Tag Archives: Uighur

China’s Latest War Manual

27 Wed May 2015

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On May 26 this year, China released its latest Defence White Paper in which it outlined the direction and scope of its military modernisation efforts. As with the release of every such document, the immediate question is, ‘What’s new?’ The honest answer is, ‘Not much.’ The White Paper has never been the vehicle through which Beijing announces its policy changes; usually, these documents, about nine of them since 1998, reiterate already announced policies and tweak old policies a little to factor in the Communist Party of China’s latest threat perception. This means that the White Papers are fairly useless to strategists or Sinologists but may be of some use to political leaders who tend to have diverse demands on their attention.

China Defence White Paper 2015The 2015 White Paper starts typically with a brief assessment of the security situation China faces and the changes it expects in the proximate future. It repeats the standard rhetoric from Beijing of seeking only cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Beijing perceives the international environment to be fairly peaceful and stable with little risk of a major war in the foreseeable future. However, the CPC is concerned about threats arising from hegemonism, power politics, and neo-interventionism which may encourage terrorist activities, ethnic, border, and territorial disputes; local wars, therefore, remain a threat.

Not surprisingly, China’s political and military confidence of recent years comes from its conviction that the world’s economic centre of gravity is shifting rapidly back to Asia. Its primary concern is the US in the western Pacific but Japan’s even gradual militarisation has alarmed Beijing. In perhaps a veiled reference to India, the White Paper also mentions foreign countries interfering in South China Sea affairs. Vietnam and the Philippines get a similar mention for the Senkakus and China rounds off its list of potential threats with a mention of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.

Interestingly, the last two did not merit a mention in the previous white paper two years ago. Several incidents by Uighurs in recent months makes the addition of Xinjiang an understandable addition but Tibet is a little surprising. The paper mentions the United States and Japan by name less number of times than earlier years, indicating that China has become more confident of its anti-access/area denial tactics.

The CPC has not altered its views on the role of the military – defending Chinese interests, participating in relief operations, international security cooperation, and preserving the stability of the state. Beijing’s paranoia about outside powers trying to foment a revolution, though much reduced since the days of Mao Zedong, has still not gone away completely.

China soldiersBut what can we expect to see in China’s defence spending and its areas of interests? Unlike the 2013 white paper, there are no mentions of units, military districts, or strength of the various branches of the Chinese military. However, the general outlook appears similar – the Revolution in Military Affairs has an inherent and irresistible push, according to Beijing, towards the development of long-range weapons systems, stealth, unmanned platforms, precision weapons, and the use of cyber and outer space. The focus on cyber and space-based assets for communications, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and surveillance, is clear from the mention – fear? – of the modern “informationized” battlefield 22 times in a short, 5,500-word document.

Operationally, the People’s Liberation Army will reorient its mission from merely theatre defence to trans-theatre mobility. This sounds a little like India’s much-vaunted Cold Start doctrine but something the Chinese might actually be able to pull off given their superior infrastructure. The PLA intends to develop specially-skilled units for different terrains and tasks and train them for closely coordinated operations. The multi-functional, modular units allows the PLA greater operational flexibility for small-scale operations in localised conflicts of the kind the CPC perceives China to be occupied with in the foreseeable future. The smaller, more mobile units would be perfect for “warning exercises” opposite the Japanese or Taiwanese coast or for adventures along the Line of Actual Control.

China navyThe PLA Navy’s role has been expanded from offshore waters defence to include open seas protection. This likely means the defence of new Chinese maritime claims and the assets Beijing might place in disputed waters. To this end, Beijing’s interest in acquiring additional aircraft carriers makes perfect sense – the envelope around a carrier group will be able to create little mobile pockets of Chinese sovereignty. This expanded role is of great concern not just for China’s immediate neighbours but also Indonesia and Australia. Fielding a blue-water navy has long been a Chinese ambition but open seas protection moves beyond that to some serious force projection.

Until now, China has relied on the international system to keep its sea lines of communication safe; henceforth, the PLAN will take a direct interest in ensuring their security. A legitimate security concern, defending its SLOCs gives the PLAN an excuse to sail more regularly and in greater strength into the Indian Ocean, a move sure to alarm Delhi.

The PLA Air Force will maintain its current role of early warning, air defence and offence, and force projection while modernising itself. A small but crucial addition to its role from 2013 will be “information countermeasures.” In essence, China’s military strategists have observed over the past quarter century how the United States fights its wars – the reliance upon aerial assets for positioning, reconnaissance, communications, targeting, and electronic countermeasures is a huge force multiplier for ground forces and is something the Chinese are interested in replicating. To this end, the PLAAF’s jurisdiction will extend into space as well.

China’s use of space must worry India greatly. The successful demonstration of an anti-satellite missile in 2007 and the development of other weapons systems for “soft kills” in space puts India’s own communications with its nuclear submarines and other military units in jeopardy. As the Chinese race after the United States to achieve parity in C5ISR, sooner or later, India will be inadvertently dragged in its wake. Sooner would be better.

Of particular concern to India is the profile of the PLA Second Artillery Force, the units in charge of China’s nuclear arsenal. Beijing has always adhered to a no first use nuclear policy ever since its first nuclear test in October 1964 but in 2013, the manner in which this assurance was worded became ambiguous. That ambiguity remains in this latest edition of Beijing’s white paper too – the document reads, “China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy…. China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states…” Again, it is not clear if Beijing’s NFU posture applies to nuclear weapons states or not.

One might argue that Beijing does not view India as a nuclear weapons state as per the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore the NFU policy applies to India. Yet China has shown the ability to be surprisingly pragmatic when it serves them and the possession of nuclear weapons might confer NWS status for military purposes. Beijing’s no first use declaration, which critics, with some justification, have always considered empty words, in all likelihood does not apply to India. Delhi must take this into consideration when it next updates its own nuclear posture.

Besides this significant reorientation, the PLASAF will modernise its delivery systems and warheads and work on technologies to improve its deterrence, early warning, survivability, and counterattack capabilities as well as medium and long-range precision strikes.

The rest of the document lays out the PLA’s goals to streamline its and modernise logistics, augment its war reserves, improve rules and standards, and innovate modes of support. Officers will be given more opportunities to study military strategy and operations so that they may be able to introduce more effective principles and methods in their units. Troops will be given more “realistic” combat training and will strive for a high degree of combat readiness and alertness. The reserve force will be expanded and given better training to integrate them better with the regular military.

The PLA has stepped back from participating in the construction of civilian infrastructure but retains a focus on better integration of civilian and military infrastructure, education, manufacturing, and logistics. These personnel goals are less glamorous than the development of space-based military assets or a reorientation of operational strategy but remain nonetheless vital to the PLA’s well-being. As several US analysts have observed over the years, the PLA lacks the support of a professional non-commissioned officer corps or recent combat experience. The latter has led to China participating in UN peacekeeping missions but these human and experiential factors hamper the process of modernisation.

It would be an interesting exercise for those with Mandarin language skills to compare the English and Mandarin versions of China’s Defence White Paper. In any case, the white paper does not explain how the laundry list of goals will be achieved or make any assessments of the utility of developing certain capabilities; nor does it get into evaluations of present capabilities as a point of reference. This should be of no surprise as the primary goal of the document is to deter its foreign audience rather than provide an academic study of Chinese military thought.

On a concluding note, it is worrisome for countries vested in the Pax Americana to see how anti-status quo states like Russia and China are rapidly catching up with the United States in force-on-force warfare in terms of material as well as technology. All the while, the United States has been occupied with learning to fight a different kind of war in the Middle East and Central Asia and has had little time to dedicate to the strategic shifts in the western Pacific, space, and other theatres. India has only a secondary role to play in this imminent clash between powers but how Delhi plays its part in this game over the next twenty years will be very interesting to watch.

This post appeared on FirstPost on June 05, 2015.

A View From Central Asia

14 Wed May 2014

Posted by in Central Asia, India, South Asia

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After month-long elections in nine phases, the Bharatiya Janata Party is returning to power in India after a decade in Opposition. Led to its highest ever Lok Sabha tally by Narendra Modi, it is the first time since 1984 that the BJP or any party has secured a majority on its own. This will, observers hope, bring a new decisiveness to the Prime Minister’s Office that has been lacking for the past ten years.

In his election campaign, Modi talked about India’s relations with its neighbours in terms of trade and security. Departing from India’s traditional emphasis on ties with the superpowers, Modi focussed on India’s immediate neighbours in Asia, particularly the members of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and Japan. Though Central Asia did not feature prominently in the Prime Minister Elect’s speeches, it would be unwise to read too much into this – no matter its place amidst campaign promises, the region has geographic proximity and remains vital to Indian trade and security interests.

Until now, both sides have been subdued over the potential for better relations. The Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan – used to see India from the perspective of the Soviet Union, a friendly state which received aid and preferential economic treatment from Moscow. However, since India’s economic liberalisation began to bear fruit by the end of the previous millennium, the country has switched roles to having the capability of being a donor state to the Central Asian republics (CAR). Despite this switch, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Tashkent have been disappointed to see India defer to Russia in taking an active role in the region.

Central Asian capitals have a generally positive view of India; some of the old hands from the Soviet era still populate the bureaucracy and remember the country fondly. More importantly, India has not used its image as the world’s largest democracy to push for liberalism and democracy in the region, preferring instead to instruct by example. India’s tiny footprint in Central Asia is not seen as threatening whereas China’s economic involvement in the region is viewed with suspicion. Russia is not much liked either due to dissatisfaction over its geopolitical domination over the five -stans. The United States is also suspect because its commitment to the region, combined with its constant harangues about human rights, is not trusted.

Other smaller players like Iran and Turkey have had limited success due to their finite means to provide solutions to the region’s problems. India’s military weakness compared to the other major actors – it still depends on Russia and other foreign suppliers for an overwhelming portion of its military equipment – in Central Asia and its growing economy makes it an ideal partner for prosperity and to balance Great Power designs.

Some of Central Asia’s positive view of India is also due to the several common goals they share. All parties are worried about the threat of Islamism which may boil over from Afghanistan and Pakistan; there is eagerness to develop energy infrastructure that can deliver oil and gas to India’s growing economy; interest also exists in expanding cooperation beyond mere energy and security. In no area is there a direct conflict of interest between India and the CARs.

Despite the goodwill and potential for a rewarding relationship, the CARs remain uncertain about Indian policy towards them. How will Delhi’s alignment with the United States and the European Union on the one hand and Russia and China on the other affect them? India is proud of its non-alignment but what would that mean for the region? What is India willing to offer that others cannot? How does India see Central Asia? These questions need clarification from Delhi.

Frustration also mounts from the lethargic pace of Indian business. The perception in Central Asia is that not only are Indian investments paltry compared to Chinese projects, but India is extremely slow in its delivery mechanism. India’s political dillydallying and sluggish bureaucracy has put in doubt the country’s seriousness and ability to be a reliable partner. While several memoranda of understanding have been signed between India and the CARs, the former is not even in the top ten countries exploring the region for oil and gas. Trade between the two regions at the end of 2012 remained at a paltry $700 million while that between China and the CARs topped $46 billion. South Block’s ambitious Connect Central Asia initiative and the International North-South Trade Corridor connecting South Asia to Europe by road, ship, rail, and pipeline via Central Asia and the Caucasus has not materialised yet.

China, on the other hand, has invested tens of billions of dollars in road, rail, and pipeline projects, all linking Central Asia to China. In 2000, China launched the Great Western Development Plan, which has made Xinjiang a vital trade and energy corridor along the New Silk Road. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as bilateral agreements, China has invested over $30 billion in Kazakhstan to purchase MangistauMunaiGas and in its Kashagan oil field, the world’s largest discovery of oil in the last 30 years. Beijing has signed a $15 billion deal with neighbouring Uzbekistan for oil, gas, and uranium, and it has started production at Galkynysh in Turkmenistan, the world’s second-largest gasfield. In addition, Beijing has lent Ashgabat $4 billion to develop the gasfield at South Yolotan and extended $10 billion to the whole region during the international economic recession through the SCO. Furthermore, China is working on its New Silk Road to connect the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Once completed, it will lower cost of transport, bring Central Asia transit fees, and bypass India in the economic development of the region.

Interestingly, despite the enormous flow of investments from Beijing, there is very little trust of its motives among the Central Asian republics. The Chinese practice of using its own labour force, for example, has not eased tensions with local communities who are themselves migrant labourers in Russia due to unemployment back home. In addition, many think it is only a matter of time before Chinese immigrant workers settle in the Central Asian republics and take away more jobs. China’s brutal repression of the Uighur in Xinjiang has not gone unnoticed; despite its Soviet past, Central Asia remains a tribal society and old loyalties run deep. It is also unlikely that Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, or Kyrgyzstan will soon forget that they ceded land to China to maintain the peace, particularly when the ensuing protests removed the Kyrgyz president from office. A couple of years ago, Kanat Ibragimov, a Kazakh performance artist, symbolically decapitated a toy panda to protest against Chinese expansionism into his country.

It is in this light that the partnership with India has proven disappointing. Its failure to reap a bonanza so far has pushed Central Asia closer to the Chinese economy and kept their energy exports vulnerable to Russian transit policies by denying them access to the southern seas via Afghanistan and Iran. However, in India’s defence, one must also consider the fractious nature of the region. Rivalry, corruption, social polarisation, poverty, crime, narco-trafficking, and the lack of stable institutions has made central Asian states politically unstable and daunting to business.

Although India and China are both concerned by Islamism in the region, China would like to curtail Indian influence in Central Asia as it would eventually undermine Beijing’s goals vis-a-vis Pakistan. Similarly, though Russia might prefer India as a partner in Central Asia to balance China, it is loathe to share its backyard with anyone. The current Ukraine crisis has made China more useful to Russia while India’s diversification of its weapons suppliers in recent years has irked Moscow. As a result, India can expect little cooperation from either power in the joint development of energy and transportation infrastructure in Central Asia. Similarly, the United States and India cannot see eye-to-eye in Central Asia because of the former’s antipathy towards Iran and its ambiguous position towards Pakistan and its Islamist networks. India’s own military hesitation mean that Central Asia will continue to depend on the CSTO and the SCO for its security in the immediate future.

With a new prime minister, India has fresh impetus to pursue its mutual interests with Central Asia. A new government with a clear mandate from the people and no baggage is ideally positioned to forge stronger ties with Central Asia. First, India must recognise that it needs individual policies for each of Central Asia’s five states – each have their own priorities, problems, and the rivalries between them must be kept in mind. Second, India has so far played up its historical ties to the region and that is good soft power. However, soft power alone does not build partnerships. If it did, Turkey and Iran would be the dominant powers in Central Asia and not Russia and China. India must acknowledge that Central Asian leaders are pragmatic about security and trade bottom lines in their dealings.

Third, India needs to shift focus from the mega-projects to smaller, localised projects that will build trade relations across a spectrum of fields. India can lend its expertise in chemical equipment, electronics, telecommunications, mining, IT, services, tourism, environmental technology, education, healthcare, construction, and agriculture. Cooperation in archaeology, space, and the nuclear field is also possible. This is for two reasons: 1. it will be difficult to break into oil & gas exploration and development at this late date without even having a clear idea of how the pipelines from Central Asia will run to India, and 2. rivalries between the CARs, such as that between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan over hydropower and water, will also delay hydrocarbon transit; early successes are important to boost confidence and inspire greater engagement.

The single most important long-term project India can undertake in Central Asia is the INSTC. This trade corridor is not dependent on just hydrocarbons for its profitability but also minerals, produce, and manufactured goods. India’s PM-Elect has campaigned aggressively on infrastructural development within India. India undoubtedly has the skills required to build the INSTC but has been lacking the political will to do so. With Iran becoming less of an international pariah, Modi only needs the political will to expand his infrastructural vision to India’s near abroad for the benefit of all concerned.

PM Elect Modi has suggested that India’s foreign policy will be intertwined with trade and focus more on the immediate neighbourhood such as SAARC, ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea under him. He has prioritised infrastructural development within India as well as with important trading partners such as Burma. Central Asia also fits comfortably within Modi’s rubric of a co-prosperity sphere for the region and will enhance the stability and security in Central and South Asia. All that is required now is for Modi to “Look North.”

This post appeared in the June 2014 issue of the Diplomatist.

Non-State Actors and the Great Game

11 Fri Apr 2014

Posted by in Opinion and Response

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There has been some speculation after the Kunming attack in March this year about how terrorism in Central Asia might result in strange bedfellows. The knife attack in the southern Chinese city left 33 dead, including the assailants, and 143 wounded. The attack – pre-meditated, methodical, and outside Xinjiang – does not fit the previous pattern of Uighur violence and China has been quick to place the ultimate blame on Islamic terror from Central Asia. After initial reluctance, the United States also declared the Kunming attack an act of terrorism.

Some observers believe that such unrest in Central Asia will reorient geopolitical alliances in the region. China will move closer to the United States to fight the common enemy, Islamic terrorism, and become warmer towards India. Simultaneously, rifts will appear in China’s relations with Pakistan over the latter’s alleged training of Uighur militants and as well as Beijing’s common cause with Delhi.

It is unlikely, however, that such an alliance will materialise. The complex relations between the countries in the region – their mutual animosity and suspicion – raise the threshold for cooperation above the potential for Islamic terrorism in Central Asia to be a serious threat.

China has long claimed the unrest in Xinjiang province to have an Islamist dimension with ties to cells in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan but there have been few takers for these accusations. Several of the more infamous incidents – the Ürümqi bus bombing in 1997, the Aksu bombing in 2010, and the Hotan and Kashgar attacks in 2011 were all carried out by Uighurs, a persecuted ethnic minority in northwestern China. None of the violence so far has revealed the modus operandi of al Qa’ida or its affiliates and has therefore received no attention from the international community. The United States initially hesitated to declare even the Kunming attacks an act of terrorism and did so only upon chiding from Beijing.

India

To gain sympathy for its fight, China may reach out to its neighbours. India, long a target of Islamic militancy, is a natural partner in the war against Islamism in Central Asia. Furthermore, like Beijing, India has high hopes for energy investments in the region and would not like to see an increase of militancy there. However, any partnership with India is likely to be more on paper than on the ground; India has steadfastly refused to take up a greater role in Afghan security despite its own assets in the country repeatedly coming under attack.

Delhi also has its own problems with Beijing: geopolitical rivalries aside, China invaded India in 1962 and still holds Indian territory in Aksai Chin. Beijing is also laying claim to even more in Arunachal Pradesh. In addition, Beijing has liberally armed Pakistan against India with the exchange of even nuclear weapons designs and missiles (though more of this came from North Korea). China’s stance on terrorism in Kashmir, from Delhi’s perspective, also leaves a lot to be desired. There is little reason for India to want to exert itself in coming to China’s aid in Central Asia if its neighbour can be distracted elsewhere.

Pakistan

China’s strategic and regional partner, Pakistan, cannot offer much assistance either. Islamabad may have little to do with the attacks in China, and the Inter Services Intelligence has less perfect control over all the groups it trains and funds than is commonly thought. If aid is flowing to the Uighurs from the badlands of Pakistan’s northwest, it may be without the approval or even knowledge of Islamabad.

While Beijing can threaten to curtail military and economic aid to Pakistan, China has long used the Islamic republic as a counterweight to India. It is unlikely that this policy will be reconsidered short of a minor revolution in Xinjiang. Pakistan also knows that it remains one of Beijing’s few reliable allies in the region and a reasonably sized market for China’s wares, including weapons and nuclear reactors. The symbiotic relationship that Beijing and Islamabad have nurtured over decades will require much more than a body count in the low two digits to rupture.

The United States

The United States is already embroiled in wars against Islamist forces in several places in the world, and in many others, it is actively giving aid to opposing forces. Unhindered by regional rivalries, Washington would seem an ideal partner for China’s war against the Uighurs. Unfortunately for Beijing, the United States’ present involvements have already strained its treasury and Washington is not trawling for another conflict to get involved in.

Despite the rhetoric of the Global War on Terror, the United States is very flexible in its designation of terrorism. After the attacks of September 2001, Washington declared al Qa’ida and the Taliban as terrorist organisations and US forces flew half way around the world to invade Afghanistan and kill Osama bin Laden. However, despite much evidence that points to Pakistan as a hotbed of terrorist activity, Islamabad remains one of the United States’ closest non-NATO allies. Washington has continually ignored Indian warnings about cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and maintains its arms sales to the country.

Similarly, while the United States has waged an under-reported drone war in Yemen, it has removed the Iranian Mojahedin-e-Khalq from the list of terrorist organisations and rationalised support to “moderate” Islamists in Syria against Bashar al Assad. To cover its retreat from Afghanistan with some dignity, Washington has come up with some fascinating new vocabulary such as “good Taliban.” Simply put, the United States is interested in fighting only its own terrorists.

There is little awareness, let alone sympathy, for the Uighur cause in the United States; however, if the Uighurs were to limit their violence to Chinese targets alone and avoid flamboyant displays of links with the Taliban, al Qa’ida, or its affiliates, they might find private pockets of sympathy in the United States; neither would it be detrimental to Washington’s interests to have its Great Power rival distracted by domestic security concerns.

There is also this to be considered: for over a decade now, the United States has been opposed to China having a larger role in Afghan security. The Uighur trail will inevitably do exactly that, not just in Afghanistan but also in the former Soviet Central Asian republics. There is no compelling reason for the United States to change that position on China as long as the threat does not grow much beyond China.

Others

China’s overtures to the United States and India are bound to cause concern in Moscow and Tehran. Though both Iran and Russia desire the demise of terror groups in Central Asia, neither would be too keen in seeing renewed US presence in the region. For that matter, neither would Beijing. With ambitious plans in the offing for the revival of the ancient Silk Road and Sino-Russian energy ties, Beijing will have to take regional dissatisfaction over its closer ties to the United States into consideration.

The United States must also take into consideration its allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. With recent friction in the South China Sea between China and its neighbours, Seoul and Tokyo would be looking to the United States for reassurance. Furthermore, a second US rapprochement with China may imperil Washington’s pivot to Asia and validate in Asian capitals their scepticism over US commitments to the region’s security.

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The notion that an arrival of Islamist terrorism in Central Asia will alter regional geopolitics is premised upon two questionable assumptions: 1. that Islamism is a greater threat than mutual rivalries; and 2. that the Islamism is genuine and not a cover for an undercurrent of ethnic grievances indulged only by Islamist groups. This is all, of course, assuming that China’s claims of Islamist links are true. For now, however, no one will play Beijing’s game.

This post appeared on Daily News & Analysis on April 13, 2014.