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Chaturanga

~ statecraft, strategy, society, and Σοφíα

Chaturanga

Tag Archives: Yemen

Humanitarian Farce

29 Sat Apr 2017

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Book Review

≈ Comments Off on Humanitarian Farce

Tags

Antonio Gramsci, Bashar al-Assad, Benjamin Netanyahu, Britain, diplomacy, France, Hardeep Singh Puri, hegemony, India, Iraq, Libya, machtpolitik, matsya nyaya, media, mindfare, Muammar Gaddafi, Paul Wolfowitz, Perilous Interventions, R2P, Right To Protect, Russia, Saddam Hussein, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, terrorism, think tank, Ukraine, United Nations Security Council, United States, veto, Yemen

Perilous InterventionsPuri, Hardeep Singh. Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos. Noida: HarperCollins Publishers, 2016. 280 pp.

“Something is rotten in the state of Denmark,” Marcellus tells Horatio in the opening act of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Former diplomat Hardeep Singh Puri probably could not have put it better about the United Nations Security Council and the existing global order. Through his book, Perilous Interventions: The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos, a devastating indictment of Western hypocrisy in international governance, India’s former permanent representative to the United Nations gives readers a ringside seat to some of the discussions that went on in the Security Council during some of the major crises of the past decade. Puri lambasts the existing system and warns that without reforms, faith in multilateralism will soon fade.

Disregarding the advice of German chancellor Otto von Bismarck about the making of sausages and laws, Puri details the discussions within the Security Council on the question of whether the international community should intervene in Iraq in search of weapons of mass destruction in 2003. Yet long before then, Iraq had attracted the attention of certain American strategists such as Paul Wolfowitz. They had argued as early as the early 1970s, Puri reminds us, that the removal of Saddam Hussein from power could potentially result in a domino effect of democratisation in the region and with it better partners for the United States. Two other candidates for regime change to accelerate this region-wide democratic revolution were Iran and Iran. Revolution in the former in 1979 and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war extinguished all such thoughts from the White House.

However, they were not forgotten. In Benjamin Netanyahu’s address to a joint session of the US Congress in 2002, the former and future Israeli prime minister reiterated this same idea. American fears about Iraqi ABCs – atomic, biological, and chemical weapons – rang his message sweeter to Washington. Looking to their own careers, CIA officials funnelled intelligence reports they knew would be prefered by the High Command rather than those undermining the public narrative of state sponsorship of terrorism and WMDs. The United States went to war in Iraq soon afterwards and the Middle East began to unravel – not in a manner either Wolfowitz, Netanyahu, or anyone else had envisioned.

Narrow national interests coloured the deliberations of the Security Council over Libya as well. Puri recounts how Britain, Germany, and especially France, more than the United States, were interested in deposing strongman Muammar Gaddafi from the beginning. Libya’s relations with Western governments had been slowly improving since 2003 when Tripoli reached out through the United Nations to make amends for its role in several acts of terrorism in the late 1980s. That, however, was not the public face of relations between Libya and the Western bloc. The Arab Spring protests gave the West, probably hoping for a quick success, the opportunity required to oust Gaddafi.

Under the guise of humanitarian intervention and R2P – the Right to Protect – Western nations placed onerous conditions upon Tripoli. Puri narrates the arguments over the language of Resolution 1970 and how, through wording that was loose at best and deceptive at worst, the Western powers tried to gain international sanction to bring Gaddafi to heel using “all necessary means to protect civilians and make available humanitarian assistance.” As Libyan government forces started to turn the tide against the rebels in the civil war that had devolved out of earlier protests, France, buoyed by an Arab League resolution calling upon the United Nations to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, pushed through Resolution 1973 that was sufficiently lax in its formulation to allow military action. NATO, led by France and supported by the United States went to war in Libya. Puri strenuously makes the point that this was in complete violation of the spirit of the discussions in the Security Council but the West did not wait until even the inl was dry before invding Libya.

Everything has conequences, and the Western sleight of hand over Libya had got Russia’s back up over Syria. As a result, when the Security Council started deliberating on Bashar al-Assad’s civil war, Moscow was implacable in their opposition to any sort of intervention. It is also possible, Puri admits, that this was due to greater Russian interest in Syria – a naval and ar force base – or because there had been a change in power in Moscow from Dmitry Medvedev to Vladimir Putin. It is also possible that there was no appetite for yet another war in the Middle East in Washington during an election year. Yet the pattern of Western behaviour was similar: hollow humanitarian claims supported by regional powers with vested interests against the incumbent authority. Predictably, the results were also similar: chaos, instability, wanton destruction of life and infrastructure, the rise of private militias, and terrorism – all at the cost of the region. Any chance for an early peace was stymied by unrealistic preconditions such as the abdication of Assad. Furthermore, Washington’s too clever by half notion of ‘good terrorist’ and ‘bad terrorist’ helped spawn its own nemesis – something American politicians, despite several repetitions, are yet to learn from.

Perilous Interventions also describes the paralysis of the Security Council owing to its veto provisions over the crisis in Ukraine caused by the secession of Crimea and its return to Russia. The author stops short of excusing Russian behaviour as he lambasts European and American ambition in seeking to pry Ukraine out of the Russian sphere of influence. From the beginning, military force was out of the question in Ukraine for two reasons: Russia maintained a veto in the Security Council, and it was a major nuclear power that could not be trifled with as the likes of Iraq or Libya. The Western strategy, then, was to try and isolate Russia through economic sanctions. These may have worked partially but were doomed to fail eventually without the support of Moscow’s BRICS partners.

Yemen saw similar inaction from the Security Council. The country, already a regular on the UN body’s agenda even before civil war broke out, has experienced more death and destruction in five months than even Syria after four long years of fighting. Impoverished Yemen has for long been Saudi Arabia’s bete noire: fearful of foreign intervention – Egypt in the 1960s and Iran since the 1980s – in a country bordering its own restive Shia population, Riyadh has been quick and ruthless in its involvement in Yemen. The Saudi campaign, Puri reminds us, has received complete support from the United States and other Western powers despite the horrendous loss of civilian life due to the callousness of Riyadh’s military tactics that ranged from the use of missiles to indiscriminate bombing, which in one case even destroyed a Medecins sans Frontieres hospital.

Puri is not unfair in targetting only Western nations. He has a few choice words for the Indian debacle in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s too. However, the reader may surmise from the tone that the author is more understanding of Delhi’s compulsions than he is with Washington, London, or Paris. Furthermore, India’s reasons for getting involved in its southern neighbour’s affairs are a far more convoluted cocktail of domestic political considerations rather than the relatively straight-forward rapacious realpolitik of the West. The narrative also feels more restrained about the human cost of the tragedy in Sri Lanka compared to Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Yemen – but that may also be because the South Asian island has suffered far less despite a longer lasting conflict.

In each of the chapters is detailed a series of operational blunders that fed on each other and led to the present quagmire. From the insane notion of good and bad terrorism to the arming of certain rebel factions, from an utter disregard of historical follies to an almost stubborn refusal to accept intelligence from the ground, from giving ground to less informed commentators over professionals to cherry-picking intelligence, Puri’s rap sheet of Western political myopia and ideological blindness makes for a discomforting read – each of these mistakes, as we disapssionately read them, cost tens of thousands of lives.

Although Perilous Interventions is an excellent exposition of Great Power hypocrisy and the weakness of the United Nations in both, curbing the predatory instincts of some of its members and the oppressive nature of other members, it does not offer more insight on the crises of the past decade and half than a discerning reader could have gleaned from the regular perusal of the daily newspaper over the years. Why would a seasoned and distinguished diplomat be surprised by an unremarkable display of matsya nyaya?

The real punch of Perilous Interventions comes from its author’s assertion that this behaviour of the Western powers was given intellectual cover by their think tanks and media. In fact, Puri explicitly states that the push towards intervention in Libya came from the Western media over the inclination of a hesitant diplomatic corps. Gaddafi was portrayed negatively, incompletely, and even falsely – he had not, for example, threatened civilians with retaliation – in the tabloids to the extent that it was difficult for him to even get hotel rooms in New York during a 2012 visit. These observations by Puri only cement the cautious view of Western organisations in the rest of the world. They can no longer be seen as sources of intellectually rigorous, methodologically sound, and unbiased information. In fact, reading Puri between the lines, think tanks and media have become a new front for the West to propagate their hegemony through ‘mindfare’ – the war for opinions and minds throughout the world – true hegemony as described by Antonio Gramsci.

Perhaps the only criticism of Perilous Interventions is the author’s discordantly Pollyanna-ish view that India played a positive role during the deliberations over these crises. The Indian stance has always been distant, unhelpful, and predictable – urge a cessation of hostilities, encourage negotiations, and plead for an arms embargo on the region. Although these are perfectly rational recommendations, it is similarly irrational to expect that the agitated actors in a conflict that has already spilled over to violence wish to listen to sense. Consider, for example, the Indian response to international calls for restraint during its wars with Pakistan.

Furthermore, Puri’s suggestion that the permanent members of the Security Council volunatrily give up their veto powers – de facto if not de jure – is laughable. Such largesse may be expected only from foreign policy neophytes of the kind India has been blessed with but not anywhere else. Yet even if the Permanent Five were to surrender their veto powers, the question then arises as to who will bell the cat. Is the international community truly willing or capable of conducting a military intervention in China, for example, for any reason?

Perilous Interventions will certainly feed those who are already deeply sceptical of the West and subliminally hostile to it. However, rather than adding ghee to the fire of conspiracy theories, Puri records in detail, with evidence, genuine cases of opportunism and hypocrisy. His call for reforms in the United Nations is likely to go unheeded for the same reasons he gives for the crises of the past decade and half – machtpolitik and opportunism. As a result, Puri’s admonition that the Security Council and multilateralism will lose credibility may indeed come true.

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We Live in Small Times

20 Sun Jan 2013

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in United States

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Bahrain, Barack Obama, China, Egypt, Hillary Clinton, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Secretary of State, State Department, Syria, United States, Yemen

As President Barack Obama swears his oath of office for his second term, one of the most prominent names who served under him during his first four years shall not be joining him – Hillary Rodham Clinton. Bested in the Democratic primaries by the President, Clinton served Obama in one of the most powerful positions in the US government, the Secretary of State. Yet as she leaves office, what is the legacy Clinton leaves behind?

It is not an easy task to make such evaluations, particularly in the era of the imperial presidency. Furthermore, the public at large has an inflated image of the SecState owing to the preponderance of American military and economic power. Yet international leaders are also focused nationalists, brazen manipulators, and opportunists willing to use world crises for their own ends. Clinton also enjoys tremendous popularity, voted by Americans as the most admired woman in the world 12 years in a row and 17 times since she became First Lady in 1993. In many eyes, her achievements are magnified and her failures diminished. Another factor is that some policies bear fruit only in the long run, and it is too soon to be speaking of Clinton’s legacy. Thus, any judgement must be taken with a grain of salt.

Clinton’s term has been beset with many challenges – some inherited from the previous administration such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and a few new ones such as the Arab Spring, Iran, and Pakistan. In an era of receding US influence, Clinton has had to rely more on persuasion than economic or military inducement than her predecessors did. The results have been somewhat lacklustre. To be fair to the SecState, however, social media, terrorism, and cyber attacks have dispersed threats and created a far more complex world for the simple exercise of 20th century state power.

Clinton is largely credited with persuading the President to intervene militarily in Libya in support of the rebels against Muammar Qaddafi. Yet much of her efforts were tarnished when Islamists attacked the US consulate in Benghazi and killed the US ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, among three other US citizens. As revolution swept across the Middle East, it was evident that the Department of State had no strategy to handle the situation. On the one hand, many observers saw it as yet another sign of US hypocrisy when Foggy Bottom chose to ignore the unrest in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq; Syria and Yemen only saw a delayed and mild response. On the other hand, Washington incurred the suspicion of its traditional allies too, who perceived the US reaction to the Egyptian conflagration as an abandonment of a long-time ally, Hosni Mubarak. “We were perceived to have thrown Mubarak under the bus,” said Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State under Bill Clinton.

Moving across the region, Clinton has not been able to report any positive movement in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The ayatollahs remain intractable as ever and have brought more centrifuges online as they maintain 19.5% uranium enrichment. The Taliban remains a potent force in Afghanistan and the US hopes to abandon the country for the second time in 25 years; Pakistan has seen a spike in anti-Americanism and extremism, while the state of its nuclear arsenal gives many officials sleepless nights.

In perennially problematic zones, Clinton has seen no more success than her predecessors. North Korea conducted yet another nuclear test in 2009 as well as several missile tests, and successfully launched a rocket in 2012. The peace process between Israel and Palestine is not stagnant but has actually taken a step backwards with increased Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel and Israel’s launching of Mivtza Amud Anan in response. Clinton has not been able to make any headway in either of these areas.

Clinton admirers argue, however, that the State Department has broken new ground in engaging with civil society. Clinton’s department has close to 200 Twitter accounts and almost 300 Facebook pages with over 15 million subscribers and many millions more visitors. The SecState created a new position, Ambassador for Women, to pursue women’s issues across the globe. Clinton embraced the notion of soft power and used her embassies and consulates to promote US exports, sports ties, educational and other exchanges. She has also encouraged working directly with non-governmental organisations in the distribution of aid for development. The core theme of the Clinton State Department was developing dialogue and relationships with the US’ international partners that would last much after she had left the office.

It is not clear how much of this will truly survive Clinton’s term. Engagement with social media has amorphous benefits, and the constant re-invention of the medium requires a serious commitment to it. More tangibly, the progress on women’s issues that Clinton pursued has already begun to unravel – in Afghanistan, women have yet again been subjected to barbarous practices in areas controlled by the Taliban, and the situation is expected to get worse as the US plans its exit next year. The  reversal illustrates strikingly for any in doubt that soft power not supported by hard power is meaningless. Lastly, the relationships Clinton forged with foreign leaders will evapourate with her departure. Diplomacy is a human activity, and it will be influenced by its practitioners – it would be foolish to believe that John Kerry will not create his own relationships, none of which need be the same as his predecessor’s.

Clinton has certainly not affected the fate of a continent as George Marshall did with his eponymous plan; nor has she defined an era as Dean Acheson did the early Cold War. Clinton’s term does not even boast of major events, such as Nixinger’s opening of China in 1972, or for that matter, Condoleezza Rice’s nuclear overtures to India. While these standards seem stratospherically high, so were these events unimaginable until they occurred. Clinton’s term could certainly have been better, but to be fair, it could also have been much worse. Her failures have befuddled many before her and will likely do so her successors too; after all, it is not everyday that a Bismarck is born.


This post appeared on Tehelka on January 21, 2013.

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Staying in Power: A How-To Guide for Would-be Dictators

15 Wed Feb 2012

Posted by Jaideep A. Prabhu in Middle East

≈ 3 Comments

Tags

Ali Abdullah Saleh, Arab Spring, Bahrain, dictatorship, Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, Libya, Muammar Qaddafi, revolution, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali

By many accounts, the Arab Spring all started with a fruit vendor in Tunisia (December 17, 2010). Mohamed Bouazizi, an unemployed youth who had taken to selling fruits to make ends meet, set himself on fire in public when he was harassed by state officials for conducting commerce without a license. Within a month of the daring protest, Tunisian leader Zine el Abidine Ben Ali was ousted, ending his 23-year rule. To the chagrin of dictators all over the Middle East, the revolt – or rather, the idea of it – spread like wildfire, first to Egypt (January 1, 2011), then to Algeria (January 7), Libya (January 14), Yemen (January 23), Lebanon (January 25), Palestine (January 28), Jordan (January 28), Iran (February 14), Bahrain (February 14), Morocco (February 21), Iraq (February 25), Saudi Arabia (March 6), and Kuwait (November 17). Relatively minor protests were seen in Mauritania, Oman, Sudan, and the Western Sahara as well. Within a year, four of these leaders (Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Qaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh) were replaced while those that managed to stay in power were forced to make serious concessions in the face of public pressure.

The astute Middle East observer may notice that while the West (some permutation of the United States, the European Union, and NATO) strongly supported the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran, intervened militarily in Libya, and are contemplating doing so in Syria, other countries have managed to stay below their radar. This may have had partly to do with the size and length of protests as well as casualties. Or not. Bahrain, for example, despite conceding to reforms, suppressed the revolt with Saudi and Pakistani troops. Protests lasted for approximately five months until late June/early July and 72 people were killed although the situation is still far from resolved (The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry also found that almost 2,000 people had been tortured, 3,000 wounded, and another 3,000 arrested). Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, the situation remains tense although most of the violence has stopped. Official figures put the casualties at 10 dead with 200 arrests, but news reports have risen that Saudi security agencies have removed bodies to ‘hide evidence of the crime.’

Despite revolutions in over 20 countries in the Greater Middle East and Africa, so far, only five leaders (Ivory Coast’s Laurent Gbagbo) have been deposed. If you are in the dictatorship business, it should relieve you that the rebels so far enjoy merely a less than 25% success rate. Nonetheless, here are a few things that one can do to bolster the prospect of maintaining one’s grip on one’s state:

1. The Resource Card: Ideally, your state should have some precious or critical resource that everyone wants. However, this is not enough on its own – ask Saddam Hussein. It is vital to maintain close relations with at least one of the UNSC Five – historically, the US has been uncomfortably fickle and should not be the only option. Similarly, the UK and France may succumb to US pressure. Although Russia and China are far more reliable UNSC-wise, they may exact a heavier price than you are willing to pay. Role model – Saudi Arabia

2. The Geography Card: It may be too much to hope that Americans ever learn geography, but do not underestimate their military – whether a senator can find Bushehr or not, a Tomahawk cruise missile certainly could! These men in uniform are perfectly capable of reporting to their leaders the implications of geography on policy. For example, if you were a tiny island nation close to a state the US has designated as one of the “axis of evil,” and your state has a large minority of people with a similar demographic category as the neighbouring AoE state, let’s say Shi’a, the political consequences of their rise in power and your demise would be too high to bear. Bonus points if you can also buy American (F-16s, oil machinery, etc.), and lots of it. Role model – Bahrain

3. The Opportunities Card: This card is in some ways a combination of the first two cards. Sometimes, your state may not possess any resources of its own in abundance, nor will it have the fortune of being placed right next to an AoE state (a list which, after all, is constantly changing). However, you may be blessed with being in a strategic location that makes your state the easiest conduit to such fields of wealth. Pipelines for oil and gas, water, etc. must all cross your land before they can be shipped to their far off destinations. Entering into multi-billion dollar contracts will force states (of the UNSC Five) to put their commitment to you in writing. After all, it would take a very brave politician to abandon a billion-dollar pipeline, causing job loss in his country and a loss of resource…especially after he’s paid for it. Such opportunity can also come through influence – some non-state entities might agree to talks with state actors only if you are at the table. As a facilitator, your role could be indispensable. Role model – Syria

4. The Discrimination Card: Don’t play this card – it only makes you look stupid. Although there is ample ground to accuse other state leaders of xenophobia, racism, and now Islamophobia, most of them are smart enough not to allow it to get in the way of common sense politics. The US certainly didn’t hesitate to withdraw support from Ian Smith (white dude) or Manuel Noriega (Christian brother). Chances are, people just don’t like you. Besides, if your own people are against you, it would be difficult to convince the world press that the infidel is out to get you. Role model – Iran…seriously Tehran, WTF?

5. The Timeliness Card: If it comes down to the use of force, it is best to act quickly and quietly. The Venetian Republic, for example, would visit opposition leaders quietly and late at night lest their busy day schedule be disturbed. If that is not possible (social media and the internet have made censorship and surveillance so much harder), it is best to act when everyone is distracted by something else – turmoil in the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, sectarian violence, missile defence, the Superbowl, Lindsay Lohan…there are many options. Act quickly and brutally but leave as little mark as possible. Once they get a whiff, human rights groups can be quite persistent and annoying. It is best to portray your actions as defending law and order – that gives you much room to squeeze through all kinds of repression under the guise of cultural norms. Role model – Saudi Arabia

6. The Nuclear Card: This is the most difficult card to play in the Successful Dictator’s set. For one, acquiring nuclear capability has become much harder unless you get China to give you blueprints under the table. Secondly, even if you acquired such weaponry, it cannot be used indiscriminately – the first time you use it will most definitely be your last, so bluff very cautiously. There is a reason Stalin and Mao stopped spouting drivel after their nuclear tests. Role model – North Korea

7. If-you-shoot-us-we-will-die Card: This is an exceptionally potent card that works best with the US (Russia and China seem too bloody-minded). Always project yourself as the only sane and stable ally in the region, particularly in your own country. Quietly dispose of the opposition to make sure that is at least partly true. Portray a scenario of doom and gloom if you were replaced. Bonus points if you have weapons of mass destruction. Role model – Pakistan…wow, pure genius!

8. The Where-the-hell-are-you Card: If your country is poor and does not have enough resources of any kind to make it worthwhile to learn your name and location, rest assured, you will not be deposed. But then, why would you yourself want to stay in such a place? Role model – a lot of inner African states

Hopefully, this brief guide will keep you and yours in power for years to come. Don’t worry, international affairs has never been about morality, human rights, or, in the updated 21st century jargon, R2P (right to protect). For those of you trying to figure out why the world wanted to sanction Syria and not Bahrain, why they invaded Libya but not Saudi Arabia, or why the Arab Spring turned into an Islamic Winter, I hope you learned something too…arrivederci.

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