Tag Archives: uranium

The Hurdle to India’s Nuclear Renaissance

05 Wed Apr 2017

Posted by in India, Nuclear, South Asia

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Ambitious and well-intentioned as it may be, the department of atomic energy’s (DAE’s) recent proposal to build 12 nuclear reactors to boost power generation in the country needs to be taken with a pinch of salt. In recent decades, DAE has been long on promises and short on delivery—the proverbial white elephant.

Yet it was not always so. When India’s nuclear establishment got under way in 1944—theoretical research had been going on since the mid-1930s, in European labs as well as in India—Homi Bhabha charted out a road map for the country’s nuclear programme for the rest of the century. In a country with appalling literacy levels, unspeakable poverty and little by way modern infrastructure, nuclear power was a bold gamble. Over the next couple of decades, a pool of talent was created, expertise was developed, and collaboration with advanced states sought. Though progress was not breakneck, it was, nonetheless, impressive. Apsara, which went critical in 1956, was Asia’s first research reactor; India’s first power reactor, Tarapur, came online in 1969.

With the exception of an eight-year gap between 1972 and 1980, DAE has been commissioning a reactor every two or three years. However, the reactors were notorious for having a low plant load factor (PLF)—in other words, they were inefficient. The popular belief is that this is largely due to unreliable supplies of uranium fuel but wear and tear and system malfunctions are as much to blame.

Second, India’s pace of nuclear energy growth is dismally slow. When France and the US decided to embrace nuclear energy in the 1960s and 1970s, the former built approximately 60 reactors within two decades and the latter about 100 in a similar time span. China has, at present, as many reactors under construction as India has built since independence. After the end of India’s ostracism from international nuclear commerce, the government ambitiously announced an increase in India’s nuclear energy generation up to 63 GW by 2032; this was drastically revised downwards to 27.5 GW. Recent statements suggest that the target may have been lowered further.

The inordinate delays from conception to commission have been fatal for the sector. The nuclear project at Gorakhpur, for example, was sanctioned in 1984 but is yet to be built; the power project at Narora took 20 years from 1972-92 to complete; the first two units at Kaiga took 15 years. The fast breeder reactor project is also languishing, while DAE has been promising to begin construction on the advanced heavy water reactor next year since 2003.

Cost overruns have also been ingrained into the Indian nuclear process—the Narora plant was sanctioned for approximately Rs200 crore but ended up costing four times that amount; the first two units at Kakrapar saw a 350% increase in cost from conception to commission. Every Indian reactor has seen similar cost spikes.

Technology assimilation has also been a tough nut for DAE. India’s third commercial nuclear power reactor, the 220 MW pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) at Rawatbhata, was built with technology from Canada. Since then, Indian scientists have indigenized the design and scaled it up to 540 MW and 700 MW but haven’t been able to cross the 1,000 MW mark as Canada has long done. Today, India needs larger reactors for economies of scale but DAE is yet to deliver.

To be fair, not all of the blame can be placed at DAE’s door. The international nuclear industry, for example, has been in a depressed state for a while—Westinghouse’s financial woes and Areva’s problems with steel forging were self-inflicted disasters. DAE has also had to navigate around uninspired leaders who just could not see the transformative promise of nuclear power. That has resulted in budgetary restraints, poor policies and little encouragement.

However, the atomic energy establishment does not seem to have offered much resistance to the government’s apathy; ministries normally jostle for increased budgets, influence, limelight, a place in national strategy, or a seat at the table. In some ways, the apathy has suited DAE’s own lackadaisical work habits. And the shrivelled ambitions of its Nuclear Power Corp. of India Ltd, which is responsible for the construction and operation of nuclear power reactors, hasn’t helped matters either.

Notably, the atomic community was also divided over the India-US civil nuclear deal—despite the lack of indigenous achievement in the country. It also went soft on the stringent supplier liability laws introduced in 2010 that were not in keeping with international industry norms and effectively made the Indian nuclear market a no-go zone for both foreign and domestic suppliers. Furthermore, there has been strong opposition from the atomic community to privatization under the bogey of national security—a convenient shield—against calls for transparency.

Responsibility for DAE falls on the prime minister’s shoulders. It is no coincidence that DAE’s brightest years were under Jawaharlal Nehru and the agency has been languishing somewhat ever since. Curing this white elephant is an easy process—without even getting into long-term, sustainable goals such as privatization, clear regulation and transparency, closer scrutiny by the prime minister and an adoption of the sector as he has done with solar power would go a long way in revitalizing a moribund agency.

This post appeared on LiveMint on April 05, 2017.

A 50 Quadrillion Dollar Discovery

01 Wed Jun 2016

Posted by in Nuclear

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Sometimes, it is not easy to assess the importance of a discovery: JJ Thompson, the discoverer of the electron, is said to have once called his sub-atomic particle a most useless thing. Today, that same useless electron has gone on to drastically transform the world. Thorium shares an almost similar tale. Discovered in 1829 by Swedish chemist JJ Berzelius from samples of earth sent him by mineralogist Jens Esmark, the new element named after the Norse god of thunder, Thor, held only academic interest for the next half century.

In 1884, Auer von Welsbach invented the incandescent gas light mantle which used thorium oxide. However, when electricity replaced gas for lighting by the mid 1920s, thorium was again nearly forgotten. What saved the element was World War II and the quest for the atomic bomb.

It was the golden age of atomic science: in 1895, German physicist William Röntgen discovered x-rays, though their mechanism eluded him then. The following year, French physicist Henri Becquerel observed that uranium salts emitted rays similar to x-rays in their penetrating power but differing in that they seemed to arise internally in the uranium than be caused by any external excitation. Although credit for the 1898 discovery of radioactivity in thorium goes to the German chemist Gerhard Carl Schmidt, he believed that “thorium rays” were similar to “Röntgen rays”; an accurate understanding of the phenomenon had to await the work of Marie Curie and Ernest Rutherford.

Rutherford’s further experiments revealed basic atomic structure as well as a better understanding of radioactivity. Frederick Soddy, Rutherford’s colleague, saw the enormous potential of their discovery and wrote that here was a virtually inexhaustible source of energy that could, properly applied, “transform a desert continent, thaw the frozen poles, and make the whole earth one smiling Garden of Eden.”

The beginning of World War II put nuclear physics front and centre of the Allies’ agenda. Afraid that Germany might beat them to a horrendous new type of weapon – the German chemists, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, together with Austrian physicist Lise Meitner, had successfully created a small fission chain reaction in 1938, after all – the United States commenced the Manhattan Project, one of the most secretive, international, well-funded, and undemocratic technological initiative to date.

In this project, Glen Seaborg was tasked with assessing which would be the most suitable element to make a nuclear device. Due to wartime exigencies, no efforts were spared in rushing to an atomic bomb. Seaborg was allowed to experiment simultaneously on all tracks he thought worthy of yielding a working weapon – a very expensive proposition. As a result, research was conducted on uranium, plutonium, and thorium paths towards weaponisation. Thorium was found to be unsuitable for weaponisation and, again, the war came first: Seaborg spent most of the war years working with plutonium.

Seaborg’s work, however, had pointed to thorium’s eminent suitability as a fuel for peaceful purposes. Along with his research assistant John Gofman, Seaborg bombarded the thorium atom with neutrons from a cyclotron. They observed that thorium-232 transmuted to thorium-233 and then to protactinium-233. This was carefully extracted from the sample to avoid further transmutation to protactinium-234; after waiting for a couple of months, Gofman observed that the protactinium-233 had transmuted further, into uranium-233 as was later discovered. With the help of fellow researcher Raymond Stoughton, Gofman separated enough of the uranium-233 to test it for fissionability. As per his meticulous notes, it was on February 02, 1942, at 9:44 PM, that the uranium-233 first underwent fission via slow neutron absorption.

Seaborg had already noticed how abundant thorium was, far more than uranium, and when Gofman showed him the results of their labour, he is said to have exclaimed, “we have just made a $50,000,000,000,000,000 (fifty quadrillion) discovery!”

After the war, several of the scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project shifted their attention to peacetime applications of nuclear energy. Two of them, Alvin Weinberg and Forrest Murray, co-authored a paper on what would eventually evolve into the basic design for light water reactors. The authors were not remiss in noting the several drawbacks of their design, suggesting instead that a reactor operating on thorium would not face similar problems. In 1948, Weinberg became the director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and he kept the research on thorium reactors going. The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment was an experimental reactor that operated at ORNL from 1965 to 1969 and proved the viability of molten salt reactors.

Despite its success, the MSR programme was mothballed. The United States continued to work on the 50 quadrillion dollar discovery sporadically – such as with the experimental thorium-uranium-233 core inserted into a conventional pressurised water reactor at Shippingport in 1977 – but the results were not built upon. The reason for this, according to some such as Nobel laureate Carlo Rubbia, is that Washington was not interested in energy but in the production of plutonium to expand its nuclear arsenal and thorium reactors are particularly useless at supporting a nuclear weapons programme. It is only in the last decade that interest in thorium reactors in the United States has again risen but this time more among private entrepreneurs than the government.

Like the United States, most countries that were involved in thorium research gradually abandoned them. West Germany shut down the Lingen reactor in 1973, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor in 1988, and the Thorium High Temperature Reactor in 1989; Britain’s Dragon reactor was switched off in 1976, and the Netherlands pulled the plug on their SUSPOP/KSTR in 1977. India was one of the handful of exceptions that continued to try and tame thorium for energy purposes. Homi Bhabha, the father of the Indian nuclear programme, had theorised along the same lines as Weinberg by 1954 that given the abundance of thorium and the scarcity of uranium in his country, they would be better served by a fleet of thorium reactors rather than what was appearing to be the conventional choice of uranium fuelled reactors. Indian scientists were keen on collaborating with as many of the advanced Western countries as possible, from the United States to France, West Germany, Poland, Hungary, and others in basic nuclear science.

The Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay started working on producing thorium nitrates and oxides in 1955; Indian Rare Earths had been extracting thorium from the beaches of southern India already since 1950, primarily for export to the United States in exchange for help setting up the nuclear programme. By the mid-1960s, India had started irradiating thorium in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor and in September 1970, uranium-233 was first recovered from the process. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre conducted experiments on the properties of thorium, uranium-233, mixed oxide fuels, reprocessing, fabrication, and other aspects of the thorium fuel cycle. Progress was slow for multiple reasons: the technical requirements of handling highly radioactive substances are stringent and remote manipulation in glove boxes was time-consuming and tedious; India’s nuclear tests in 1974 resulted in technological sanctions against the country which disrupted academic networks and supply chains; as a developing country, India could not afford the lavish sums thrown at nuclear programmes in the United States, France, and elsewhere; finally, a lack of political vision and bureaucratic politics stifled the pace of development.

Nonetheless, by 1984, India had built Purnima II, the first reactor in the world that handled uranium-233, part of the thorium fuel cycle. Experiments were also conducted using thorium-based mixed oxide fuel bundles in the regular fleet of heavy water reactors. In 1996, KAMINI went critical, the only presently operating uranium-233 fuelled reactor operating in the world. India has also been working on several thorium reactor designs, each at different stages of completion: the Compact High Temperature Reactor, the Innovative High Temperature Reactor, the Indian Molten Salt Breeder Reactor, and most famously, the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. Construction on the AHWR is supposed to break ground this year but that is a tale that has been repeated for the past 12 years.

In recent years, several private companies have also started entering the thorium reactor business. Flibe Energy has been marketing the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor, while two doctoral students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technolgy started Transatomic Power on the strength of their Waste Annihilating Molten Salt Reactor.

Despite much optimism and promise, the development of thorium energy has historically been hampered by politics, bureaucracy, and economics. For a species whose hallmarks are greed and violence, it is sometimes puzzling that a 50 quadrillion dollar discovery is lying around, waiting to be tapped even 70 years after the realisation of its terraforming potential.

This post appeared on FirstPost on June 04, 2016.

Fast Forwarding to Thorium

19 Mon Oct 2015

Posted by in Nuclear

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What is the single greatest factor that prevents the large-scale deployment of thorium-fuelled reactors in India? Most people would assume that it is a limitation of technology, still just out of grasp. After all, the construction of the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) – a 300 MW, indigenously-designed, thorium-fuelled, commercial technology demonstrator – has been put off several times since it was first announced in 2004. However, scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre have successfully tested all relevant thorium-related technologies in the laboratory, achieving even industrial scale capability in some of them. In fact, if pressed, India could probably begin full-scale deployment of thorium reactors in ten years. The single greatest hurdle, to answer the original question, is the critical shortage of fissile material.

A fissile material is one that can sustain a chain reaction upon bombardment by neutrons. Thorium is by itself fertile, meaning that it can transmute into a fissile radioisotope but cannot itself keep a chain reaction going. In a thorium reactor, a fissile material like uranium or plutonium is blanketed by thorium. The fissile material, also called a driver in this case, drives the chain reaction to produce energy while simultaneously transmuting the fertile material into fissile material. India has very modest deposits of uranium and some of the world’s largest sources of thorium. It was keeping this in mind that in 1954, Homi Bhabha envisioned India’s nuclear power programme in three stages to suit the country’s resource profile. In the first stage, heavy water reactors fuelled by natural uranium would produce plutonium; the second stage would initially be fuelled by a mix of the plutonium from the first stage and natural uranium. This uranium would transmute into more plutonium and once sufficient stocks have been built up, thorium would be introduced into the fuel cycle to convert it into uranium 233 for the third stage. In the final stage, a mix of thorium and uranium fuels the reactors. The thorium transmutes to U-233 as in the second stage, which powers the reactor. Fresh thorium can replace the depleted thorium in the reactor core, making it essentially a thorium-fuelled reactor even though it is the U-233 that is undergoing fission to produce electricity.

After decades of operating Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR), India is finally ready to start the second stage. A 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam is set to achieve criticality any day now and four more Fast Breeder Reactors have been sanctioned, two at the same site and two elsewhere. However, experts estimate that it would take India many more FBRs and at least another four decades before it has built up a sufficient fissile material inventory to launch the third stage. The earliest projections place major thorium reactor construction in the late 2040s and some put the date past 2070. India cannot wait that long, and neither can the world. If the quality of life of 1.2 billion Indians starts to approach European levels without nuclear power, the goal of keeping global warming below two degrees Celsius will seem a hare-brained fantasy.

The obvious solution to India’s shortage of fissile material is to procure it from the international market. As yet, there exists no commerce in plutonium though there is no law that expressly forbids it. In fact, most nuclear treaties such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) address only U-235 and U-233, presumably because plutonium has so far not been considered a material suited for peaceful purposes. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) merely mandates that special fissionable material – which includes plutonium – if transferred, be done so under safeguards. Thus, the legal rubric for safeguarded sale of plutonium already exists. The physical and safety procedures for moving radioactive spent fuel and plutonium also already exists – France and the UK have operated commercial reprocessing facilities since the late 1960s that have served several countries such as Japan, Italy, and Germany.

If India were to start purchasing plutonium and/or spent fuel, it would immediately alleviate the pressure on countries like Japan and the UK who are looking to reduce their stockpile of plutonium. Other countries like South Korea would also be able to relieve their stores of spent fuel to countries who possess reprocessing facilities and have a need for separated plutonium. India is unlikely to remain the only customer for too long either. Thorium reactors have come to be of great interest to many countries in the last few years, and Europe yet remains intrigued by FBRs as their work on ASTRID, ALFRED, and ELSY shows. Additionally, Russia is building the BN-800 and already operating the BN-600 at Beloyarsk.

The unseemly emphasis on thorium technology has many reasons. First, thorium reactors produce far less waste than present-day reactors; two, they have the ability to burn up most of the highly radioactive and long-lasting minor actinides that makes nuclear waste from Light Water Reactors a nuisance to deal with; three, the minuscule waste that is generated is toxic for only three or four hundred years rather than thousands of years; four, thorium reactors are cheaper because they have higher burnup; and five, thorium reactors are significantly more proliferation resistant than present reactors. This is because the U-233 produced by transmuting thorium also contains U-232, a strong source of gamma radiation that makes it difficult to work with. Its daughter product, thallium-208, is equally difficult to handle and easy to detect.

The mainstreaming of thorium reactors worldwide thus offers an enormous advantage to proliferation resistance as well as the environment. Admittedly, the technology is no magic pill and there still remains a proliferation risk – albeit significantly diminished – but these can be addressed by already existing safeguards. This makes newcomers to nuclear energy lesser risks. For India, it offers the added benefit that it can act as a guarantor for the lifetime supply of nuclear fuel for reactors if it chooses to enter the export market, something it is unable to do for uranium-fuelled reactors.

It is clear that India stands to profit greatly from plutonium trading but what compelling reason does the world have to accommodate India? After all, self-professed hard-nosed realists are unlikely to settle for climate change and proliferation resistance. The most significant carrot would be that all of India’s FBRs that are tasked for civilian purposes can come under international safeguards in a system similar to the Indo-US nuclear deal. There is little doubt that India will one day have a fleet of FBRs and large quantities of fissile material that can easily be redirected towards its weapons programme. This will limit how quickly India can grow its nuclear arsenal to match that of Pakistan or China. Delhi has shown no inclination to do so until now but the world community would surely prefer that as much as possible of India’s plutonium was locked under safeguards.

The United States could perhaps emerge as the greatest obstacle to plutonium commerce. Washington has been resolutely opposed to reprocessing since the Carter administration, preferring instead the wasteful once-through, open fuel cycle. Although the United States cannot prevent countries from trading in plutonium, it has the power to make it uncomfortable for them via sanctions, reduced scientific cooperation, and other mechanisms. The strong non-proliferation lobby in the United States is also likely to be nettled that a non-signatory of the NPT would now move to open and regulate trade in plutonium. The challenge for Delhi is to convince Washington to sponsor rather than oppose such a venture, if not internationally then at least bilaterally. In this, a sizeable portion of the nuclear industry could be Delhi’s allies.

Any list of the greatest challenges facing the world this century is bound to have energy poverty and climate change in the top five slots. For developing economies like India, the relationship between the two is likely to be an added concern: on the one hand, energy consumption bears a strong correlation with development and wealth while on the other, historically, material advancement has not occurred without placing a significant burden on the environment. Scientists also predict that the impact of climate change will be worse on India, particularly on coastal cities with high population densities. Even if one is not inclined to accept the data on climate change, the detrimental health effects and the poor quality of air and water cannot be denied. Bringing forward the deployment of thorium reactors by four to six decades via a plutonium market might be the most effective step we take towards curtailing carbon emissions and development this century.

A version of this post appeared in The Hindu on November 03, 2015.