; China shares a border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, but India is separated by difficult terrain through Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, Several Indian companies have refrained from doing business with Central Asia only due to the high cost of logistics.

India’s entire Central Asian strategy hinges on Chabahar, a port in Iran that Delhi was supposed to develop but has been dragging its feet on in fear of US and European sanctions. The connection of Bombay to Chabahar via ship and road, rail, and pipeline from Chabahar to Bamiyan in Afghanistan by way of Zaranj and Delaram, and to Bandar-e Anzali on the Caspian Sea will drastically cut the time and cost of transporting goods from Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia to India. The project has support from several countries, not the least of which are Iran, Russia, Armenia, Afghanistan, the five Central Asian states, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Belarus, and Syria. Beyond transportation, countries along the route must come up with mechanisms to decide pricing, legal issues, banking and procedure before the INSTC can come to fruition.

India’s greatest advantage in Central Asia is that the same logistical difficulties that prevent it from a fuller engagement with the region also make it a safer and more trustworthy partner. India’s goals in Afghanistan and its own concern regarding Chinese expansionism makes India a welcome partner in Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Tashkent. Washington is also likely to smile upon increased trade between Central Asia and India and Europe as it would balance Russia and China in the region and avoid a Chinese monopoly over Central Asian resources.

It is unclear why Delhi does not pursue its plans in Central Asia more forcefully. It has refused to equip the Afghan army, put the development of Chabahar in cold storage, and slunk away after it was bettered by Russia and China in Central Asia. If India continues at this pace, it will find itself hemmed in on all sides and fighting for scraps even in its own backyard.


This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on December 13, 2013.

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Thinking Beyond the Horizon on Afghanistan

06 Tue Aug 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in India, Security, South Asia

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Afghanistan, Central Asia, Chabahar, China, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, ETIM, India, Iran, Muhammad Asif Mohseni, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, TIP, Turkistan, Turkistan Islamic Party, Uighur, United States, Xinjiang

Last weekend’s bombing in Jalalabad came as a reminder to India’s policy makers that there is no free lunch in international relations. Together with the news of the escape of hundreds of jihadists from Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan, as well as the United States reconsidering the resumption of its military aid to Pakistan, India needs to think quickly on how to defend its interests in Afghanistan.

India’s present options are neither pretty nor pleasant, but conflict seldom provides one with neat choices. Even if India were to increase military and infrastructural assistance to Afghanistan, even if it were to create and deploy an elite “Diplomatic Assets Protection Force” to its four missions in Afghanistan, Delhi cannot hope that it would be enough. Given the humbling even the greatest empires have received in the mountainous central Asian state, what can India do that countless others before it have not tried and failed?

The first and most difficult step for anyone getting into Afghanistan would be to understand and accept that they will be in there for at least 20 years. Though theories on counter-insurgency abound, very few have actually snuffed one out. The second step is to realise that everyone needs allies – India once found an ally in Iran against the Taliban, and today, Russia and the United States may also share some of the same goals. The third step, which has proven impossible for India in the past, is to articulate a clear and limited vision behind which these like-minded states might temporarily band.

Delhi has one potential partner in Moscow for its Afghan venture. Russia has been torn about US presence in former Soviet backwaters, but realises the dangers present in a complete NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. Worried that the country might collapse into civil war and become a hub of narcotics and Islamism, the Russian foreign ministry has announced that it is considering deploying troops along the Tajik-Afghan border. The Kremlin genuinely worries that like in the turbulent 1990s, Islamist ideology might spread to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and that drug money might reinvigorate criminal organisations in the region. Under no circumstance, however, will Moscow be drawn into sending troops back into the war-torn country.

Russia’s leasing of an airbase to NATO forces to assist in logistics and resupply efforts is nonetheless a sign that the Eurasian giant is willing to assist in curbing the Taliban’s influence. Russia has sold, through the US as well as directly to Kabul, approximately 100 Mi-17 helicopters that can act as a transport as well as a gunship. However, after its own ten-year war with the mujaheddin, extensive Russian aid might not only be politically difficult for Kabul but also unwanted. India can augment Kabul’s supply with its own Russian-origin arms and the training of Afghan troops.

Tehran is an old ally in the region that Delhi can also turn to. Like Russia, Iran has viewed US presence in Afghanistan with suspicion, so much so that it has been alleged that Tehran is temporarily supporting a low-level insurgency against US interests in the country. The ayatollahs have maintained close ties with Kabul since the ouster of the Taliban, and contributed to rebuilding Afghanistan. At the state level, Iran has built roads, dental colleges and libraries in Afghanistan, and in the harsh winter of 2008-2009, even supplied oil at below-market rates to help with Kabul’s electricity supply. At a humanitarian level, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee is providing micro-loans, non-cash assistance, and even vocational training to families and orphans. Among Tehran’s chief cross-border concerns are narcotics and the influx of refugees, already numbering around 2.5 million.

To make matters easier, though some of Tehran’s tactics have caused resentment, Afghanistan also sees Iran as an important partner in its growth. Kabul wishes to develop road and rail links from its cities to Iranian ports to give its exports access to international markets, and the two countries recently signed a strategic pact that highlighted cooperation on counter-terrorism, narcotics control, information sharing, and bilateral cooperation with other regional nations such as Russia and India.

Working with Iran carries its own price tag – with US and EU sanctions in effect, India’s role in developing Iran’s Chabahar port and its supporting transportation links could meet with opposition. Ironically, this very scheme was considered by the US in the late 1990s to weaken Russia’s grip over the newly-formed Central Asian republics. Additionally, Iran’s support of figures like Ayatollah-al-Uzma Muhammad Asif Mohseni may raise awkward questions. India’s mission in Afghanistan is certainly not to build a secular democracy, but Mohseni’s political views, if as orthodox as his social views, may only exchange one problem in Afghanistan for another.

Some analysts see China as another partner against the Taliban. This analysis is based on an inflated threat perception of Beijing’s own problems in Xinjiang with the East Turkistan Islamic Movement and the Turkistan Islamic Party. Undeniably, Uighurs are unhappy with their Han overlords and there have been sporadic incidences of violence, but at the same time, there has been no sustained “hot conflict” in the province since 1949. Beijing is far more likely to use its influence with Pakistan to curtail Islamist ambitions in Xinjiang than cooperate with India for the latter undermines Beijing’s goal of using Islamabad as a counterweight and distraction against Delhi.

The US withdrawal will still leave approximately 10,000 troops in Afghanistan until 2024. India must use the US presence as additional muscle behind its Afghan policy. However, India’s cabal has its own internal tensions – no one in the region trusts the United States; the US would be wary of increased Iranian or Russian influence in Afghanistan; Afghans remain sour about Russia; Iran seeks to create a pliant regime in Kabul; Russia would be unhappy with greater central Asian access to international markets via pipelines to the Arabian Sea.

In this den of thieves, India has a central role in bringing and holding together a new anti-Taliban alliance. Indians share much goodwill in Afghanistan and is least hostile to either Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, or the United States. The question is, can Delhi show the requisite leadership?


This post appeared in the Economic Times on August 11, 2013.

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